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ABSTRACT
Water is a scarce resource in Australia, therefore the significant use of groundwater
from the Great Artesian Basin by the mining industry is inevitably controversial. This
thesis examines one such water dispute that emanated from BHP Billiton Olympic Dam
Corporation Pty Ltd’s (BHP OD) expansion and the associated water related risks.
Therefore, it is concerned with the politicised control of the Australia’s largest
groundwater resource arising from the Australia’s largest multi-mineral mine against the
broad backdrop of water scarcity. In particular, the thesis highlights the culturally
constructed meanings of risk in a contested domain of accounting and accountability.
In order to frame competing water risk perspectives from different institutions - industry,
government and civil society - into a communicative effort for enhanced public
participation and engagement, this thesis adopts a critical cultural risk perspective
combined with Burkean rhetorical criticism to analyse mandatory and voluntary water
accounting disclosures and policy debates from BHP, BHP OD, and its representative,
the Minerals Council of Australia (MCA); GAB water regulatory policy documents and
proposals from the South Australian government and Australian Federal government;
and, alternative disclosures from civil society, including non-government organisations
(NGOs), (radical) environmentalists and Aboriginal groups.
Since discourse is considered as a mode of institutional and political practice, and
rhetoric is the technique of using discourse for persuasive effects, a Burkean rhetorical
criticism (Stillar, 1998) combined with Douglas and Wildavsky’s (1982) cultural risk
theory allows a critical exploration of the underlying assumptions of contentious water
related disclosures. Further, it implicates accountability discourses and their role in
incorporating economic, social and environmental accountability into a transdisciplinary
dialogue to risk-based sustainability. Nine major sustainability-related concepts
including; preferred learning style, view of nature, properties of knowledge ideal,
attitude towards technology, view of risk, resolution of risk, cause of ecological crisis,
view of justice and fairness and properties of desired system are revealed. These
concepts map to three accounting related concepts/themes of the concept of control,
stewardship and economic consequences. Three different styles of accountability managerial, administrative and moral accountability inform the unavoidable conflicts
between capitalist system advocated and sustained by market (industry) and hierarchy
iii

(government) institutions, and a radical agenda proposed and warranted by border (civil
society) institutions.
This thesis makes unique methodological and theoretical contributions by adopting a
discursive and dialogical accounting approach and a ‘transdisciplinary’ cultural risk
theory to allow social and environmental visibilities, promote democratic participation,
enhance transparency in decision-making and improve accountability in a ‘polylogic’
society during the era of impending environmental crisis (Brown, 2009; Gray, 1992).
This study was conducted at a meso-level of analysis and therefore does not address all
the complexity and anomalies of pluralist and competing interests involved in the GAB
water debate. In respect of future research, this methodology and theoretical
development can be applied to other political debates such as those from GAB Strategic
Management Plan more broadly and other specific dialogues concerning water, for
example, coal seam gas mining in the Murry Darling Basin more specifically.

iv

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
“God, grant me the serenity to accept the things I cannot change, the courage to
change the things I can change, and the wisdom to know the difference”
(Reinhold Niebuhr)
This journey has been long and both intellectually and emotionally challenging. I am
grateful to acknowledge the constant encouragement, guidance and support from my
supervisors: Associate Professor Lee Moerman, Dr Corinne Cortese and Dr Kathy
Rudkin.
Profound gratitude is due to the Commonwealth government for the Australian
Postgraduate Award scholarship, and also the School of Accounting and Finance and
University of Wollongong for a sponsored conference in 2011, on top of other research
funding.
I am indebted as well to officers from Disability Service in University of Wollongong,
members from South Coast Bushwalking Club, and my personal friends for their
enduring companionship, support and advice along the way.
To my family, especially my parents and uncles, I thank you for your continuous care,
encouragement and faith in me.

v

TABLE OF CONTENTS
CERTIFICATION ................................................................................................................. II
ABSTRACT ........................................................................................................................... III
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS.................................................................................................... V
TABLE OF CONTENTS...................................................................................................... VI
LIST OF TABLES .................................................................................................................. X
LIST OF FIGURES ................................................................................................................ X
GLOSSARY AND ABBREVIATIONS .............................................................................. XI
CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION ........................................................................................1

1.1

The study: GAB water governance and BHP OD mine.............................................4

1.2

Methodological consideration ....................................................................................8

1.3

Method of analysis ...................................................................................................10

1.4

Theory to explicate...................................................................................................12

1.5

Structure of the thesis ...............................................................................................15

1.6

Summary ..................................................................................................................17

CHAPTER 2

BACKGROUND ........................................................................................18

2.1

Introduction ..............................................................................................................18

2.2

Why water is an issue...............................................................................................18

2.3

Contested water governance paradigm ....................................................................21

2.3.1 Water for development and industrial water governance paradigm ....................22
2.3.2 Water for citizens and government water governance paradigm .........................23
2.3.3 Water for life and civil society’s water governance paradigm ............................24
2.3.4 Conflictual facets within the contemporary Australia water reform ....................26
2.4

The GAB water issue ...............................................................................................28

2.4.1 GAB governance in general .................................................................................29
2.4.2 Australian mining industry’s water use in general ...............................................30
2.4.3 BHP OD’s Olympic Dam mine and ODEP .........................................................32
2.4.4 The GAB water debate .........................................................................................33
2.5

Summary ..................................................................................................................36

CHAPTER 3

CRITICAL ACCOUNTING AND ACCOUNTABILITY .....................38

3.1

Introduction ..............................................................................................................38

3.2

Critical accounting studies .......................................................................................39
vi

3.2.1 Water-related Social and Environmental disclosure & Counteraccounting ........................................................................................................................42
3.3

Accountability ..........................................................................................................48

3.3.1 Managerial accountability ....................................................................................50
3.3.2 Administrative accountability ..............................................................................52
3.3.3 Moral accountability ............................................................................................55
3.4

Summary ..................................................................................................................57

CHAPTER 4

METHODOLOGY.....................................................................................59

4.1

Introduction ..............................................................................................................59

4.2

Realist/Positivist perspective of risk ........................................................................61

4.2.1 A technical perspective of risk .............................................................................61
4.2.2 An economic perspective of risk ..........................................................................63
4.2.1 A psychological perspective of risk .....................................................................64
4.3

Social construction of risk........................................................................................65

4.3.1 A sociological perspective of risk ........................................................................66
4.3.2 A Governmentality/Foucauldian perspective or risk ...........................................69
4.3.3 A cultural perspective of risk ...............................................................................72
4.4

A cultural perspective of risk for critical accounting research ................................74

4.5

Summary ..................................................................................................................78

CHAPTER 5

METHOD ...................................................................................................80

5.1

Introduction ..............................................................................................................80

5.2

A critical accounting approach.................................................................................82

5.3

Discourse ..................................................................................................................83

5.4

Discourse in documents ...........................................................................................85

5.5

Text and textual analysis ..........................................................................................86

5.6

Rhetoric ....................................................................................................................89

5.7

Rhetorical criticism ..................................................................................................91

5.7.1 Burkean rhetorical criticism .................................................................................92
5.8

Scope and data........................................................................................................100

5.9

Method and approach .............................................................................................110

5.10

Summary ................................................................................................................112

CHAPTER 6

CULTURAL RISK THEORY ................................................................114

6.1

Introduction ............................................................................................................114

6.2

Cultural risk theory ................................................................................................115
vii

6.3

Application of Burkean rhetorical criticism to cultural risk theory .......................123

6.3.1 Preferred learning style, View of nature and Properties of knowledge
ideal 125
6.3.2 Attitude towards technology, View of risk and Resolution of risk ....................132
6.3.3 Cause of ecological crisis, Justice and fairness and Properties of
desired
system………………………………………………………………………139
6.4

Critical themes .......................................................................................................145

6.5

Summary ................................................................................................................147

CHAPTER 7 PREFERRED LEARNING STYLE, VIEW OF NATURE
AND PROPERTY OF KNOWLEDGE IDEAL ................................................................150
7.1

Introduction ............................................................................................................150

7.2
Preferred learning style, View of nature and Property of knowledge ideal
of the centre institutions .....................................................................................................152
7.2.1 Grammatical analysis - Preferred learning style of centre institutions ..............152
7.2.2 Rhetorical analysis - View of nature of centre institutions ................................160
7.2.3 Logological analysis - Properties of knowledge ideal of centre
institutions ......................................................................................................................165
7.3
Preferred learning style, View of nature and Property of knowledge ideal
of the border institutions ....................................................................................................167
7.3.1 Grammatical Analysis - Preferred learning style of border institutions ............168
7.3.2 Rhetorical analysis - View of nature of border institutions ...............................171
7.3.3 Logological analysis - Property of knowledge ideal of border
institutions ......................................................................................................................173
7.4

Concept of control ..................................................................................................176

7.5

Summary ................................................................................................................182

CHAPTER 8 ATTITUDE TOWARDS TECHNOLOGY, VIEW OF RISK
AND RESOLUTION OF RISK ..........................................................................................184
8.1

Introduction ............................................................................................................184

8.2
Attitude towards technology, View of risk and Resolution of risk of
centre institutions ...............................................................................................................186
8.2.1 Grammatical analysis - Attitude towards technology of centre
institutions ......................................................................................................................186
8.2.2 Rhetorical analysis - View of risk of centre institutions ....................................192
8.2.3 Logological analysis - Resolution of risk of centre institutions.........................197
8.3
Attitude towards technology, View of risk, and Risk resolution of border
institutions ..........................................................................................................................200
viii

8.3.1 Grammatical analysis - Attitudes towards technology of border
institutions ......................................................................................................................201
8.3.2 Rhetorical analysis - View of risk of border institutions ...................................204
8.3.3 Logological analysis - Resolution of risk of border institutions ........................208
8.4

Stewardship ............................................................................................................210

8.5

Summary ................................................................................................................216

CHAPTER 9 CAUSE OF ECOLOGICAL CRISIS, VIEW OF JUSTICE
AND FAIRNESS AND PROPERTY OF DESIRED SYSTEM .......................................217
9.1

Introduction ............................................................................................................217

9.2
Cause of ecological crisis, View of justice and fairness and Properties of
desired system of centre institutions ..................................................................................219
9.2.1 Grammatical analysis - Cause of ecological crisis of hierarchy
institutions ......................................................................................................................220
9.2.2 Grammatical analysis - Cause of ecological crisis of market
institutions ......................................................................................................................222
9.2.3 Rhetorical analysis - View of justice and fairness of hierarchy
institutions ......................................................................................................................227
9.2.4 Rhetorical analysis - View of justice and fairness of market institutions ..........228
9.2.5 Logological analysis - Properties of desired system of hierarchy
institutions ......................................................................................................................230
9.2.6 Logological analysis - Properties of desired system of market
institutions ......................................................................................................................233
9.3
Cause of ecological crisis, View of justice and fairness and Properties of
desired system of border institutions..................................................................................235
9.3.1 Grammatical analysis - Cause of ecological crisis of border institutions ..........236
9.3.2 Rhetorical analysis - View of justice and fairness of border institutions ...........238
9.3.3 Logological analysis - Properties of desired systems of border
institutions ......................................................................................................................241
9.4

Economic consequences.........................................................................................244

9.5

Summary ................................................................................................................251

CHAPTER 10

CONCLUSION.....................................................................................253

10.1

Contribution to the accounting literature ...............................................................260

10.2

Contribution to methodology and method .............................................................261

10.3

Contribution to theory ............................................................................................262

10.4

Thesis limitations ...................................................................................................264

10.5

Future research .......................................................................................................265

ix

APPENDIX A
AN EXAMPLE OF DIFFERENCES BETWEEN
GRAMMATICAL AND RHETORICAL ANALYSIS.....................................................266
APPENDIX B BALANCE SCORECARD (BSC) INFORMATION
TECHNOLOGY IN BHP OD’S SUSTAINABLE WATER MANAGEMENT .............268
REFERENCES .....................................................................................................................272

LIST OF TABLES
Table 1.1 Application of Burkean Rhetorical Criticism Framework to Cultural Risk
Theory to determine Critical Themes (see Chapter 6, Section 6.1) ........................ 14
Table 6.1 Main Representors of Centre and Border Institutions .................................. 122
Table 6.2 Application of Burkean Rhetorical Criticism Framework to Cultural Risk
Theory to determine major Theoretical Concepts ................................................. 125
Table 6.3 Application of Burkean Rhetorical Criticism Framework to Cultural Risk
Theory to determine Critical Themes ................................................................... 147
Table 7.1 Preferred Learning Style, View of Nature, Properties of Knowledge Ideal
and Concept of Control ......................................................................................... 151
Table 7.2 Predicted and Actual Impacts on WMC Monitored Spring Groups and
Observed Impacts on Endemic Mound Spring Fauna .......................................... 158
Table 8.1 Attitude towards Technology, View of Risk, Resolution of Risk and
Stewardship ........................................................................................................... 185
Table 9.1 Cause of Ecological Crisis, View of Justice and Fairness, Properties of
Desired System and Economic Consequence ....................................................... 218
Table 9.2 Water consumption and Industry Gross Value Added by Industry .............. 223

LIST OF FIGURES
Figure 1.1 Mapping Main Areas of the Thesis ................................................................. 4
Figure 6.1 Grid/Group Model ....................................................................................... 118
Figure 7.1 Why an Artesian Bore Flows ....................................................................... 154
Figure 8.1 Total Variance of Water Consumption ........................................................ 189
Figure 8.2 Industrial Water Use Efficiency at Olympic Dam, FY04 to FY09 ............ 191
x

GLOSSARY AND ABBREVIATIONS
ACCC

Australian Competition and Consumer Commission

BHP

BHP Billiton

BHP OD

BHP Billiton Olympic Dam Corporation Pty Ltd

BPT

Best Practicable Technology

BSC

Balance Scorecard

CDP

Carbon Disclosure Project

CSIRO

Commonwealth Scientific and Industrial Research Organisation

DNR

Queensland Department of Natural Resource

EMMR

Environmental Management and Monitoring Report

EMP

Environmental Management Program

FASB

Financial Accounting Standards Board

GAB

Great Artesian Basin

GABCC

Great Artesian Basin Coordinating Committee

GEMI

Global Environmental Management Initiative

GL

Giga-litre

IASB

International Accounting Standard Broad

ICMM

International Council on Mining and Metals

KL

Kilolitre

LCA

Life Cycle Assessment

MCA

Minerals Council of Australia

ML

Million litre or Mega-litre

MM

Millimetre

NGO

Non-Government Organisation

NNW

North-Northwest

NRM

Natural Resource Management

NRMMC

National Resource Management Ministerial Council

NWI

National Water Initiative

ODEP

Olympic Dam Expansion Project
xi

ORS

Online Response System

PIMS

Production Information Management System

PIRSA

South Australian Department of Primary Industry and Resources

SAALNRM South Australian Arid Lands Natural Resources Management (Board)
SEAR

Social & Environmental Accounting & Reporting

(S)EIS

(Supplementary) Environmental Impact Statement

WAP

Water Allocation Plan

WBCSD

World Business Council for Sustainable Development

WMC

Western Mining Corporation

UNESCO

United Nations Educational Scientific and Cultural Organisation

UNEP

United Nations Environment Programme

UN-FAO

Food and Agriculture Organisation of the United Nations

xii

CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION
Water is an essential natural resource for life. It is pivotal in sustaining human health,
economic development, as well as environmental and ecological stability (Morrison,
Schulte & Schenck, 2010; United Nations, 2006). In recent decades, increasing water
scarcity, a growing demand for water, and degraded water quality have become a
challenge to human beings and ecosystems at regional, national and international
level (Morrison et al., 2010).
Historically, in Australia, controversies and debates have arisen around water
scarcity and control (James, Dowd, Rodriguez & Jeanneret, 2012). Due to a
significant variability of rainfall, Australia faces a range of issues resulting from
drought because of high evaporation rates and a low proportion of runoff (Prosser,
2011). Fully-allocated and over-allocated use of river and underground water
systems compound the problem (Prosser, 2011) and give rise to conflicts over the
control of water, both at a material and symbolic level (James et al., 2012).
According to James, et al. (2012), water, as a practical and daily substance, is highly
valued and deeply integrated across multiple cultures. People attribute various
meanings to water ranging from an essential resource for life, a binding fabric for
communities, an inherent substance for social identity, as well as a means to
maintain wealth, health, social order and power (Strang, 2005a; Strang, 2005b). In
Australia, conflicts over allocation of water arise between irrigation challenges and
environmental conservation (Jackson, Stoeckl, Straton & Stanley, 2008), rural and
urban, indigenous and non-indigenous populations (Alston & Mason, 2008a; Jackson
et al., 2008), industrial water consumption and recreational water use in the public
sphere (Jackson et al., 2008). Certain actions that are perceived to endanger the water
resource, such as mining operations, have the potential to provoke intense backlash
from residents of local communities (James et al., 2012). This thesis delves into this
contested domain over the control of the GAB underground water resource among
three different socio-cultural institutions in society - industry, government and civil
society (including NGOs, (radical) environmentalists and Aboriginal groups).
To comprehend the social conflict arising from water issues, it is pivotal to
understand how water is perceived and valued by different socio-cultural groups. A
1

managerial, economic and technical perspective focusing on efficiency and
productivity, often from industries and to a certain extent the government authorities
overlooks and underemphasises social and environmental values. This inadequate
representation of the values of the broader community sets the scene for a
worldview-clash (Allan, 2003; Hussey & Dovers, 2006; Patrick, 2012; Syme,
Portera, Goeftb & Kington, 2008) over water allocation that will be discussed in this
thesis.
The context of water scarcity gives rise to the fraught terrain of accounting and
associated issues of accountability. Since the late 1970s and 1980s, critical
accounting studies have emerged as an alternative perspective to acknowledge
accounting’s discursive and ideological significance. According to Hutchinson (1989)
and Brown (2009), accounting inscribes its value as an authoritative discourse
through which power is exercised and imposed. It therefore has significant influence
upon social and economic exchange and conflict mediation, such as “widespread
debate” on water control and allocation (Head, 2010, p.2).
As asserted by Brown (2009, p. 316), a mainstream approach to accounting is
“notably monologic” and it is “overwhelmed” by capitalist assumptions. It
downplays the context-dependent or social-situated nature of knowledge,
depoliticises politics, and gives priority implicitly to the interests of financial capital.
Such a one-dimensional viewpoint sidesteps conflicting perspectives and naturalises
the “non-reporting of others” (Hutchinson, 1989, p.317). However, a body of
accounting literature has recognised that the majority of ‘critical’ social and
environmental accounting and reporting (SEAR) studies (including accounts of
water) are under-theorised with respect to social conflict and dissention and its
implications for wider social engagement (Brown & Dillard, 2013; Spence, Husillos
& Correa-Ruiz, 2010; Tinker, Neimark & Lehman, 1991). As contended by Spence
et al. (2010), this apolitical approach (in terms of ignorance of political struggles
within civil society) undermines both the theoretical and practical agenda for social
change.
To respond to this criticism, a stream of studies has emerged in the accounting
literature to highlight political struggles and social conflicts (Archel, Husillos,
2

Larrinaga & Spence, 2009; Boyce, 2000; Gallhofer et al., 2006; O'Sullivan &
O'Dwyer, 2009). By giving voice to alternative views and interests from sociopolitical constituencies (other than those from industry and sometimes the
government), these counter-accounting (see Chapter 3, Section 3.2.1) studies expose
the fundamental contradictions and exploitative dimensions of a capitalist system,
and promote democratic dialogue and enhanced accountability (Bebbington, Brown,
Frame & Thomson, 2007; Brown, 2009; Brown & Fraser, 2006; Dillard & Brown,
2012).
This thesis is concerned with a broader appeal of how water matters to a range of
stakeholders. It extends water-related SEAR studies by collating and analysing
accounting disclosures in the form of mandatory and voluntary social and
environmental disclosures within the context of a policy debate from industry, water
regulation related disclosures from governments and external alternative accounting
disclosures in form of public submissions, independent academic research and web
documents from civil society. It further interrogates three different modes of
accountability/stewardship through the lens of water-related accounts/accounting
disclosures. It is therefore aligned with the counter-accounting studies and ethos for
the call for a dialogical approach to accounting to facilitate democratic participation
(Brown, 2009; Gray, 1992).
By adopting a cultural risk perspective as a methodology and cultural risk theory as a
theoretical framework, this thesis explicitly identifies and engages contested
ideological perspectives from water accounting disclosures and discourses among
divergent social groups. In this sense, accounting serves an enabling function to
create social and environmental visibilities, broaden the exposure of priority and
values for public dialogue and debate, promote transparent decision-making process
and improve accountability discourses in the form of democratic participation
(Boyce, 2000; Brown, 2009). It is important to note that this accounting system does
not aim to bring premature and decisive closure or any consensually-orientated
approach given that the definition for the concept of sustainability is elusive and
contestable. Accounting’s social worth is judged here in terms of producing
conflictual reports and the ability to raise questions of contentious issues for

3

discussion (Brown, 2009; Frame & Brown, 2008). Figure 1.1 maps the different
main areas of this thesis.

Figure 1.1 Mapping Main Areas of the Thesis
1.1

The study: GAB water governance and BHP OD mine

The term ‘water governance’ appeared in 2000 at the second World Water Forum
held in Hague, and is referred to as
the range of political, social, economic and administrative systems that are in
place to develop and manage water resources, and the delivery of water services,
at different levels of society (Veiga da Cunha, 2009, p. 109).
Bearing the prospect of (re)solving social and environmental problems, water
governance systems cover the establishment of legal frameworks, institutional
reforms as well as efficient use, equitable access to water resources and enhanced
allocation for environmental ecosystems (James et al., 2012; Veiga da Cunha, 2009).
The role of politics and how diverse interests are involved in the decision-making is
critical in defining the dynamics of water governance, especially in the broader
context of water scarcity (Veiga da Cunha, 2009). A participatory approach to water
governance “build[s] a diverse picture of water values” in terms of fairness and
justice (James et al., 2012, p. 5) which “benefits from the input of broad-ranging
stakeholders who, together, produce knowledge about sustainability in dialogic, ad
hoc and incremental ways” (Frame & Brown, 2008, p. 228).
The mining industry is chosen as the empirical site for its importance in economic
and political dimensions in Australia, as well as for the significant controversies over
4

its social and environmental impacts (Cortese, Irvine & Kaidonis, 2009, 2010;
Stoianoff & Kaidonis, 2005). As one of the most socially and environmentally
disruptive activities ever undertaken by mankind, the mining industry is generally
coupled with a negative image including; pollution (ten Kate & Wilde-Ramsing,
2011), exploration of the weak and vulnerable (e.g. workers in regional areas,
indigenous populations in native lands and local villagers in developing countries)
and depletion of limited natural resources (Peck & Sinding, 2003).
Like the rest of the world, access to water is one of the major sustainability issues for
the mining industry in Australia. The Australian mining industry at present
constitutes 3.6% of the total water consumption in Australia (Barrett, 2011). Despite
this relatively small proportion, the mining industry is considered responsible for a
significant volume of water usage in local catchments (Barrett, 2011; National Water
Commission, 2010). When mining companies’ water-related activities are deemed as
irresponsible, conflicts and protests often arise and, consequently, corporate water
practices are subjected to a stricter regulatory scrutiny (Morrison, Morikawa,
Murphy & Schutle, 2009; Morrison et al., 2010). The GAB water issue from BHP’s
ODEP is one such example.
According to Sampford (2009, p. 47), the Australian treatment of this underground
water resource is “positively criminal”. Australia has the deepest and largest artesian
basin - the Great Artesian Basin (GAB), in the world and it is up to 3,000 metre deep,
covering one fifth of the continent and holding an estimated water amount of
64,900km3. Deep drilling of bores without capping over the last century has caused a
massive wastage of water for the last 100 years. The BHP OD mine - Australia’s
largest multi-mineral mine in South Australia is located over 1,600 km from any
significant water system and currently draws water at the rate of 33 ML/d from the
GAB. In 2005, the mine sought to treble its output, moving from an underground
operation to an open cut method. A corresponding increase in water use magnified
the controversy of water scarcity and mining.
Risk discourse, in this context, has proliferated as a water governance tool to frame
and manage economic, social and environmental issues (Baleta, 2012). Baleta (2012,
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p. 9) provides a classification of three interrelated risk types arising from water
scarcity:
a) Risk from insufficient water resources to meet the basic needs of people, the
environment and business, which in turn leads to... b) Risk from the
consequences of insufficient water resources, such as higher energy prices, loss
of competitive advantage, political and economic instability, population
migration, or lost economic opportunities to name a few; and as a result... c) Risk
from poor water management decisions taken in reaction to water scarcity, with
negative consequences for some or all users. Such decisions may be a result of
political or economic expediency, short term thinking, lack of knowledge or
capacity or simply desperation and lack of choice.
In this thesis, these three-tier risk types are investigated from the perspectives of the
mining industry, government and civil society. The debate about whether the GAB
underground water system is ‘replenishable’ or ‘inrechargeable’ (Chapter 7) has
exacerbated public dispute over the economic, social and environmental benefits
(Chapter 8). To respond to this confronting water scarcity, GAB water resource
management and planning activity led by government agencies has again triggered
significant controversies over potential social and environmental consequences
(re)allocated to different institutional groups within society (Chapter 9). As such, this
thesis emphasises the socially constructed nature of the GAB water risk debate.
In contemporary risk research, risks have not only been viewed from a realist,
techno-scientific perspective, but also a social constructivist aspect, which perceive
the recognition and assessment of risk as inherent socio-political activity infused
with the (re)production of shared meaning and understanding of reality (HorlickJones & Sime, 2004). Although contemporary water governance policies tend to be
dominated by “the managerialist focus on greater efficiency” and “bureaucratic focus
on authoritative processes” (Head, 2010, p. 10), these generalised, decontextualised
and reductionist approaches in discipline based risk research has been insufficient for
understanding the entire risk profile related to water resources issues (Baleta, 2012;
Horlick-Jones & Sime, 2004). Transdisciplinary research is a potential method to
address the increasingly complex water problems with an emphasis on socio-cultural
expectations and value debates (Horlick-Jones & Sime, 2004; Sampford, 2009).
It is notable that the (re)solution to wicked water problems are uncertain and
provisional (Head, 2010). Although a full consideration of the potentially best
6

desirable practice for the achievement of a democratic and fair representation goes
beyond the scope of this thesis, it is acknowledged that there is a need to engage with
various stakeholder groups to understand the fuller aspects of each dimension of the
water issue before any possible policy adjustment or change can be achieved.
The diverse perspectives of various stakeholder groups in the water contest reflect
the contentious domains of accounting disclosure and the related discourse of
accountability. Accounting’s discursive and ideological functions have been
highlighted in critical accounting studies since the 1980s (e.g. Chua, 1986a; Dillard,
1991; Hines, 1988, 1989). Accounting disclosures do not simply provide neutral and
value-free information, but rather, a set of ideological discourse, constructing the
social reality with the inscription of a particular version of accountability (Brown,
2009; Messner, 2009; Roberts, 1991; Shearer, 2002).
This thesis explores the GAB water risk debate from BHP OD’s water extraction by
investigating corporate sustainability reports and statements, government regulatory
documents, and by contrasting them with alternative disclosures in form of public
submissions, independent academic research and web documents obtained from civil
society. It examines how ideologies inscribed in corporate and governmental water
disclosures are resisted and challenged by NGOs, environmental activists and
Aboriginal groups. This thesis, therefore, is consistent with a genre of alternative
accounting studies that problematises and destabilises the normalised nature and
taken-for-granted assumptions of business and sometimes government (e.g. Dey,
Russell & Thomson, 2011). As a result, it facilitates the articulation of, and
reflection upon, different modes of accountability from corporation, government and
civil society (Buhr, 2001; Rodrigue, 2014).
Consistent with a social constructivist ontology and epistemology, this thesis
performs a discourse analysis approach to collate and analyse accounts for the GAB
water debate. It investigates discourses within institutional disclosure documents,
using rhetorical criticism in general, and Burkean rhetorical criticism as a mode of
inquiry in particular. It examines how rhetoric is used by three institutions - industry,
government and civil society through accounting and accountability discourses as a
strategic resource to portray themselves in a particular light so as to influence debate
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in society. This study seeks to advance an understanding of accounting for water by
focusing on contested accounting disclosures which is further informed and
explicated by a theoretical framework of cultural risk theory (Douglas & Wildavsky,
1982). By applying a Burkean rhetorical criticism framework to cultural risk theory,
major sustainability-related assumptions of three institutions - industry, government
and civil society become explicit and enable informed and genuine public
participation in the processes of natural resource policy decision-making.
In summary, this study investigates the mandatory and voluntary water disclosures
and policy debates from BHP; GAB water regulatory statements and policies of the
Australian Federal and South Australian government; and, juxtaposes these with
alternative disclosures from civil society to examine the constructed meanings for
the GAB risk-based sustainability debate. The context is noteworthy for this study,
as it delves into the contested socio-political terrain over the control of the GAB - the
Australia’s largest groundwater resource arising from the Australia’s largest multimineral mine against the broad backdrop of water scarcity. This context provides a
unique opportunity to analyse disclosures with their related accountability discourse.
Therefore, the following research question is identified for this study:
How do disclosures of perceived risk impact on assumptions of accounting and
accountability provided by industry, government and civil society in the case of
contested water sustainability of the GAB?
1.2

Methodological consideration

Although most of the water accounting studies identify water-related SEAR practices
as neither neutral nor apolitical but rather ideological (e. g. Daniel & Sojamo, 2012;
Egan, Frost & Andreeva, 2015; Morrison et al., 2010; Von Schwedler, 2011), the
entry point of the current literature on SEAR is often at the level of managerial and
economic accountability through corporate disclosure mechanisms including
mandatory and voluntary sustainability type reports. In other words, they tend to be
organisational or industry-focused without juxtaposing and engaging with the
construction of social and environmental values and positions from other perspective
such as those from governments and civil society.
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This thesis adopts a cultural risk perspective as a transdisciplinary methodology to
investigate ecological issues as well as accounting and accountability discourses.
Positivist research with a techno-economic focus has viewed risk as an object and is
insufficient to understand the entire risk profile related to water resource issues
(Baleta, 2012; Horlick-Jones & Sime, 2004). Cultural risk perspective emphasises
the culturally constructed nature of this debate on risk-based sustainability related
concepts to facilitate public engagement and participation for the ‘polyglot’ problem
of water governance.
This cultural perspective, unlike a psychological analysis, assumes a (proactive)
organisation or institution, rather than an individual, since individuals “affiliate with
organizations that resonate with their values” (Dietz, Frey & Rosa, 2002, p. 346).
Risk is inherently a social construction and a cultural choice according to
imperatives of an organisation (Reddy, 1996). Therefore, the cultural risk
perspective combines elements of various methodologies from both positive and
normative risk disciplines in a single approach (Horlick-Jones & Sime, 2004). It is
located within critical theory as it assumes that rationality is embedded within social
institutions and systems within a pluralist society, where risk is a real phenomenon
caused by structural constraints such as the capitalist system (Baleta, 2012).
This thesis frames the contested GAB water risk to deliver and enhance public
participation and engagement in policy decision-making. Participatory discourses in
the form of disclosures are analysed at the institutional level. This thesis therefore
brings together ‘hard’ - positive and objective, and ‘soft’ - normative and
judgemental, knowledge in a transdisciplinary form. As Horlick-Jones and Sime’s
(2004, p. 444) assert, cultural risk perspective exchanges
inputs and outputs… across disciplinary boundaries, in an evolved methodology
which transcends ‘pure’ disciplines. In epistemological terms, [this]
transdisciplinary [approach] involves an integration of knowledge.
Accounts in this thesis are conceived and utilised as rhetorical components of a
dialogue or a conversation (Frame & Brown, 2008). By making cultural assumptions
from each institution more transparent, this study exposes the pluralistic nature of
accounting to promote radical change within a democratic society (Boyce, 2000).
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1.3

Method of analysis

This study employs a critical accounting approach to acknowledge divergent
ideologies and interests among different stakeholder groups to promote democratic
participation through genuine ‘dialogue’. It explores the GAB water risk debate from
BHP OD’s water extraction by compiling accounts from corporate sustainability
reports and other public statements; government regulatory documents and
alternative public disclosures obtained from civil society respectively.
This study performs a discourse analysis approach to collate and analyse a range of
accounts for GAB water. In social theories and analyses, discourse is used widely
referring to “different ways of structuring areas of knowledge and social practice”
(Fairclough, 2003, p. 3). This stance is attributed to Foucault’s (1976, 1980 in
Alvesson & Karreman, 2000) assumption that discourses constitute both subjects and
objects, and arrange and naturalise the social world in a particular way to inform
social practices.
While discourse is considered as a particular way of representing some area of the
world or a possible world with projected change in some directions, discourses are
often alternative and competing, consistent with different social identities, positions
and social relationships with others (Fairclough, 2003). In this thesis, discourse is
considered to be a mode of institutional and political practice. In accordance with a
culture risk perspective as methodology (Lupton, 1999), both competing and
complementary discourses emanate out of interactions between BHP OD,
governments and civil society around the water intake of BHP OD for the ODEP.
This thesis uses documents issued by three institutions as data sources to analyse
three different sets of institutional discourses emerging from the GAB water debate.
Documents define and specify things, classify events and describe processes (Prior,
2004). In this thesis, the documents issued by BHP, BHP OD and governments can
be largely recruited and used as allies to support each other’s actions when their
interests coincided (except in some special cases - for example, see Chapter 9), while
civil society tends to view these documents as enemies that need to be challenged
and transformed.
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Since discourses are both embodied and enacted in various texts, texts can be
regarded as “a discursive ‘unit’ and a material manifestation of discourse” (Phillips
& Hardy, 2002, p. 4). This thesis analyses textual discourses in documents. When
texts are approached as elements of social events, texts are concerned as an
interactive process of meaning-making (Fairclough, 2003). Discourse studies can be
considered to be an analysis of text in context.
This thesis investigates discourses through a textual approach based on “interpretive
structuralism” (Phillips & Hardy, 2002, p. 24). An interpretive structuralist approach
is primarily concerned with how social and cultural meanings are constructed. In this
study, the particular emphasis is on rhetoric. Rhetoric is the technique of using
discourse for persuasive effect, and this study examines how rhetoric is used by three
institutions as a strategic resource to further their views.
To analyse rhetoric, Burkean rhetorical criticism (Stillar, 1998) is adopted as a
specific method to interrogate institutional documents. It is a specific method based
on the assumption that rhetoric is one of the symbols to constitute the world, give it
meaning and express common interests required for achieving social unity (Burke,
1950, 1966, 1969). Burkean rhetorical criticism incorporates three levels of analysis
- grammar, rhetoric and logology (Stillar, 1998). The grammatical analysis focuses
on the features of texts within the documents issued by three institutions and the
rhetorical situation from which the production of those texts arise. Rhetorical
analysis deals with the function of texts, which is how the public, as audiences, are
invited by each institution to share and believe in different risk assumptions
regarding the GAB. Logological analysis is concerned with social implications and
the consequences of “terministic screens” (Burke, 1966, p.50). In different
institutions, texts and discourses function to condense the GAB water-related reality
by highlighting certain aspects of it for public attention and engagement. Burkean
rhetorical criticism is applied to cultural risk theory (Chapter 6, Section 6.3) to allow
the researcher to identify features, functions and implications of each institutional
risk practice. Making those theoretical elements explicit, in turn, provides analytical
scaffolding which facilitates an interpretation of the GAB water risk debate.
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Since the GAB water risk debate is centred upon BHP OD’s entitlement to the GAB
water and its water management, the timeline covered by this study is from 2005, the
year in which BHP acquired Western Mining Corporation (thereafter WMC),
established BHP OD and applied for ODEP, to October 2011, when the final
decision (Approval with conditions) from Commonwealth Federal Government,
South Australian and Northern Territory Government about the ODEP was made. It
is important to note that while BHP OD’s direct involvement into the GAB water
risk debate started from 2005, the debate has been evolving since the WMC, BHP
OD’s predecessor, discovered and started operating the Olympic Dam mine in 1978.
Therefore, historic documents issued that are highly relevant to the GAB water
controversy are also selected for analysis. The overall data therefore cover
disclosures made at any time relating to this period.
1.4

Theory to explicate

To investigate the GAB water debate from various constituencies, a cultural risk
theory (Douglas & Wildavsky, 1982; Schwarz & Thompson, 1990; Thompson et al.,
1990; Thompson & Rayner, 1998) is utilised as a transdisciplinary theoretical
approach to define problems from heterogeneous domains (Lawrence, 2010). It
critically explores the underlying assumptions for contentious water-related
disclosures and accountability discourses (embedded within disclosures) and
analyses their role in incorporating economic, social and environmental
accountability into a transdisciplinary dialogue to the risk-based sustainability
problems. Assessing risk as socio-political activities, cultural risk theory (Douglas,
1970; Douglas & Wildavsky, 1982) enables contestation among divergent interest
groups, creates and enlarges institutional spaces of potentiality through which
alternatives are facilitated to emerge (Brown & Dillard, 2013).
Cultural risk theory (Douglas & Wildavsky, 1982) conceives risk as social constructs
determined by structural and institutional constraints of society. Risk-based
sustainability policies, from this viewpoint, are a result of a constant struggle among
these participants to position their risk perspective on the public agenda and also
impose it on others (Baleta, 2012). Although these pluralist views of knowledge
systems, lifestyles and values make direct communication difficult within society,
the notion of risk spans the boundaries of all confined institutional groups to
12

highlight the essentiality of communication (Baleta, 2012). This locus is pivotal in
the context of a water crisis, where industry (market), government (hierarchy) and
civil society (border) consider water as inherently different resources.
Since the three-fold Burkean rhetorical criticism as a method in Chapter 5 identifies
and interprets the features, functions and implications of discursive practices (Stillar,
1998), applying a Burkean framework to cultural risk theory allows a researcher to
identify various notions for conceptualising risk-based sustainability, with the
features, functions and implications of each institutional groups’ risk discourses
manifest within disclosures. These notions form the major concepts of cultural risk
theory to analyse the discourses of the GAB water related disclosures from BHP OD,
governments and civil society. In this thesis, these concepts are ‘preferred learning
style’ (feature), ‘view of nature’ (function), ‘property of knowledge ideal’
(implication), ‘attitude towards technology’ (feature), ‘view of risk’ (function),
‘resolution of risk’ (implication), ‘cause of ecological crisis’ (feature), ‘view of
justice and fairness’ (function), and ‘property of desired system’ (implication).
These nine concepts in turn are linked to three accounting and accountability related
themes. A preferred learning style, view of nature and property of knowledge ideals
from three institutions help to understand the contested nature of the accounting
concepts of control with associated accounting recognition and measurement rules.
Institutional assumptions of an attitude towards technology, view of risk and risk
resolution facilitate the understanding of the stewardship debate from both
mainstream and critical accounting’s perspectives. Institutional perceptions of a
cause of ecological crisis, view of justice and fairness and property of desired system
enable the analysis of the natural resource allocation debate with its related economic
consequences arguments, and the further implication for accounting practices.
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Table 1.1 Application of Burkean Rhetorical Criticism Framework to Cultural Risk
Theory to determine Critical Themes (see Chapter 6, Section 6.1)
Major
Concepts

View of Nature

Properties of
Knowledge ideal

View of Risk

Resolution of
Risk

View of Justice
and Fairness

Holism
Ephemeral and Fragile
Imperfection

Grammatical Analysis
Pro-technology
Technical Fix

Anti-Technology

Rhetorical Analysis
Opportunity
Controllability

Need to Minimise

Logological Analysis
Economic
Regulation
Growth
Grammatical Analysis
Government
Loss of Control
Intervention
RhetoricalAnalysis
Equality of
Equality before Law
Opportunity
Logological Analysis

Inequitable System
Equality of Condition
and Result

1990; Thompson, 1980; Thompson et al., 1990; Thompson & Rayner, 1998)

Cultural risk theory (Douglas, 1970; Douglas & Wildavsky, 1982) recognises the
existence of three active (and one inactive) institutional solidarities. Each institution
possesses a restricted risk position and corresponding solution according to its
cultural assumptions and beliefs. These value-consistent solutions may be
satisfactory to solve simple, one-dimensional problems, but unsuitable to solve
complex water problems (Linsley & Shrives, 2014). In fact, each institution’s
assumptions of risk-based sustainability shapes the definition of the perceived water
problem, and each institutional solution is only endorsed by its institutional norms
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Themes

Low Growth and
Invasiveness

Free Market
Governance and
Social and
Properties of
Planning
Environmental equity
Desired System
Adapted from: Schwarz and Thompson (1990, pp.66-67, see also Ney & Thompson, 2011;

and values (Linsley & Shrives, 2014).

Critical

Economic Consequence

Cause of
Ecological Crisis

Grammatical Analysis
Science (Trial
Expertise
and Error)
Rhetorical Analysis
Cornucopian and
Stable within
Abundant
Boundaries
Logological Analysis
Objectivity
Procedural Validity

Border
Institutions

Stewardship

Attitude
towards
Technology

Hierarchy
Institutions

Concept of Control

Preferred
Learning Style

Market
Institutions

The utilisation of a cultural risk theory (Douglas & Wildavsky, 1982) therefore
forefronts topics and issues of social and environmental concern and provides a locus
for transdisciplinary approaches. It delivers a typology to examine various
institutions and their diverse ontological and epistemological positions. Cultural risk
theory allows the topic or issue, rather than an organisation or institution of
stakeholder to become the locus of analysis; discloses partisan interests from various
parties; and, harnesses an interdisciplinary approach to study phenomena.
1.5

Structure of the thesis

This thesis is structured as follows:
Chapter 2: This chapter provides an overview of the water scarcity as an issue at
global and national level. Three contested water governance paradigms are then
discussed from perspectives of industry, governments and civil society with an
example of contemporary Australian water reform. This is followed by a
presentation of the GAB water governance and mining industry’s water use in
general and BHP OD’s GAB water intake in particular. The GAB water debate
arising from BHP OD’s mining operation and the proposed ODEP concludes this
chapter.
Chapter 3: This chapter provides an overview of the water scarcity as an issue at
global and national level. Three contested water governance paradigms are then
discussed from the perspectives of industry, governments and civil society with an
example of contemporary Australian water reform. This is followed by a
presentation of the GAB water governance and mining industry’s water use in
general and BHP OD’s GAB water intake in particular. The GAB water debate
arising from BHP OD’s mining operation and the proposed ODEP concludes this
chapter.
Chapter 4: This chapter discusses of methodological issue of risk research with its
application in accounting studies. Shifted meanings of risk representing different
methodologies are outlined first before the overview of realist/positivist perspective
of risk. This is followed by a presentation of social constructivist perspective of risk.
Throughout this discussion, the application of these diverse risk methodologies in
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accounting studies are reviewed individually with a focus on cultural risk
methodology in critical accounting research.
Chapter 5: This chapter explicates the research method used to examine how the
GAB water risk debate is manifest through cultural practices. It begins with an
overview of a critical accounting approach, discourses, discourse in documents, and
text and textual analysis with reference to an interpretive structuralist approach. This
is followed by a general discussion of rhetoric and rhetorical criticism. A Burkean
perspective of rhetorical criticism is subsequently discussed, with a particular
emphasis on grammatical, rhetorical and logological analyses. The documents used
as data in this study are then presented before a final description of the process of
data analysis.
Chapter 6: This chapter first introduces cultural risk theory in general (Douglas,
1970; Douglas & Wildavsky, 1982). The three folded Burkean framework of
rhetorical criticism is then applied to the cultural risk theory to tease out the
theoretical elements for each institutional risk discursive practices. Three critical
themes derived from these institutional discourses are finally discussed with the
implication for accounting research and practices.
Chapter 7: This chapter applies three major concepts from the cultural risk theory preferred learning style, view of nature and property of knowledge ideal to analyse
market - BHP and BHP OD, hierarchy - Australian Federal and South Australian
government and border institutions’ - civil society’s viewpoints manifest in their
disclosure documents in the context of the GAB water-related risks. This analysis
has implications to understand the accounting concept of control of natural resources
from both mainstream and critical perspectives, and it provides insights for financial
accounting-standard setting in the era of impending environmental crisis.
Chapter 8: This chapter applies three major concepts from cultural risk theory attitude towards technology, view of risk and resolution of risk to analyse market BHP and BHP OD, hierarchy - Australian Federal and South Australian government
and border institutions’- civil society’s viewpoints manifest in their disclosure
documents in the context of the GAB water-related risks. This analysis has
implications for an understanding of the accounting concept of stewardship from
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both mainstream and critical perspectives, and it provides insights for social and
environmental accounting and reporting practices in the era of looming
environmental crisis.
Chapter 9: This chapter applies three major concepts from cultural risk theory- the
cause of ecological crisis, view of justice and fairness and property of desired system
to analyse market - BHP and BHP OD, hierarchy - Australian Federal and South
Australian governments and border institutions’ - civil society’s viewpoints manifest
in their disclosure documents in the context of the GAB water-related risks. This
analysis has implications for an understanding of the accounting concept of
‘economic consequence’ from both mainstream and critical perspectives. It also
provides insights to facilitate/justify government intervention in financial accounting
and reporting practices in the era of looming environmental crisis.
Chapter 10: This final chapter provides a recap of the study and detailed
contributions of this thesis. It concludes the insights from previous chapters and
discusses the concept of value underpinning the juxtaposed assumptions for riskbased sustainability among market - BHP and BHP OD; hierarchy - Australian
Federal government and South Australian government; and border institutions - civil
society. Contribution to extant accounting literature and methodology and theory are
also considered with regard to the democratic participation in public policy decision
making based on accounting and accountability discourses against the background of
sustainability problems. A presentation of thesis limitations and further research
opportunities conclude this chapter.
1.6

Summary

This chapter introduces the study in general - presenting background, research
motivations and purposes, discussing methodology and method, and describing the
structure of the thesis. The next chapter provides an overview of water scarcity and
conflicts together with different water governance paradigms.
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CHAPTER 2 BACKGROUND
2.1

Introduction

This chapter provides the context for the case of the Great Artesian Basin (GAB)
water governance and GAB water risk related controversies arising from BHP
Billiton Olympic Dam Corporation, Pty Ltd. (BHP OD)’s mining operation and the
proposed Olympic Dam Expansion Project (ODEP). This context is important for an
understanding of three contested water governance paradigms, from the perspectives
of industry, governments and civil society, which manifest as irresolvable conflicts
to date. In Chapter 7, 8 and 9, this context and different water governance paradigms
will be reconsidered in light of cultural risk theory.
The next section (2.2) provides an overview of water scarcity as an issue at global
and national level. This environmental, social, economic and political environment is
particularly salient as it helps to understand the highly politicised relationships over
water resource allocation. Three contested water governance paradigms are then
discussed from the perspectives of industry, governments and civil society with an
example of contemporary Australian water reform (Section 2.3). This discussion is
relatively brief and will be revisited in Chapter 7, 8 and 9, as its significance is
inscribed and predicated in the contested disclosures regarding the GAB water risks
from the BHP OD’s water intake. This is followed by a presentation of the GAB
water governance and mining industry’s water use in general and BHP OD’s GAB
water intake in particular. The GAB water debate arising from BHP OD’s mining
operation and the proposed ODEP concludes this chapter (Section 2.4).
2.2

Why water is an issue

Although two thirds of earth’s surface is covered by water, only 1% of it is fresh
water. Like any other natural resource, this water resource is unevenly distributed
around the planet, with some regions enjoying relatively abundant watering and
more regular rainfall, while others face a dearth of water availability (Hazelton,
2007). Climate change also poses a serious threat to the hydrologic cycle, rainfall
pattern and freshwater systems (Bates, Kundzewicz, Wu & Palutikof, 2008;
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), 2007; Morrison et al., 2009).
According to Morrison et al. (2009), droughts, which are largely attributable to
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climate change, have affected more regions 1 and caused acute shortages of water in
Asia, Africa, Australia and the United States. For example, in China and India,
declined water supplies have arisen from depleted groundwater and melting glaciers,
which have caused receding river levels (Gleick, Cooley, Katz, Lee, Morrison,
Palaniappan, Samulon & Wolff, 2007; Morrison et al., 2009). In the United States,
annual river flows and natural water storage capacities are also reducing due to the
shrinking snow-cap on the Rocky Mountains (Barnett & Pierce, 2008)
Population growth also results in significant pressure on water resources (Morrison
et al., 2009; United Nations, 2006). Agriculture water use constitutes more than twothirds of global usage, including almost 90% in developing countries (ESCAP, 2007).
With the world population growth of fifty million per year (Morrison et al., 2009),
freshwater consumption is expected to rise 25% by 2030 (Wild, Francke, Menzli &
Schön, 2007).

2

Furthermore, there has been increased competition between

agriculture and industry’s demand for water, leaving many countries in a dilemma
between the issues of water scarcity and constrained economic growth (Plummer &
Tower, 2010).
Another severe problem in accessing a freshwater resource is declining water quality
(United Nations, 2006). In developing countries, like China, India, and Pakistan,
rising agricultural and industrial water demands, combined with a lack of adequate
treatment for wastewater, have already caused heavily contaminated waterways
resulting in more than one billion people short of safe drinking water (Morrison et al.,
2009). For instance, many rivers have been so heavily contaminated in China that
even industry cannot use the water, and more than two-thirds of the large cities in
China do not have sufficient recycling or sanitation facilities for wastewater (Wild et
al., 2007).
Agenda 21 (United Nations Division for Sustainable Development, 1992) ranked
preservation and supply of freshwater reserves among the most urgent and important
environmental issues. United Nations Educational Scientific and Cultural

1

The percentage of ‘very dry’ land had doubled since 1970s, including large parts in Africa and Australia (National Center for
Atmospheric Research (NCAR), 2005).
2
According to the Food and Agriculture Organisation of the United Nations (UN-FAO) (2007), currently around 2.4 billion
people - more than one third of the world population live in countries under water stress. And this number is expected to be
doubled by 2025.
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Organisation (UNESCO) (2006, p.524) neatly summarises the UN’s assessment of
global water supplies:
Providing the water needed to feed a growing population and balancing this with
all the other demands in water is one of the great challenges of this century.
Providing water for environmental flows and industry will tax water resources
even more.
The United Nations Committee on Economic Social and Cultural Rights (2002) has
also declared access to adequate and clean water resource as one of the basic human
rights.
As the second driest continent next to Antarctica (Vardon, Lenzen, Peevor & Creaser,
2007) and the driest continent with inhabitants in the world (Wahlquist, 2008),
Australia is confronted with water problems such as water scarcity, declined water
quality, and increased salinity (Hazelton, 2007). Apart from water availability, the
causes of the current water crisis are also attributed to problematic water
management (Melendez & Hazelton, 2009; UNESCO, 2006, 2009; World Water
Council, 2000).3 For example, in the early twentieth century Australia’s water was
“managed as if it were worthless” rather than “the life-sustaining, valuable, and
increasingly scarce resource that it is” (Clark, 2007, p. 1) because of the reliability
and quality of water supplies, largely due to publicly-owned utilities with low usage
charges (Egan, 2009). By 1970, emerging concerns over water pollution and misuse
resulted in an investigation from the Australian Federal Senate Selected Committee’s
into the issue of water pollution. The Commonwealth of Australia (1970) and the
Committee concluded that there was little public awareness about the threats and
challenges to the Australian water resource (Commonwealth of Australia, 1970, p.
184). In 1987, the Brundtland Report (1987) marked the start of global sustainability
agenda and encouraged the global community to take into account the water needs of
future generations and the environment. According to Egan (2009, p. 280), the
Brundtland Report also “lent added legitimacy to Australian water management
policies focused on demand management”.

3
Nestle’s chairman Peter Bradeck-Letmathe bluntly points out that the challenges of water availability is more severe than that
of energy security; and, that human beings will run out of water before fuel under the current water management (The
Economist, 2008).
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From the late 1990s water storage has declined rapidly and water scarcity has
become acute in Australia as a result of continued droughts (Egan, 2009). According
to the Australian Government Bureau of Meteorology (AGBoM) (2007), Eastern and
Southern Australia have been affected by droughts since 1996, with the worst years
on record in 1997/1998 and 2002/2003; while some regions in Southern-Western
Australia have suffered protracted droughts for 30 years (World Meteorological
Organisation (WMO), 2006). For this reason, every Australian mainland state capital
since 2006 has had to deal with water restrictions due to an insufficient water supply
(Melendez & Hazelton, 2009; Wahlquist, 2008).
Climate change is now widely accepted as exacerbating water risks (Plummer &
Tower, 2010; Savolainen, 2008; The Economist, 2009). In 2008, the then Australian
Federal Minster for Climate Change and Water, Penny Wong, stated in 2008 that,
while the overconsumption and mismanagement of water have imposed a serious
negative impact on Australian aquifers and rivers, climate change will worsen the
situation resulting in more droughts and unreliable rainfalls (IPCC, 2007; Wong,
2008).4
2.3

Contested water governance paradigm

As with most natural resources, scarcity gives rise to opportunities for those with
access. Accordingly, relationships over water resources tend to be highly politicised,
especially where allocation issues abound. Generally speaking, water is understood
as a multi-purpose resource and it functions on different levels and dimensions
(Dubreuil, 2006). The priority of, and the focus on, different levels and dimensions
leads to contested water governance paradigms 5 , inspired and driven by different
social and institutional preferences and interests (Allan, 2003; Dubreuil, 2006; Veiga
da Cunha, 2009).

4
The Garnaut Report (2008) notes that problematic water supply in Australia results from climate change increased population
and uneconomic water pricing policies.
5
Governance is defined as ‘‘the exercise of economic, political and administrative authority to manage a country’s affairs at all
levels. It comprises the mechanisms, processes and institutions through which citizens and groups articulate their interests,
exercise their legal rights, meet their obligations and mediate their differences” (Sampford, 2009, p. 51).
Water governance refers to ‘‘the range of political, social, economic and administrative systems that are in place to develop and
manage water resources, and the delivery of water services, at different levels of society” (Veiga da Cunha, 2009, p. 109).
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2.3.1 Water for development and industrial water governance paradigm
Dubreuil (2006) advances three levels and dimensions of water function. They are
‘water for development’, ‘water for citizens’ and ‘water for life’. ‘Water for
development’ is “an economic function related to production activities” (Dubreuil,
2006, p. 4). It is normally the concern of private interests including irrigation for
agriculture, food and industrial production, hydropower generation as well as
recreation and tourism (Wallacw, Acreman & Sullivan, 2003). For economists to
formalise the benefits of water resources, a key concept termed ‘production function’
is used. Hanemann (2006, p. 84) defines a production function as “an empirical,
causal relationship between the levels of inputs required to produce an output, or an
outcome, and the level of output or the outcome that results.” One example is the
production function for mining, agriculture or forestry industrial output as a function
of water extracted from rivers or underground resources and other inputs to the
production process (Hanemann, 2006).
To fulfil the production function on an ongoing basis, it is essential that access to
water of sufficient quantity and quality is available (Syme et al., 2008). From this
perspective, nature in general and water in particular could and should be mastered
by science and industrial technologies (Allan, 2003), along with the principle of
efficiency as the primary criterion for water allocation (Patrick, 2012). It is argued
that water, as a scarce resource, has an economic value, therefore should be allocated
according to the principle of economic efficiency (Allan, 2003). Making water
available at a subsidised price, from an industrial perspective, will generate
inefficient water use, thereby contributing to water scarcity (Veiga da Cunha, 2009).
However, this economic argument is sometimes mutually exclusive with respect to
the principle of social and environmental equity (Dinar, Rosegrant & Meinzen-Dick,
1997). This idea is exemplified through a focus on short-term gains derived from
acute changes to natural water flows through dams, reservoirs or irrigation schemes
which are unsustainable in the long run6 (Syme et al., 2008). It is worth noting that

6
So far there has been a view that environmental concerns conflict with economic development. In terms of contested process
for water allocation decision-making, this conflict essentially is, according to (Patrick, 2012), a short-term vs long-term view.
That is, water resources for immediate use or production might be in direct conflict with its long-term benefits for those in
distant areas and in the future, including non-human beings and ecosystems (Syme et al., 2008).

22

one of the reasons for allocative water criteria to resort to efficiency-based rules is
the ease and simplicity to account for and justify use (Patrick, 2012).
2.3.2 Water for citizens and government water governance paradigm
While water is considered by industry as an economic good, it is “a special economic
good” due to its essential, non-substitutable, finite nature (Veiga da Cunha, 2009, p.
101). Water, therefore, can be perceived as a social good, as the benefits and costs
from individual or group use of water tends to affect a larger social community
within the same water distribution system (Veiga da Cunha, 2009). Dubreuil (2006)
argues that it is the role of governments to act in the interest of the social wellbeing
in respect of social rights of citizens. As such, ‘water for citizens’ is concerned with
“providing water for general interest purposes, as regards public health or the
promotion of values of social equity or social cohesion” (Dubreuil, 2006, p. 4).
As noted by Veiga da Cunha (2009, p. 10), this social dimension points to the
“equitable use” of water resources, since water is unevenly distributed not only “in
time and space”, but also among “various socio-economic strata of society”. How the
water resource is distributed and allocated entails direct impacts on a citizen’s
physical and mental health, as well as their livelihood opportunities (United Nations
Children's Emergency Fund & World Health Organization, 2011; Veiga da Cunha,
2009). From a social perspective, public health cannot be achieved when access to
sufficient water for personal and domestic use is not safeguarded (Patrick, 2012).
Basic human needs of water include water for drinking, food preparation, bathing
and sanitation. Gleick (1998) suggests 50 litres of water per person per day as the
minimum to secure health and the minimal standard of living in these four areas, and
the state holds due diligence to protect these rights, for both intra-generational and
inter-generational equity (Veiga da Cunha, 2009).
Therefore, governments have the dual goal of ensuring the supply of water to
industry, as well as the basic health need of communities. These goals sometimes
contradict each other (Roa-García, 2014; Veiga da Cunha, 2009). On one hand,
considering water as an economic good facilitates the implementation of efficiency
measures to benefit society as a whole. On the other hand, however, water allocation
decisions are seldom taken purely on economic grounds, as some environmental and
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social costs cannot be quantified in practice (Roa-García, 2014; Veiga da Cunha,
2009). Therefore, to decide on the most sustainable and advantageous water use in a
broader social and political context, governments sometimes make water available
free of charge or at subsidised cost to some water users, including industry, irrigation
and domestic users (Veiga da Cunha, 2009).
Since planning for dual and often competing objectives is complicated, it is often
found that “the partial achievement of one goal” has been used by governments to
“offset significant failures to achieve others” (Sampford, 2009, p. 63). For example,
in recent decades in Western liberal democratic societies, water has been governed
and managed in “an apolitical way - as if the engineers and technocrats/bureaucrats
were engaged in the administration of things” (Sampford, 2009, p. 50). Water policy
and management has often been implemented through the use of market mechanisms
to improve water use efficiency in an attempt to protect ecosystems that supply water
for public interest (Mercer, Christesen & Buxton, 2007).
This market model of water governance by governments has raised questions about
whether government values water in the general interests of civil society. There are
doubts on “the agenda surrounding water decisions and prioritised stakeholders”
(Alston & Mason, 2008b, p. 132). It is argued that governments have taken “a far
narrower perspective” on the idea of ‘water for citizen[s]’ (Sampford, 2009, p. 51)
by prioritising economics and overshadowing the social equity implications of water
allocation (Alston & Mason, 2008b). As Alston and Mason’s (2008b, p. 136) assert,
these government water policies are found “neither fair nor efficient”, and reflect the
interests of certain stakeholder groups more than others “even in the absence of overt
conflict”. One reason is that governments are identified as poor community engagers,
albeit the acknowledgement of the significance of community participation and
engagement (Alston & Mason, 2008b).
2.3.3

Water for life and civil society’s water governance paradigm

‘Water for life’ entails “providing water for the survival of both human beings
(individual and collective) and other living beings” (Dubreuil, 2006, p. 4). As the
basis of nature, water is described by Ripl (2003, p. 1921) as “the bloodstream of the
biosphere”. Ranaganathan et al. (2008) thoroughly document the social and
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environmental benefits provided by water-based ecosystems and categorise them
into four types of services - provisioning, regulating, cultural and supporting services.
Provisioning services cover goods or products such as food, fibre, fuel and
freshwater that can be obtained from ecosystems. Regulating services include water,
air quality and climate regulation, for disease or natural hazard control. Cultural
services refer to the nonmaterial benefits like spiritual, religious and ethical values
that are attached to ecosystems. Supporting services are those underlying processes
necessary to produce all three other ecosystem services, which involve soil formation,
nutrient cycling and so on (Ranganathan, Raudsepp-Hearne, Lucas, Irwin, Zurek,
Bennett, Ash & West, 2008).
From this perspective, water is treated as an environmental, social and cultural good,
“not primarily as an economic good” (Hazelton, 2013, p. 276). As Syme et al. (2008,
p. 332) suggest, “the moral, the cultural and the natural have always been intimately
related”, and the importance of water is continually reflected in rituals, ceremonies
and language of a particular culture. For example, watercourses and floodplain areas
hold “significant cultural and social value as a focus for spiritual, political, national
or other cultural sentiment” (Environment Australia, 1998, p. 3), as they have long
enabled human activities including settlement, transportation and recreation (Syme et
al., 2008). People from a culture close to water or whose lives associated inseparably
with water, like fishermen, give prominence to water, as well as indigenous
Australians who are morally obligated to look after their country and all it contains,
including surface and groundwater (Syme et al., 2008). This moral obligation also
includes adequate care for current and future generations, and those beyond the
scope of immediate social relations, such as ecosystems and nonhuman life forms
(Smith, 2000; Syme et al., 2008). In respect of the cultural value of water, Nathan
(2007, p. 4) argues that:
[o]ur imagination ... require[s] a history of our past connections with water, a
sense of how our values have shaped particular waterscapes and then ricocheted
back into community life ... A scientific understanding of changes in riparian
vegetation, streamflow volume, and the physical form of bed and banks are
strands of knowledge that can strangle our more central stories of the natural
world.
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As such, the fundamental values of life are intrinsically linked to those of sustainable
ecosystems including aquatic ecosystems. The value of this dimension of water
function cannot be measured in monetary terms, therefore should not be
administrated and managed according to market rule (Dubreuil, 2006). From the
perspective of civil society, including the non-government organisations (NGOs),
environmentalists and Aboriginal groups, water governance is
not just a matter of management but of making value choices, allocating
resources, avoiding inefficiencies and recognizing the dangers of market failure
and the abuse of market power… [from] engineers and technocrats (Sampford,
2009, p. 51).
In other words, current water resource governance and management policies in
Australia promote an economic and technical view that lacks equity considerations
including the distribution of social, cultural and environmental costs and benefits
(Alston & Mason, 2008b). Therefore, government authorities are required to broaden
their capacity, to be more inclusive of social and cultural concerns of sustainable use
of water resources and ecosystem integrity (Jackson, 2005; Veiga da Cunha, 2009).
A process of transparent and participatory engagement for a shared vision is
suggested especially from those marginalised communities, such as Aboriginal
groups (Alston & Mason, 2008b; Jackson, 2005; Veiga da Cunha, 2009). As
contended by Alston and Mason (2008b, p. 133), it is the dimension of ‘water for life’
that adds to the “quality of life experiences” that have not been addressed by
industries at large, and governments to a some extent, with regard to their
reconceptualisation of water scarcity and the value of water.
2.3.4

Conflictual facets within the contemporary Australia water reform

The Australian governments’ National Water Initiative (NWI) is used to exemplify
these contested water paradigms. The NWI aims to facilitate Australian Water
Management Reform7 through a coordinated approach in response to concerns over
droughts and climate change (Egan & Frost, 2010; Hazelton, 2007; Melendez &
Hazelton, 2009; Morrison et al., 2010). The signing of the Intergovernmental
Agreement on the NWI (National Water Commission, 2007) is said to represent a
7

SKM (2008) and Waterlines (2008) identify the problems involving in water reform, including conflicting interests of winners
and losers in a new system of transparency (SKM, 2008); lack of professionals with technical expertise related to water issues,
government intervention at local and state level, lack of agreement and clarity on the specific actions needed; and lack of clear
accountability (Waterlines, 2008).
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culminating step for water policy in Australia,8 because critical ideas, previously in
the form of “proposals and points for discussion, now have official status at a
national level” (Chalmers, Godfrey & Lynch, 2010, p. 8). With assistance from the
National Water Commission (2007),9 the key objectives of the NWI are to: increase
the efficiency and productivity of water use; ensure the need to service urban and
rural communities; improve the health of river and groundwater system; and,
establish an efficient national water market with a pricing system, trading
arrangement and water resource accounting (National Water Commission, 2007).
However, the NWI incorporates tensions among key components and the challenges
of associated implementation (Hussey & Dovers, 2006). In spite of its commitment
to integral and ecologically sustainable water development (Hussey & Dovers, 2007),
it is argued that the NWI fails to reconcile major conflicting imperatives such as
those of social equity, environmental sustainability and economic rationality (Hussey
& Dovers, 2006). Its incapability to accommodate the diverse aspirations of multiple
participants is reflected through the focus of this reform, which is to ensure
efficiency of water usage for an increasing level of productivity and competitiveness
through introduction of privatisation, market and property right mechanisms, as well
as the environmental flow allocation (Hussey & Dovers, 2006; Syme, 2014).
According to Hussey and Dovers (2006, p. 39), these managerial and administrative
approaches are deeply rooted within “dominant neoliberal political philosophy and
neo-classical economic theory, manifesting in the Australian term ‘economic
rationalism’”. The role of market mechanisms, along with increased knowledge in
hydrology are only rational from a technical, economic and organisational-centred
perspective (Funder & Ravnborg, 2004), yet doubtful on environmental and social
grounds (Hussey & Dovers, 2006). As suggested by Hussey and Dovers (2006, p.
43), a technical and procedural water governance paradigm shifts the logic of water
resource management and planning from that of “the social and ecological” to that of

8
Furner (2008) indicates that the Australian government’s fundamental reform agenda embraces four key policy initiatives:
wisely using water; ensuring water supply; supporting healthiness of river systems; and, combating climate change. New ways
are suggested to increase water supply, for example, establishment of desalination plants, recycling of more wastewater, less
wastage from evaporation and seepage and so on.
9
Egan (2009, p. 285) notes that “the need for an NWC [National Water Commission] had however been flagged decades
earlier by the 1970 Senate Select Committee investigation into water pollution. It was only when water became particularly
scare throughout Australia that the NWC was finally established, resulting in an increasingly co-ordinated national dialogue on
water reform impacting all Australian water sectors”.
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“the economic”. Markets are seen as a social and ecological goal instead of an
instrument to that goal (Common, 1995).
This above example demonstrate that the debates around water tend to be highly
political and it is almost impossible, through increasingly sophisticated scientific
knowledge, technology and developed market mechanisms, that optimal strategies
and decisions for water allocation can be achieved (Gross, 2011). Similarly, such
techno-economic

approaches

recommended

through

national

water

policy

frameworks such as the NWI also set the scene for the governance of the Great
Artesian Basin (GAB) in general and the on-going public outrage and protests over
BHP’s GAB water extraction for the Olympic Dam expansion project (ODEP).
2.4

The GAB water issue

The GAB is an underground aquifer which spans three states including Queensland,
New South Wales, South Australia and the Northern Territory10 (Endersbee, 2000a).
Covering one fifth of Australia, it is one of the largest artesian groundwater basins
across the world (Commonwealth Scientific and Industrial Research Organisation
(CSIRO), 2013a). Australia’s dependence on water is evident in its historic and
continued use of groundwater from the GAB. Since 1886, drilling of deep bores into
the basin has allowed the artesian water released under natural pressure to flow
uncontrolledly into creeks and open drains for stock distribution (Department of the
Environment, 2011). This has caused a high waste rate of 80% due to evaporation
and seepage (Plastics Industry Pipe Association of Australia Ltd, 2002). Such
uncontrolled development, according to Llamas and Martinez-Santos (2006), can
give rise to a series of negative effects such as depletion of the water table,
degradation of groundwater quality and subsidence of land. In the GAB case,
uncontrolled flow has led to pressure decline - some bores and springs have stopped
flowing and wetlands have desiccated (Commonwealth Scientific and Industrial
Research Organisation (CSIRO), 2013a). As a consequence, the health of
groundwater dependant ecosystems has been threatened, together with the continued

10
The Commonwealth of Australia is a federation consisting of six states and two territories. They are New South Wales,
Victoria, Queensland, Western Australia, South Australia, Tasmania (States), the Australia Capital Territory and the Northern
Territory (Territories). The Commonwealth government, is also called Australian government or Federal
government.(Australian Government, 2009).
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access of groundwater by local users including pastoralists (Department of the
Environment, 2011).
2.4.1

GAB governance in general

Against the backdrop of a national focus on water management reform and
investment, especially in the form of a national policy framework, such as the NWI,
particularly heightened attention is given to the sustainable and effective ‘whole of
basin’ management and its coordinated approach between stakeholders (National
Water Commission, 2011). While each State and Territory manage the GAB water
resource under their respective legislative frameworks, the National Resource
Management Ministerial Council (NRMMC) established the Great Artesian Basin
Coordinating Committee (GABCC) in 2004, comprising key stakeholder
representatives from each State and Territory governments’ advisory bodies
(National Water Commission, 2011). The Great Artesian Basin Technical Working
Group was set up alongside the GABCC to provide technical advice to the
Committee (National Water Commission, 2011).
The Great Artesian Basin Strategic Management Plan (the Plan) was released to
guide governance and management regarding groundwater and related natural
resources. It is a 15-year (2000-2015) strategic framework, providing direction to all
jurisdictions across the GAB on policies, supporting programs and actions essential
to obtain the optimum social, economic and environmental benefits from the existent
and continuing use of the GAB water resources (Department of the Environment,
2011; National Water Commission, 2011). Responding to the NWI, the Plan also
embraces national policy principles on sustainable groundwater and biodiversity
management, including market approaches to reallocate water savings for new usage
(Great Artesian Basin Coordinating Committee, 2009b; National Water Commission,
2011). It is said to complement, rather than override existing State and Territory
groundwater resource legislation and statutory responsibilities (National Water
Commission, 2011).
To implement key actions of the Plan, the Australian Federal and State governments
established a joint project- the Great Artesian Basin Sustainability Initiative (GABSI)
with a commitment of AUD$140 million over fifteen years (1999-2014). This
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initiative aims to encourage sustainable usage and maintenance of the GAB water by
repairing uncontrolled artesian bores and replacing the open earth bore drain with
reticulated piped water systems (Department of the Environment, 2011).
Under the Plan, there is a significant focus on the scientific and technical assessment
of the nature of artesian water interaction and the characteristics of artesian springs
(National Water Commission, 2013). In March 2013, the Great Artesian Basin Water
Resource Assessment (the Assessment) was delivered by the Australian Government
Department of Sustainability, Environment, Water, Population and Communities,
Geoscience Australia and the National Water Commission is engaged the
Commonwealth Scientific and Industrial Research Organisation (CSIRO) to provide
an analytical framework to facilitate water management, along with the Allocating
Water and Maintaining Springs in the Great Artesian Basin research project (the
GAB Mound Springs project) to investigate the operation of mound springs

11

(Commonwealth Scientific and Industrial Research Organisation (CSIRO), 2013b).
Through a substantial update of geological and hydro-geological knowledge, and, an
improvement of measuring and monitoring techniques (Commonwealth Scientific
and Industrial Research Organisation (CSIRO), 2013a; Smerdon, 2013), it is
believed that an advanced understanding of the extent and complexity of the GAB is
likely to be attained through improved modelling and predictive capacity (Great
Artesian Basin Coordinating Committee, 2009a; National Water Commission, 2013).
2.4.2 Australian mining industry’s water use in general
Secure access to water is a feature that affects individuals, communities, the natural
environment, agriculture and industry. In particular, the mining and extraction
industry rely on water as a resource. The Australian mining and mineral processing
sector is the world’s leading producer of lead, bauxite and alumina, diamonds (by
volume), ilmenite, rutile and zircon (and synthetic rutile) and tantalum; the second
largest producer of uranium, zinc, and nickel; the third largest producer of iron ore,
lignite, silver, manganese and gold, the fourth largest producer of black coal and
copper, and the fifth largest producer of aluminium (Minerals Council of Australia,
11
Mound springs in South Australia are “a unique groundwater discharge feature of the Great Artesian Basin (GAB), a deep
regional groundwater system that covers 22% of the Australian continent. They are the principal sources of surface water in the
arid to semi-arid inland heart of Australia, and have great ecological, scientific, anthropological and economic significance”
(Mudd, 2000, p. 463) .

30

2011). As a main force of the Australian national economy, the mining industry
contributed up to 9% ($115.56 billion) of the Australian GDP and accounted for 68.4%
of total merchandise exports during 2009-2010 (ABARES, 2011). Australian mine
production for 2010-2011 is forecast to rise by 2%, with the increasing earnings from
exports of minerals and energy commodities by 30% to $182 billion (ABARES,
2011)12.
In the mining industry, secure access to water is critical for developing and
processing minerals. As the input to almost all operations, water is used in a broad
range of ways, particularly for processing and separating ores from waste material
(DRET, 2008; Minerals Council of Australia, 2009a; National Water Commission,
2010). The water consumption by mining industry currently makes up 3.6% of the
total water use in Australia (Barrett, 2011). Although this proportion is relatively
small, compared to urban and agriculture water usage, the mining industry is
responsible for a significant component of water accounts in local catchments
(Barrett, 2011; Minerals Council of Australia, 2009a; National Water Commission,
2010). According to the Australian Bureau of Statistics (ABS) (2006), for example,
mining activities can comprise up to 73% of consumptive use outside the Murray
Darling Basin 13 . During periods affected by droughts, the mining industry is a
primary consumer of water within a region due to slow agricultural production
and/or water entitlements purchased by mining companies (Barrett, 2011).
In addition, water use in the mining industry has rapidly increased over the last
decade and will keep rising, since, strong demand especially from China and India,
has “drive[n] an ongoing need for Australian resources” (Barrett, 2011, p.1). As a
result, direct water use14 in the mining industry grew from 321 GL/year in 2001 to
413GL/year in 2004/2005 and 508GL/year in 2008/2009. This figure will further
escalate to 1,000GL/year in 2020, according to linear forward projections (Barrett,
12
The time span covered by this study is concerned with BHP OD’s direct involvement into the GAB water risk debate from
2005 to 2011.
13
The Murry-Darling basin originates from two main rivers- the Murry River and the Darling River. It “covers 1,062,025 km²
or approximately one-seventh (13.8%) of the total area of mainland Australia (7,692,024 square kilometres). It contains over 40%
of all Australian farms, which produce wool, cotton, wheat, sheep, cattle, dairy produce, rice, oil-seed, wine, fruit and
vegetables for both domestic and overseas markets. As Australia's most important agricultural region, the Basin produces one
third of Australia's food supply and supports over a third of Australia's total gross value of agricultural production” (Discover
Murray River™ - Official Murray River Travel Website, 2016)
14
According to Barrett (2011) in the mining industry, direct water use is for processing, transporting and other tasks associated
with production of ores. Indirect use of water includes water needed to generate energy required by mining activities. Despite
the inextricable link between water and energy, the detailed discussion of indirect water usage in mining industry for electricity
production is outside the scope of this study.

31

2011). Considering the impact of mining it is not surprising that the ODEP was
controversial.
2.4.3

BHP OD’s Olympic Dam mine and ODEP

The Olympic Dam (Roxby Down) mine is located in South Australia, 550 km northnorthwest (NNW) of Adelaide. It is the largest known single deposit of uranium and
the fourth largest copper deposit in the world. This deposit was first discovered in
1975 by Western Mining Corporation (WMC) and has been mined since 1988 (BHP
Billiton, 2005). In 2005, BHP Billiton (BHP) acquired WMC resources, formed BHP
Billiton Olympic Dam Corporation Pty Ltd. (BHP OD) and applied to the State and
Federal governments for the expansion of Olympic Dam. Open cut methods of
extraction are recommended since it is not economical to mine low grade ore under
the current underground operations (BHP Billiton, 2009). Both governments later
required BHP to submit an Environment Impact Statement (EIS) for the ODEP,
consistent with joint EIS governmental guidelines (Wallace & Smiles, 2007).
The 4,600 page EIS was finally released by BHP on 1 May 2009, following three
years of preparation (Gout, 2009). The expansion plan for the Olympic Dam
incorporated three stages with the ultimate target of extracting 1 million tonnes of
copper and 25,000 tonnes of uranium per annum. This EIS was available for public
comment for 14 weeks (Gout, 2009), and after addressing issues of public concerns,
BHP published the supplementary EIS (SEIS - the final plan) on 13 May 2011 (BHP
Billiton, 2011a).
The expansion proposal of Olympic Dam resulted in extensive public debate within
Australia around corresponding environmental and social issues. Generally it is
claimed that, although the mine has an expected 70-100 year life, BHP has only
disclosed the impact for the next 40 years, thereby underestimating at least half of
their environmental impacts (Parnell, 2009). According to an anti-nuclear
campaigner, Jim Green, from Friends of the Earth Australia, the uranium fuel pellets
which caused the meltdown of Fukushima reactor cores were from BHP’s Olympic
Dam mine. He holds BHP accountable for the safety issues and fraud of the Japanese
nuclear industry, accusing it of “turning a blind eye… [and] continu[ing] to peddle
its toxic product to the quake-prone nation in the run up to the Fukushima [disaster]”
32

(Rugh, 2012, p. 2). BHP OD is also South Australia’s single biggest electricity user,
while the proposed expansion requires diesel fuel to increase to more than one
million litre per day regardless of the enormous amount of greenhouse gas pollution
(Australian Greens., 2011c; Rugh, 2012) Apart from that, concerns such as: waste
management of tailings; negotiation with Aboriginal landowners; and, the use of
water resources were all on the agenda for debate (Gout, 2009; Parnell, 2009). These
issues are complex and this thesis will concentrate on the issue of water, especially
underground water from the GAB for the period 2005-2011 that corresponds with
the time span between acquisition of WMC by BHP and when the final decision
from the State and Federal government about the ODEP was made.
2.4.4 The GAB water debate
BHP OD’s mining operation is governed under the Roxby Downs (Indenture
Ratification) Act (1982). Two special water licences are issued by the South
Australian government to BHP OD for GAB water extraction under the criteria of an
acceptable drawdown rate (Roxby Downs (Indenture Ratification) (Amendment of
Indenture) Amendment Act 2011; Roxby Downs (Indenture Ratification) Act 1982)
(see Chapter 8). The Olympic Dam mine uses approximately 33 million litre of GAB
water per day (BHP Billiton, 2011a) via two principle borefields / wellfields, known
as Borefield A and Borefield B (Great Artesian Basin Protection Group, 2009a). The
proposed expansion of Olympic Dam had significant implications for water demands
(Parnell, 2010). BHP OD not only needed to increase the water extraction rate from
the GAB to 42 million litre / per day (maximum amount permitted under the current
licence), it also planned for to establish a desalination plant at Point Lowly located in
the north of Spencer’s Gulf (BHP Billiton, 2009). This increased amount of water
usage imposed on the GAB gave impetus to concerns that already existed and led the
increasing calls for protection of the GAB from civil society stakeholder groups,
including NGOs, environmentalists, and Aboriginal elders (MacPherson, 2008;
Serve the people, 2008).
Apart from BHP OD’s free usage of GAB water, the nature of GAB is also open to
debate. Some argue that the GAB is an open system replenished by rainfall in
Northern Queensland - a view favoured by the government and industry; while
others argue that it is a closed system of non/renewable plutonic water (Endersbee,
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2000a; Gregory, 2009). According to Endersbee (2000a), the formula used in
textbooks to calculate groundwater flow is based on the key assumption that surface
rainfall recharges the groundwater, which may not be the case for the GAB.
Within the uncertainty of the nature of the GAB, evidence to date shows that water
extraction from the two borefields by BHP has caused declining flows of many
surrounding mound springs since 1988, with some springs, such as Venables and
Beatrice, ceasing to flow (Great Artesian Basin Protection Group, 2009a). This has a
major effect on rare and endangered flora and fauna nearby, which are drying out
due to the water drawdown rate (Great Artesian Basin Protection Group, 2009a).
However, despite this ecological degradation, BHP asserts that its “use of water from
the GAB is sustainable and is subject to stringent licensing and reporting
requirements of the South Australian Government” (BHP Billiton, 2011a, p. 115).
For example, BHP has prepared and submitted a GAB Wellfields Report annually to
satisfy requirements of the Roxby Downs (Indenture Ratification) Act 1982. These
reports rely on technical language and hydrological factors supplemented by statistic
hydrogeological modelling. There is seemingly a belief that through increasingly
advanced science, technology and sophisticated modelling, an optimal plan for water
allocation will be achieved (e.g. Syme, 2014). However, according to Lupton (1999),
scientific measures and calculative mechanisms are not fully objective or neutral as
they are often understood and negotiated through human interests and values
(Kasperson, 1992; Lupton, 1999; Renn, 1992).
It is worth noting that, in the case of the proposed ODEP, government interests
overlap with the interests of BHP to a great extent. The South Australian Premier Mr.
Rann, for example, announced in May 2009 when the original EIS was released, that
“it [the expansion project] has got massive benefits for South Australia, but I will
insist that world’s best practice in terms of the environment is complied with”
(Parnell, 2011, p. 1). According to Serve the People (2008), BHP has the resources
to wield large economic and political ‘sticks’, and has the power to play ‘games’.
While BHP was waiting for the final decision following the submission of the SEIS
(Supplementary Environmental Impact Statement) to Federal South Australian and
Northern Territory governments, the public outrage at BHP’s water grab was still ongoing. Two major issues, BHP’s rights to GAB water (e.g. Parnell, 2009; Quality,
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2011; Serve the people, 2008) and the urgent need for funding the Cap and Pipe15
scheme (e.g. Great Artesian Basin Protection Group, 2009c) were the most
prevailing demands from these stakeholder groups.
On 10 October 2011, BHP received environmental approvals (with conditions) from
Federal Environmental Minister Tony Burke for its ODEP (Department of
Sustainability Environment Water Population and Communities, 2011). BHP has
also signed an Indenture Agreement with the South Australian Government to enable
this project to go ahead. For part of the agreement, BHP would be required to pay for
the GAB water that it extracts for the first time once the expansion started16 (Homer,
2011).
This case, presented above, is characteristic of a constant debate with multiple
viewpoints promoted by different interests. From the perspective of BHP OD and the
South Australian government, the Roxby Down (Indenture Ratification) Act (1982) is
a legal framework to govern BHP OD’s mining project, the associated GAB water
extraction and the future water charge. Subsequently, it should encourage sustainable
usage and management of the GAB water resource by incorporating diverse social,
economic and environmental concerns (National Water Commission, 2011).
However, these approaches largely emphasise a scientific understanding of the
complex GAB groundwater system, the importance of technology in achieving water
use efficiency for enhanced productivity and competitiveness, as well as market
approaches such as pricing mechanisms (e.g. water levy) to protect the water
resource. Nevertheless, these statistical modelling, technical efficiency and market
mechanism arguments for a more robust economy are proven to be somehow
insufficient for those in civil society who are concerned with water-related social and
environmental impacts. After all, water is a public/common/social good, and its
management cannot be reduced purely to scientific, technical and economic
dimensions.

15
According to Great Artesian Basin Protection Group (2009), since 1980s, some landholders of the GAB have began capping
and piping their bores due to the realisation of unsustainable extraction and use of water from the GAB. “The water was then
piped through poly pipe to tanks and troughs, where the stock watered. This eliminated the water running down open drains,
and an estimated 95 percent of water was thus saved.” However, capping and piping is a very expensive exercise and
governments have started funding it since 1999.
16
According to Homer (2011) this Indenture Bill will be introduced to state Parliament in which “BHP will be charged for
GAB at the current NRM Board levy rate (currently $0.0318/KL) for the region (capped at $0.10/KL) for a period of 30 years
from the commencement of the project. The Charge will then revert to the current NRM levy rate”.
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Inspired by a genre of recent social and environmental (critical) accounting studies
on ‘counter accounting’ (Gallhofer, Haslam, Monk & Roberts, 2006) (see Chapter 3),
this thesis analyses the debate surrounding BHP’s GAB water intake for the Olympic
Dam mine operation and the proposed ODEP from several stakeholders including;
BHP, the Federal and State governments and civil society through publicly available
information/disclosures. It explores the procedural, techno-scientific and economic
rationality of the industry and governments by contrasting them with social and
environmental concerns from civil society. This thesis will critically evaluate BHP’s
GAB water extraction related disclosures and the Australian Governments’ GAB
water governance related disclosures and compare them with external disclosures
from civil society. It explores and highlights aspects of accountability supported by
different stakeholder groups or institutions as a form of moral agency that underpins
these contested disclosures. This position echoes the perspective of critical
accounting studies, which perceives accounting as a combination of discourse and
ideology (Chapter 3).
2.5

Summary

This chapter introduces the context of water scarcity within which three contested
water governance paradigms from industry, government and civil society emerge.
These paradigms are evident in the GAB water debate and BHP OD’s mining
operation and the proposed ODEP. The GAB water governance, the mining
industry’s water use and BHP OD’s GAB water intake have been briefly presented.
The mining industry and governments advocate a procedural, technical, scientific
and economic rationality, whereas civil society including NGOs, environmentalists
and Aboriginal groups are concerned with social justice and environmental equity.
This will be further explicated in the thesis through the lens of cultural risk theory in
chapter 6.
Since this thesis explores BHP and BHP OD’s GAB reliance on disclosures, this
chapter has provided a broad overview of environmental and socio-political setting
for analysing these contested disclosures. The next chapter outlines different
assumptions of accountability that give rise to the different ideals of water
governance paradigms manifested in the form of contested water disclosures. It also
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presents a critical perspective of accounting and water related social and
environmental disclosures before a discussion of accountability.
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CHAPTER 3 CRITICAL ACCOUNTING AND ACCOUNTABILITY
3.1

Introduction

The previous chapter presented the context of water scarcity for the case of Great
Artesian Basin (GAB) water risk-related controversies arising from BHP Billiton
Olympic Dam Corporation Pty Ltd (BHP OD)’s mining operations and Olympic
Dam Expansion Project (ODEP). These controversies were discussed with regard to
contested water governance paradigms from the perspective of industry,
governments and civil society. This context reveals that the domain, within which
accounting and accountability are related issues, is contentious. This chapter
provides an overview of critical accounting studies in general and water accounting
(disclosure) studies, in particular, to identify the discursive and ideological
significance of accounting as a social practice and facilitate the discussion of three
forms of accountability from the perspective of industry (BHP, BHP OD),
government (Australian Federal government and South Australian government) and
civil society (Non-Government Organisations (NGOs), environmental activists and
Aboriginal groups).
Critical accounting approaches and methodologies are reflected in the cultural risk
perspective introduced in Chapter 4. Mainstream accounting approaches,
fundamentally embedded in a realist ontology and positivist epistemology, promote
“the dominance of capital market[s]” (Brown, 2009, p. 315) and uncritically accept
and legitimate current social institutions and practices (e.g. Chua, 1986a; Cooper &
Sherer, 1984; Dillard, 1991). Critical accounting approaches, on the other hand, are
based on a social-constructivist ontology and anti-positivist epistemology that views
accounting as emanating from a social, environmental, political and institutional
context. Accounting, therefore, is not a neutral set of practices but an ideology
(Dillard, 1991; Hines, 1988, 1989). By adopting a “radically” different value
position (Chua, 1986a, p. 625), critical accounting with its emancipatory potential
reconceptualises social welfare and promotes interests and concerns such as social
equity and environmental conservation (Arnold, 1990; Cooper & Sherer, 1984).
In the same vein, mainstream corporate water accounting and reporting practices are
found to portray financial performance positively based on a particular set of
capitalist ideologies, whilst excluding and silencing social and environmental values
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and positions (Daniel & Sojamo, 2012; Egan et al., 2015; Von Schwedler, 2011).
This thesis explores the GAB water risk debate from BHP OD’s water extraction by
analysing corporate sustainability reports and other public statements, government
regulatory documents, and contrasts these with alternative public disclosures
obtained from external sources. It investigates how the ideology or value system
inscribed in corporate and governmental water disclosures is resisted and challenged
by the NGOs, environmental activists and Aboriginal groups. This thesis therefore is
in line with a genre of studies termed ‘counter-accounting’ that problematise and
destabilise the normalised nature and taken-for-granted assumptions of business and
sometimes government (Dey et al., 2011). As a result, it facilitates the articulation of
and reflection upon different styles of accountability/stewardship from the
perspective of industry, government and civil society (Buhr, 2001; Rodrigue, 2014).
It therefore echoes the call for a dialogical approach to accounting which enables
democratic participation (Brown, 2009; Gray, 1992).
This chapter first explores critical accounting studies in general and water related
social and environmental disclosure with the notion of ‘counter-accounting’ in
particular (Section 3.2). An emphasis is subsequently given on three forms of
accountability from the perspective of industry, government and civil society
(Section 3.3).
3.2

Critical accounting studies

Since the late 1970s and 1980s, a body of alternative accounting studies, including
critical accounting perspectives, have emerged in the accounting literature (Andrew,
2000; e.g. Chua, 1986a; Dillard, 1991; Moerman & van der Laan, 2005; Tinker,
Merino & Neimark,

1982). These studies critique the dominant paradigm in

accounting, which is characterised by utility - based marginalist economic theory
(Tinker, 1985).
Dillard (1991, p. 11) defines ontology as “the nature of being or reality” and
epistemology as “the means or process of knowing”. Stated somewhat differently,
ontology is the belief of what really exists, while epistemology is about what counts
as knowledge and how it is acquired. A mainstream accounting approach holds a
realist ontology which views the empirical reality as “objective and external to the
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subjects [observers]” (Chua, 1986a, p. 611). Epistemologically, a mainstream
accounting approach is dominated by positivism, which separates theory from
observation (Chua, 1986a; Dillard, 1991). Positivists believe that knowledge can be
gained and accumulated through activities searching for internal coherence,
consistencies and causal relationships, regardless of the values or interests of the
observer (Chua, 1986b; Dillard, 1991).
A realist ontology and objectivist epistemology is fundamental to the predominate
view that accounting is “a neutral set of techniques” (Roberts, 1991, p. 355), and
accounting phenomena can be explained, predicted and controlled through scientific
methodologies (Chua, 1986b). According to Cooper and Sherer (1984) and Chua
(1986a), the scientific and technical approach to accounting uncritically accepts
extant social institutions and practices, and assumes that the social order is
essentially stable and controllable (Chua, 1986a). Such a mainstream approach to
accounting is unlikely to reflect critically on the present system, let alone respond to
the issue of radical change from a developmental, evolutionary and emancipatory
perspective (Dillard, 1991).
In contrast, a critical accounting approach holds a social-constructivist ontology and
anti-positivist epistemology (Dillard, 1991). Reality is considered relativistic and
produced and reproduced through subjective interpretation. Criteria for judging valid
knowledge are based on social experience that is temporal and context-bound (Chua,
1986a; Dillard, 1991). A study of historical development and change of an object is
essential for understanding it within “the totality of relations” (Chua, 1986a, p. 622).
Human beings are perceived as having inner potentiality, alienated from a full
emergence through current social structures (Chua, 1986a).
Following this ontology and epistemology, accounting can no longer be regarded as
only scientific, but emanating from a social sphere (Dillard, 1991). It is within social,
environmental, political and institutional frameworks that economic activities take
place and accounting reports covering financial, narrative and pictorial disclosures
have effects on distributions of income and wealth (Cooper & Sherer, 1984).
Accounting therefore is a result of social construction. It is a socially determined
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technology (Dillard, 1991), which has a mutually constitutive relationship with
social reality (Hines, 1988, 1989).
Critical accounting researchers question and challenge the dominant view of
accounting and its underpinning ideology (Dillard, 1991). Ideology is defined as a
“representation of the imaginary relationship of individuals with the real conditions
of their existence”, and it is inherent in “the taken-for-granted social practices and
symbols that people use to interpret and organize their world” (Chua, 1986a, p. 625).
According to Hutchinson (1989) and Brown (2009), mainstream accounting
inscribes its value as an authoritative discourse through which power is exercised
and imposed. It therefore has a significant influence upon social and economic
exchange and conflict mediation as a discursive and ideological tool, legitimising
particular interests and behaviour (Cooper & Sherer, 1984; Tinker et al., 1991).
While accounting information provided by business entities is designed to serve
specific interests associated with profits, shareholders and the financial class (Cooper
& Sherer, 1984), governments in western societies regulating accounting information
hold a “conservative political agenda” (Tinker et al., 1991, p. 29) based on liberal
democracy which reduces politics to a merely administrative and technical project
(Lehman, 1999; Spence et al., 2010). In the absence of “any significant
countervailing power” to capital, there is rarely any valid political question to
consider “what kind of economic system we will construct, but rather address what
kind of capitalism we will live under the shadows of” (Spence et al., p. 78).
Mainstream accounting therefore is said to promote a particular view of the
importance of business, free markets and the State which “institutionalise[s] a biased
version of structural conflicts” and rationalises power relations (Chua, 1986a, p. 625).
In other words, it justifies a capitalist system and its patterns of advantage and
disadvantage without questioning how different interests have been determined, or
how the status quo has come about and is maintained (Cooper & Sherer, 1984). As
such, mainstream accounting is “notably monologic” despite that it is alleged to
serve pluralistic interests (Brown, 2009, p. 316).
A critical accounting perspective holds the premise that the problems of accounting
potentially reflect the problems of society (Cooper & Sherer, 1984). Social conflicts
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are a reflection of inherent contradictions and inequalities within the prevailing
social system, instead of a mere temporary disruption (Dillard, 1991). The current
social structure, therefore, needs to be critically analysed prior to a study of
accounting technology (Cooper & Sherer, 1984; Dillard, 1991).
This critical perspective encourages accounting researchers to adopt a “radically”
different value position (Chua, 1986a, p. 625) to expose the social conflict and
dissentions and their implications for wider social engagement (Brown & Dillard,
2013; Spence et al., 2010; Tinker et al., 1991). This approach focuses on “the
subjective, voluntary empowering action of individual members of society in
bringing about individual, and thus social, emancipation” (Dillard, 1991, p. 14). It
elucidates alternative understandings of the relationship between accounting and
income, resource and power distribution within society, and suggests a different
conceptualisation of social welfare that takes an aggregate view of society,
emphasising the interests of other groups, such as social equity and environmental
conservation, instead of those only from shareholders (Cooper & Sherer, 1984).
A dialogic approach to accounting promotes the interests and concerns of
subordinate classes and social movements (Arnold, 1990; Cooper & Sherer, 1984).
Subsequently, a rethink of ‘recognition’ and ‘disclosure’ criteria in accounting
regulation and practice to reconcile economic imperatives with demands for social
equity and justice may exist (Lehman, 1999). The following sections discuss water
related social and environmental disclosures, particularly drawing upon the notion of
counter-accounting (Section 3.2.1); and accountability from the perspective of
industry, governments and civil society in Western liberal democracy.
3.2.1 Water-related Social and Environmental disclosure & Counter-accounting
As water is critical for industrial processes, social cohesion and ecological integrity,
water has become one of the dominant social and environmental issues around the
world at a time of water scarcity (Chapter 2). There has been a development of
water-related accounting practices in the last decade, and this development in both
measurement methodologies and frameworks for non-financial disclosures is notable
in the context of regulatory and community concerns with respect to the industrial
impacts on water resources (e.g. Egan & Frost, 2010; Hazelton, 2013, 2014).
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In 2010, the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) and the UN CEO
Water Mandate 17 undertook a stocktake exercise to assess the current water
accounting methods/tools used in the corporate sector, with the aim to investigate
“commonalities and differences among emerging methods and practices” and
identify “gaps and challenges” (Morrison et al., 2010, p.6). Four major
methods/tools were found to be most commonly applied, they are: ‘Water
Footprint’18, ‘Life Cycle Assessment’19 , ‘World Business Council for Sustainable
Development (WBCSD) Global Water Tool’

20

; and, ‘Global Environmental

Management Initiative (GEMI) Water Sustainability Planner/Tools’.21
While corporate water accounting has been undertaken for internal management,
there is an increasing expectation for companies to disclose relevant data related to
their water accounting to investors, shareholders and the general public (Morrison et
al., 2010). For this reason, some water disclosure metrics and protocols have been
developed by third party interests, including the Global Reporting Initiative (GRI)
and the Carbon Disclosure Project (CDP).22
The most notable and widely applied sustainability reporting framework is the GRI
Guidelines (Global Reporting Initiative, 2013). This 2013 version of the framework G4 guidelines embraces five water-related indicators among economic, social and
environmental criteria: the total amount of water withdrawal by source (EN8); the
17
The UN CEO Water Mandate requires corporate commitment for water responsibility and reporting against that commitment
(United Nations (UN) Global Compact Office, 2015).
18
Water Footprint is an emerging tool to assess direct and indirect water usage, discharge and pollution of any group of
consumers (e.g. businesses, producers, regions, etc.) and to provide better understanding of their basic water use and
relationship with watersheds. It has been developed and disseminated by Water Footprint Network (WFN), a not-for-profit
entity which promotes water stewardship. There are three key components in the water footprint measure: blue water footprints
- freshwater from surface or underground sources, green water footprints - rain water found in soils or evaporated water and
gray water footprints - polluted water (Morrison et al., 2009; Water Footprint Network, 2012)
19
Life Cycle Assessment (LCA) is defined by International Organization for Standardization (ISO) as “compilation and
evaluation of the inputs and outputs and potential environmental impacts of a product system throughout its life-cycle” (ISO,
1997, p.2). Regarding water accounting, LCA tool is particularly designed to measure water use and discharge through all
components of products’ value chain (Horne et al., 2009; Morrison et al., 2010). Among a number of entities which develop
LCA, Australia’s Commonwealth Scientific and Industrial Research Organisation (CSIRO) has played an active role especially
in respect of water and other environmental issues (Horne, Grant & Verghese, 2009). CSIRO Minerals recently has facilitated
the LCA implementation for Australian mining companies, helping them analyse and assess environmental impacts of different
metal production, including water- related impacts throughout the value chain (Morrison et al., 2010).
20 WBCSD Global Water Tool is launched in 2007 by WBCSD which is a business association promoting sustainable
development (WBCSD, 2011). This free online software allows global companies with extended supply chains to calculate
their water consumption and compare it with the water availability based on country and watershed. Unlike methodologies of
Water Footprint and LCA, the most important feature of Global Water Tool is to access the water related business risks
explicitly (Morrison et al., 2009; Morrison et al., 2010).
21 GEMI Water Sustainability Tool and Planner are two free web-based platforms to enhance companies’ understanding of
their water issue at both company and facility level (GEMI, 2010a, 2010b). They were released by GEMI, an organisation of
companies worldwide striving for environmental and social sustainability. The Water Sustainability Tool assesses companies’
relationship to and impact on water, determines water related risks and suggests responses and actions. The water Sustainability
Planner helps clarify a facility’s needs for water and the local watershed’s status (Morrison et al., 2010).
22 BHP has disclosed water related information according to GRI, CDP and WBCSD Global Water Tool.
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water source affected significantly by water withdrawn (EN9); the percentage of
water recycled and reused (EN10), the total amount of water discharge by
destination and quality (EN21), and finally, the social and environmental impacts of
water discharge (EN25).23
The CDP developed a framework in 2010 to collect information from companies
around the world regarding water-related policies and information (CDP Water,
2012). An annual CDP Water Disclosure Information Request is sent to companies
(from 2010) and requires a reply by 30th June by using an Online Response System
(ORS). CDP’s water disclosure system uses information on companies’ water
management and governance, assessment of risks and opportunities and associated
water accounting.
However, similar to critical researchers that view current Social and Environmental
Accounting and Reporting (SEAR) practices as limited with respect to its sufficiency,
credibility and usefulness (e. g. Gray, 2012; Jones & Solomon, 2013; Moneva,
Archel & Correa, 2006; O'Dwyer, Unerman & Hession, 2005), water accounting
procedures are also viewed negatively (Hazelton, 2013). In general, it is recognised
that mainstream approaches to water accounting and reporting system are based on
techno-scientific concepts such as neutrality, objectivity, verifiability and causality,
and only provide a partial representation of a firm’s performance (Bebbington &
Thomson, 2007).
For example, Morrison and Schulte (2009) investigated a sample of 110
multinational corporations in intensive water using industries, and found that 80%
did not apply the GRI guidelines properly; only 55% provided information on
materiality assessment processes; and, 53% outlined the stakeholders’ role in the
reporting process. Egan and Frost (2010) reviewed the Australian food and beverage
and tobacco sectors, and identify a shortage of basic disclosures of water inflows and
outflows, despite of an increasing awareness of water issues. These disclosures in
23 However, Morrison et al. (2010) note that GRI guidelines do not require the disclosure of quanlitative information. In
practice therefore, companies often report some limited and quatitative information (e.g. amount water usage, discharge,
recycle, and efficiency of water use) without describing local water conditions. This aggregated nature of data obscures the
contextual information related to water scarcity. Similarly, in another study (Hazelton, 2007) which examines the extent to
which GRI indicators might improve the Australian corporate sustainable water practices, disclosure of aggregated water usage
from BHP-Billiton is argued to be “of little comfort to a community if their primary water source is being unsustainably
depleted” (Hazelton, 2007, p. 11). Yet to provide disaggregated data of each site for each water-extraction for BHP would be
immense. Therefore, the GRI “reporting is either too superficial to be useful or too onerous to be feasible” (Hazelton, 2007, p.
4).
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2013/2014 were found to decline in a more recent follow-up study (Egan et al.,
2015), which suggests that investment in corporate water management and
disclosure practices during the late 2000s might have decreased. Hazelton (2014), in
his study of water footprint labelling of products in the Australian context, contends
that the concept of a water footprint fails as an indicator of environmental
degradation, because it ignores the contextual dependence and localised impact of
water extraction, although it contributes significantly to a public understanding of
water scarcity.
Moreover, a relatively sceptical view of SEAR is that it portrays only economic
performance positively based on a specific set of institutional values or ideologies
rather than a moral imperative (e.g. Buhr, 2001; Dey et al., 2011). This can be
extended to reviews of water disclosures. For example, Von Schwedler (2011, p. 125)
analyses the progress of sustainable development in the regulated UK water industry
and remarks upon the regulatory requirement of corporate preparations of a 25-year
strategic direction statement as aligned

with a “‘business as usual’ ideology”.

Another study from Daniel and Sojamo (2012) points out that developing strategies
around water management, encouraging water-risk debate participation, and using
metrics or tools to account and disclose water risks by food and beverage companies,
represents a proactive approach to risk management against a more stringent level of
regulation. A similar argument is also made by Egan et al. (2015) where they found
that corporate management in the food, beverage and tobacco sectors see value in
disclosing internal water management information when communal interest and
pressure emerges. In Morrison et al.’s (2010, p. 7) words, the disclosure of available
corporate water accounting information is driven by “the desire to identify and
reduce water-related business risks” through “building competitive advantage” (e.g.
enhanced water use efficiency) and “ensuring long-term operational viability” (e.g.
maintained or improved social licence to operate).
As such, corporate water accounting and reporting practices seem to “fall somewhere
within the status quo and reformist camps”, not that of the transformists24 (Hazelton,

24
Hazelton (2014, p. 12) summarises Hopwood, Mellor and O’Brien’s (2005) three categories of sustainability proponents:
“those supporting the “status quo” who suggest that market forces with minimal government regulation are sufficient to drive
social and environmental outcomes, such as the World Business Council for Sustainable Development (WBCSD); the
“reformists” who believe that significant government intervention is required but that the liberal democratic systems are
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2014, p. 12). Water related SEAR technologies, therefore, can no longer be treated as
neutral or apolitical, but rather constitutive in terms of particular social relations.
According to Lehman (1999, p. 222), modern SEAR has taken “a managerial and
procedural turn”, therefore perpetuating the idea that “human[s] can control and
manage nature”. It more often than not mutes social and environmental values and
positions other than those of the technical, procedural and economic, and renders
alternative voices and interpretations non-existent by exclusion and silence (Archel
et al., 2009; Buhr, 2001).
However, accounting studies that explicitly highlight the political struggle and social
conflicts by bringing socio-political constituencies, other than those from the
industry and sometimes the government are limited. In other words, the current
literature on water related accounting practice tends to be organisational or industryfocused without juxtaposing and engaging with the construction of social and
environmental values and positions from other perspectives, such as those from civil
society. As such, Spence, et al. (2010, p. 85) argue that SEAR studies should engage
with social and environmental movements, and other grass roots actions, as “it is
more important to engage with the construction of the ‘people’ and challenge the
logic of the system per se”.
This thesis echoes this call and examines how BHP, Australian Federal and South
Australian governments and civil society perceive sustainable water governance and
management in general and BHP’s entitlement to the GAB water in particular, by
comparing corporate sustainability reports and statements, government regulatory
documents and Hansards with alternative disclosures obtained from external sources.
It explores the way in which ideology is manifest in water disclosures of the
corporation and governments and is resisted and challenged by NGOs,
environmental activists and Aboriginal groups.
This thesis is also inspired by the notion of ‘counter-accounting’ (Gallhofer et al.,
2006). Counter-accounting has recently emerged in SEAR field as a stream of
critical accounting research (e.g. Archel et al., 2009; Boyce, 2000; Gallhofer et al.,

fundamentally sound, such as the Club of Rome; and “transformationists” who believe that fundamental change is required,
such as neo-Marxists and deep ecologists.”
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2006; O'Sullivan & O'Dwyer, 2009). It perceives accounting information as a
rhetorical means to manipulate social perceptions and improve corporate image
strategically (Archel et al., 2009; Mäkelä & Näsi, 2010). Counter-accounting
embraces
information and reporting systems employed by [different stakeholder] groups
…with a view to promoting their causes or countering or challenging the
prevailing official and hegemonic position (Gallhofer et al., 2006, pp. 681-682).
The latter is largely dominated by business concerns, sometimes aligned or
overlapping with those of the government (Archel et al., 2009; Gallhofer et al., 2006),
whereas the former, notably environmental NGOs and other campaigners intend to
reveal controversies and contradictions of existing situations by representing views
of the less powerful, usually in the form of disadvantaged social groups or ecological
systems (Dey et al., 2011).
Adams (2004) for example, uses the concept of accountability as a framework to
compare social, environmental and ethical disclosures of a company, Alpha, with
information obtained from external sources. The portrayal gap she identifies between
these various perspectives is found to be mainly due to the lack of completeness in
reporting, leading to the conclusion that Alpha is not a highly responsible or
accountable company to its key stakeholder groups.
Mäkelä and Nasi (2010) combine stakeholder theory, legitimacy theory and the
concept of social contract. They demonstrate how a multinational corporation
understood corporate social responsibility differently from its employees,
governments and the community in a case of organisational downsizing, by
contrasting corporate reports with media articles. They find that while employees
and their representatives adopt a social stance on the downsizing issue, the corporate
argumentation is dominated by an economic dimension.
Similarly, Archel et al. (2009), by expanding the scope of legitimacy theory, captures
different channels of information to examine diverse views on a lean production
process introduced by a corporation. Two types of discourse are revealed - the
economic discourse represented in corporate annual reports and social discourse
from employees on welfare issues. More specifically, they find that the State
government supports and assists corporate legitimising strategies through ideological
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alignment, as opposed to the concerns of the employees, such as working conditions
and life quality.
The initial concern of counter-accounting activities is to problematise and destabilise
the normalised nature and taken-for-granted assumptions of business and sometimes
the government (Dey et al., 2011). In the same vein, counter-accounts often
encompass the development of a counter-narrative (and metaphors) (as opposed to
quantified indicators) to facilitate other voices (Boyce, 2000; Dey et al., 2011;
Everett, 2004). This recognition and acknowledgement of alternative perspectives
forms the initial step in the transformative potential of critical accounting and ethos
the call for a dialogic approach to accounting which facilitates democratic interaction
and participation (Brown, 2009; Gray, 1992).
This thesis explores the procedural, techno-scientific and economic rationality of the
corporation and governments through juxtaposing and contrasting them with social
and environmental concerns from the civil society manifest through various
disclosure documents. It exposes the fundamental contradictions and exploitative
dimensions of capitalist systems to promote a democratic dialogue (Brown, 2009;
Brown & Fraser, 2006). This thesis consequently allows different styles of
accountability from corporations, governments and civil society to be articulated and
reflected upon (Buhr, 2001; Rodrigue, 2014).
3.3

Accountability

Accountability is a sociological term that “denotes the exchange of reasons for
conduct” (Messner, 2009, p. 920). It relates closely to one principle purpose of
financial reporting - stewardship, and the other one is decision-usefulness
(International Accounting Standard Broad (IASB), 2001, IASB Framework para. 12;
13; 14). In fact, in July 2005, IASB proposed not to designate ‘stewardship’ as a
separate objective of financial reporting in their converged framework. Instead, this
conceptual framework should acknowledges that
financial information directed at the primary objective of providing
information useful for investment, credit, and similar resource allocation
decisions is useful for other purposes, including assessing management's
stewardship (IASB, 2005a, Framework para. 24 in O'Connell, 2007).
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This proposal means that although stewardship will still be indicated in the
framework, it is subsumed by the main objective of financial reporting to provide
decision-useful information. Stewardship/accountability refers to the efficient
administrative and executive plans for consuming and conserving resources, which
include directing and controlling material and human resources of an organisation,
and maintaining and reporting on the custodianship/stewardship decision of
resources (Chen, 1975).
Stewardship/accountability is derived from property rights and is based on the idea
that managers as agents look after the assets or resources which are entrusted to them
by the owners (IASB 2001, IASB Framework para.14). The concept of
stewardship/accountability has evolved through historical development from
traditional custodial relationship to the modern concept of managerial performance
(O'Connell, 2007; Pannell, 1979). According to Chen (1975), the managerial
stewardship concept covers not only the accountability to immediate ownersshareholders’ interest, but also social accountability. In other words, it requires
managerial accountability to not only embrace the “resolution of agency problems
between management and owners” (Shearer, 2002, p. 562), but also extend to the
accountability of environmental assets.
Following this logic, it can be argued that financial accounting reports are reports of
and reported by management on its stewardship/accountability (Chen, 1975;
O'Connell, 2007).
[I]t is management’s point of view that the accountant should adopt in order to
define the objectives of financial reporting, to analyse transactions, and to
provide financial statements pertinent to the evaluation of management’s
performance as a steward (Chen, 1975, p. 542).
However, according to Sinclair (1995, p. 219), accountability is an “elusive” concept,
and its meaning is nuanced dependent upon its context. An increasing body of
accounting literature has demonstrated the different forms and multi-dimensions of
accountability, such as Sinclair’s (1995) political, public, managerial, professional
and personal accountability, Roberts’ (1991, 2003) hierarchical and socialising
accountability, Benston’s (1982) corporate accountability, Shearer’s (2002)
economic accountability and Gray’s (1992) democratic accountability. Yet whatever
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form and meanings one adopts, accountability unavoidably attempts to reflect
“symbolically upon the practical interdependence of action”, that entails “both moral
and strategic dimensions” (Roberts, 1991, p. 356).
While the concept of accountability can be simply referred to as “the duty to provide
an account of the actions for which one is held responsible” (Gray, Dey, Owen,
Evans & Zadek, 1997, p. 334), there are social values featured by different
stakeholder groups (institutions) which define who is expected to account to whom,
for what, and in which manner (Messner, 2009; see also Shearer, 2002). In
Schweiker’s (1993, p. 235) words,
giving an account is one activity in which we come to be as selves and
particular kinds of communities through forms of discourse that shape, guide
and judge life regarding concern for the common good, human solidarity and
basic respect.
The competing views of stewardship/accountability therefore hinges on an
understanding or disclosure of that which a company is said to control and manage.
For the purpose of this thesis, managerial accountability, administrative
accountability and moral accountability resonate with ‘ideal’ forms of accountability
which BHP OD, the Federal and South Australian governments, and civil society
have towards the GAB water resource respectively. It is the fundamental concepts of
rights and obligations drawn from these different forms of accountability that the
different institutions identify for its actions and undertakings as an account for
legitimacy (Shearer, 2002).
3.3.1

Managerial accountability

Managerial accountability25 is normally assumed by private entities (Messner, 2009;
Shearer, 2002). This accountability portrays human identities as merely economic
subjects guided by self-interests, and restricts social relationships to economic terms
(Messner, 2009; Roberts, 1991). In other words, when providing interpretations and
justifications for its actions, a business entity will draw on the accepted motivations
and rationales of economic subjects such as individualism, utilitarianism and an
instrumental value of good (Arrington & Francis, 1993; Messner, 2009; Shearer,
2002).
25

See also economic accountability by Shearer (2002), financial or hierarchical accountability by Roberts (1991, 2003).
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What underpins these assumptions is a strong liberal belief based in neoclassical
economics that an individual should be free to pursue his or her vision of the good
(Shearer, 2002). ‘Value’ of the good is not inherent in the good itself, but rather
within that good’s relationship to the satisfaction of human needs and desires.
Natural resources are treated, therefore, as economic goods objectified for efficiency
and profit maximisation (Shearer, 2002), and are normally controlled and managed
by modern science and technology through calculation, quantification and prediction
(Gray, 1992; Power, 2007).
Similarly, managerial accountability does not take into account the existence of
social and environmental costs (Freedman & Stagliano, 1990; Lehman, 1996). There
are two reasons for this. First, managerial accountability presupposes that the
common good is the outcome of a free exchange which can be achieved by the
pursuit of private interests.26 It does not acknowledge that shareholder interests do
not necessarily serve the collective or common good of the wider community
(Shearer, 2002). Therefore, the issue of managerial accountability is dependent upon
“the extent or resolution of agency problems between management and owners”, not
the possibility that society holds corporate owners accountable to a
[common/public] good [such as social and environmental costs] that is not
congruous with these owners’ private interests (Shearer, 2002, p. 562).
Second, managerial accountability is based on the dominant neo-classical economic
supposition that social and environmental costs and benefits are immaterial, thought
to be unquantifiable, therefore unmeasurable, in the domain of a free market
(Freedman & Stagliano, 1990). When natural resources such as water become scarce,
the best way to protect them is to assign a monetary value to ensure that the market
allocates water according to its best use. It is important to note that advocates of
managerial accountability characterise the market as a ‘fair’ distributive mechanism,
which is considered to “reward the ‘productive’ fairly with pecuniary compensation
and to punish the ‘non-productive’ justly with failure” (Young, 1996, p. 49). Direct
intervention, such as government regulation, therefore, is perceived as inappropriate
unless it is aligned with principles of the free market (Young, 1996). Managerial

26
This point is evident in Benston’s (1982) essay on accounting and corporate accountability towards shareholders. ‘Corporate
accountability’, from Benston’s perspective means ‘managerial accountability’, and it is a meaningful issue because managers
have discretion to use the resources from shareholders in a way that do not serve shareholders’ interests.
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accountability favours economic instruments such as water licences/rights/permits to
protect the environment (Jones, 2010).
3.3.2

Administrative accountability

Administrative accountability

27

derives from Westminster traditions of the

responsibility of public servants (Funnell & Cooper, 1998). These public servants
exercise authority on behalf of elected representatives, who hold direct
accountability to the public (Burritt & Welch, 1997; Sinclair, 1995). In modern
liberal democracies, a Westminster government is said to be accountable to
parliament and the people for “governing in the best interests of all citizens
according to accepted conventions or legally prescribed processes” (Funnell, 2003, p.
107).
Government policies, accordingly, have a social value base, which is influenced by
social needs and perceptions of doing the right thing. The underlying reason is
assumed to be a mechanism “keeping the population safe from threats of discord,
violence or, more broadly, freedom from fear” (Ball & Grubnic, 2007, p. 247).
Government policies are considered to reflect the collective by focusing on a group
of citizens instead of individual consumers’ choices (Burritt & Welch, 1997; Parker
& Gould, 1999).
It is notable that the necessity of government regulation is embedded in the notion of
a common/public good. Common/public goods, from the perspective of the
government, are common properties which are perceived as necessary for the
enhancement of both the economic and social well-being of a nation (Barton, 2006;
Pallot, 1992). With respect to the common/public goods as natural resources, the
government objective is to preserve them in good condition so as to provide social
and environmental benefits to the public in perpetuity (Barton, 1999). Under
circumstances where a private entity uses a public resource to produce private goods,
governments normally restrict its commercial activities by realigning the private,
social and environmental costs through regulation or by levying ‘green taxes’ to
remedy the problem of externalities (Barton, 1999).

27

See also constitutional accountability by Funnell (2003).
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Government policy decisions are usually referred to as a “fair resource distribution”
(Ball & Grubnic, 2007, p. 252) around “which public goods are to be provided, in
what quantities and to whom, and their method of funding” (Barton, 1999, p. 25).
Although governments are considered to have multiple roles i.e. to make the private
sector accountable for its commercial performance, as well as the responsibility for
social justice and environmental protection against the backdrop of sustainable
development (Burritt & Welch, 1997), Western liberal democratic societies over the
last three decades have largely concerned themselves with increasing economic
growth, achieved through “passing more power to the market, coupled with steadily
decreasing levels of political engagement from the demos” (Spence et al., 2010, p.
78). According to Tinker, et al. (1991, p. 29), modern liberal democracy is founded
on pluralist political assumptions. These assumptions include
a belief that no undue concentrations of power exist that confer systemic
advantages to some groups; that, notwithstanding their differences, social
protagonists share a common interest in sustaining the whole system; and that
the state pursues a neutral, mediating role in conflict resolution (Tinker et al.,
1991, p. 29).
In other words, the government is considered as providing “a neutral marketplace”
where aggregate social preferences are expressed in the political process (Arnold,
1990, p. 179), and the democratic electoral and legal system and the market can
function in “a desirable manner” (Tinker et al., 1991, p. 29). Regulation, as such, is
deemed as a response to public demand and therefore upholds the public interest
(Arnold, 1990). Government policies involved in modelling, standard-setting,
monitoring, reporting and enforcement mechanisms are said to align with the
prevailing business model (Burritt & Welch, 1997).
From a civil society perspective, managerial accountability has an overriding
concern with the individual and profits that serve to negate the very obligation to
broader social and environmental distributive justice (Schweiker, 1993; Shearer,
2002). Administrative accountability, albeit allegedly taking a social value base, is
vested in agreed procedures and rules supported by government regulatory coercion
(Puxty, Willmott, Cooper & Lowe, 1987), which is concerned with political
pragmatism and acceptance rather than social and environmental equity and justice
(Tinker et al., 1991). Administrative accountability, therefore, is merely a short-term
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solution mechanism (Lehman, 1996), unlikely to rectify social ills fundamentally
from “waste, exploitation, extravagance, disadvantage or coercion” (Tinker et al.,
1991, p. 29). According to Buhr (2001), Lehman (1995) and Tinker, et al. (1991),
managerial accountability and administrative accountability are the forms most
commonly seen in current western liberal societies, and subscribes to ‘business-asusual’ and ‘middle of the road’ cases for sustainability .
As a steward, management’s performance should be evaluated in terms of both
profit and the accomplishment of social objectives. The latter aspect has long
been neglected by the accounting profession (Chen, 1975, p. 542).
As Andrew (2007) asserts, managerial and administrative approaches to
accountability focus mainly on the scientific, technical and procedural dimensions of
accountability rather than ethical and moral dimensions. For example, the
internalisation of externalities through regulation that requires modelling, standardsetting, efficiency-oriented performance measures and green taxes that are numerical
in general, and monetary in particular, reinforces scientific and analytical solutions
(Gray, 1992). In the meantime, it neglects the full social and environmental costs that
are beyond monetary value (Beder, 1997; Dumay, Guthrie & Farneti, 2010).
This ostensible objectivity with both “positive and negative sanctions” surrounding
managerial and administrative accountability make it “the image of events that
counts” (Roberts, 1991, p. 363) and often entails “unintended and unacknowledged
moral, social and environmental consequences that spill out from the pursuit of
strategic objectives” (Roberts, 1991, p. 367). According to Lehman (1999, p. 518),
managerial and administrative accountability form a “strict liberal accountability”
framework perpetuating the status-quo by simply providing information so as to
allow efficient utilisation of scarce resources without critically analysing what a
corporation is doing to the environment and society.
Therefore, managerial accountability at large and administrative accountability to
some extent reflects “a sense of self as solitary and singular with no necessary
connection to others” (Roberts, 1991, p. 358). That is, managerial accountability and
administrative accountability can be considered as “a self-referential exercise”
(Shearer, 2002, p. 559) which justify one’s actions for one’s own sake (Messner,
2009) and constructs social relations in a way that the moral obligation to others tend
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to be diminished if not silenced (Shearer, 2002). In Adam’s (Adams, 2004, p. 732)
words, the alignment of these two forms of accountability brings into focus
“sustainability of the business [and government] rather than [social and]
environmental sustainability”. This separation of strategic and moral dimensions of
accountability is detrimental of both strategic and ethical concerns (Roberts, 1991).
This combination of managerial and administrative accountability is reflected in the
cultural risk model adopted in this thesis as both market and government institutions
form a strong centre.
3.3.3

Moral accountability

To challenge the problematic capitalistic and governmental structures and mitigate
environmental damage and social inequity, a wider concept of accountability is
suggested by civil society. This form of accountability can be termed ‘moral
accountability’ 28 which is a fundamental and more encompassing and democratic
form of accountability to cover the ethical requirement of accountability to the other
(Messner, 2009; Shearer, 2002). According to Shearer (2002, p. 559), to be
accountable to the other is to acknowledge “a non-instrumental relationship”, which
is a relationship of obligation to or responsibility for the other that cannot be
discharged by reference merely to one’s own interest. As Roberts (1991, p. 358)
contends, moral accountability can enact “a sense of self which, whilst individually
confirming, simultaneously acknowledges and expresses the interdependence of self
and other”.
Moral accountability embraces ethical concerns regarding “the moral status of
economic collectivities, including the scope of the moral community and the good
that this community seeks” (Shearer, 2002, p. 541). It is the moral community within
which private entities and governments are situated that defines “whose needs count
and whose goods are sought” (Shearer, 2002, p. 546). Moral accountability, therefore,
considers an identity answerable to wider social interests and encompasses a wider
scope of common/public good, apart from the private good (Schweiker, 1993).
What we account for (actions, outcomes, intentions, relations) and our
substantive notions of what is good are bound up with these relations to
others and ourselves. As we will see, the social nature of giving an account…
28

See also socialising accountability by Roberts (1991, 2003), and democratic accountability by Gray (1992).
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is the roots for developing claims about distributive and social justice
(Schweiker, 1993, p. 224).
Moral accountability consequently cultivates openness and dialogue rather than
scientific, technical and economic reasoning (Messner, 2009). The development of
moral accountability can be regarded as a liberating social process with “a means to
define and re-define community, to create closer social relationship and bring power
back to “the People”” (Buhr, 2001, p.409). In this practice, others are encountered
more directly and relationships between self and others developed more fully than
merely fundamental utility that is demanded or officially required (Roberts, 1991).
This moral relation to others necessitates mutual understanding beyond the giving
and receiving of accounts through formal categories provided by managerial and
administrative

accountability

(Messner,

2009).

It

requires

face-to-face

communications to facilitate openness and mutual understanding in the absence of
hierarchical power dynamics and especially seeks to make the voice of the most
vulnerable heard (Messner, 2009; Roberts, 1991).
Moral accountability, therefore, involves democratic participation to make
corporations not only comply with legal relationships, but also undertake “a process
of negotiation, explanation and articulation” which seeks to create “a sense of
belonging and understanding in the community” (Lehman, 1999, p. 232). In this case,
moral accountability requires negotiation and explanation concerning whether a local
community wants mining development, and whether they are given a fair hearing.
Moral accountability
offer[s] the possibility of a more complete recognition of self, the
engagement of personal understanding and the challenging of others’ views
and expectations. Out of such relationships is built mutual understanding and
ties of friendship, loyalty and reciprocal obligation; a sense both of individual
difference and mutual dependence. Self is confirmed but in a way that
simultaneously acknowledges and articulates the interdependence of self and
other (Roberts, 1991, p. 363).
To promote democratic dialogue and discharge moral accountability, critical
accounting (counter narrative) can act as an enabling tool that facilitates decisions of
the community in a fairer and more equitable manner (Schweiker, 1993). Critical
accounting (counter narrative) “can be developed as part of a public sphere
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committed to exposing and explaining corporate effects on ‘the world’ and to reflect
on what is ‘significant’ for communities” (Schweiker, 1993, p. 220).
The utility of such accounting is not in its representation of “infallible truth'” but in
its creation of a range of environmental and social visibilities and exposure of values
and priorities that become inputs to wider democratic processes of discourse and
decision making (Boyce, 2000, p. 53).The case of BHP OD’s water intake plan and
the associated controversies of ODEP provide an opportunity to explore different
forms of accountability. By comparing corporate sustainability reports and
statements, government documents with alternative disclosures obtained from public
submissions and other external sources, this study opens the door for a development
of constructive participatory democracy, along with critical (counter) accounting’s
emancipatory potential.
3.4

Summary

This chapter explored critical accounting studies generally and water related social
and environmental disclosure specifically. This thesis is predicated on the
assumption that mainstream accounting and reporting practices promote a capitalist
ideology and economic interests while silencing social and environmental values.
Since this thesis examines the GAB water debate arising from BHP OD’s Olympic
Dam mining operations, the study will analyse the way in which ideology is
inscribed in the water disclosures of corporations and governments and resisted and
challenged by NGOs, environmental activists and Aboriginal groups. The study is
located within critical accounting studies with a concern of a broader appeal of how
water matters to a range of stakeholders. It exposes the fundamental contradictions
and exploitative dimensions of capitalist system, and promotes democratic dialogue
within society (Bebbington et al., 2007; Brown, 2009; Brown & Fraser, 2006;
Dillard & Brown, 2012). Three types of accountability were also introduced in this
chapter to facilitate an understanding of the rationality differences between BHP OD,
governments and civil society. These different accountabilities map directly to a
cultural risk model that explores markets, governments and civil society at an
institutional level.
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The following chapter examines a cultural perspective of risk as the methodology
that this thesis adopts to investigate different institutional positions towards the GAB
water related social and environmental risks manifest in respective disclosure
documents.
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CHAPTER 4 METHODOLOGY
4.1

Introduction

Chapter 3 reviewed the critical accounting studies in general and water accounting
studies in particular and included a discussion of three styles of accountability that
underpins the rationality and value differences among BHP Billiton Olympic Dam
Corporation Pty Ltd (BHP OD), governments and civil society in relation to the
Great Artesian Basin (GAB) water debate. This chapter presents a cultural
perspective of risk as an appropriate methodology to examine different institutional
stances towards the GAB water related economic, social and environmental risks
manifest in contested water disclosures. This methodology is anchored in a
transdisciplinary approach that emphasises socio-cultural expectations and value
debates (Horlick-Jones & Sime, 2004; Sampford, 2009).
Risk, from a cultural perspective, is nuanced and water, as a scarce and valuable
resource, is valued differently across a range of institutions according to different
cultural patterns and belief systems (Lupton, 1999). By adopting a culturally inspired
construction of risk, this thesis investigates the socially constructed nature of the
GAB water risk debate and how it is linked to different assumptions underlying
various institutional disclosures and the related issue of accountability.
There has long been a struggle between positivism and social constructivism in the
field of risk research. The term ‘risk’ came to light during the transitional period
between late Middle Ages and early modernity (Lupton, 1999). Throughout the
centuries, the meaning of risk has changed in its proliferate application to diverse
situations (Luhmann, 1993). In pre-modern times, humans were preoccupied by the
mysterious power of fate; and risk awareness often arose from uncertainties about
the future. Natural disasters such as earthquakes, floods, storms, famines or
epidemics were perceived as risk, since they created disorder outside the control of
mankind (Luhmann, 1993; Lupton, 1999). The notion of risk was expanded by the
nineteenth century. Instead of being located exclusively in nature, risk was also
acknowledged in human conduct. Unexpected outcomes may come as a result of
human action and has resulted in the modern way of looking at the world and its
chaotic manifestations, uncertainties and contingencies (Lupton, 1999).
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In a modernist view, risk is distinct from uncertainty, in that, the likelihood of an
unanticipated event happening is estimable therefore manageable (Lupton, 1999;
Renn, 1992). Uncertainty, conversely, presupposes a form of “indeterminacy” that is
not subject to any probability evaluation (Reddy, 1996, p. 227). This “managerial
distinction” (Power, 2007, p. 5) is derived from the development of scientific
knowledge and rational thinking which is deemed as the key to human civilization
and progress. It assumes that the social order and laws of nature may be measured,
calculated and predicted (Lupton, 1999). As such, once uncertainty transforms into a
form of risk through organising, it is subjected to rationalised counting, ordering and
therefore, becomes manageable (Moerman & van der Laan, 2012; Power, 2007).
Risk can also be used as a “neutral” idea incorporating both ‘good’ and ‘bad’. It
represents the possibility for the occurrence of certain incidents associated with
either losses or gains or both (Douglas, 1992, p. 23).
Accounting systems have long played a pre-eminent role in the risk assessment and
management of modern economic entities (Bebbington & Thomson, 2007; Miller,
Kurunmäki & O’Leary, 2008; Moerman & van der Laan, 2012; Power, 2007). Being
understood conventionally as “the process of identifying, measuring and
communicating economic information to permit informed judgments and decisions
by the user of that information” (American Accounting Association, 1966, p. 1),
accounting practice is used to present an objective, true and fair view of the entities
performance, including risk related calculations and cost-benefit analyses
(Bebbington & Thomson, 2007; Young, 2001). Shifts in the meaning of risk
connotes that the identification and conceptualization of risk is not static and onedimensional, but is dependent on both historical and social-cultural contexts (Lupton,
1999). Particularly, it is dependent on the methodological framing of both the
questions about risk and the subsequent means to find ‘solutions’.
This chapter outlines the methodological issues in risk research with its application
in accounting studies. An overview of a realist/positivist perspective of risk (Section
4.2) is provided before a discussion of a social constructivist perspective of risk
(Section 4.3). Throughout this discussion, the application of these diverse risk
methodologies in accounting studies are reviewed with a focus on cultural risk in
critical accounting research.
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4.2

Realist/Positivist perspective of risk

Risk criteria are framed and defined to enable the prioritisation of actions within
social systems. According to Renn (1992, p. 54), core questions collateral to a risk
debate include questions such as;
[w]hat criteria are appropriate for dealing with risk? How safe is safe enough?
Should society adapt a set of uniform criteria for all types of risk regardless of
context? Who should be involved in designing these criteria? Who should be held
accountable if the criteria prove inadequate?
The responses to these questions vary according to different perspectives in society
(Bradbury, 1989). If risk is viewed as pre-existing in nature and as an objective
attribute of an activity or event, risk is identified and ordered through scientific
measures and calculations of probability and magnitude of harm (Lupton, 1999;
Renn, 1992) and result in the technical, economic and psychological perspectives of
risk outlined below.
4.2.1

A technical perspective of risk

Technical approaches to risk stem from fields such as statistics, engineering and
epidemiology and combine the notion of physical danger and hazard with a
measurement instrument (Lupton, 1999; Renn, 1992). Risk here is defined as a
“product of the probability and consequences (magnitude and severity) of an adverse
event” (Bradbury, 1989, p. 382). Using models or observed relative frequencies, a
technical approach anticipates the likelihood and the average of past risk events over
time and space to estimate the magnitude of a negative effect. This focus on
combining risk assessment and risk management underlies the prevalent risk analysis
paradigm (Kasperson, 1992; Lupton, 1999; Renn, 1992).
Accounting has been considered important to the development of risk analysis
(Power, 2007). Through capturing, quantifying and communicating financial risk,
traditional accounting systems help to “tam[e] incalculable uncertainties as
calculable risks” (Power, 2007, p. 13) in the processes of corporate management and
governance (Bebbington & Thomson, 2007). Social and environmental accounting
and reporting practices are perceived to carry the same role in organisations with the
extension of corporate accountability into social and environmental dimensions of
activity (Gray, Owen & Maunders, 1987).
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However, a formal risk analysis, accompanied by an ill-masked system of expert
knowledge, produces flawed and biased risk management practices, (Dietz, Frey &
Rosa, 2002; Lupton, 1999; Reddy, 1996). Experts, while seeking the artefactual
status of objective knowledge, tend to ignore underpinning value positions or
assumptions (Lupton, 1999; Wynne, 1989). This is also the case for accountants.
According to Bebbington and Thomson (2007, p. 41), the fact that accountancy
professionals “promote themselves as experts in evidence-based governance and
decision-making” is based on “an implicit assumption” that the objective, verifiable
and rationality-based decision making process is most appropriate to manage risks.
And this belief is pervasive in their official reports and statements.
Yet accounting’s role as an ideological weapon that goes beyond a merely technical
practice is increasingly recognized and well-documented by a large number of
alternative accounting researchers (e.g. Chua, 1986a; Dillard, 1991; Hopwood, 1987;
Miller, 1994; Power, 1994). Accounting, “as social and institutional practice” (Miller,
1994, p. 1) implicates the context within which it operates as a “intervening ... device
for acting upon activities, individuals and objects in such a way that the world may
be transformed” (Miller, 1994, p. 2). It confers “a particular form of visibility”
through calculating and recording certain processes or events in order to “alter the
way in which it can be thought about and acted upon” (Miller, 1994, p. 1). By doing
this, accounting may “tend to give undue prominence to values that can be calculated,
not necessarily to the most significant” (Douglas & Wildavsky, 1982, p. 70; see also
Reddy, 1996). Additionally, this bias is not only restricted to the “numerical
computations” of costs, profits, losses and returns since accounting also involves
“complex language and meanings” (Miller, 1994, p. 3). Young (2001, p. 607) for
example, analyses the risk-related language from the Financial Accounting Standards
Board (FASB), and highlights the way in which “metaphors have contributed to the
thinkability of risk management”. In this article, risk is depicted metaphorically as
“exposure, disease, burden and adversary” (Young, 2001, p. 620) which is consistent
with the idea of an “opponent” that “must and should be confronted and managed”
(Young, 2001, p. 607).
Since technical risk analysis does not represent an objective, neutral, absolute and
universal truth (Bradbury, 1989) experts, such as accountants, attempt to reify and
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objectify the localised nature of risk measurement and calculation. In so doing they
separate the socially and culturally shaped components of knowledge and reduce
them to certain subjective values (Bebbington & Thomson, 2007; Lupton, 1999;
Miller, 1994). This fact/value dichotomy (Bradbury, 1989; Rayner, 1992) is
apparently convenient and attractive for science exponents to seek simple solutions
to complex situations (e.g. Cohen, 1985). From this perspective, laypeople or public
sources of knowledge are seen as ‘inappropriate’ or ‘incorrect’, in comparison to the
‘superior’ and ‘sophisticated’ knowledge of experts (Lupton, 1999).
4.2.2 An economic perspective of risk
The realist perspective of risk is also reflected in the economic notion of costs and
benefits associated with expected utility losses arising from an activity or event
(Dietz et al., 2002; Reddy, 1996; Renn, 1992; Short, 1984). Here, the criterion to
predetermine undesirable effects used in the technical perspective is substituted by
the subjective satisfaction to “make benefits and risk commensurable” (Renn, 1992,
p. 63).
According to Miller (1992), accounting is identified as a commensuration practice
that makes “activities and processes whose physical characteristics and geographical
location may bear no resemblance” comparable by according them “the single figure”
(Miller, 1992, pp. 68-69). The problem of incommensurability occurs because the
emphasis is to “assign monetary values to all costs and benefits” (Dietz et al., 2002,
p. 333). This approach is less problematic if the value is assigned to certain benefits,
say, productivity. However, it is a serious issue when assigning costs arising from
health, ecological and social risks (Dietz et al., 2002; Krimsky & Golding, 1991;
Reddy, 1996). In a study investigating the implementation of private sector
accounting in public prison entities, Mennicken (2011) argues that accounting and
risk management, while promoting an individual prison’s financial performance,
shifts the focus from “the individual prisoner... [and] the Prison Service as a whole”
to “individual prison establishments.” It consequently results in “a systemic
decentring of Prison Service accountability” (Mennicken, 2011, p. 18).
Another critique of the economic model of cost-benefit-analysis is centred on the
fundamental philosophical underpinning of the economic approach - the rational
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actor paradigm (Adams, 1995; Dietz et al., 2002; Renn, 1992). It has a considerable
implications for accounting, especially since accounting texts are usually coupled
with the image that purposive individuals search for accurate and complete
information so as to make ‘rational’ decisions including acting rationally on risk
decisions (Miller & O'Leary, 1990). Nonetheless, economic rationality is
questionable in the face of uncertain conditions (Power, 2007). Indeed, as Miller
(1994, p. 18) indicates, organizations and individuals “might not conform to the
idealized and naive models of rational behaviour” and are more likely to be
“constrained” and “uncertain” about preferences, especially under uncertainty.
Therefore, as a “logical consequence” of a ‘rational’ cost and benefit analysis,
uncertainty that “cannot be valued in an acceptable fashion” is “ignored and
therefore does not form part of this analysis” (Bebbington & Thomson, 2007, p. 44).
4.2.1

A psychological perspective of risk

The rationality of a techno-economic risk analysis has also been explicitly
challenged in studies regarding perceptions of risk perceptions (Kasperson, 1992;
Lupton, 1999; Power, 2007). Combining risk perceptions with behavioural decision
theory, a psychological perspective of risk has shed light on the controversial and
conflicting phenomena of risk management in society. It provides insights to identify
the differences and similarities among a group’s responses to risk events and found a
systematic and predictable linkage between perceived and acceptable risk (Sovic,
1992). For example, an experts’ judgement of risk is highly correlated with technical
estimations while judgements from laypeople bear other contextual features (Renn,
1992).
The psychological approach to risk analysis expands the subjective notion of risk
judgment in three ways (Sovic, 1992). First, it attempts to explain the divergence of
public perception from expert assessment by focusing on the individual preference
for probabilities and magnitude of risk (Renn, 1992). Second, it analyses individuals’
intuitive processing under uncertainty (Krimsky, 1992; Renn, 1992) and has
uncovered judgmental biases in individual capability to estimate probability. These
biases, referred to as ‘heuristics’, are certain discernible rules applied to simplify
complex problems (e.g. complicated risk information) when facing potential
hazardous conditions (Krimsky, 1992; Renn, 1992). Third, it identifies a number of
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risk attributes as contextual variables that influence an individuals’ risk perception
(Krimsky, 1992). These attributes include: acceptability (Lupton, 1999), voluntary,
involuntary (Krimsky, 1992), familiarity, equity, controllability, catastrophic
potential (Sovic, 1992) and expected fatalities or losses (Renn, 1992).
The psychology of risk reveals that public ideas about safety and risks are
complicated “social constructions subject to processes of framing” (Power, 2007, p.
15) and therefore cannot be reduced to techno-economic risk assessment in the form
of consequences and probabilities, or cost-benefit analyses (Renn, 1992). However,
it is still an “ahistorical and non-contextual” approach despite the “strong intuitive
and phenomenological grounding” (Krimsky, 1992, p. 18). According to Lupton
(1999), psychological risk analyses are established in rational behaviour theory to
resemble an economic notion of risk. It is assumed that, through the design of a
survey instrument, subjective factors influencing personal perception and their
relationships can be quantified, modelled and tested in order to predict individual
and societal responses to potential hazards (Sovic, 1992). In this approach, the nature
of risk itself is taken-for-granted and the research emphasises “[p]eople’s responses
to the objects, not the objects themselves” (Hilgartner, 1992, p. 41).
These limitations of a psychological risk perspective highlight the need for a sociocultural inquiry (Dietz et al., 2002). For example, Douglas and Wildavsky (1982)
argue that individuals’ risk attitudes and beliefs are ascribed to a broader cultural
frame. Therefore, a cultural perspective of risk is deemed as more appropriate to
explain how risk is selected, framed and presented by organizational dynamics
(Dietz et al., 2002; Douglas & Wildavsky, 1982; Power, 2007). This perspective also
underpins the theoretical framework for this study. Before discussing a cultural
perspective of risk, the general social constructivist view of risk is presented, with
examples of two other constructivist branches, namely a sociological perspective and
a governmentality perspective of risk.
4.3

Social construction of risk

Those who adopt a social constructivist viewpoint deem risk to be a sociocultural
construct that cannot ever be fully objective as it is bound with historical, social,
cultural and political contexts (Lupton, 1999; Renn, 1992). Social constructionists
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believe that the social, material world and humans are in a dialectical relationship in
which one creates the other. Social reality, although appearing to be objective and
pre-existing, involves actors’ subjective interpretations and the production and
reproduction of definition and knowledge via socialization, social interaction and a
reliance upon shared meaning (Chua, 1986a; Lupton, 1999). Meanings are
“emergent”, “subjectively created” and only “objectified through human interaction”
(Chua, 1986a, p. 615). Scientific knowledge, like any other knowledge, is not
constituted outside belief-systems or moral stances, but rather it is value-laden
(Lupton, 1999). Risk therefore is not an objective or static phenomenon, but is
continually “constructed and negotiated as part of the network of social interaction...
[and] its meanings are precarious and subject to change” (Lupton, 1999, p. 29).
For research into risk as phenomena, social constructionists focus on how it is
identified, labelled and dealt with through sociocultural patterns and changing
patterns of risk perception both spatially and temporally (Lupton, 1999).
Accordingly, the notion of risk exists as a worldview that informs “assemblages of
meanings, logics and beliefs cohering around material phenomena, giving these
phenomena form and substance” (Lupton, 1999, p. 30). The corresponding risk
management activities are planned to reflect life style preference and social value
(Renn, 1992).
There are many perspectives within this sociocultural dimension, yet they can be
loosely grouped into three categories: a sociological perspective, a governmentality
perspective, and a cultural perspective (Lupton, 1999). The following sections
briefly introduce each perspective with its implications for accounting.
4.3.1 A sociological perspective of risk
All sociological concepts of risk share the common notion that human beings never
look at the world with “pristine eyes” (Renn, 1992, p. 67). Risk events, as such, are
understood and negotiated through human values and interests (Kasperson, 1992;
Lupton, 1999). Probabilities and consequences of hazards are socially defined,
constructed, and to a considerable degree, subject to human interventions, social
processes and technological developments (Kasperson, 1992; Renn, 1992). Thus
even though the cause of hazards may not necessarily derive from human conduct,
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risk control and management is essentially founded in social institutions and
interactions (Kasperson, 1992; Renn, 1992).
The German sociologist Ulrich Beck has been predominant in sociological studies of
risk. His work, for example Risk Society Towards a New Modernity (Beck, 1992b),
Reflexive Modernization (1994), The Normal Chaos of Love (1995), and Ecological
Politics in the Age of Risk (1995) are predominantly concerned with the macro-level
process of contemporary risk meaning and strategy and its relationship to what he
perceives as the unique features of the current post-industrial society 29 (Lupton,
1999).
Beck (1992a, 1992b, 1994, 1995) asserts that the transformation of Western societies
from the pre-modern/industrial to the post-modern/industrial era has had a significant
impact on the concept of risk due to the process of industrialisation. Conventional
industrial society is perceived as a ‘Risk Society’, whereby mass production and
consumption are accompanied by risks which have flourished as a result of
modernisation (Lupton, 1999). As such, the fundamental difference identified by
Beck between industrial/modern society and contemporary post-industrial/modern
society is that, whereas the former is concerned with distributing ‘goods’, the latter is
concerned with distributing ‘bads’. Previously, these might have been considered as
“latent and controllable ‘side effects’” (Reddy, 1996, p. 245), however, now are
hazards which are deemed as “intrinsic, irreversible and uncontrollable” (Reddy,
1996, p. 245). These risks, principally environmental, such as air and water pollution
and nuclear radiation, differ markedly from those in previous epochs or other
societies, in that they have confronted human health and life “on a unprecedented
scale” with long-term effects (Lupton, 1999, p. 62). In addition, these risks are
neither visible nor perceptible to the victims... [and] require the sensory organs of
science, theories, experiments, measuring instruments in order to become visible
or interpretable as hazards at all (Beck, 1992b, p. 27).
From the aforementioned, science is understood by Beck as a key player in “the
creation and multiplication of these risks” (Bebbington & Thomson, 2007, p. 47).
This has a significant implication for accounting. Although one of the primary goals

29
As ‘Risk Society’ is not chosen as the theoretical framework for this thesis, but rather a relevant component for methodology,
this section only outlines some relevant themes, focusing on its implication for accounting research.
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of accounting is to enable complex, contingent and intangible risks to emerge and
become amendable through management processes, it is argued that accountancy
professions and accounting systems are incapable of illuminating risks from
industrialisation, let alone managing them (Bebbington & Thomson, 2007; Reddy,
1996). Indeed, mainstream accounting measurement, calculation and valuation are
problematic and implicated in the production, proliferation and dissemination of
these risks (Bebbington & Thomson, 2007; Reddy, 1996). For example, accounting
can be used as a system to legitimate the effects of business-related environmental
harms or hazards (Bebbington & Thomson, 2007). In the absence of an
environmental cost or a social liability, accounting practice is usually taken to
represent the “objective absence” of this externality (Bebbington & Thomson, 2007,
p. 48). Accounting is reduced to “technical objective and apolitical means of
quantifying the world out here” (Saravanamuthu, 2009, p. 164).
According to Beck (1992b), in a post-industrial/modern society, anxieties arising
from risk introduced by industrialisation or modernisation call into question
established beliefs in scientific enterprise and current practices in authoritative
calculation (Lupton, 1999; Reddy, 1996). Individuals no longer see modernity and
science as a key to civilization and progress, but tend to challenge the fundamental
assumptions of this period (Lupton, 1999). This is called ‘reflexive modernity’,
which is characterised by “a negotiation of knowledge claims between science,
political interests, and laypersons - in effect, negotiation between different
epistemologies” (Dietz et al., 2002, p. 346). It highlights the need for “a more
accessible and democratic discourse concerning human needs and divergent human
perceptions [than the mere] calculating approaches to knowing the future” (Reddy,
1996, p. 248). In the same vein, if accountants and accounting practices are about to
capture environmental and social risks fully, make them visible and amenable to
management, current social and environmental accounting technologies must
provide a basis for stakeholder engagement to allow a new form of accountability
(Bebbington & Thomson, 2007).
There are a number of accounting studies conducted in this area. Georgakopoulos
and Thomson (2005) for example, interview relevant stakeholders including
producers, consumers and regulators in the Scottish Salmon farming industry, and
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explore their competing risk perceptions, discourses, and reasons for the absence of
social and environmental accounting and reporting practices. They suggest that
social and environmental accounting should reflexively engage stakeholders, for
example, in a dialogical approach (Thomson & Bebbington, 2005) at all levels in
order to improve democratic accountability. Saravanamuthu (2009, p. 121), on the
other hand, constructs “a risk-based accountability mechanism” by combining
Beck’s theory of ‘Risk Society’, Luhmann’s sociological theory of risk and Gandhi’s
vehicle of communicative action to “facilitate reflexive communicative action” (see
also Saravanamuthu, Lehman & Nyamori, 2012).
To sum up, Beck’s ‘Risk Society’ is concerned with individuals’ emerging
consciousness of shared risk arising from the industrial society where science has
played a dominant role in “externalising and objectifying social form” (Reddy, 1996,
p. 247). The potential of democratic engagement and discourse is to at least mitigate
the “innumerable”, “uncircumscribable” and therefore “radically unpredictable”
effect of risks (Reddy, 1996, p. 244). Beck’s epistemological position is labelled as
‘weak’ social constructivism by Lupton (1999) 30 because the risk phenomena in
‘Risk Society’ are;
based on objective facts about dangers and hazards amenable to rationalistic
calculation, which are then mediated, perceived and responded to in particular
ways via social, cultural and political processes (Lupton, 1999, p. 28).
This thesis, rather than looking at accounting’s potential to objectify environmental
and social danger and harm, focuses on the socially constructed nature of GAB water
related risk and the role of accounting and disclosures within this construction
process.
4.3.2 A Governmentality/Foucauldian perspective or risk
A governmentality perspective on risk investigates how risk is conceptualised and
operated in postmodern society and, is especially related to discipline, surveillance
and regulation exerted by governments upon the population (Lupton, 1999).
Drawing on Michel Foucault’s insights on ‘Governmentality’, modernity and self30

Lupton (1999, p. 26) also categorises the ‘risk society’ thesis as a critical structuralist approach. A critical structuralist
approach, as she contends, “builds on the Marxist critical legacy to focus more on social conflict, inequities and dissent and the
need for social change in relation to risk. Critical structuralists tend to be interested in critiquing the ways in which social
institutions (such as government, the economic system and the legal system) wield power over individuals, reducing their
capacity for agency and autonomy.”
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information, ‘Governmentality’ theorists focus on risk strategies and discourses as
the political echoes of neo-liberalism and explore how they order the material and
social world to render uncertainty and disorder controllable (Lupton, 1999). 31
Therefore, ‘Governmentality’ is a strategy and rationale to social regulation and
control in contemporary western societies is centred on neo-liberalism and political
rule “which champion individual freedom and rights against the excessive
intervention of the state” (Lupton, 1999, p. 86).
Like Beck, the role of science and expert knowledge is emphasised by Foucault with
regard to the phenomena of risk construction in post modernity (Lupton, 1999).
However, instead of a transparent means of reflexive engagement for individuals,
science and expert knowledge is viewed as a key to social administration to provide
advice and guidance concerning risk governance and prevention to the government
(Lupton, 1999).This mode of surveillance, or detecting and monitoring risks in the
wider population, is based on the computing technology of normalization where
statistic probabilities and correlations identify the norms of social behaviour within
certain groups or the overall

population (Lupton, 1999). As such, risk is

problematised, calculated (e.g. categorising marginalised individuals risk or groups)
and governed through external regulation and intervention (Lupton, 1999).
Apart from these directly enforced strategies, a contemporary ‘Governmentality’
approach also involves ‘indirect strategies’ which rely on individual autonomy
through self-regulation (Lupton, 1999). Aligned with the neo-liberal goals and
interests of the state, it is the most crucial aspect of ‘Governmentality’ to promote
voluntary compliance and self-discipline of the population in order to minimize
external intervention (Lupton, 1999). Accounting is understood as such an indirect
means through which the conduct of individuals can be governed (Miller, 1994).
Indeed, accounting systems and practices in a liberal democratic society are deemed
as a mode “of governing economic life” (Miller & O'Leary, 1994, p. 111). According
to Miller (1994, p. 29);
31
‘Governmentality’/Foucauldian approach to risk adopts a poststructuralist perspective on power relations. Unlike functional
structuralism, exponents of poststructuralism emphasize less on the rigid and static definition of structure, and more on the
aspects such as change of meaning and flux in social structure and organization (Lupton, 1999). Individuals are seen as
continuously shifting among different cultural and social identity, equipped with combination of power and knowledge. Power
is not simply viewed as oppressive and coercive, but manipulated through manifold sites, as both productive and inescapable in
any social networks and relations (Lupton, 1999).
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[in] so far as such societies mark out the economy as a distinct sphere with its
own laws and regularities, and make the individual a fundamental locus of
responsibility, accounting has a central place.
By focusing on performance evaluation, accounting techniques provide a particular
way of “exert[ing] a positive influence” (Foucault & Hurley, 1981, p. 137) on
individual actions to “remedy deficits on rationality and responsibility” (Miller, 1994,
p. 29). This system of governmentality has been made possible by resorting to a
neutral and objective “single figure” which is a final result from diverse technologies
of calculation (Miller, 1994, p. 29). For example, standard costing and budgeting
play a principal role in the attempt to make individual performance visible and
calculable in terms of normative financial standards (Miller & O'Leary, 1987). The
analysis of accounting as a governing practice is not only restricted to an
organisational level, but extends to a national level. Knights and Vurdubakis (1993,
p. 729), for instance, examine the “interdependencies between politics and forms of
calculation” through the lens of life insurance. They argue that the “construction of
risk as the object” in life insurance, along with calculative accounting techniques, are
used as “moral and political” strategies by liberal governments to direct, coordinate
and manage social life (Knights & Vurdubakis, 1993, p. 729). As such, accounting is
regarded as pivotal “in creating and sustaining control of capitalistic activities... [It
consequently] enable[s] organisation and governance frameworks to have a global
reach” (Bebbington & Thomson, 2007, p. 45).
In sum, ‘Governmentality’ highlights modern strategies and discourses which bring
risk into being and link this risk concept to an idea of how people should conduct
their life through self-control and management. This approach reflects the neo-liberal
objectives of institutional governments (Lupton, 1999). A ‘Governmentality’
approach adopts a ‘strong’ version of social constructivist and relativist positions
(Lupton, 1999). The intensification of risk discussion and management is a result of
the social change associated with modernization (Lupton, 1999). This concept of risk
is highly political and constitutes a particular norm of behaviour and basis for action
by which individuals are organised and regulated (Lupton, 1999).
For Foucauldian scholars, the physical nature of risk is not at the centre of an
analysis (Lupton, 1999). As Ewald (1991, p. 199) indicates;
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[n]othing is a risk in itself, there is no risk in reality. But on the other hand,
anything can be a risk; it all depends on how one analyses the danger, considers
the event.
Although this thesis is concerned with the social construction of risk as an object, it
does not focus on the governing process to promote voluntary compliance and selfmonitoring of individuals, organisations or industries (Lupton, 1999). Instead, this
thesis investigates the constructed GAB water related risk phenomena from a
cultural perspective, which is explicated in the next section.
4.3.3 A cultural perspective of risk
Whereas sociological and governmentality perspectives link risk perceptions,
responses and strategies to social values and interests, a cultural analysis proposes
that these social values are determined by different cultural patterns and principles
(Krimsky, 1992; Lupton, 1999; Rayner, 1992; Renn, 1992). In other words,
individuals’ risk perception and awareness cannot be made intelligible without
reference to “cultural and political domains”, which are “potentially fraught with
conflict between points of view” (Reddy, 1996, p. 239). This cultural divergence in
risk consciousness has resulted in an emphasis on different risks (Krimsky &
Golding, 1991) which either reinforce social cohesion or support a particular lifestyle (Kasperson, 1992; Rayner, 1992; Thompson, Ellis & Wildavsky, 1990).
It is important to note that a cultural perspective, unlike a psychological analysis,
assumes a (proactive) organisation or institution, rather than an individual, since
individuals “affiliate with organizations that resonate with their values” (Dietz et al.,
2002, p. 346). Risk is inherently a social construction and a cultural choice according
to imperatives of an organisation (Reddy, 1996). Therefore, a cultural risk
perspective combines elements of various methodologies, from both positive and
normative risk disciplines, in a single approach.
From a cultural approach, risk awareness and tolerance can never be elucidated
merely by a technical risk assessment because it is not a value-free exercise (Reddy,
1996). Although engineers and statesmen are said to obtain “objective” facts from
tools such as risk analysis, “the figures about probabilities that are put into the
calculation reflect the assigner’s confidence that the events are likely to occur”
(Douglas & Wildavsky, 1982, p. 71). In the case of Environmental Impact
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Assessments (EIA) and Environmental Impact Statements (EIS) 32 , for example,
despite their official objectives of “identify[ing] the possible risks to the environment
from project proposals” (Harding, 1998, p. 134), do not “necessarily guarantee
scientific validity” (Harding, 1998, p. 142). Based on previous experience, those who
conduct or commission the EIS - often proponents of the project, usually “formulate
EISs so that their proposal is seen in a more favourable light” by highlighting
advantages and trivialising disadvantages (e.g. any adverse effects to the
environment associated with their proposal) (Harding, 1998, p. 142). In this thesis,
BHP’s EIS related to Olympic Dam Expansion Project (ODEP) is found to be
similarly biased, as BHP’s interests, including extracting more water from GAB,
differ significantly from the interests of civil society.
The rejection of a ‘science versus value’ dichotomy is also reflected in a cultural
viewpoint of standard-setting processes (Krimsky & Golding, 1991). According to
Weinberg (1981, p. 5):
Even when the risk can be quantified, the setting of standards is intrinsically a
political act. That is the standards themselves must in the final analysis be
arbitrary.
As such, public environmental decisions or policies, no matter how neutral or
scientific the relevant risk assessment, are essentially derived from a social process
involving the creation of a shared meaning among communities and relations of trust
(Krimsky & Golding, 1991; Rayner, 1992). Water accounting standard-setting, for
example, needs consensus from the key stakeholder groups such as water suppliers,
water recipients and regulatory bodies (Egan & Frost, 2010). As well, environmental
decisions from the Australian Federal and South Australian governments regarding
the charging of a fee or levy for BHP for GAB water extraction required an
agreement among major stakeholders including BHP, local community, and
governmental agencies. As Krimsky and Golding (1991, p. 110) assert, decisionmaking processes may also reflect “the ebbs and flows of any political debate”.

32

According to Harding (1998, p. 134), “[t]he EIA process enables consideration of environmental factors alongside traditional
consideration such as economic and technical aspects of a development proposal”. As “a key document or step in the
framework of an [EIA], an [EIS] ... is the document which details the case for a particular development, the state of the
environment in which the proposal is to be located, likely environmental impacts of the proposal, the alternative operations,
potential safeguard, management and monitoring” (Harding, 1998, p. 138).
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As described previously, a cultural perspective views risk as a social construct and
emphasises the cultural patterns and belief systems through which risk knowledge is
mediated (Lupton, 1999). This approach demonstrates a stronger constructivist view
than the ‘Risk Society’ thesis (4.3.1) and a weaker constructivist view than
‘Governmental’ thesis (Lupton, 1999) (4.3.2), as it acknowledges that real danger, or
risk, exists in the world, but its major arguments are concerned with how risk is
“politicalized” (Douglas, 1992, p. 29). Additionally, a cultural perspective of risk is
indicative of a functional structuralist approach as it focuses on the attitudes or
convictions of social aggregates and analyses their risk selection to address how to
mitigate social deviance and strengthen social order (Lupton, 1999).
In this thesis, a cultural risk perspective is harnessed as a transdisciplinary means to
address conflictual and oppositional socio-cultural expectations and values (HorlickJones & Sime, 2004; Sampford, 2009). It facilitates public engagement and
democratic participation in a communicative and dialogic effort among the regime of
polylogic water governance against the backdrop of water scarcity. The next section
briefly explains the interrelationship between several related themes including risk
management, risk object, accounting and hybrids, from a cultural perspective of risk.
4.4

A cultural perspective of risk for critical accounting research

It is argued by a number of critical accounting researchers that contemporary risk
management practices, with their aim of ‘taming’ incalculable uncertainty into
calculable therefore manageable risks, have become “almost synonymous with ideals
of good management” (Miller et al., 2008, p. 43; see also Power, 2007). What cannot
be overlooked here is the “institutional rationality” that underpins the management
of risk (Moerman & van der Laan, 2012, p. 111).
According to Power (2007, p. 5), the separation of risk from uncertainty implies a
social expectation for “decidability” and “actionability” about the future, and
constructs a new area of responsibility and accountability. As such, uncertainty
becomes risk when it is expected to be manageable. There is a need, both “functional
and political ... to maintain perception of control and manageability” (Power, 2007, p.
5). Therefore, whether all risks are able to be managed is not the core issue. As
Douglas and Wildavsky (1982, p. 1) assert: “[c]an we know the risks we face, now
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or in the future? No we cannot, but yes we must act as if we do” - for that reason,
organisations “must be seen to act as if the management of risk is possible” (Power,
2007, p. 6). Risk management, therefore, has turned into a major strategy of
corporations for managing risks for themselves (Miller et al., 2008; Moerman & van
der Laan, 2012).
It is important to understand the role of accounting in risk management and the
important notion of hybrids. According to Miller et al. (2008), risk management is a
set of practices that are prevalent in both private and public sector organisations. In
spite of its different manifestations in varied fields, risk management generally can
be considered as “an overlapping family” of measuring and calculating methods for
risk that is rooted in statistics (Power, 2007, p. 13). A further investigation of risk
management reveals a broad range of ‘hybrids’ (Miller et al., 2008; Power, 2007)
which are defined by Miller et al. (2008, p. 943) as “new phenomena produced out of
two or more elements normally found separately”. Such cases can be exemplified by
accounting, as accounting techniques, practices and expertise have largely drawn
from other domains and disciplines (Miller, 1994; Miller et al., 2008). Management
accounting, for example, has drawn its calculative contents from disciplines such as
economics and engineering, including discounted cash flow, fixed and variable costs
and standard costing (Miller et al., 2008). Moreover, not only have the core
calculative practices of accounting, but also its rationales, have been adopted from
elsewhere, e.g. science and economics, for other purposes (Miller, 1994, 1998;
Miller et al., 2008). According to Miller (1994, p. 3),
[t]he term rationales can be used to designate this aspect of accounting as a social
and institutional practice ... it is these rationales ... that mobilize the calculative
technologies of accounting.
The hybridisation of accounting is accompanied by the inter-organisational and intraorganisational coordination and cooperation in which sharing expertise and
transferring inter-professional knowledge often result in the creation of “new bodies
of expertise” and the emergence of the “novel metric” (Miller et al., 2008, p. 962;
Moerman & van der Laan, 2012). It is through these hybridising processes, practices
and expertise, that “discrete elements get mixed up to form something new”, and it is
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through this “newly formed object” that managing risk is made possible (Miller et al.,
2008, p. 952; Moerman & van der Laan, 2012).
Indeed, the power of the hybridised accounting technique lies in its role as a
‘boundary object’ (Miller et al., 2008; Moerman & van der Laan, 2012; Power, 2005;
Power, 2007). Bowker and Star (1999, p. 297) note that:
Boundary objects are those objects that both inhabit several communities of
practice and satisfy the informational requirements of each of them. Boundary
objects are thus both plastic enough to adapt to local needs and constraints of the
several parties employing them, yet robust enough to maintain common identify
across sites.
By uniting disparate concerns and interests from diverse domains, accounting can be
seen a “boundary-spanning activity” (Miller et al., 2008, p. 943) that facilitates the
collaboration of multiple “interest groups and potential allies” (Power, 2007, p. 27)
and makes the future uncertainty “calculable and manageable” (Moerman & van der
Laan, 2012, p. 107). Miller and O’Leary (2007) for example, identify the
microprocessor industry’s road-mapping practices and Moore’s Law, as hybrids and
boundary objects from disciplines of finance and scientific technology that help to
minimise risk by affiliating expectations among different firms. In a study of Finnish
health care reforms, Kurunmäki (2004) suggests that the hybridisation between
medical, financial and accounting expertise across organizational boundaries reduced
the uncertainty arising from a new system of resource allocation. Moerman and van
der Laan (2012, p. 107) examine how the hybridised accounting calculative
technology was able to “manage, mediate, and facilitate the socialization of risk” in
the context of liabilities arising from asbestos-related disease and compensation
funding.
In this thesis, GAB water related regulations and (accounting disclosure) practices
from BHP OD and governments differ from classic financial accounting (disclosure)
due to the multiple dimensions it embraces, such as economic, environmental and
social (Chalmers et al., 2010; Plummer & Tower, 2010). Therefore, it can be
understood as a hybrid form of techniques and practices, which falls between
disciplines including engineering, accounting, environmental science and physics,
economics and law (Plummer & Tower, 2010). Combining these different bodies of
expertise and interests, water accounts/disclosures can also be considered as a
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boundary object which is expected by BHP OD and governments to identify and
measure water input, output, and usage in order to facilitate the decision making of
allocation of scare water resources and consequently reduce water-related risks
(Chalmers et al., 2010; Plummer & Tower, 2010).
Apart from the investigation of the water risk regulations and management from
BHP OD and governments, this thesis also analyses counter (accounting) disclosures
from civil society, which challenge BHP OD and governments’ risk management
with their construction of GAB water-related risk and the corresponding risk
management.
Risk is not understood as ‘real’ property in the world, therefore, risk management is
underpinned by various logics and values (Krimsky & Golding, 1991). The focus of
this thesis is on the social, cultural and institutional frames that shape our
understanding and management strategies of risk (Power, 2007). Since most research
with a techno-economic emphasis has treated risk as an object and comparatively
unproblematic, there is a lack of attention and effort to examine the socio-cultural
process whereby ‘risk objects’ are constructed (Hilgartner, 1992; Power, 2007). Risk
objects are defined by Hilgartner (1992, p.41) as “things that pose hazards the source
of danger, the entities to which harmful consequences are conceptually attached”.
For example, in the phrase ‘the risk of smoking’, ‘smoking’ is the risk object. A
simplified process of risk object construction involves making the linkage of harm to
an object and defining it (Hilgartner, 1992; Power, 2007). According to Hilgartner
(1992, p. 46),
[t]his task is a rhetorical process, performed in texts that are displayed in
specialized organisations or in public arenas, and it usually involves building
networks of risk objects.
These socio-technical networks consist of experts, resources, organisations and
regulations through which particular risk control activities are constructed (Power,
2007). The task of building networks is often complex and the social and political
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struggles over the control of a risk object are pervasive, generally through strategies
of emplacing and displacing the risk object33.
According to Power (2007, p. 26), “[a] focus on the sociotechnical networks which
support, or destroy, risk objects requires definitions of risk to be endogenized, rather
than treated abstractly”. The definition of risk-related concepts therefore is socially
constructed, and any change in the definition could result in the redistribution of
responsibility for risk, relocation in scope or decision making and a redetermination
of an actor’s rights and obligations in dealing with danger or hazards (Hilgartner,
1992). Linsley and Shrives (2014), for example, utilise cultural risk theory to analyse
comments letters associated with the Financial Reporting Council’s (FRC)
‘complexity of corporate reporting’ discussion paper. They identify three sets of
institutional perceptions and constructions of risk - related issues with respect to the
free market, regulation, the priority of stakeholder groups, justice and ethical actions.
Each institution seeks to persuade others about the validity of their preferred way of
life.
This thesis concentrates on the “dynamics” of BHP OD’s GAB water extraction as
the risk object in “organizing definitions and descriptions of a practice and its
constituent elements” (Power, 2007, p. 26). It investigates the socio-cultural
constructed nature of the debate arising from the GAB water related risk, by
emphasising the different institutional views on risk and sustainability related
concepts, and their corresponding normative ideals of risk resolution. As risk
management crucially depends on “management systems of representations ... [and]
instruments for framing objects for the purpose of action and intervention” (Power,
2007, p. 4), this thesis analyses “the manner in which [GAB water risks] are
presented and constructed” (Power, 2007, p. 8) through contested disclosure
documents from BHP, governments and civil society.
4.5

Summary

This chapter discussed the methodological issues of risk research and the application
for accounting studies. Positivist research with a techno-economic focus has viewed

33
Hilgartner (1992, p. 48) notes that “construction risk objects is a two-way process, propelled by efforts to emplace risk
objects within, and displace them from, sociotechnical networks.” Emplacement can be conducted through “construction” of
risk objects or “resistance to control”; displacement can be conducted through “deconstruction” or “control”.
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risk as an object and is insufficient to understand the entire risk profile related to
water resource issues (Baleta, 2012; Horlick-Jones & Sime, 2004). This thesis adopts
a cultural risk perspective as a transdisciplinary approach to investigate different
institutional positions towards the GAB water related social and environmental risks
manifest in disclosure documents. It emphasises the culturally constructed nature of
this debate on risk-based sustainability related concepts to facilitate public
engagement and participation for the complex problem of water governance. The
next chapter presents the research method to analyse the GAB water-related
disclosure from BHP, governments and civil society.
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CHAPTER 5 METHOD
5.1

Introduction

The previous chapter discussed methodological issues in risk studies and their
implications for accounting research. A cultural perspective of risk was presented as
the appropriate methodology to examine different institutional stances towards the
Great Artesian Basin (GAB) water related economic, social and environmental risks
in contested water disclosures. This thesis adopts cultural risk theory (Douglas, 1970;
Douglas & Wildavsky, 1982) as a theoretical framework (Chapter 6). According to
the framework, two relatively stable centre institutions (market made up of
individualistic solidarity, and hierarchy made up of hierarchical solidarity) and
border (made up of sectarian/egalitarian solidarity) institutions exist and for this
thesis these are: the market (BHP Billiton (BHP) and BHP Billiton Olympic Dam
Corporation Pty Ltd (BHP OD)), hierarchy (Australian Federal government and
South

Australian

government)

and

border

institutions

(Non-Government

Organisations (NGOs), environmental activists and Aboriginal groups). Contrary to
the usual practice of presenting the theoretical frame first, this chapter explicates the
research method used to examine how the GAB water risk debate is manifest
through cultural practices. It is through this method that the various notions of riskbased sustainability from cultural risk theory are identified and (re)structured
(Chapter 6, Section 6.3) to further enable the interpretations of contested institutional
discourses.
This thesis employs a critical accounting approach to acknowledge divergent
ideologies and interests among different stakeholder groups to promote democratic
participation through genuine ‘dialogue’. It explores the GAB water risk debate from
BHP OD’s water extraction by compiling and analysing corporate sustainability
reports and other public statements; government regulatory documents; and
alternative public disclosures obtained from civil society. It examines whether the
ideology or value system inscribed in corporate water disclosures is aligned with
and/or differs from the governmental regulatory disclosures and how it is resisted
and challenged by the NGOs, environmental activists and Aboriginal groups.
Consistent with a social constructivist ontology and epistemology, this thesis
performs a discourse analysis approach to collate and analyse accounting
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disclosures/accounts for the GAB water debate. It investigates discourses within
documents issued by BHP OD, governments and civil society through a textual
approach termed “interpretive structuralism” (Phillips & Hardy, 2002, p. 24). An
interpretive structuralist approach is primarily concerned with how social and
cultural meanings are constructed through discourses and texts. In this study, the
particular emphasis is on rhetoric. Rhetoric is a technique of using discourse for
persuasive effect, and this study examines how rhetoric is used by three institutions
as a strategic resource.
To interrogate institutional documents, Burkean rhetorical criticism (Stillar, 1998) is
adopted as a specific method. While rhetorical criticism is considered as a relatively
broad interpretive tool to discover how people ‘particularise’ social situations with
the attempt to influence others through language (Gill & Whedbee, 1997; Selzer,
2004), Burkean rhetorical criticism is a specific method with an assumption that
rhetoric is one of the symbols used to constitute the world, give it meaning and
express common interests required for achieving social unity (Burke, 1950, 1966,
1969).
Burkean rhetorical criticism incorporates three levels of analysis - grammar, rhetoric
and logology (Stillar, 1998). The grammatical analysis focuses on texts within the
documents issued by institutions and the rhetorical situation from which the
production of those texts arise. Rhetorical analysis deals with how the public, as
audiences, are invited by each institution to share and believe in different risk
assumptions regarding GAB water related risks. Logology analysis is concerned with
social conditions and the consequences of “terministic screens” (Burke, 1966, p. 50).
In different institutions, texts and discourses function to condense GAB water related
risks by highlighting certain aspects for public attention and engagement.
This chapter begins with an overview of a critical accounting approach (Section 5.2),
discourse (Section 5.3) discourse in documents (Section 5.4), and text and textual
analysis (Section 5.5) with reference to an interpretive structuralist approach. This is
followed by a general discussion of rhetoric (Section 5.6) and rhetorical criticism
(Section 5.7). A Burkean perspective of rhetorical criticism (Section 5.7.1) is
subsequently discussed, with a particular emphasis on grammatical, rhetorical and
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logological analyses. The documents used as data in this study are then presented
(Section 5.8) before a final description of the process of data analysis (Section 5.9).
5.2

A critical accounting approach

As explicated in Chapter 3, this thesis adopts a (critical) counter-accounting
approach to explicitly acknowledge divergent interests and engage ideological
contestations among different stakeholder groups in order to engender/foster genuine
dialogue and democratic participation for promoting progressive and emancipatory
change (Brown, 2009; Brown & Dillard, 2013; Dey et al., 2011; Gallhofer et al.,
2006).
Analysing ‘polylogic’ accounting reports are argued to facilitate the shift of the
narrow form of accountability from an organisationally or institutionally centred
framework to a more encompassing and democratic form of accountability (Brown
& Dillard, 2013; O’Dwyer, 2004); offer opportunities for an open dialogue among
company and its heterogeneous stakeholders (Dey, 2003); and present emancipatory
potential in fostering “counterhegemonic” (Brown & Dillard, 2013, p. 15).
This thesis explores the GAB water risk debate from BHP OD’s water extraction by
compiling corporate sustainability reports and other public statements; government
regulatory documents; and alternative public disclosures obtained from civil society.
It investigates whether the ideology or value system inscribed in corporate water
disclosures is aligned with and/or differs from the governmental regulatory
disclosures and how it is resisted and challenged by the NGOs, environmental
activists and Aboriginal groups. This thesis therefore is in line with a genre of
studies termed ‘counter accounting’ that problematises and destabilises the
normalised nature and taken-for granted assumptions of business and sometimes
government (Dey et al., 2011). As a result, it facilitates the articulation of and
reflection upon different styles of accountability from the perspective of industry,
government and civil society (Buhr, 2001; Rodrigue, 2014). It therefore echoes the
call for a dialogical approach to accounting which enables democratic participation
(Brown, 2009; Gray, 1992).
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5.3

Discourse

This thesis performs a discourse analysis approach to collate and analyse accounts
for the GAB water debate. Fairclough (2003, p. 2) describes language as “an
irreducible part” of social life and it is “dialectically interconnected” with other
elements in social life. Discourse is a linguistic term covering extended samples of
spoken or written language. It emphasises the interaction between writer and reader
or speaker and addressee, thus emphasising the production and interpretation
processes of talk and text, as well as the situational context (Fairclough, 1992).
While there are various definitions of discourse among the literature, the most
common one refers to “the actual practices of talking and writing” (Phillips & Hardy,
2002, p. 3).
In social theory and social analysis, discourse is used widely to refer to “different
ways of structuring areas of knowledge and social practice” (Fairclough, 2003, p. 3).
This stance is attributed to Foucault’s (1976, 1980 in Alvesson & Karreman, 2000)
assumption that discourses constitute both subjects and objects, and arrange and
naturalise the social world in a particular way to inform social practices. These
practices construct specific forms of subjectivity to manage human subjects. These
certain forms are considered as rational and self-evident (Alvesson & Karreman,
2000). Discourse, from this perspective, does not just represent or reflect social
entities. Instead, it constitutes the foundation of a social construction process upon
which social reality depends (Hardy & Phillips, 1999). In Fairclough and Wodak’s
(1997, p. 258) words, discourse does not simply mirror “reality”, but rather
constitutes “situations, objects of knowledge, and the social identities of and
relations between people and groups of people”.
It is important to note here that it is an intermediate version of social constructivism
of discourse that this thesis takes. According to Fairclough (1992, p. 66),
the discursive constitution of society does not emanate from a free play of ideas
in people’s heads but from a social practice which is firmly rooted in and
oriented to real, material social structures.
In other words, although people may construe (e.g. represent and imagine) the social
world in some particular way, whether such a construal or representation has an
changing effect on textual construction of the social world, depends on other
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contextual factors, such as “the way social reality already is, who is construing it,
and so forth” (Fairclough, 2003, p. 9). Indeed, there are various orientations that
social reality and social practice exhibit, such as economic, cultural, political and
ideological. Discourse might be implicated in all the above dimensions “without any
of them being reducible to discourse” (Fairclough, 1992, p. 66). As such, discourse
is regarded as “a form of social practice” instead of merely a reflection of situational
variables or an individual activity (Fairclough, 1992, p. 63).
There is an implied dialectical relationship between social practice and social
structure (Fairclough, 1992). Generally speaking, the latter acts both as an effect of
and a condition for the former. On one hand, discourse, as a form of social practice,
is constrained and shaped by social structure in the broadest sense and at different
levels. Depending on structural determination, discursive events vary in accordance
with the particular institutional framework or social domain from which they are
generated. On the other hand, discourse contributes to the construction of all the
dimensions of social structure which constrains and shapes it directly and indirectly
in terms of its own conventions and norms, as well as social identities, relations and
institutions which underpin it (Fairclough, 1992). In this sense, discourse is a social
practice “signifying the world, constituting and constructing the world in meaning”
(Fairclough, 1992, p. 64).
While discourse is considered as a particular way of representing some area of the
world or a possible world with projected change in some directions, there are often
alternative and competing discourses, consistent with different social identities,
positions and social relationships with others (Fairclough, 2003). These discourses
differ in the representation of social events in terms of their inclusion or exclusion,
the abstractness or concreteness, and the specification of social actors, their relations,
time, space and processes of the events (Fairclough, 2003). Despite these differences,
a particular discourse is always connected to other discourses which were produced
earlier in the context, as well as those which are produced subsequently and
synchronically (Fairclough & Wodak, 1997, p. 277).
In this thesis, discourse is considered as a mode of institutional and political practice.
In accordance with a cultural risk methodology (Douglas & Wildavsky, 1982), both
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competing and complementary discourses emanate out of interactions between BHP
OD, governments and civil society around the water intake of BHP OD for Olympic
Dam Expansion Project (ODEP). These discourses differ significantly in terms of
their representations of several dimensions of this water issue, and they are related to
different cultural and institutional risk perspectives regarding the relations people
have to nature, and social relations (Fairclough, 2003).
5.4

Discourse in documents

This study uses documents issued by three institutions - market, hierarchy, and
border as data sources to construct and analyse accounts which comprise three
different sets of institutional discourses emerging from the GAB water debate.
According to Sharp and Richardson (2001), documents are sources in which
different discourses are manifest. Since documents are both nestled within and
represent a set of discursive practices (Phillips & Hardy, 2002), documents are
considered as situated products rather than fixed and stable artefacts (Prior, 2003).
According to Prior (2004, p. 376), each document enters “social interaction in a dual
manner” as both “a receptacle of content” and “an functioning agent in its own right”.
It is the second function of documents, their mediation of social relationships that
this study focuses upon. Documents define and specify things, classify events and
describe processes. They also structure identity and circumstance, set boundaries of
expertise and social networks, and make objects visible and therefore manageable
(Prior, 2004).
As such, documents are not merely passive and inert items operated by human
beings. Rather, they actively influence the actions of human agents (Prior, 2004). As
Prior (2003, p. 2) asserts, documents should be considered in terms of “fields, frames
and networks of action”. The status of documents depends primarily on the way in
which they are produced and consumed. It is also important to note that those who
consume the documents are not just passive agents in the communicative process,
but also active in the document production processes as well (Prior, 2003).
In this study, fields of networks involve market, hierarchy, and border institutions
and the broad setting of the GAB water-related risks. These three realms are
implicated in the discursive formations in all documents employed within accounts
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emerging from the GAB water debate. The documents issued by market and
hierarchy institutions are largely “recruited as allies” (Prior, 2003, p. 13) to support
each other’s actions (except in some special cases - for example, see Chapter 9),
while border institutions tend to view these documents as “an enemy” (Prior, 2003, p.
3) that need to be challenged and transformed. This dynamic of production and
consumption of various documents assimilates different risk perspectives into
cultural and institutional water practices, which is “the key to understanding the
process of [social] fabrication” (Prior, 2003, p. 10).
5.5

Text and textual analysis

Text is considered as one dimension of discourse, and the spoken and written
product of the text production process (Fairclough, 1992). Apart from written texts
and spoken words, the variety of textual forms also covers pictures, symbols, sounds
and artefacts (Grant, Keenoy & Oswick, 1998; Kress, Leite-Garcia & van Leeuwen,
1997). Since discourses are both embodied and enacted in various texts, texts can be
regarded as “a discursive ‘unit’ and a material manifestation of discourse” (Phillips
& Hardy, 2002, p. 4). This thesis analyses textual discourses in documents.
According to Phillips and Hardy (2002), texts are the emergence site of the
complexity of social meanings produced in a particular history. Texts record, in
partial ways, the history of who participated in the production of the text and how the
institutions were brought into play. In other words, texts name and arrange
participants, processes and circumstances. They construct perspectival and temporal
conditions through linguistic resources (Stillar, 1998). Texts, in this sense, are indeed
“a partial history of the language and social system” arising from the structuring of
relations between participants (Phillips & Hardy, 2002, p. 4). According to
Fairclough (2003, p. 8), texts can be seen as “elements of social events” since one
way for people to act and interact in social events is to write or speak.
When texts are approached as elements of social events, texts are concerned with an
interactive process of meaning - making (Fairclough, 2003). As Phillips and Hardy
(2002, p. 4) contend,
[t]exts are not meaningful individually, it is only through their interconnection
with other texts, the different discourses on which they draw, and the nature of
their production, dissemination, and consumption that they are made meaningful.
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There are various approaches to discourse analysis. Alvesson and Karreman (2000)
for example, propose four versions centred on organisational studies from a microdiscourse approach to a mega-discourse approach. Micro-discourse approaches
emphasise social texts to form a detailed study of language use in a specific microcontext. A meso-discourse approach, while relatively sensitive to texts, focuses more
on the broader patterns and similar local contexts, beyond the details of texts. A
grand discourse approach draws on an assembly of discourses which are ordered and
presented as an integrated framework to constitute organisational reality. A megadiscourse approach is concerned with a universal connection of discourse material. It
typically addresses somewhat standardised ways of constituting or referring to a
certain type of phenomenon.
Phillips and Hardy (2002) also classify four main perspectives in respect of discourse
analysis: interpretive structuralism; social linguistic analysis; critical discourse
analysis; and, critical linguistic analysis based on a combination of text and context
scale and constructivist and critical scale. Interpretive structuralism emphasises the
understanding of the broader social and institutional context and its supported
discourse. Instead of analysing individual texts on a micro-level, texts are collected
and investigated with a primarily constructivist concern of how “discourse contexts
come into being and the possibilities to which they give rise…without a direct
concern with power” (Phillips & Hardy, 2002, p. 24). Social linguistic analysis is
constructivist and based mainly on individual texts, only marginally referring to its
context. The goal of this analysis is to understand how texts organise and construct
social phenomena. Critical discourse analysis emphasises the role of discursive
practice in constructing, legitimating and sustaining unequal power relations and
analyses dialogical struggles in privileging one particular discourse and
marginalising others. Critical linguistic analysis, like social linguistic analysis,
focuses on individual texts. However, this analysis also entails a strong interest in
power dynamics that surround the text. It shares the concern of critical discourse
analysis but emphasises more the micro-dynamics of texts.
This thesis takes the interpretive structuralist approach to analyse discourse and text
in documents with regards to the GAB water related risks. While it is concerned with
ideological effects of each institutional discourse, it underscores a meso-level
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analysis of institutional communications in their context, without necessarily
analysing “the interplay between the text and the discursive context” referred by
critical discourse analysis (Laine, 2009, p. 1049). As such, an interpretive
structuralist approach can be considered as studying “discourse in text”, where
discourses have existence and coherence beyond the text (Sharp & Richardson, 2001,
p. 195). This thesis thus does not intend to deconstruct texts in institutional
documents from a linguistic perspective either. Instead, it examines different
institutional accounts regarding the way how discourses of the GAB water debate are
manifest in documents issued by BHP OD, governments and civil society.
The interpretive structuralist approach has been adopted by a number of accounting
researchers in their studies of business discourse of sustainable development. Milne
et al. (2009), for example, employ an interpretive structuralist analysis to critical
examine both visual and textual (re)presentations of sustainable development from a
New Zealand business association. They found that these business reports present “a
pragmatic and middle-way discourse” characterised by a largely instrumental and
utilitarian view of the natural environment (Milne, Tregidga & Walton, 2009, p.
1211). Such representations facilitate particular actions while constraining and
silencing alternative perspectives. Tregidga and Milne (2006) investigate
sustainability reporting from a New Zealand water utility, a leading reporter on
social and environmental effects. Through interpretive structuralist analysis, the
authors identify the organisation’s evolving construction of itself from a sustainable
resource manager to a sustainable development practitioner.
By deploying a similar ‘interpretive textual analysis”, Laine (2005, 2009, 2010) has
conducted a genre of studies to critically assess the social constructed process of
sustainable development through corporate disclosures in the context of Finnish
listed companies. In one study (Laine, 2005, p. 402), sustainable development is
constructed as “compatible and mutually reinforcing” with economic growth, which
is attainable without the radical restructuration of the prevailing social order. In
another studies (Laine, 2010, p. 247), the conceptualisation of sustainable
development has transformed from “revolutionary” to “evolutionary” during 19872005 to sustain the status-quo. Corporate disclosure was also used as a rhetorical
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device, reflective and adjusted to changing institutional pressures for legitimacy in
society (Laine, 2009).
This thesis explores how discursive formations in the form of texts construct
meanings of the GAB water risk related concept and how these concepts are utilised
in the GAB water debate manifest in contested disclosures issued by different
institutions. By doing so, it flushes out the alternative interpretation from civil
society as a counterpoint to business entities and governments, and leads to the
“possible radical edge” (Laine, 2005, p. 408) of sustainability and risk-based
concepts in water accounting studies.
5.6

Rhetoric

In this study, different institutional documents can be understood as a bundle of
exchanges that give shape to the GAB water debate through the strategic nature of
their discourses. In other words, documents from each institution are considered as
media involving rhetorical arguments through which each institution attempts to
influence society at large through its position on the GAB water-related social and
environmental issues.
Rhetoric is a method of persuasion, or the technique of using discourse for effect. It
is normally “located on a political stage” (Gill & Whedbee, 1997, p. 157) where
language, including metaphors, symbols, expressions have been consciously selected
to (re)present a certain institution to other institutions and public in a particular light
(Craig & Amernic, 2004; Lawrence & Suddaby, 2006; Livesey, 2001; Suddaby &
Greenwood, 2005). As such, rhetoric is largely “instrumental” (Gill & Whedbee,
1997, p. 157) in “persuad[ing] others to change their attitudes, beliefs, values or
actions” (Cheney, Christensen, Conrad & Lair, 2004, p. 79), and rhetoric more
broadly emphasises the strategic function of language as a vehicle to shape both
means and ends of human action (Green, 2004).
Rhetoric originates from education, philosophy and political systems of the ancient
Greeks and Romans (Cockcroft & Cockcroft, 2005), and is inevitably involved in
everyday communication and interaction (Hartelius & Browning, 2008). From an
Aristotelian perspective, classical rhetoric is categorised by three unique but nonseparable elements - ethos (credibility), pathos (emotion) and logos (reason) (Aho,
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1985; Haskins, 2004). These three elements identify distinct dimensions of
persuasive appeals and uncover the characteristics of good arguments (Holt &
Macpherson, 2010).
According to Cheney, et al. (2004), rhetorical studies have emerged in different
disciplines such as sociology, physics and economics. The principal symbols
including metaphors, models and images in each case have been examined for their
persuasive effects (Simons, 1990). In the same vein, accounting symbols are claimed
to be essentially rhetorical by their nature and accounting terminology, calculative
practices and narratives have been studied to reveal how they frame and convey
particular understandings of the social and environmental realm, and therefore
socially construct reality (Hines, 1988; Laine, 2005, 2009; Moerman & van der Laan,
2007; Tregidga & Milne, 2006; Walters-York, 1996).
This study goes beyond the rhetorical influence of an organisational or institutional
rhetoric to encompass symbolic actions from three distinct but complementary
institutions in respect of the GAB water risks. It analyses accounts in the form of
institutional discourses as dialectical processes that link texts, institutional actors and
rhetorical situations. In other words, this study investigates how different institutions
utilise rhetoric to proactively frame and shape rhetorical situations or respond to such
rhetorical situations.
Indeed, the strategic or political nature of institutional rhetoric is raised by Cockcroft
and Cockcroft (2005), who draw on Michael Billig’s (1996) Arguing and Thinking
and assert that the value of rhetoric is embedded in dialogue, rather than a
monologue, as it offers a typical model of human thinking. This is manifest in all
levels of public discussions and debate throughout contemporary society, and serves
to either avoid conflict or resolve conflicts after they arise (Brennan & Merkl-Davies,
2014; Cockcroft & Cockcroft, 2005). Consistent with cultural risk theory, this study
views different discourses of market, hierarchy and border institutions manifest
through documents as rhetorical by their very existence as they are disseminated to
create and privilege different risk perspectives in the GAB water risk debate. In
particular, centre (i.e. market and hierarchy) institutions’ rhetoric comprises
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arguments “implicitly, if not explicitly” (Cockcroft & Cockcroft, 2005, p.2) opposed
by the border institutions’ counter arguments.
5.7

Rhetorical criticism

This study adopts rhetorical criticism as a broader approach to analyse rhetoric.
Rhetorical criticism, in the modern era, is understood as an interpretive tool to
discover and analyse how people ‘particularise’ social situations with the attempt to
influence others’ understanding of the social fabric through language (Gill &
Whedbee, 1997; Moerman & van der Laan, 2007; Peterson, 1997; Selzer, 2004). It
requires us to identify, describe and dismantle textual structures to investigate how
they shape understanding, privilege and silence particular interests (Gill & Whedbee,
1997).
Consistent with various approaches to discourse analysis, approaches to rhetorical
criticism vary along a continuum between two extremes. At one level, analyses
concentrate on texts more than contexts, while at the other end, context is the major
focus rather than text (Selzer, 2004). The former approach emphasises significant
features of a text, such as “structure and temporality, argument, metaphor and
iconicity” (Gill & Whedbee, 1997, p. 17). This model of textual analysis, albeit
involving a detailed discussion of instrumental operations of particular texts, is
necessarily limited as the authors’ intentions, audiences’ response and any
unintended consequences can only be speculated (Cheney et al., 2004; Moerman &
van der Laan, 2007).
The latter approach as a model of contextual analysis focuses on a series of texts to
create and recreate a thick description of “the social circumstances that call rhetorical
events into being and that orchestrate the course of those events” (see also Cheney et
al., 2004; Selzer, 2004, p. 292). Contextual analysts understand that social practices
in general, and communications in particular, reflect attitudes and values of different
communities. They seek to expose the intention and role of actors, their persuasive
tactics and appeals for legitimacy, the power relations between them, and intended
and unintended consequences (Cheney et al., 2004; Fairclough, 2003; Moerman &
van der Laan, 2007; Selzer, 2004).
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In accordance with most approaches to discourse analysis, rhetorical criticism is
generally understood as both textual and contextual in nature, and most rhetorical
analysts not only passively decode a particular text, but also actively understand the
context from which the text arises (Gill & Whedbee, 1997; Moerman & van der
Laan, 2007; Selzer, 2004; van Dijk, 1997). Since this study investigates how the
GAB water risk debate between market, hierarchy and border institutions manifests
in cultural practices and how this debate is conducted through various discourses in
documents/accounts, a full appreciation of the interplay between context and text is
required, especially as texts often embrace important clues about context (Selzer,
2004), and texts operate to name and rename the context (Gill & Whedbee, 1997).
5.7.1

Burkean rhetorical criticism

Kenneth Burke is an American literary philosopher and theorist who has had a
significant impact in the disciplines of philosophy, linguistics, literature, sociology
and economics throughout the twentieth century (Foss, Foss & Trapp, 2002; Toye,
2013). As a specialist in rhetoric theory and criticism, Burke deviated away from
traditional notions of rhetoric and oriented his writing of language towards the social
context. He recognises that language involves more than just logic and grammar, and
the social context of language goes beyond the principles of pure reason (Hansen,
1996). Burke is best known for his idea of rhetoric as an art of persuasion (Foss et al.,
2002). His principle works include Permanence and Change (Burke, 1984b),
Attitudes Toward History (Burke, 1984a), A Grammar of Motives (Burke, 1969), A
Rhetoric of Motives (Burke, 1950), and Language as Symbolic Action (Burke, 1966).
From a Burkean perspective, symbols are related to the material world dialectically.
That is, symbols do not simply mirror the world. Instead, they constitute the world
and give it meaning. Reality for Burke (1966, p. 5), is indeed
[a] cluster of symbols about the past combined with whatever things we know
mainly through maps, magazines, newspapers, and the like about the present…a
construct of our symbol systems.
Burke (1950, p. 43) defines rhetoric as “the use of language as a symbolic means of
inducing cooperation in beings that by nature respond to symbols”. For him, the
primary means of persuasion is identification between the rhetor and audience.
Rhetoric is used as a symbolic means to express common interests required for
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achieving social unity (Burke, 1950, 1966, 1969). Drawing upon the meaningmaking function of language, Burkean rhetorical criticism emphasises the human
relationship to language as a symbolic system. Such a symbolic system allows us to
shape and interpret a world of experience as we actively construct our ways of
knowing and acting through symbols. At the same time, the symbolic system and
structure constrains the symbol using by defining us as social agents and constituting
our ways of being in the world (Peterson, 1997; Stillar, 1998). As Burke (1969, p. 33)
asserts:
Dialectically considered men are not only in nature. The cultural accretions made
possible by the language motive become “second nature” with them….
[s]ymbolic communication is not a merely external instrument, but also intrinsic
to men as agents. Its motivational properties characterise both “the human
situation” and what men are “in themselves”.
A Burkean scope of rhetoric is vast and goes beyond formal discourse to include
“[l]ess traditional forms of discourse such as sales promotion, courtship, social
etiquette, education, hysteria, witchcraft and works of art such as literature and
painting” (Foss et al., 2002, p. 194). Although non-verbal elements are not strictly
speaking rhetoric themselves, rhetoric is considered “apparent” in their meaning
(Foss et al., 2002, p. 194). In Burke’s (1950, p. 172) view: “where there is
persuasion, there is rhetoric. And wherever there is ‘meaning’, there is ‘persuasion’”.
Burke’s rhetorical criticism was adopted widely as a method in the research field of
communication studies due to an increasing influence of rhetorical and discourse
analysis (e.g. Appel, 1987; Boyd, 2004; Kuseski, 1988; Moore, 1992; Olson &
Olson, 2004). For example, Appel (1987) applies Burke’s philosophy of dramatism
and the pentad (see Section 5.6.1.1) as a method to analyse the tragic-symbol
televised preaching of an American religious figure Reverend Jerry Falwell. This
study finds that Falwell’s discourse is strongly dramatic given his true believers are
bent on the changing society he projects. Livesey (2002b) analyses texts published
by ExxonMobil regarding climate change by drawing upon the Burkean method of
dramatism in general and the pentad in particular. She focuses on the purposeful act
of the rhetor and ethical effects of the rhetoric in maintaining organisational
legitimacy. However, such applications of Burkean rhetorical criticism as a method
are absent in accounting studies. This study bridges this gap by employing the
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Burkean method developed by Stillar (1998) to analyse the rhetoric deployed by
market, hierarchy and border institutions with regards to the GAB water risk debate.
According to Stillar (1998), this systematic framework for rhetorical criticism is
based on Burke’s idea of grammar, rhetoric and logology. Centred on language as
symbolic action, this method complements and extends the social function of
discourse analysis. Grammatical analysis focuses on vocabularies and structure of
texts used to construct the motive. It is also an analysis or criticism of “dramatism”
(Burke, 1968, p. 445), since language is perceived as both motive and act. Rhetorical
analysis deals with the role of language in identifying and classifying or categorising
social agents on one hand and providing a point of unity on the other. The exchange
of discourse is viewed as the principal model through which construction and
transformation of social order are attained through symbolic action. Logological
analysis is concerned with social conditions and consequences of symbolic action. It
deals with implications of symbolic action which is “conditioned by the negative and
by the attendant forms of transgression that are invited by the implicit ‘perfection’ of
various semiotic order” (Stillar, 1998, p. 62). It is important to note that while
Burke’s grammatical, rhetorical and logological analyses are outlined in separate
sections, they “all share in the substance of symbolic acts” (Stillar, 1998, p. 88). The
next section explicates this Burkean framework of rhetorical criticism in more detail.
5.7.1.1 Grammatical analysis
Burke’s grammatical analysis deals with language in its own terms rather than in a
traditional linguistic sense. It emphasises the way language patterns index, construct
and embrace motives (Stillar, 1998). This method is termed “Dramatism” by Burke
(1968, p. 445), and it is
a method of analysis and corresponding critique of terminology designed to show
that the most direct route to the study of human relations and human motives is
via a methodological inquiry into cycles or clusters of terms and their functions.
As such, dramatism considers language as “primarily a species of action, or
expression of attitudes, rather than an instrument of definition” (Burke, 1968, p. 447).
In other words, it is concerned with the purposive use of language by agents to
motivate or block certain understandings, shape attitudes and predispositions toward
cooperative action (Livesey, 2002b; Peterson, 1997).
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Dramatism aims to make replicable and explicit statements with regards to the
function of combined language units and operates with a consistent and coherent set
of terms to derive a descriptive analysis (Stillar, 1998). This method provides a
means for analysing features of the texts and the relationship among them in respect
of a rhetorical situation. Burke (1969, p. xv) named this means “the pentad”. This
pentadic model embodies five terms - scene, agent, act, agency and purpose to
discern the structure and functions of symbolic action. According to Burke (1969, p.
xv),
in a rounded statement about motives, you must have some word that names the
act (names what took place, in thought or deed), and another that names the scene
(the background of the act, the situation in which it occurred), also you must
indicate what person or kind of person (agent) performed the act, what means or
instruments he used (agency), and the purpose.
The pentadic analysis helps us to understand how language represents ‘reality’
through investigating how a text interprets those five elements. It is important to note
that such a representation is “attitudinal and motivated” since it is the “situated social
practice of real social agents who necessarily construct ‘reality’ with reference to
their practices and the terminology that are a part of them” (Stillar, 1998, p. 64). As
Burke (1966, p. 45) asserts: “even if a given terminology is a reflection of reality by
its very nature as a terminology, it must be a selection of reality.”
Therefore, a particular textual pattern from a pentadic analysis selectively reflects a
reality (Stillar, 1998). In this case, texts within the documents issued by market,
hierarchy and border institutions and the rhetorical situation from which the
production of those texts arises are the principal focus of grammatical criticism.
Language as symbols is chosen by three different institutions, with different risk
assumptions and values to define and redefine various concepts and control their
meanings within the GAB water risk debate and thus produce a different ‘reality’ in
respect of this dimension of an environmental crisis.
5.7.1.2 Rhetorical analysis
Rhetorical analysis focuses on the overriding function of language as symbolic
action (Stillar, 1998). There is one key term in Burkean rhetorical criticism “Identification” (Stillar, 1998, p. 59). Identification is concerned with humans as
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both natural and social beings - we are divided in attitude, ability, interest and access
to resources and so forth (Burke, 1984a). Rhetoric under this condition is “a
moralising process” implied in all socialising processes to overcome division and
reinforce unity (Burke, 1962, p. 563). According to Burke (1969, p. 20):
A is not identical with his colleague, B. But insofar as their interests are joined, A
is identified with B. Or he may identify himself with B even when their interests
are not joined. If he assures that they are, or is persuaded to believe so.
Burke (1966, 1969) indicates that any identification is contextualised by some sense
of social order which sets the conditions for determining the legitimate terms of
substance for consubstantiality. Substances are constructed through production and
reproduction of identities, attributes and classes by symbolic action. Burke (1969, p.
21), also explains the ambiguities of substance.
In being identified with B, A is “substantially one” with a person other than
himself. Yet at the same time he remains unique, an individual focus of motives.
Thus he is both joined and separate, at once a distinct substance and
consubstantial with another.
As such, identification with something or someone is to construct reality “in the
same terms as another…as united by similar substance” (Stillar, 1998, p. 73). When
rhetoric draws upon grammatical resources that function in respect of substances
pertinent to a particular hierarchy, identification becomes possible (Stillar, 1998).
It is important to note that “hierarchy” and “order” are another two primary concepts
related to rhetorical analysis (Stillar, 1998, p. 76). For Burke (1969, p. 279),
hierarchy can be understood as a product of symbolic action.
[I]n any order, there will be mysteries of hierarchy since such a principle is
grounded in the very nature of language, and reinforced by the resultant diversity
of occupational classes. That claim is the important thing, as regards the ultimate
reaches of rhetoric. The intensities, morbidities, or particularities of mystery
come from institutional sources, but the aptitude comes from the nature of man,
generically, as a symbol-using animal.
To be invited to identify with some particular substances (classes, identities and
attributes) represents the inherent tensions within discourses of social orders. The
rhetorical acts seek to gather audiences who share interests and have a common stake
in those social orders (Stillar, 1998). To overcome a division through identification
in the hierarchy is to initiate a transformation. That is, to change the way “what is
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seen in terms of what” (Stillar, 1998, p. 74). Therefore, members from a social group
“promote social cohesion by acting rhetorically upon themselves and one another”
(Burke, 1962, p. 522) (Appendix A provides an example used by Stillar (1998) to
illustrate differences between grammar and rhetoric).
In this case, while grammatical analysis is concerned with the way market, hierarchy
and border institutions’ risk-related worldview is defined, developed and sustained
as a part of a process to challenge other worldviews; rhetorical analysis investigates
how the public as audiences are invited by each institution to share and believe in
different risk assumptions through identification regarding the GAB water risks. The
texts and discourses from various institutional documents, from a Burkean
perspective, are considered as rhetorical acts seeking to “transcend and transform”
both “literal” and “symbolic” division (Stillar, 1998, p. 75) with regards to GAB
water risk assumptions.
For example, centre institutions construct a social order around the mysteries of
science, technology and market, to transcend the cultural differences of the border
institutions and the general public, to become consubstantial with their scientific,
technological and efficient market practices. The implicit hierarchy within such an
order is that science and technology are superior to any other alternative practice.
5.7.1.3 Logological analysis
Logological analysis discusses social conditions and consequences of symbolic
actions. It is a study of how symbolic systems constrain social practices of “vision
and division” and structure social consequences such as “guilt, imperfection,
hierarchical psychosis-of living in terms of symbolic systems” (Stillar, 1998, p. 59).
While grammatical and rhetorical analysis emphasises the dynamic process of
symbolic action by drawing upon the elements in symbolic acts and characterising
them as pentad, identification, hierarchy, order and transformation, logological
analysis extends such analyses to symbolic systems themselves. It delves into social
functions of logonomic systems. A logonomic system is a term derived from Hodge
and Kress’s (1988) Social Semiotics. According to Hodge and Kress (1988, p. 4), a
logonomic system originates from;
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the Greek logos, which means a thought or system of thought, and also the words
or discourse through which the thought is presented, and nomos, a control or
ordering mechanism. A logonomic system is a set of rules prescribing the
conditions for production and reception of meanings; which specify who can
claim to initiate (produce, communicate) or know (receive, understand) meanings
about what topics under what circumstances and with what modalities (how,
when, why).
As such, logonomic systems include the system of language, discourses,
intertextuality and other meaning-making systems (Stillar, 1998). An instance of text
or discursive practices that involves the exchange of texts does not only have
recourse to logonomic systems but, in itself, form a logonomic system which
confines its potential meaning. All symbolic actions are attained through interaction
with logonomic systems (Stillar, 1998). To characterise logonomic systems, we draw
on the records -in the form of texts of symbolic action to analyse the evidence used
to construct “the terms, features and functions of elements of logonomic systems”
(Stillar, 1998, p. 78 ).
Burke (1970) describes texts as sources to understand the nature of language as a
motivational system. In other words, words and discourses in a logonomic system
order and control its subjects.
It is our “logological” thesis that…will provide us with good insight into the
nature of language itself as motive. Such an approach also involves the tentative
belief that, even when men use language trivially, the motives inherent in its
possible thorough use are acting somewhat as goods, however vague (Burke,
1970, p. vi).
Logology, therefore, is concerned with language as motive by focusing on
conditions and consequences of logonomic systems upon which they shape and order
social practices. While characterising logonomic systems through logology can be
abstract, logonomic systems themselves are intrinsically social phenomena arising
from “situated, historical and mediated” symbolic practices (Stillar, 1998, p. 79).
According to Burke (1984b, p. 182),
vocabularies [of a particular logonomic system] are not words alone but the
social textures, the local psychoses, the institutional structures, the purposes and
practices that lie behind the words.
As such, logology complements grammatical (dramatistic) and rhetorical analysis
with “meditation” on the conditions and consequences of symbolic action, and
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logonomic systems act as a link as well as a screening of the ‘reality’ (Stillar, 1998, p.
80).
According to Burke (1966, p. 50), life is lived through the “terministic screens”:
We must use terministic screens, since we can't say anything without the use of
terms; whatever terms we use, they necessarily constitute a corresponding kind of
screen; and any such screen necessarily directs the attention to one field rather
than another. Within that field there can be different screens, each with its way of
directing the attention and shaping the range of observations implicit in the given
terminology.
In other words, the effect and scope of our symbolic action is conditioned and
constrained by a variety of terministic screens (terminology). These terministic
screens function by highlighting certain aspects for our attention and engagement
(Stillar, 1998). According to Stiller (1998, p. 77), while symbolic action and its
rhetorical effect produces and reproduces various social orders that are appropriate to
different hierarchies, hierarchies in turn “calibrate” the social order and value it by
evaluating and ranking words, things, people, acts and so on. This is achieved with
reference to institutional practices, relations, social norms and expectations, as well
as terministic screens - the forms of symbolic action that “articulate, reproduce and
legitimate” them (Stillar, 1998, p. 77). As such, symbolic systems are considered as
“perfect” since the resources and rules are combined in a logical way appropriate to
the system itself (Burke, 1989, p. 263).
However, although a terministic screen facilitates a construction of its objects by
highlighting relevant aspects through naming, it also makes the situation manageable
and constrains our capacity to entertain other perspectives by obscuring or silencing
them (Hart, 1997; Peterson, 1997; Stillar, 1998). As Burke (1984b, p. 49) says, “[a]
way of seeing is also a way of not seeing”.
[I]mplications of the particular terminology in terms of which the observations
are made … maybe but the spinning out of possibilities implicit in our particular
choice of terms (Burke, 1966, p. 46).
Logological analysis therefore, by investigating the selecting and deflecting nature of
terministic screens reminds us that the efficacy of the symbol is imbedded in its
relationship to other terms, not in its essential accuracy in evaluating the symbolised
(Stillar, 1998). While logonomic systems in general, and terministic screens in
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particular, create bases for identification and consubstantiation, its intrinsically
hierarchising and separating effects produce and reproduce inequities and divisions
in social systems regarding certain debates or controversies (Livesey, 2001; Stillar,
1998). These paradoxes and ambiguities inherent in logonomic systems open doors
for resistance and change (Livesey, 2001).
In this case, scientific and technology-related discourse from centre institutions’
water accounts boosts the value of objectivity through quantification. In other words,
“its rhetoric of non-rhetoric”, is considered by border institutions as “exploitative
and combative” in their alternative accounts, since it dissociates feelings and
thoughts and rejects morality in terms of social and environmental responsibility
(Hart, 1997, p. 265). Such terministic screens articulate, legitimate and reproduce
centre institutions’ expectations that humans can achieve an absolute control over
nature by continuing scientific and technological progress. As Selzer (2004, pp. 264265) contends: “Scientism…needs to be counterbalanced by [other terministic
screens from border institutions with] a stress on ‘intuition’, ‘imagination’, ‘vision’
and ‘revelation’.”
To conclude, Burkean rhetorical criticism comprises grammatical, rhetorical and
logological analysis as a method and enables the researcher to identify structures,
features, relationships, functions and implications of symbolic action. As a method
adopted in this thesis, it helps to “construct objects of analysis by picking out
elements of discourse for our attention” (Stillar, 1998, p. 89).
5.8

Scope and data

As described in previous sections, the purpose of this study is to collate and compile
accounts for the GAB water risk debate to investigate the culturally and
institutionally constructed nature of GAB water related risks, and how it is
conducted through strategic discourses in documents. In line with cultural risk theory,
three institutions - market, hierarchy and border institutions actively engage in this
constructive process and in the meantime, privilege different risk perspectives and
corresponding risk mediation or management.
As the GAB water risk debate in this study is centred upon BHP OD’s entitlement to
the GAB water and its water management, the timeline covered by this study is from
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2005, the year in which BHP acquired WMC, established BHP OD and applied for
ODEP. It extends to October 2011, when the final decision from Commonwealth
Federal Government, South Australian and Northern Territory Government about the
ODEP was made.
Since this study is concerned with the contested domain of discursive construction of
GAB water related risks, social and environmental accounting disclosure documents
that have been produced in respect of the GAB water debate from BHP, BHP OD,
WMC and other mining related associations; regulatory documents from the Federal
government, South Australian government 34 and their scientists; and counter
accounting disclosure related documents from civil society are analysed. These are
scrutinised initially for their relevance before the compilation of contested accounts.
It is important to recall that while BHP OD’s direct involvement into the GAB water
risk debate started from 2005, the debate has been evolving since WMC, BHP OD’s
predecessor, discovered and started operating the Olympic Dam mine in 1978.
Therefore, historic documents issued back then that are not covered by the timeline
of the study, but are highly relevant to the GAB water controversy are also selected
for analysis (The dataset of documents used in this study is also contained in
Appendix C).
Since the BHP and BHP OD’s water accounts represent the official corporate talk,
the information was collated through mainly organisational and institutional websites
and library archives using publicly available data produced directly by market
institutions, which include:
BHP and BHP OD
Olympic Dam Environmental Management and Monitoring Report (1 July 200530 June 2006)
Olympic Dam Environmental Management and Monitoring Report (1 July 200630 June 2007)
Olympic Dam Environmental Management and Monitoring Report (1 July 200730 June 2008)

34
The Northern Territory government is primarily concerned with the radioactive pollution of uranium ore from a
transportation perspective, which is not directly related to the GAB water issue.
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Olympic Dam Environmental Management and Monitoring Report (1 July 200830 June 2009)
Olympic Dam Environmental Management and Monitoring Report (1 July 200930 June 2010)
Olympic Dam Environmental Management and Monitoring Report (1 July 201030 June 2011)
Olympic Dam Environmental Management and Monitoring Report (1 July 201130 June 2012)

Environmental Management Program FY 11-13, 2012
Environmental Management Manual FY 11-13, 2012
Monitoring Program - Great Artesian Basin (GAB) FY 11-13, 2012
Environmental Management Program FY 08-10, 2008
Environmental Management Manual FY 08-10, 2008
Monitoring Program - Great Artesian Basin (GAB) FY 08-10, 2008

Great Artesian Basin Wellfields Report (1 July 2007- 30 June 2008)
Great Artesian Basin Wellfields Report (1 July 2008- 30 June 2009)
Great Artesian Basin Wellfields Report (1 July 2009- 30 June 2010)
Great Artesian Basin Wellfields Report (1 July 2010- 30 June 2011)
Great Artesian Basin Wellfields Report (1 July 2011- 30 June 2012)

Olympic Dam Project: Draft EIS 2009
Olympic Dam Project: Supplementary EIS 2011

BHP Billiton Sustainability Report 2006
BHP Billiton Sustainability Report 2007
BHP Billiton Sustainability Report 2008
BHP Billiton Sustainability Report 2009
BHP Billiton Sustainability Report 2010
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BHP Billiton Sustainability Report 2011
BHP Billiton Sustainability Report 2012

Sustainable Water Use at Olympic Dam 2009

WMC (Western Mining Corporation)
Olympic Dam Project Draft Environmental Impact Statement 1982
Olympic Dam Project Supplement to the Draft Environmental Impact Statement
1983
Assessment of Exploration and Post - European settlement significance of the
Mound Springs of South Australia 1984
Olympic Dam Expansion Project Environmental Impact Statement 1997

Australian Uranium Association
BHP Billiton’s Olympic Dam Mine- Issues Briefing 2009

MCA (Minerals Council of Australia)
Draft Advice on Water Charge Rules for Recovery of Planning and Management
Costs 2009
MCA response to National Water Initiative 2009 Biennial Assessment of
Progress 2009

ICMM (International Council on Mining and Metals)
Water Management in Mining: a selection of case studies 2012

Media
BHP Billiton flags further development of Olympic Dam 2007
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For the Australian Federal government and South Australian governments’ water
accounts representing hierarchy institutions’ perspective on the GAB water risks,
GAB water governance and regulation related documents are accessed and
interrogated electronically through both governments’ (and their agents’) website
and public release. They include:
Federal Government
(Bureau of Rural Sciences)
The Great Artesian Basin, Australia 1980
(Australian Bureau of Statistics)
Water Account Australia 2010-11
(National Water Commission)
Regional Water Resources Assessments 2009

South Australian Government
Water Allocation Plan for the Far North Prescribed Wells Area 2009

Roxby Downs Indenture Arrangements for water management 2002
Roxby Downs (Indenture Ratification) Act 1982
Roxby Downs (Indenture Ratification) (Amendment of Indenture) Amendment Act
2011

Parliamentary Debates (Hansard) 2005
Parliamentary Debates (Hansard) 2010
Parliamentary Debates (Hansard) 2011

Frequent Asked Questions (ODEP EIS) 2011
Assessment Report - Environmental Impact Statement Olympic Dam Expansion
2011
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ACCC (Australian Competition and Consumer Commission)
Water Charge Rules for Water Planning and Management Draft Advice 2009

SAALNRM (South Australian Arid Lands Natural Resources Management (Board))
Water Allocation Plan for the Far North Prescribed Wells Area 2009
Proposed amendments to the Regional Natural Resources Management Plan
2009

Public Release (of governments’ approval decision for ODEP)
Olympic Dam Mine Expansion Approved 2011
BHP’s $30b Olympic Dam Expansion Approved 2011

For the civil society’s water accounts representing border institutions’ perspectives
on the GAB water risks, publicly available and externally constructed information
was confined to public submission to Draft EIS of ODEP, independent academic
research, web documents from NGOs, and media outlets. It is important to note that
while Aboriginal people didn’t release their perspectives directly, they are
represented through disclosures from other members of border institutions. These
channels of information, in which many of them share same contents, portray civil
society’s perceptions on BHP OD’s GAB water related impact, and allow adequate
scoping of the thesis by providing relevant and comparative information dynamics,
which include:
Public Submissions (Comment Letters)35
Submission Name/Organisation
number
7

Anti- Nuclear Alliance of W. A.

35

According to BHP (2011a), there are 74 public submissions in total address the issue of BHP OD’s GAB water intake and its
related risks from civil scoety. Submission 136, 189, 199 and 337 are indirectly related to the GAB water issues.

105

8

Arid Lands Environment Centre

10

Australian Conservation Foundation

11

Australian Conservation Foundation-form letter

13

Australian Greens

24

Conservation Council of South Australia

35

Environment Centre NT

37

Environment Tasmania Inc.

42

Friends of the Earth

44

Friends of the Earth Adelaide

46

Hastings Area Nuclear Free Alliance

55

National Farmers’ Association

57

Nature Conservation Society of South Australia

62

Outback Areas Community Development Trust

65

People for Nuclear Disarmament

77

Roxstop Action

85

The Macleay Nuclear Free Alliance

88

United Nations Association of Australia South Australia

92

Women’s International League for Peace and Freedom

95

Worms SA

97

Ms Jess Abrahams

99

Miriam Amery-Gale

102

Ms Christine Arnold

105

Ms Yvonne Badger

114

Ms Antoinette Bentley

116

Ms Cath Blakey

125

Ms Jamie Brideson

136

Ms Catherine Cox

138

Ms Helen Crawford

146

Mr John Denlay

147

Mr Andrew Derrick

159

Ms Renee Engl

161

Mr William Alford Fisher
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180

Ms Sophie Green

185

Mr Anthony Hack

189

Ms Lisa Hall

196

Ms Kristy Henderson (also represents Aboriginal group’s interests)

199

Ms Kellie higginbottom

204

Ms Lyn Hovey

206

Ms Madeline Hudson

216

Ms Dawn Jecks

217

Mr Harry Johnson

224

Mr S Keyes

233

Mr Al Lad (also represents Aboriginal group’s interests)

241

Ms Joanne and John Lewis

244

Mr Alan, Jenny, Antony and Natalie Luesby

247

Ms Michele Madigan

248

Ms Petrina Maizey

254

Ms Janet Mayer

255

Mr Chris McBride

258

Ms Ella Mckinley

287

Ms Susanna Pearson

288

Hon Liz Penfold

289

Mr Joseph Philippa

292

Mr John H Pope

297

Mr Richard Quilty & Willem Vervoort

299

Ms Eva Rainow

304

Ms Georgia Roberts

306

Ms Amanda Rowe

309

Ms Angela Rozali

313

Ms Gabrielle Scarman

315

Ms Rachel Scarman

328

Mr Daniel Spencer

331

Ms Alys Stevens

335

Mr Samantha Sunners
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337

Ms Rebecca Taylor

343

Ms Miriam Tonkin

345

Mr Andrea Tschirner

351

Ms Janelle Veitch

352

Ms Narelle Walker

353

Mr Tim Walsh

363

Jessie Wells -second submission

388

Confidential

389

Confidential

Independent Academic Research References
The Plutonic Waters of the Great Artesian Basin (Endersbee, 2000b)
The Great Artesian Basin Management of Water resources after 100 Years of
Development (Hillier, 1996)
Mound Springs of the Great Artesian Basin in South Australia: A case study
from Olympic Dam (Mudd, 2000) (also represents Aboriginal group’s interests)
The Sustainability of Use of Groundwater from the South-Western Edge of the
Great Artesian Basin with Particular Reference to the Impact on the Mound
Springs of the Borefields of Western mining Corporation (Keane, 1997) (also
represents Aboriginal group’s interests)

Web Documents from NGOs
(Great Artesian Basin Protection Group)
Impact of Olympic Dam/ Roxby Downs 2009
Management History 2009
Submission 2009
Government Documents 2009

(Save the Basin)
Save the Great Artesian Basin from Olympic Dam: An Ethical Issue 2011
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BHP Billiton Assertion 2011
Read What the Minister for water says 2011

(Friend of the Earth)
Campaign: Expansion of Roxby Downs 2011

(Friend of the Earth Australia)
Watered Down Negotiations - WMC Picks Both Sides 1996
Summary + Articles re Olympic Dam Mine Expansion 2011

(Friend of the Earth Adelaide)
Above the Law? Roxby Downs and BHP Billiton’s Legal Privileges 2006

Media
‘Corporate Abuse’ hits Great Artesian Basin 2009
Protect the Great Artesian Basin! Stop Olympic Dam! 2011(also represents
Aboriginal group’s interests)
BHP gets Approval for World’s Largest Open Pit Mine 2011
S.A. Government and BHP Billiton sign Olympic Dam Deal 2011
Industry Welcomes Uranium Mine Expansion 2011 (also represents Aboriginal
group’s interests)
S.A. Greens fault BHP’s Olympic Dam safeguards 2011
Greens leader Mark Parnell has Welcomed 2011
In an effort to improve benefits for South 2011

Australian Greens’ Public Release:
Mark Parnell Speech (Parliamentary Debates)
Australian Greens: BHP: “Jump!” Government: “how high?” 2011
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Greens Bill: Roxby Downs (Indenture Ratification) (Application of Acts)
Amendment Bill 2007
South Australia, Legislative Council, Parliamentary Debates 2011

While the use of market institutions’ social and environmental disclosures and
hierarchy institutions’ regulatory disclosures help to ameliorate the researcher bias,
this bias seems to prevail more in the alternative disclosures representing the
perspectives of civil society. To mitigate this bias, information was captured from a
wide range of media outlets which are syndicated sharing identical contents. These
articles were then scrutinised with tracing of further references before information
was selected based on its relevance to the BHP OD’s mining operation and its social
and environmental effects on the GAB groundwater system. To further augment
editorial bias, the selected information was paraphrased closely or quoted directly to
compile the alternative accounts. It is important to note that while these accounts
comprised of externally sourced and web-based information can also be biased,
subjective and partisan (Spence, 2009), they are argued to perform a “balancing view
in the face of the considerable resources that organisations have at their disposal”
(Gibson, Gray, Laing & Dey, 2001, p. 1) and “will be almost bound to improve on
the accounts that the average company will prepare on and by itself” (Medawar,
1976, p. 394).
5.9

Method and approach

The data analysis for this study is an iterative process, which occurs both during and
after the data collection. It includes six stages. At the first stage, a wide range of
publicly available disclosure documents related to the GAB water risk debate were
searched, gathered and read through so as to generate a broad picture for identifying
important sustainability issues and major stakeholder groups. The complete dataset
consists of 37 documents from market institutions, 17 documents from hierarchy
institutions and 101 documents from border institutions (Section 5.8).
At the second stage, the emphasis was on a discussion of whether the GAB
groundwater system is ‘replenishable’ or ‘inrechargeable’ (see Chapter 7); a public
dispute over the economic, social and environmental benefits deriving from BHP
OD’s mining operation and proposed ODEP (see Chapter 8); and, a controversy over
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potential social and environmental consequences (re) allocated to different
institutional groups within society triggered by GAB water resource management
and planning activity led by government agencies (see Chapter 9). Relevant excerpts
from these discussions are collected into three databases, one for each institution. It
is notable that these three major debates had been narrowed down and developed
into three themes for data analysis in the fifth stage.
At the third stage, the focus was on rhetorical effects of risk-related reasoning and
argumentations employed by three institutions - the market (BHP, BHP OD, WMC
and other mining related associations); the hierarchy (the Australian Federal
government, South Australian government and their scientists), and the border (civil
society). Burkean rhetoric criticism was applied to cultural risk theory (Chapter 6,
Section 6.3) to identify features, functions and implications of each institutional risk
discursive practices. Making those theoretical elements explicit in turn provides
analytical scaffolding against which the compilation and evaluation of three different
sets of accounts could be facilitated.
There are nine risk-based sustainability notions which form major concepts of
cultural risk theory (see Chapter 6, Table 6.1). They are ‘preferred learning style’
(feature), ‘view of nature’ (function), ‘property of knowledge ideal’ (implication),
‘attitude towards technology’ (feature), ‘view of risk’ (function), ‘resolution of risk’
(implication), ‘cause of ecological crisis’ (feature), ‘view of justice and fairness’
(function) and ‘property of desired system’ (implication). These nine concepts were
specifically identified for the GAB water risk debate arising from BHP OD’s mining
operation, and they enable researcher to align contents of the market institution’s
water accounts to those from hierarchy institutions and border institutions.
At the fourth stage, three databases were re-read individually to highlight and code
contents that are reflective of and consistent with those nine concepts of cultural risk
theory. The close paraphrasing and/or the direct quote from these contents (excerpts)
are recorded and collated into three sets of accounts - one for market institutions, one
for hierarchy and one for border institutions. The purpose of this stage is to handle an
otherwise unmanageable body of text to compile parallel (aligned and/or counter)
information for the further interpretation of the GAB water risk debate.
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At the fifth stage, both cultural risk theory and the comparative information in three
sets of accounts were read through for numerous rounds to facilitate the
interpretation of different institutional risk discursive practices against nine riskbased sustainability theoretical concepts. This iterative analysis aided the
development of a taxonomy (categorisation and formation) of three somewhat
coherent stories/themes (Chapter 7, 8, 9) - on how the ideology or value system
inscribed in corporate disclosure is aligned with or differs from that in governmental
regulatory disclosures, and how these normalised and taken-for-granted assumptions
of business and (sometimes) government are resisted and challenged by the NGOs,
environmental activists and Aboriginal groups from civil society.
At the final stage, the interpretation of corporate narratives and governmental
narratives, juxtaposed with the counter-narratives from civil society for three themes
were scrutinised and reorganised individually (with the guidance of supervisors), for
further discussions of implications on three critical accounting themes - ‘concept of
control’ (see Chapter 7, Section 7.4); ‘stewardship’ (see Chapter 8, Section 8.4) and
‘economic consequences’ (see Chapter 9, Section 9.4). Accountability ‘gaps’ were
also identified -

between managerial accountability (from corporate claim);

administrative accountability (from governmental talk) and moral accountability
(from counter-narrative), corresponding to the social and environmental impacts that
BHP OD’s mining operation has on the GAB groundwater system. This thesis
therefore echoes the call for a dialogical accounting approach to accounting which
promotes democratic participation in a ‘polylogic’ society (Brown, 2009; Gray,
1992).
5.10 Summary
This chapter presented the method adopted, the relevant data and process of data
analysis used in this thesis. This thesis explores the GAB water risk debate by
compiling and analysing three sets of accounts from market, hierarchy and border
institutions’ disclosures respectively, resonant with a critical accounting approach.
The interpretive structuralist approach to discourse analysis explicitly emphasises the
subjective nature of the sense-making and interpretive process. The method of
Burkean rhetorical criticism aims to analyse different institutional texts at three
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different levels - grammar, rhetoric and logology with a focus on concepts such as
the pentad, identification, hierarchy, order and terministic screens.
Given that allocative hydro-politics are necessarily discursive due to contending
articulated concerns (Allan, 2005), discourse analysis in general and rhetorical
criticism in particular are considered as the appropriate research method for this
thesis to investigate accounting and alternative (including counter) accounting
information and discourse dynamics of this political contest with regard to the GAB
water debate. In practice, data collection and analysis was conducted through
numerous rounds of reading and organising major themes of disclosure documents
from three institutions, based on the cultural risk theory. The next chapter introduces
a cultural risk theory (Douglas, 1970; Douglas & Wildavsky, 1982) to assist the
interpretation of institutional discourses in respect of the GAB water risk.
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CHAPTER 6 CULTURAL RISK THEORY
6.1

Introduction

The previous chapter explained the research method used in the thesis to examine
how the contested Great Artesian Basin (GAB) water disclosure is manifest through
cultural risk perceptions and practices. Given the methodological assumption in
Chapter 4, risks are recognised and selected by cultural norms, standards and
constraints (Cheit, 1983; Park, 2010). This chapter introduces cultural risk theory
(Douglas & Wildavsky, 1982) to facilitate an interpretation of institutional discourse
with respect to the GAB water risk.
The cultural risk theory informed by the Grid/Group typology (Douglas, 1970) and
the Risk and Culture model (Douglas & Wildavsky, 1982), and further developed by
Thompson et al., (1990), Schwarz and Thompson (1990) and Thompson and Rayner
(1998) provides four (including three active, one inert and passive) institutional
typologies and explicates different institutional positions and responses towards the
GAB water governance related politics, technology and social choice within a
context of sustainable development. According to cultural risk theory, it is these
different risk perspectives that trigger the debate in the form of contested water
disclosures. Therefore, each institutional risk discourse can be understood as
rhetorical in nature.
Since Burkean rhetorical criticism outlined in Chapter 5 identifies and interprets the
features, functions and implications of discursive practices (Stillar, 1998), applying
this framework to cultural risk theory allows the researcher to identify various
notions of conceptualising risk-based sustainability, its associated features, functions
and implications of each institutional groups’ risk discourse. In this thesis, these are:
preferred learning style (feature); view of nature (function); properties of knowledge
ideal (implication); attitude towards technology (feature); view of risk (function);
resolution of risk (implication); cause of ecological crisis (feature); view of justice
and fairness (function); and, properties of desired system (implication).
These nine concepts in turn are linked to three accounting and accountability related
themes. Preferred learning style, view of nature and property of knowledge ideals
from three active institutions help to understand the contested nature of the
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accounting concept of control with associated accounting recognition and
measurement rules. Institutional assumptions about the attitude towards technology,
and a view of risk and risk resolution, facilitate the understanding of the stewardship
debate from both mainstream and critical accounting perspectives. Institutional
perceptions of the cause of the ecological crisis, view of justice and fairness and
property of desired system enable an analysis of resource allocation issue and its
associated economic consequences arguments, to further understand accounting and
accountability.
This chapter first introduces cultural risk theory in general (Douglas, 1970; Douglas
& Wildavsky, 1982) (Section 6.2). The three fold Burkean framework of rhetorical
criticism is then applied to cultural risk theory to tease out the theoretical elements
for each institutional risk discursive practice (Section 6.3). Three critical themes
derived from these institutional discourses are finally discussed with an implication
for accounting research and practice (Section 6.4).
6.2

Cultural risk theory

A cultural theory of risk suggests that any particular view or position of individuals
towards risk is shaped by the beliefs and values of the cultural group to which they
belong (Douglas & Wildavsky, 1982; Tansey & O'Riordan, 1999). Risk therefore,
can be seen as a social choice and cultural selection which is constructed for
defending a particular way of life (Douglas & Wildavsky, 1982; Moerman & van der
Laan, 2012; Reddy, 1996). In this thesis, a cultural risk perspective is used to
critically explore the underlying assumptions for contentious water related
disclosures and accountability discourses. Cultural theories of risk originally derived
from the early studies of ritual in tribal communities (Krimsky, 1992; Rayner, 1992;
Renn, 1992). American anthropologist Mary Douglas, with her colleagues,
investigated ‘forbidden’ activities in tribal societies and identified several generic
value clusters and cultural patterns that form early organizational principles in tribal
groups (Douglas, 1966; Douglas & Wildavsky, 1982). According to these principles,
different groups develop particular risk positions and strategies to reinforce the
religious and moral order of the group (Renn, 1992).
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Like African tribal communities, organisations, social groups or societies in
contemporary western society use the notion of risk as a modern strategy to
“establish and maintain conceptual boundaries between self and other” (Lupton,
1999, pp. 24-25). As the role of taboo in tribal cultures is to protect the tribe from
certain destabilising behaviour, the symbolic aspects of perceptions about purity,
pollution and otherness are linked to risk and serve to bolster social cohesion and
fend off threats of disorder (Douglas, 1966; Lupton, 1999). Risk is understood from
a cultural perspective as the offence or violation of cultural values and expectations.
Emotions such as anger, fear, desperation or hatred are manifestations of risk
(Lupton, 1999).
Cultural risk frameworks were developed to explain various risk phenomena, such as
how different social and cultural structures influence individual risk perceptions and
accepted levels of risk e.g. Grid/Group typology (Douglas, 1970; Douglas, 1985;
Thompson, 1980) and institutional-biased political debate and policy decisionmaking e.g. Risk and Culture model (Douglas & Wildavsky, 1982). In this thesis, the
institutional debate of GAB water related risks from BHP OD’s GAB water
extraction and its proposed ODEP are analysed, using the combination of
Grid/Group typology and Risk and Culture model. The unit of analysis is an
‘aggregate of individuals’ i.e. the institutional group. According to Douglas (1985, p.
67), culture is
[the] actively invoked conventional wisdom...[and] the publicly shared collection
of principles and values used at any one time to justify behaviour...[and] uphold
the forms of institutional life.
In this sense, people who live in a particular social institution are affected and
monitored by its norms, standards and constraints (Cheit, 1983; Park, 2010). It is
these institutional processes and cultural dynamics that mediate “social patterns and
relationships” (Moerman & van der Laan, 2012, p. 110) and determine risk selection
(Bowen, 1995; Elliott, 1983).
[T]he choice of risks to worry about depends on the social forms selected. The
choice of risk and the choice of how to live are taken together. Each form of
social life has its own typical risk portfolio. Common values lead to common
fears... This cultural bias is integral to social organization. Risk taking and risk
aversion, shared confidence and shared fears, are part of the dialogue on how best
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to organize social relations. For to organize means to organize some things in and
other things out (Douglas & Wildavsky, 1982, p. 8).
As such, culture is considered as “the coding principle” (Douglas, 1985, p. 68)
through which risks are recognised, selected and framed, usually inseparable from
public ideas and issues associated with justice, power and legitimacy (Moerman &
van der Laan, 2012; Tansey & O'Riordan, 1999). These predefined codes or
categories constitute and stablise sets of meaning to facilitate communication and
decision-making of any new phenomenon within society (Douglas & Wildavsky,
1982).
The Grid/Group typology has been developed from ethnographic studies (Douglas,
1970). According to the Grid/Group typology, there are four principal ways of
perceiving and structuring human relations (Douglas, 1970). Each cultural unit
unfolds in contradistinction to one another which constitute a continuous “cultural
dialogue” (Linsley & Shrives, 2014, p. 757) of which ways of defining, valuing and
resolving social issues should be supported (Ney & Thompson, 2011). In Douglas’
(2013, p. 290) words, “[a]t all times, a culture is responding to the individual culture
bearers and how they are dealing with each other.”
The Grid scale measures the extent of role differentiation and social classification
that individuals as social actors are constrained. Group scale, by contrast, is
concerned with the degree of collective commitment to which those social beings are
subjected (Douglas, 1970; Ney & Thompson, 2011; Schwarz & Thompson, 1990). A
high-grid state stands for a significant bundle of social constraints on interacting
social members. Distribution of roles here are dependent on the explicit social
stratification, such as gender, age, colour, hierarchical position, and so on (Douglas,
1970; Linsley & Shrives, 2009; Ney & Thompson, 2011).A low-grid state indicates
the weak limits of classificatory differentiation on the range of social activities and
options open to social members. Social roles here can be chosen freely without
prejudice, depending on either personal capacities of competing or negotiating for
them; or formal policies ensuring equal opportunity for competition (Linsley &
Shrives, 2009; Ney & Thompson, 2011).
A high-group state designates that there are strongly shared aims and tight social
identity for actors within the society. A low group state, in contrast, is associated
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with little or no cohesion between people and sparse sense of interdependence
(Linsley & Shrives, 2009; Ney & Thompson, 2011).Overall, the Grid/Group
typology gives rise to four cultural solidarities: individualists (low grid, low group),
hierarchists (high grid, high group), egalitarians (low grid, high group) and fatalists
(high grid, low group).

Figure 6.1 Grid/Group Model
Source: Douglas (1982, in Linsley & Shrives, 2009, p. 495)

Individualistic solidarity emphasises the individual autonomy and the resultant
freedom to transact with each other. The principal motivation underlying such
alliance is to gain resources with no binding loyalty to others (Linsley & Shrives,
2009, 2014). As Douglas (2003, p. 1358) asserts, individualists are “expected to go
forth entrepreneurially, get new ideas, work hard, and compete for esteem and
income”.
Hierarchical solidarity respects hierarchical values and procedural rules (Douglas,
1985). Social roles within such solidarity are well-defined; where customs and
traditions constitute an important component of institutional life (Linsley & Shrives,
2009). Being faithful to stability, hierarchical solidarity emphasises maintaining
boundaries, both internally and externally (Linsley & Shrives, 2009).
Egalitarian solidarity stresses the wellbeing of the group and the level of
commitment, which results in a constraint on human self-interested behaviours, with
clear demarcation of the external boundary (Linsley & Shrives, 2009). Despite the
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close-knit nature of such solidarity, social roles for individuals are unrestricted and it
is difficult to establish and assert authority (Linsley & Shrives, 2014).
Fatalist solidarity is the final classification where individuals are highly restricted
with respect to the selection of social roles and little opportunity for selfdetermination (Linsley & Shrives, 2009). In addition, members of this solidarity are
relatively inert, isolated and alienated with little sense of community (Linsley &
Shrives, 2014).
Built upon Grid/Group typology, the further development of Risk and Culture model
(Douglas & Wildavsky, 1982) assumes that cultural theory can also be applicable to
the analyses of policy actors beyond individuals and their social context. In this
model, institutional values equalise the concept of individual risk perception (Cheit,
1983).
According to Douglas and Wildavsky (1982), a social system embraces ‘the centre’
and ‘the border’. The centre institutions consist of market (individualistic) and
hierarchy (hierarchical) cultures, whereas the border institutions are characterised by
sectarian (egalitarian) interests. These three types of institutions have distinct ideas
and theories regarding proper or improper social organisation (Park, 2010), and they
participate in public debate and decision-making either through exerting power or
monitoring the powerful (Cheit, 1983; Douglas & Wildavsky, 1982).
It is notable that it is only these three active solidarities - the individualistic, the
hierarchical and the egalitarians are explicitly and positively involved in policysetting through different but complementary ways (Ney & Thompson, 2011;
Schwarz & Thompson, 1990). Fatalists, in contrast, are those passive individuals
whom each active solidarity seeks to mobilise in order to advance their cause
(Schwarz & Thompson, 1990). Market institutions made up of individualists
champion the system of free market and seek to maximise utility (Douglas &
Wildavsky, 1982). They believe in “a means-end rationality” (Douglas, 1985, p. 87)
which results in implicit controls and favours self-regulation (Lupton, 1999; Park,
2010). Viewing economic risks as the most significant threat, market institutions
value fair play and protected contracts in an exchange system, and introduce
standardised measures (Douglas & Wildavsky, 1982), such as accounting practices
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(Moerman & van der Laan, 2012) to solve common problems. However, risks are
not necessarily regarded as negative, as they also offer opportunities (Douglas &
Wildavsky, 1982; Linsley & Shrives, 2009; Moerman & van der Laan, 2012).
Market institutions are oriented towards the present, and therefore assume a shortterm perspective of risk (Douglas & Wildavsky, 1982).
Within hierarchy institutions comprising hierarchists, the system of justice rewards
loyalty and punishes unorthodox attitudes and behaviours through regulations
(Douglas & Wildavsky, 1982; Elliott, 1983; Linsley & Shrives, 2009). Hierarchies
tend to have “multiple... vague... [and] modest” objectives, and correspondingly the
decision making process is “incremental; remedial and serial” (Douglas &
Wildavsky, 1982, p. 93). Actions, such as foreign attacks that undermine
institutional order and rules, are deemed most threatening. Economic risks are
acceptable to the degree that they are manageable within standardized operating
procedures (Douglas & Wildavsky, 1982; Jaeger, Renn, Rosa & Webler, 2001). As
such, hierarchies are often dependent on professional knowledge and expertise
(Linsley & Shrives, 2009; Moerman & van der Laan, 2012).
Despite divergent views between market and hierarchy institutions, they adopt
similar ideas and understandings of risk and danger (Douglas & Wildavsky, 1982),
and coexist and collaborate to some extent as the ‘centre’ (Elliott, 1983; Linsley &
Shrives, 2009). When interests of both institutions intersect, their power becomes
formidable (Linsley & Shrives, 2009; Moerman & van der Laan, 2012), and risks are
considered “properly managed” within the centre, “unless social disorder exists”
(Durkin, 1990, p. 5).
Border or periphery institutions consist of sectarian (egalitarian) groups, which
recruit and bind members in opposition to the centre organisations (Douglas &
Wildavsky, 1982). Concepts such as equality and justice reside in the border
(Douglas & Wildavsky, 1982; Linsley & Shrives, 2009) and often criticise the
injustice and inequity perpetuated by the centre institutions (Douglas & Wildavsky,
1982; Moerman & van der Laan, 2012; Tansey & O'Riordan, 1999) e.g. the
environmental risk of pollution from advanced technologies (Park, 2010). Once
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individuals “align themselves with the border”, the centre institutions are seen as
failing to manage risks and these “risks become social” (Durkin, 1990, p. 5).
Fatalist solidarity, on the other hand, incorporates passive outsiders for both centre
and border institutions. These marginal members of society perceive the world as
‘capricious’ and human beings as untrustworthy (Ney & Thompson, 2011; Schwarz
& Thompson, 1990). The resulting submissive towards risk and fairness therefore is
that there can be no control over any event and themselves resign as merely victims
of fate (Linsley & Shrives, 2009, 2014). For fatalists, “[s]preading democracy and
peace around the world maybe a lofty endeavour, but it is not a realistic goal…
everyone has to fend for themselves, which the devil takes the hindmost”36(Ney &
Thompson, 2011, p. 38).
Although fatalist solidarity is found to produce no policy suggestion, they still
remain relevant to these potential policies. As Schwarz & Thompson (1990, p. 10)
contend:
They are the great risk absorbers, enduring with more or less dignity, greater or
lesser ignorance, whatever comes their way: a social sponge that the active
policy-makers, in their different ways, publicly wring their hands over and
privately make good use of.
As such, without fatalists, the rest of the society would not be capable to implement
their favoured policies (Schwarz & Thompson, 1990).The combination of
Grid/Group typology and Risk and Culture model provides a theoretical framework,
not only to explicitly acknowledge the diverse institutional responses to manage
risks, but also to answer questions about the policy decision-making process (Park,
2010, p. 82) - [w]hy policy makers and stakeholders support different policies; how
the policy agenda changes; why different societies focus on different policy issues,
and so on”. Cultural risk theory has also been expanded by other scholars to
synthesise a more recent intellectual development in natural resource ecology and
anthropology, to further conceptualise politics; technology; and, social choice

36

According to Ney and Thompson (2011, p. 40), however, “this ‘non-story’ also contains a kernel of truth. Sometimes, a
social ill – however pressing it may seem or feel - maybe unsolvable for instance due to its sheer complexity. In fact, it may
happen that any attempts to address the issue end up making matters worse. In those cases, the resignation that this way of life
induces might provide much needed wisdom and solace”.
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against a backdrop of sustainable development (e.g. Schwarz & Thompson, 1990;
Thompson & Rayner, 1998).
This theoretical framework enables an analysis of different positions taken by market
institutions (represented by BHP Billiton Olympic Dam Corporation Pty Ltd (BHP
OD)); hierarchy institutions (represented by Federal, and South Australia
governments); and border institutions (represented by civil society), regarding GAB
water related risks from BHP OD’s GAB water extraction and its further proposal of
Olympic Dam Expansion Project (ODEP) (Justifications are provided in Chapter 7, 8,
and 9). BHP and BHP OD are identified as market institutions since they
demonstrate an overriding goal of profit maximisation and shareholder value. The
hierarchy institutions are identified being represented by the Australian Federal and
South Australian governments that regulate the GAB water allocation regimes and
corporate activities. The border institutions are identified as members from civil
society, including Non-Government Organisations (NGOs), environmental activists
and Aboriginal groups who are high-profile GAB conservationists protesting against
BHP OD’s water intake for its mining operations. There are no identified responses
and positions from fatalist solidarity - such a result from data collect has also,
unsurprisingly, reflected and reinforced the theoretical suggestion and expectation.
Table 6.1 Main Representors of Centre and Border Institutions
Centre

Border

Market Institutions

Hierarchy Institutions

Border Institutions

BHP & BHP OD

Australian Federal Government

Civil Society

& South Australian
Government

This cultural risk theory (Douglas, 1970; Douglas & Wildavsky, 1982) facilitates an
understanding of how “risk-related discourse and strategies” operate within centre
institutions, and how they are “negotiated and resisted by those who are the subject
of them [mainly members from border institutions]” (Lupton, 1999, p. 102). The
next section presents three themes of cultural risk theory, with the application of the
Burkean method of rhetorical criticism.
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6.3

Application of Burkean rhetorical criticism to cultural risk theory

As explicated in Chapter 5, the Burkean framework of rhetorical criticism comprises
three complex but complementary vocabularies to enable researcher to identify
structures, features, relationships, functions and implications of symbolic action.
While grammatical analysis emphasises the way language patterns index, construct
and embrace motives, rhetorical analysis focuses on the overriding function of
language - to overcome division and reinforce unity as symbolic action (Stillar,
1998). Logological analysis on the other hand, discusses social conditions and
consequences of symbolic actions (Stillar, 1998). This three-fold theoretical
framework as a method enables the identification and interpretation of “significant,
salient features and functions” of symbolic actions or discursive practices (Stillar,
1998, p. 88).
Cultural theory of risk considers positions of risk as they are shaped by cultural
beliefs and values (Douglas & Wildavsky, 1982). Different meanings of risk are
manifest through three institutional risk discourses, to facilitate communication and
decision-making within society. Each institutional risk discourse or symbolic action
can be understood as rhetoric in nature, since distinctive risk perspectives are viewed
as social choice and cultural selection constructed for defending a particular way of
life (Douglas & Wildavsky, 1982). Applying the three-fold Burkean framework of
rhetorical criticism to cultural risk theory allows a researcher to identify features,
functions and implications of each institutional risk discursive practice. Teasing out
these theoretical concepts explicitly in turn, provides an analytical scaffolding to
facilitate an interpretation of the GAB water risk debate (Chapter 7, 8, 9).
There are nine concepts of risk-based sustainability, representing features, functions
and implications of three institutional discourses (Table 6.2). According to Stillar
(1998), Burkean grammatical analysis focuses on vocabularies and the structure of
texts used to construct motive. In the case of cultural risk theory, market, hierarchy
and border institutions represent diverse learning styles, attitudes towards technology
and causes of ecological crisis to motivate or block certain understandings and shape
predispositions toward cooperative action (Livesey, 2002a; Peterson, 1997).
Drawing on grammatical resources, Burkean rhetorical analysis deals with the role of
language in identifying and classifying social agents on one hand and providing a
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point of unity on the other (Stillar, 1998). In the case of cultural risk theory, market,
hierarchy and border institutions, by representing diverse learning styles, attitudes
towards technology and causes of ecological crisis, identify different social orders
related to views of nature, risk, justice and fairness. These institutions gather
audiences who share interests and have a common stake in those social orders
through rhetorical acts (Stillar, 1998).
Burkean logological analysis complements grammatical and rhetorical analysis with
concerns about the social conditions and consequences of symbolic action (Stillar,
1998). In the case of cultural risk theory, market and hierarchy (centre) institutions’
symbolic actions, whilst representing their preferred learning style, attitudes towards
technology and causes of ecological crisis and identifying certain social orders
related to views of nature, risk and justice and fairness; create hierarchising and
separating effects, which produce and reproduce divisions and inequities in social
systems (Livesey, 2001; Stillar, 1998). These hierarchising and separating effects are
derived in respect of properties of knowledge ideal, resolution of risk and properties
of a desired system. The paradoxes and controversies (see Chapter 5, Section 5.6.1.3)
inherent in the centre institutions’ logonomic system in general, and terministic
screens in particular, open doors for resistance and transformation by border
institutions. In Selzer’s (2004, pp. 264-265) words, logonomic systems and
terministic screens of the centre institutions need to be “counterbalanced” by those
from border institutions.
In this section, the major concepts of cultural risk theory are presented in Table 6.1
with the application of the Burkean framework of rhetorical criticism.
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Table 6.2 Application of Burkean Rhetorical Criticism Framework to Cultural Risk
Theory to determine major Theoretical Concepts
Major
Concepts
Preferred
Learning Style
View of Nature
Properties of
Knowledge ideal
Attitude towards
Technology
View of Risk
Resolution of
Risk
Cause of
Ecological Crisis
View of Justice
and Fairness

Market
Hierarchy
Institutions
Institutions
Grammatical Analysis
Science (Trial
Expertise
and Error)
Rhetorical Analysis
Cornucopian and
Stable within
Abundant
Boundaries
Logological Analysis
Objectivity
Procedural Validity

Border
Institutions
Holism
Ephemeral and Fragile
Imperfection

Grammatical Analysis
Pro-technology
Technical Fix

Anti-Technology

Rhetorical Analysis
Opportunity
Controllability

Need to Minimise

Logological Analysis
Economic
Regulation
Growth
Grammatical Analysis
Government
Loss of Control
Intervention
Rhetorical Analysis
Equality of
Equality before Law
Opportunity
Logological Analysis

Low Growth and
Invasiveness
Inequitable System
Equality of Condition
and Result

Properties of
Free Market
Governance and
Social and
Desired System
Planning
Environmental equity
Adapted from: Schwarz and Thompson (1990, pp. 66-67, see also Ney & Thompson, 2011;
1990; Thompson, 1980; Thompson et al., 1990; Thompson & Rayner, 1998)

6.3.1

Preferred learning style, View of nature and Properties of knowledge ideal

In this study, market, hierarchy and border institutions represent diverse learning
styles to motivate certain understandings of sustainable development and shape
attitudes towards cooperative action. These different learning styles, in turn, identify
different social orders regarding the view of nature and revealed through different
sets of discourses. These discourses are symbolic actions of market and hierarchy
(centre) institutions. They have hierarchising and separating effects in respect of
properties of their knowledge ideals. These paradoxes and controversies are
challenged by border institutions through ‘counter’ discourses or symbolic actions.
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6.3.1.1 Grammatical analysis - Preferred learning style
Contested learning styles in the broader context of sustainable development are
constructed by market, hierarchy and border institutions through discursive practices.
Market institutions are agents who support the development of modern science as
agency against the backdrop of modernisation (Douglas & Wildavsky, 1982). Since
scientific knowledge “make[s] us modern…[and] advanced statistics enable us to
calculate [the risks]” (Douglas & Wildavsky, 1982, p. 29), market institutions’
purpose is to control and manage natural resources and “rule the world” (Douglas &
Wildavsky, 1982, p. 30) through acts which prompt “bold experimentation in the
face of uncertainty” (Thompson et al., 1990, p. 27). Quantification is constructed by
market institutions as “a method of stating problems” (Douglas & Wildavsky, 1982,
p. 101). A trust in quantification is manifest through the construction of risk
probability (Douglas & Wildavsky, 1982).
However, although science is said to have broadened the area of the unknown to a
certain degree, scientific development such as probabilistic risk analysis is
characterised by market institutions as an ever-evolving process, and therefore is
subject to error and uncertainty (Douglas & Wildavsky, 1982). For example,
scientific efforts are said to entail possibly negative results due to false assumptions,
defective measures, faulty data, and poorly-conducted experiments (Douglas &
Wildavsky, 1982). In this thesis, border institutions believe that the centre
institutions’ assumption of the ‘rechargeability’ of the GAB is flawed and BHP
OD’s modelling studies are faulty due to simplistic models and limited data (Chapter
7, Section 7.3.1).
Hierarchy institutions construct themselves as agents that know about the boundary
line between nature’s equilibrium and disequilibrium zones, in respect of human
intervention (Thompson et al., 1990). Since hierarchy institutions believe that the
ecosystem can only be stable within certain limits of human interaction - neither
‘unbridled interference’ nor the ‘tiptoe response’ is the moral concern (Thompson et
al., 1990). Therefore expert knowledge, based on the assumption that certified
experts can generate objective and true knowledge (Ney & Thompson, 2011)
becomes the agency for determining limits and predicting certainty, matched within
the complexity and time span of the risk issue (Schwarz & Thompson, 1990).
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As such, hierarchy institutions construct an unshakable faith in expert predictions for
“a comprehensive, objective and balanced view of the subjective matter” (Ney &
Thompson, 2011, p. 65). While this view reflects “the mainstream academic
literature and are supported by thousands of scientists” (Ney & Thompson, 2011,
p.66), this hierarchical way of processing ‘valid information’ is congruent with that
of the market, both believing in the authority of science and expertise.
As noted by Douglas and Wildavsky (1982), hierarchists believe in the limitations of
calculations. They therefore construct professional knowledge as subject to a
continuously evolving and updated process. This view is consistent with the trial and
error learning style of the market institutions.
Again, and for different reasons, their bias on risks coincides. Hierarchists can
take free- lance entrepreneurs and brokers for advisers because there is sufficient
understanding between them (Douglas & Wildavsky, 1982, p. 100).
Border institutions construct themselves as agents whose act is characterised by
“timorous forbearance” which necessitates “effective sanction” for prevention of any
possible catastrophe (Thompson et al., 1990, p. 27). Border institutions believe that
the act of bold experimentation and continuous trial and error processes from centre
institutions are a way of regulating institutional life that is culpable and more likely
to cause irreversible damage (Thompson et al., 1990). Border institutions insist that
holistic knowledge, as the agent, is the key to understanding and protecting a fragile
nature with depleting resources (Ney & Thompson, 2011). Therefore, border
institutions tend to collect, organise and reveal hidden assumptions, flawed
experiments and limited data which are usually excluded from market and hierarchy
(centre) institutions’ disclosures to the public (Douglas & Wildavsky, 1982).
As constructed by border institutions, the degree of knowledge completeness does
not only require the acknowledgement of non-scientific knowledge, but also
embraces that knowledge beyond the field of formal scientific inquiry. Aboriginal
knowledge for example, has taught that life in all kinds of forms are connected
vitally - “everything is connected to everything else” (Ney & Thompson, 2011, p.
41).
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6.3.1.2 Rhetorical analysis - View of nature
Based on a view of science as the appropriate agency for learning style, market
institutions believe they are intelligent and informed human agents who conquer and
improve nature based on ingenuity (Ostrander, 1982). This is enacted by market
institutions by framing public interest in “a wonderfully robust and bountiful natural
world” with abundant resources (Ney & Thompson, 2011, p. 48). A hierarchy or
social order between nature and humans is subsequently constructed. Market
institutions promptly advocate the myth of a “[b]enign” nature (Ney & Thompson,
2011, p. 48), which is “morally neutral” (Douglas & Wildavsky, 1982, p. 29),
resilient and able to accommodate change (Douglas & Wildavsky, 1982; Ney &
Thompson, 2011). In Douglas and Wildavsky’s (1982, p. 63) words, “Mother Nature
[is] merely secreting a healthy amount of dirt”.
Drawing upon expert knowledge as the agency for learning style, hierarchy
institutions exploit the strategy of identification with public interest by constructing
themselves as responsible human agents who protect nature within ecological
boundaries (Thompson et al., 1990). Hierarchy institutions consequently establish a
hierarchy or social order discursively. Nature is constructed as a scarce, albeit stable,
resource with “precise and knowable limits” (Schwarz & Thompson, 1990, p. 65).
When pushed beyond those limits, nature becomes vulnerable to catastrophic
consequences (Thompson et al., 1990). Human society and nature are said to be
inseparable from each other. Indeed, their synthesis is seen as ‘in harmony’ and
“necessary to everyone’s wellbeing” (Ostrander, 1982, p. 26).
Although hierarchies acknowledge that irresponsible human behaviour has affected
ecosystems negatively, they believe that humankind can still remedy this matter by
using natural resources more sustainably (Ney & Thompson, 2011). This is similar
to the border institutions view; except that the hierarchy believe that ecosystems are
stable when human beings interfere with them within the boundaries discovered and
determined by experts (Ney & Thompson, 2011).
While constructing holistic knowledge as the appropriate agency for learning style,
border institutions promote identification with the public by framing themselves as
moral agents who seek to treat ecosystems with great care (Schwarz & Thompson,
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1990), permitting “life in its varied and beautiful forms to continue” (Douglas &
Wildavsky, 1982, p. 135).
Border institutions identify the acts from the market and hierarchy institutions as
guilty and culpable because human activities have brought disastrous physical
consequences that have accelerated the extinction of countless species (Ney &
Thompson, 2011). This catastrophic environmental degradation also confronts and
threatens human wellbeing (Douglas & Wildavsky, 1982). Border institutions depict
humankind as “standing on the very edge of the abyss of environmental catastrophe”
(Thompson & Rayner, 1998, p. 294).
Border institutions therefore construct a hierarchy and social order distinct from
market and hierarchy institutions. ‘Ephemeral’ nature (Thompson et al., 1990),
where nature is constructed as fragile with depleting resources, is prevalent (Schwarz
& Thompson, 1990). Border institutions suggest that everything in the natural and
social world is interconnected intricately (Ney & Thompson, 2011), and that this
web of life is “so complicated that even small changes could have great importance”
(Douglas & Wildavsky, 1982, p. 62). For border institutions, nature and society are
said to be in equal position (Douglas & Wildavsky, 1982). This is a utopian
worldview of a balanced and harmonious ecosystem in which life of all forms exists
“without political, economic and technological restraints” (Douglas & Wildavsky,
1982, p. 136).
6.3.1.3 Logological analysis - Properties of knowledge ideals
While constructing science as an agent and identifying nature as having abundant
resources, market institutions establish ‘objectivity’ as the terministic screen or
“symbolic god-term” (Livesey, 2002b, p. 132) with respect to the properties of their
knowledge ideal and to legitimate their preferred learning style and view of nature.
According to Douglas and Wildavsky (1982), what underpins any scientific method
is ostensible objectivity. Probabilistic risk calculation for instance, conveys the
delusion of a value-free practice. As Douglas and Wildvasky (1982, p. 71) contend:
Objectivity means preventing subjective values from interfering with the
analysis. Put the figures in, work out the probabilities, crank the handle, and the
answers will come out. … Far from being objective, the figures about
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probabilities that are put into the calculation reflect the assigner's confidence that
the events are likely to occur. Since the risk analyst who feeds the machine its
data is only human, he cannot focus on all prospects with an equally steady gaze.
As such, market institutions create hierarchising and separating effects producing
and reproducing social divisions and inequalities in evaluating risks. According to
Douglas and Wildavsky (1982), market institutions’ scientific experimentations are
inadequate for judging whether some risks are ‘properly managed’ while others are
worth taking due to the subjective value of the risk analyst (Douglas & Wildavsky,
1982).
Furthermore, scientific risk analysis, more often than not, “decontextualizes and
dissocialises” human problems through quantification (Douglas & Wildavsky, 1982,
p. 80). Throughout the process of measuring, organising (including discriminating)
and calculating, the market institution creates areas with “closely scrutinized and
ordered” details, in contrast to the discriminated shadowed spots “in which nothing
can be seen and no questions asked” (Douglas, 1986, p. 69). According to Douglas
and Wildvasky (1982, p. 81), “science and risk assessment… explicitly try to
exclude moral ideas about the good life. Where responsibility starts, they stop”.
Hierarchy institutions, by constructing expert knowledge as the agent and identifying
nature as stable within boundaries, use ‘procedural validation’ as the terministic
screen with regards to properties of their knowledge ideal for legitimating their
preferred social order and learning style. As Douglas (1986) contends, while
hierarchy institutions insist their processes of gaining knowledge (along with that of
market institutions) is consistent with mainstream science, it is extremely difficult to
widen the field of knowledge, especially because it prefers to remain silent on those
scientific inquiries which are in tension or contradictory. According to Douglas
(1986, p. 77), “[o]ften when a new scientific discovery has been rejected and left to
lie inert until later, it is precisely an idea which lacked formulaic interlocking with
normal procedures of validation.” As such, hierarchists construct and control
institutional memory by bringing certain knowledge events to its members’ minds
while encouraging them to forget others (Douglas, 1986).
This case can be exemplified by US governments’ position of economic hegemony
in the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change’s (IPCC) climate negotiation. US
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representatives suggest that ‘global warming’ science is no more than a stumbling
hypothesis to the complex questions of climate change. Human activity, from this
perspective, is merely a tiny and possibly insignificant component within a colossal
system. Climate change may be beneficial to promote forest and crop growth. This
position from the US government creates the antagonistic relations between
industrialised and developing economies in IPCC climate negotiations (Livesey,
2002b).
Evidently, hierarchy institutions create hierarchising and separating effects which
(re)produce social divisions and inequities while determining what type of expert
knowledge is legitimate and what kind of scientific evidence counts as credible (Ney
& Thompson, 2011). According to Rayner (2012, p. 110), “institutionalised
forgetfulness” is crucial to maintain institutional arrangements, and public memory
as the storage system is for establishing the “social order” (Douglas, 1986, p. 70).
The paradoxes and controversies inherent in the hierarchising and separating effects
derived from properties of market and hierarchy (centre) institutions’ knowledge
ideal provide opportunities for border institutions to resist and transform. Through
the construction of holistic knowledge as agency and identification of nature as
ephemeral and fragile, border institutions establish ‘imperfection’ as the terministic
screen with respect to properties of their knowledge ideal, to legitimate their
preferred social order and learning style.
Since border institutions’ knowledge ideal is morally explicit, they acknowledge the
“polarized and politicized” scientific community itself and make the frustrations over
scientific disputes visible (Douglas & Wildavsky, 1982, p. 65). From a border
institution’s perspective, market and hierarchy (centre) institutions highlight some
‘facts’ while obscuring others based on selective principles (Douglas, 1986).
There is so much still out there [about the physical nature] capable of being
established by objective scientific inquiry. Science works wonderfully; it has
organized some of the facts. For the sake of coherence, the intellectual energy
that develops a theoretical scheme makes grand leaps over abysses when the facts
are thin. At the same time, it relegates to the background yesterday's facts, which
belong in yesterday's theories (Douglas & Wildavsky, 1982, p. 72).
In other words, scientists from the centre institutions consign unused theoretical
schemes to oblivion, as well as silence historical underpinnings (Douglas &
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Wildavsky, 1982). As such, “feasible limits depend not on what nature will
withstand but on what people will stand for” (Douglas & Wildavsky, 1982, p. 64).
While the distinctive value of centre institutions generates the basic scientific
techniques of organisation, calculation and discrimination, this pertinent social order,
from the perspective of the border institution, inevitably gives rise to “myopia”
(Douglas & Wildavsky, 1982, p. 75). That is, non-knowledge or nonacknowledgement of the known as “uncomfortable knowledge” (Rayner, 2012, p.
107), serves as a political and ideological tool for centre institutions to impose
‘involuntary risk’ on society (Douglas, 1986; Douglas & Wildavsky, 1982; Rayner,
2012). “Involuntary risk” is those risks and damages caused by individuals who
profit from others’ ignorance. This differs from voluntary risk undertaken by
individuals knowingly in order to gain benefits (Douglas & Wildavsky, 1982, p. 19).
There are various cases showing that wilful non-disclosure is due to “economic selfinterest” and research funding and investments “serve to hide the truth” of potential
environmental risks and pollution (Douglas & Wildavsky, 1982, p. 59). Therefore,
from a border institutions’ perspective, it is extant mainstream knowledge systems
that causes environmental harm and fails to take prompt action (Douglas &
Wildavsky, 1982).
6.3.2

Attitude towards technology, View of risk and Resolution of risk

Market, hierarchy and border institutions discursively represent diverse attitudes
towards technology to motivate certain understandings of sustainable development
and shape attitudes towards cooperative action. These different attitudes towards
technology, in turn, lead to the identification of a different social order regarding the
view of risk through different sets of discourse. These discourses or symbolic actions
from market and hierarchy (centre) institutions have hierarchising and separating
effects with respect to their resolution of risk. These paradoxes and controversies are
challenged by border institutions through ‘counter’ discourses or symbolic actions
(Douglas & Wildavsky, 1982; Stillar, 1998).
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6.3.2.1 Grammatical analysis - Attitude towards technology
Contested attitudes towards technology in the broader context of sustainable
development are constructed by market, hierarchy and border institutions through
discursive practices. Market institutions are open to the view that technology is the
agent of social distinction and wealth generation (Douglas & Wildavsky, 1982)
because the unpredicted force of technological progress will mitigate unforeseeable
harms (Thompson et al., 1990), and render the present ‘fuss’ over the environmental
risk irrelevant in the near future (Thompson & Rayner, 1998). Market institutions’
purpose is to tackle environmental risks through technology and to increase the scale
of economic production. This increased scale is said to, in turn, generate more
economic (and environmental) benefits to enlarge the volume and velocity of the
technology as well as widen the dissemination of innovation (Thompson & Rayner,
1998). Technology is argued to facilitate “standard measures” and calculation, such
as risk utility analysis (or cost-benefit analysis), in a “monetarised” economic system
under the protection of legislation (Douglas & Wildavsky, 1982, p. 95).
Hierarchy institutions protect both economic growth and the environment (Douglas
& Wildavsky, 1982). Like market institutions, technology as the agent is also
favoured by hierarchy institutions (Douglas & Wildavsky, 1982) and that a
successful environmental policy can be carried out through technical adjustments to
extant institutions (Thompson & Rayner, 1998). Hierarchy institutions prefer
technology which demands specialised knowledge and expertise to set up and
operate (Ney & Thompson, 2011). By doing so, they protect the standard measures
introduced by market institutions (Douglas & Wildavsky, 1982).
Border institutions protest against technology as the agent supported by market and
hierarchy institutions (Douglas & Wildavsky, 1982). Since border institutions
believe that modern technology is the main source of risk, they fear environmental
pollution from dangerous technology. They insist that technologies tend to
incorporate objectives, for example, economic facets only, and this solution creates
difficulties when facing “social judgement” regarding environmental risks (Douglas
& Wildavsky, 1982, p. 70).

Border institutions hold that natural resources are

priceless and cannot be measured by any risk utility analysis (Douglas & Wildavsky,
1982). Indeed, border institutions believe that, although the ‘appropriate technology’
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is the motto of the individualists in market institutions, they “are happy to operate at
any size, to any technical specification, within their capabilities, providing it is cheap
enough to make them a profit and cheerful enough to attract the punters” (Schwarz &
Thompson, 1990, p. 11). Border institutions object to the ‘immoral’ exercise of the
market and hierarchy (centre) institutions when nature is “bought and sold” (Douglas
& Wildavsky, 1982, p. 67) and construct hidden dangers, emanating from
technology, as an evil which will “enter and spoil” the centre institutions (Douglas &
Wildavsky, 1982, p. 124). Technological pollution is representative of the “moral
defects” (Douglas & Wildavsky, 1982, p. 7) that manifest an “undemocratic
unresponsiveness to individual needs” (Douglas & Wildavsky, 1982, p. 149) and
“unfeelingness for individual suffering” within society (Douglas & Wildavsky, 1982,
p. 127).
6.3.2.2 Rhetorical analysis - View of risk
Based on the construction of technologies as the appropriate agent with respect to
risk attitude, market institutions are “the ingenious, inquiring and experimenting
individual” (Thompson et al., 1990, p. 62), or informed agents who challenge and
tackle environmental uncertainties boldly by transforming risks into opportunities
(Douglas & Wildavsky, 1982). This role of agents is enacted by market institutions
through the framing of public interest in terms of economic growth and suggests that
citizens do not “lower standards of living by very much in order to reduce risk a little”
(Douglas & Wildavsky, 1982, p. 67). Market institutions attempt to convince the
public by constructing risk aversion as the main source of danger and risk avoiders
as neglectful of “the danger[s] averted by new technology, or in advance of
experience, the benefits or economic growth” (Douglas & Wildavsky, 1982, pp. 2728).
A hierarchy or social order between nature and risk attitudes is subsequently
established. Market institutions construct nature as resilient and readily recoverable
from any turbulence such as exploitation (Ney & Thompson, 2011), and reject the
idea of limited natural resources as it perceives nature as “a raw material on which
human skill, knowledge, and daring have been successfully focused” (Thompson et
al., 1990, p. 62). Risk responses that fit into this environment are characterised as do
not “ignore or regret uncertainties” (Douglas & Wildavsky, 1982, p. 96). Risks are
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said to be opportunities ready to be exploited by entrepreneurs for individual rewards
(Douglas & Wildavsky, 1982; Ney & Thompson, 2011; Schwarz & Thompson, 1990;
Thompson et al., 1990).
Hierarchy institutions construct sustainable development as “meeting the needs of
the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own
needs” (Brundtland, 1987, p. 8). Although the market individualist risk-taking
behaviour might be rational to meet human needs and wants, the overall outcome
from economic growth is argued to be environmentally detrimental (Ney &
Thompson, 2011; Thompson & Rayner, 1998). This statement coincides with the
normative view of the border institutions, yet it differs in terms of the solution that it
suggests (Thompson & Rayner, 1998). Accordingly, complete risk aversion
responses are impractical. A “social upheaval” would only make things worse
(Thompson & Rayner, 1998, p. 305).
Hierarchy institutions consequently establish a hierarchy or social order which
constructs risk as beyond those precise boundaries knowable to relevant experts
(Schwarz & Thompson, 1990). The challenge for scarce natural resources for
hierarchy institutions is not to stop economic development, but to find the
appropriate rules, including legislation, for stronger governance to preserve the
advantages of economic growth, while leaving sufficient resources for the
community (Ney & Thompson, 2011). Decision-making in the hierarchy institution
is “incremental, remedial and serial” (Douglas & Wildavsky, 1982, p. 93).
Hierarchies solve problems in sequence and allow a long time-span for decisionmaking.
While constructing market and hierarchy agents with their preferred agency technology as guilty and culpable, border institutions promote identification by
establishing themselves as moral agents who are unwilling to face irreversible
catastrophic degradation (Douglas & Wildavsky, 1982). For border institutions, the
confidence brought by advanced scientific development has turned into a source of
risk (Douglas & Wildavsky, 1982). Irreversible risks are “explosive and unstable
[with] each deviation growing larger until the environment is so altered it can never
return to its original state” (Douglas & Wildavsky, 1982, p. 21). In Douglas and
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Wildavsky’s (1982, p. 23) words, there will be no future “if modern technology
permits any fool or rogue to inflict irreversible damage”.
Border institutions therefore construct a hierarchy or social order different from
those from market and hierarchy institutions. Nature is constructed as dreadfully
unforgiving (Schwarz & Thompson, 1990) where “unbridled economic growth” is
said to exert harm on the natural environment and humankind (Douglas &
Wildavsky, 1982, p. 67). Since border institutions are concerned with all possible
damage and assess the long-run as “imminent” (Douglas & Wildavsky, 1982, p. 122),
a radical change is proposed through the immediate adoption of the precautionary
principle in its strict version (Douglas & Wildavsky, 1982). According to border
institutions, this solution “has the added advantage of bringing us much nearer to the
desired future-harmony with nature” (Schwarz & Thompson, 1990, p. 10).
6.3.2.3 Logological analysis - Resolution of risk
While constructing technology as an agent and identifying risk as opportunities,
market institutions establish ‘economic growth’ as the terministic screen with respect
to their resolution of risk and to legitimate their attitude towards technology and
view of risk. Market institutions encourage the idea that expansion will solve all
problems, including those of the environment, since its advantages are overwhelming
(Douglas & Wildavsky, 1982). Market institutions are future-orientated in terms of
economic benefit. They seek and take risk intentionally by calculating profits:
[A]n individual can expect to get future rewards only if he can reasonably
suppose that those in his debt will be in a position (and somehow obliged) to
repay him…[For] people living together with graduated expectations for the long
term,…[t]o maintain a rosy expectation of the long term they must exert
continual vigilance in justifying the present system, with its delayed satisfactions
(Douglas & Wildavsky, 1982, p. 86).
For example, according to Douglas and Wildavsky (1982, p. 69), risk utility analysis
(or cost-benefit analysis) is a common type of risk assessment for market institutions
to compare risks “by placing their costs and benefits on a common economic plane”.
In other words, it assumes an economic/market measure is the most appropriate for
all valued objects, and that natural resources do not have any intrinsic value. This
hierarchising and separating of effects produce and reproduce social divisions and
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inequities. As Thompson and Rayner (1998, p. 329) contend, market institutions
strongly focus on immediate returns on investments and activities, since
competitive success depends largely on timing; planning for shifting market
tastes, clinching deals at the right price, meeting delivery deadlines, or knowing
when to sell pork-belly futures (Thompson & Rayner, 1998, p. 329).
Such an emphasis on short-term expectations is at odds with environmental value,
which is usually long-term focused (Douglas & Wildavsky, 1982). As such, risk
utility analysis masks the “moral ingredients” involved in market decision-making
processes (Douglas & Wildavsky, 1982, p. 70).
Hierarchy institutions, by constructing a technical fix as the preferred act, and by
identifying risks as needing to be controlled, use ‘regulation’ as the terministic
screen with regards to their resolution of risk for legitimating their risk attitude and
preferred social order. According to Douglas and Wildavsky (1982, p. 93),
hierarchical decision-making involving multiple goals makes it relatively easy to
“retrospectively rationalize whichever ones happen to be accomplished”. “[T]he
need that seems most urgent in these conditions is the one whose solution is
realistically feasible” (Douglas & Wildavsky, 1982, p. 93). Standardised operating
procedures or regulations facilitate this governing form and help hierarchies to
“objectify, rank and manage” the potential threat (Ney & Thompson, 2011, p. 63).
They “avoid attempting to know too much about future consequences” by limiting
rather than of expanding data (Douglas & Wildavsky, 1982, p. 93).
More specifically, hierarchies resegregate and redefine potential damage by
upgrading certain risk dimensions while downgrading and shifting others sideways
(Ney & Thompson, 2011). This objectified notion of risk facilitates ignorance to
certain alternatives so that attention is only given to “those best known and closest to
existing prognoses” (Douglas & Wildavsky, 1982, p. 93). In this sense, hierarchists
and individualists have similar views towards risk. Both are fearful of those risks
which threaten the system as a whole, as well as public confidence (Douglas &
Wildavsky, 1982).
As such, despite divergent views of risk between market and hierarchy institutions,
both have “imperialist tendencies” which are evidenced in the expansion of the
operational field through technological development to solve environmental
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problems (Douglas & Wildavsky, 1982, p. 97). Subsequently, these two institutional
types can coexist and collaborate to some extent (Elliott, 1983; Linsley & Shrives,
2009). According to Douglas (1990, p. 12), “market individualism needs a political
base to assure its basic security...[while] hierarchical culture needs an economic
base”.
Hierarchy institutions with market institutions consequently create hierarchising and
separating effects which (re)produce social divisions and inequities. As suggested by
Douglas and Wildavsky (1982, p. 122), the construction and objectification of risk
can be seen as an ideological tool used by the centre institutions to foresee
“disturbances and setbacks in the normal course” and “weather” them (Douglas &
Wildavsky, 1982, p. 188).
Border institutions establish ‘low growth’ as the terministic screen with response to
their resolution of risk to legitimate their preferred social order and risk attitude
(Douglas & Wildavsky, 1982; Stillar, 1998).While border institutions assess risks,
they reveal their moral commitments “explicitly and prominently” (Douglas &
Wildavsky, 1982, p. 73), and they attempt to bring risks to public attention forcibly
(Thompson et al., 1990). Underlying this perspective is the assumption of a zero-sum
game. This outlook assumes one cannot benefit except at another’s’ expense.
Following the reasoning of a trade-off, border institutions do not acknowledge
economic measures from the market (and hierarchy) institutions. Therefore, border
institutions do not believe in economic expansion as an environmental solution
(Douglas & Wildavsky, 1982). This argument from the border institutions shifts
attention to human needs and wants. From the perspective of the border institutions,
real human needs are closely aligned with the cycle of the eco-system, and are
defined in both material and spiritual terms (Thompson & Rayner, 1998). While
material needs cover food, shelter and clothing, the spiritual aspect embraces
personal development, self-realisation and harmony with nature. Technological
development implies the promise of the satisfaction of endless wants in an age of
consumerism that fails to satisfy human needs (Thompson & Rayner, 1998, p. 296).
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6.3.3 Cause of ecological crisis, Justice and fairness and Properties of desired
system
Hierarchy and border institutions discursively represent diverse causes of the
ecological crisis to motivate certain understandings of sustainable development and
shape attitudes towards cooperative action. These different causes of the ecological
crisis, in turn, identify different social orders regarding the view of justice and
fairness, through different sets of discourse. These discourses or symbolic actions
from market and hierarchy (centre) institutions have hierarchising and separating
effects in respect of properties of their desired system. These paradoxes and
controversies are challenged by border institutions through ‘counter’ discourses or
symbolic actions.
6.3.3.1 Grammatical analysis - Causes of ecological crisis
Contested causes of the ecological crisis in the broader context of sustainable
development are constructed by market, hierarchy and border institutions through
discursive practices. For market institutions, the present “ballyhoo” over
environmental issues represents “much ado about nothing” (Ney & Thompson, 2011,
p. 47). Market institutions construct border institutions as ‘scare mongers’ who hold
naïve but erroneous ideals that humans make the world better, and hierarchy
institutions as misrepresenting matters in an attempt to increase their influence by
expanding budgets (Ney & Thompson, 2011).
Market institutions construct hierarchical interference as a major obstacle for
achieving sustainable development (Thompson & Rayner, 1998). They consider
hierarchy institutions’ prices for resources as distorted, often resulting from
misguided government economic policy that is the cause of unsustainable
development and subsequent ecological crisis (Thompson & Rayner, 1998). This is
an explicitly technical argument for environmental issues that focuses primarily on
the natural resource price mechanism.
Market institutions debate resource management with respect to the economic
theories of “scarcity and cost” (Thompson & Rayner, 1998, p. 298). Accordingly,
scarce natural resources should be valued highly to cover the increasing cost of
resource planning and management activities. This scarcity, if reflected accurately in
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the resource pricing scheme, influences users’ decision making because of effective
market forces such as; technical innovation, substitution and structural alternation
(Thompson & Rayner, 1998). In order to compete in the market, strategies need to be
adopted and behaviours changed by resource users.
Conversely, if a resource is undervalued, that is, its scarcity is not reflected through a
resource pricing scheme, this resource will tend to be over-utilised. This is one
reason why a failure to internalise environmental costs leads to environmental
degradation. Market institutions therefore protect the environment through accurate
and

equal

resource

pricing

mechanisms/instruments.

This

price

mechanism/instrument is said to allocate both economic and environmental
resources to users while tackling the resource degradation through increasingly
efficient use. Therefore, institutional regulations or hierarchical interventions that
align with the objectives of an unfettered market are advocated by market institutions
(Ney & Thompson, 2011). Such regulations are said to support competition, prevent
resource loss (Douglas & Wildavsky, 1982) and therefore bring overall social
benefits such as technological innovation which, in turn, enlarges the production
scale (Thompson & Rayner, 1998).
Hierarchy institutions construct the cause of the ecological crisis as a lack of
governance and planning (Ney & Thompson, 2011). From the perspective of
hierarchy institutions, economic life, in terms of resource allocation, production and
consumption of goods or services, “should not be left to the free interplay of market
forces” but rather subjected to the act of central planning (Ney & Thompson, 2011, p.
61). The natural resource price mechanism is perceived as a bureaucratic structure
that will rectify the myopia and greed of the free market and lead to sustainable
water resource management in an incremental and carefully planned manner (Ney &
Thompson, 2011).
The purpose of governance, with regard to economic life and the environmental
crisis, can be traced back to the hierarchists’ view of nature. They do not see nature
as infinitely resilient despite the fact that it serves to meet human needs and wants.
While utility-maximisation may be rational for individuals, the overall results of
unbridled economic growth are argued to be harmful to the environment (Thompson
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& Rayner, 1998). Because “hierarchies are afraid of upheavals which escape from a
rational order and they fear for the life in the organisation” (Douglas & Wildavsky,
1982, p. 91), they believe in rational management of both the economy and the
environment to prevent the detrimental effects of excessive economic activity
(Thompson & Rayner, 1998).
A community works because the transactions balance out. The risk of free riding
is controlled by the accounting system. The accounts are audited, and debts are
collected by the way that God or nature punishes defaulters with disease and
death (Douglas, 1986, p. 74).
Border institutions consider the environmental crisis as a symptom of a wider social
ill. The abuse of nature is said to be fundamentally related to social structures and
values (Thompson & Rayner, 1998). From this perspective, the manner in which
humans pillage natural resources recklessly is a significant indicator for social
malaise such as racism, gender discrimination, social alienation and so on (Ney &
Thompson, 2011; Thompson & Rayner, 1998).
Border institutions construct centre institutions as “the ideological standard bearers”
of a devastating socio-economic system (Thompson & Rayner, 1998, p. 304). A lack
of proper governance, which is diagnosed as the root of environmental crisis from
hierarchy institutions, is merely a symptom of underlying imbalances within the
social world. Border institutions view the allocation of the GAB water resource in
favour of market and government interests as the cause of ecological crisis. As
Douglas and Wildavsky’s (1982, p. 150) assert, social and environmental issues are
“a confrontation between corporate [and governmental] technocratic domination and
decentralized community independence”. For that reason, border institutions believe
that social equity is the agent to address the social imbalance in favour of justice,
humanity and freedom from repression (Douglas & Wildavsky, 1982; Thompson &
Rayner, 1998). Border institutions’ purpose of blocking the ‘unjust’ allocation of
natural resources is said not merely to safeguard themselves from any potential
environmental crisis, but also to “break the stranglehold which they consider such
interests have on society” (Douglas & Wildavsky, 1982, p. 150).
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6.3.3.2 Rhetorical analysis - View of justice and fairness
Based on pricing regulation as the cause of the ecological crisis, market institutions
are conveyed as competitive individuals that create extra wealth to benefit
themselves and others (Thompson et al., 1990). This identity is characterised by a
laissez-faire attitude that emphasises individual autonomy and freedom with respect
to needs and wants (Ney & Thompson, 2011; Schwarz & Thompson, 1990).
Market institutions frame public interest as embodied in a competitive free market
that will “select the best and reject the worst” (Douglas & Wildavsky, 1982, p. 99).
In Thompson and Rayner’s (1998, p. 300) words, “what is good for market
efficiency is good for the environment, increased efficiency means less waste and a
more careful use of resources”. A hierarchy or social order regarding a certain view
of fairness and justice is subsequently constructed. Market institutions prefer rules
for fair-play (Douglas & Wildavsky, 1982) and construct fairness as “those who put
the most in get the most out” (Ney & Thompson, 2011, p. 37).
Drawing upon a lack of central planning and control as the cause of ecological crisis,
hierarchy institutions exploit the strategy of identification with the public interest
through plans to limit present consumption and to accumulate capital for long-run
benefits in terms of social and environmental justice and balance (Thompson et al.,
1990). Hierarchy institutions believe fair distribution is ranked by needs (Ney &
Thompson, 2011), and have confidence in “sacrificing the few for the good of the
whole” (Douglas & Wildavsky, 1982, p. 101). Therefore, priority is given to the
solidarity and maintenance of the system as a whole (Ney & Thompson, 2011). In
the hierarchical worldview, nobility obliges. That is to say, differences of rank, status,
influence, and wealth exist and are quite acceptable, as long as those at the top make
a concerted, genuine effort to shelter those at the bottom from the vagaries of life
(Ney & Thompson, 2011, p. 66).
While constructing an inequitable social system as the cause of ecological crisis,
border institutions promote identification between themselves and the public by
framing themselves as moral agents who support policies to protect the environment
without “exploitative values…and dehumanised relationships” (Douglas &
Wildavsky, 1982, p. 135). Border institutions identify depleting resources as a result
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of the current social system and inegalitarian life-style (Thompson et al., 1990).
They consequently establish another hierarchy and social order differing from those
of market and hierarchy institutions.
Border institutions construct justice and fairness with regard to both human and
nature interactions and social relations. They contend that human fate is inextricably
connected to that of the planet earth (Ney & Thompson, 2011). For border
institutions, social relationships are said to be fundamentally dependent upon
“fraternal and sororal cooperation” and therefore should be “voluntaristic and
egalitarian” (Schwarz & Thompson, 1990, p. 7). Encroachment of a differential
social status from a hierarchical lifestyle and unequal distribution of wealth and
power from market institutions threatens this ideal state of justice of border
institutions (Thompson et al., 1990).
6.3.3.3 Logological analysis - Properties of desired system
While constructing government intervention as the cause of ecological crisis and
identifying the concept of justice and fairness as the equality of opportunity, market
institutions establish the ‘free market’ as the terministic screen in respect of
properties of their desired system to legitimate their preferred style of justice and
fairness and cause of ecological crisis.
According to Thompson and Rayner (1998), the underlying market institutions’
diagnosis of an environmental crisis is linked to a capitalist system that goes hand in
hand with environmental protection and necessary growth for attaining sustainable
development (Thompson & Rayner, 1998). It is consistent with the assertion of Ney
and Thompson (2011, p. 37): “Adam Smith’s invisible hand ensure[s] that people
only do well when others also benefit”.
Yet market institutions, as such, do not take any responsibility for individual failures:
Its risk portfolio does not carry heavy fixed liabilities for pensioners, widows,
and orphans. It holds people responsible for their own misfortunes; stupidity and
neglect explain their losses (Douglas & Wildavsky, 1982, p. 101).
Personal failures, therefore, are attributed to individual incompetence and/or bad
luck, while the competitive market remains smart and guiltless (Douglas &
Wildavsky, 1982).
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Since market institutions espouse individual success and care for the ‘bottom line’
only, temporary inequalities within social groups are accepted as long as fair
competition and free exchange systems are not hampered (means-end rationality).
According to Douglas and Wildavsky (1982, p. 179):
[Market institutions’] fundamental justification is not faith in the value of the
individual but faith in the freedom to exchange… [l]ong term concentrations of
wealth make it impossible to give honest answers to the challenge of envy: with
wealth stabilised, the premise of equality is flouted.
In other words, market institutions value free competition, not the “relational niceties”
of members within society (Schwarz & Thompson, 1990, p. 6).
Hierarchy institutions, by constructing loss of government control as the cause of the
ecological crisis and identifying their concept of justice and fairness as equality
before law, use ‘governance and planning’ as the terministic screen with regards to
properties of their desired system, for legitimating their preferred social order and
perceived cause of ecological crisis.
Although hierarchy institutions prefer to use direct instrumental rules/bureaucratic
means to allocate resources by physical quantities to facilitate a top-down
reallocation (Douglas & Wildavsky, 1982; Thompson et al., 1990), they tend to
“adopt a limited redistributive ethic…limiting exchange so as to limit losers”
(Thompson et al., 1990, p. 61).
Hierarchy relies on explicit controls…[s]o long as information is tightly
controlled, there is not much worrisome contradiction among the founding
principles or incompatibility between them and the way of life they justify
(Douglas & Wildavsky, 1982, p. 180).
For example, hierarchy institutions behove the affluent e.g. industrial sectors to
assist vulnerable sectors for addressing environmental issues (Ney & Thompson,
2011). Therefore, hierarchy institutions tend to punish sectors responsible for
economic value creation (such as industrial sectors), and reward sectors with less
economic success (Ney & Thompson, 2011).
Social equity, from the perspective of hierarchy institutions, is neither possible nor
necessary. Social groups are bound to each other “in an orderly and ranked
relationship”, while hierarchy institutions seek to coordinate these groups “without
144

violating status differentials” (Schwarz & Thompson, 1990, p. 6). What they attempt
to create is “a procedural rationality that is more concerned with the proprieties of
who does what than with trying to evaluate the outcome” (Schwarz & Thompson,
1990, pp. 6-7).
Through an inequitable system as the cause of ecological crisis, and the
identification of justice and fairness as necessary for equality of conditions and
results, border institutions establish ‘social and environmental equity’ as the
terministic screen with respect to properties of their desired system for legitimating
their preferred social order and cause of ecological crisis.
Border institutions believe that environmental pollution does not only occur in a
physical and technical sense as it is divided between the moral and the immoral,
purity and impurity, innocence and guilty to “sustain the vision of good society”
(Douglas & Wildavsky, 1982, p. 37). For border institutions, pollution “carries the
idea of moral defect” (Douglas & Wildavsky, 1982, p. 36) that endangers humankind
(Douglas & Wildavsky, 1982, pp. 10-11):
Put into secular terms, worldliness appears in big organization, big money, and
market values all deny equality and attack goodness and purity; conspiracy
includes factions plotting secret attack, transporting evil into an essentially good
world.
Border institutions therefore commit to bring equality to all humankind through the
guiding principle and a belief in “human goodness and the supreme value of the
individual” (Douglas & Wildavsky, 1982, p. 177). Hence, border institutions’
desired system demands that individuals begin as equal and end up equal (Ney &
Thompson, 2011).
6.4

Critical themes

By applying a Burkean framework of rhetorical criticism to cultural risk theory,
three accounting and accountability related themes are identified. They are the
concept of control (Chapter 7, Section 7.4), stewardship (Chapter 8, Section 8.4), and
economic consequences (Chapter 9, Section 9.4).
Accounting recognition and measurement relies on the concept of control.
Nonetheless, this control concept and the subsequent recognition and measurement
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of relevant assets and liabilities in financial reports are contestable when, what is
traditionally considered a public good, becomes a resource for profit. Cultural risk
theory, by suggesting different assumptions of market, hierarchy and border
institutions with respect to preferred learning style, view of nature and properties of
knowledge ideals shaped by institutional beliefs and interests, provide us with a
critical lens to understand the contested nature of the accounting concept of control
with subsequent accounting measurement and recognition rules.
Stewardship is one objective of financial reporting, derived from property rights, and
is based on the idea of a principal and agent relationship. Like the concept of control,
stewardship is contestable when companies are held accountable for natural
resources which they control, while their business activities have environmental
impacts (Jones, 2010). Cultural risk theory, by contrasting distinctive institutional
assumptions of attitude towards technology, view of risk and risk resolution,
provides us with the rationale to understand the debate of stewardship from both
mainstream and critical accounting perspectives.
Economic consequences are understood as “the results of the reallocative outcomes”
of a policy standard (Fogarty, Hussein & Ketz, 1994, p. 25). It is the economic
consequences argument that is used by various constituents to push through their
interests and value to influence income redistribution or resource allocation policies
(Zeff, 1978). Cultural risk theory, by suggesting different institutional assumptions
of the causes of ecological crisis, view of justice and fairness and properties of
desired system, provides us with a critical lens to analyse the natural resource
allocation debate with its related economic consequences arguments, and the further
implications for accounting practices.
The application of Burkean rhetorical criticism to cultural risk theory to determine
critical themes are demonstrated in Table 6.3 below.
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Table 6.3 Application of Burkean Rhetorical Criticism Framework to Cultural Risk
Theory to determine Critical Themes
Major
Concepts

View of Nature
Properties of
Knowledge ideal

View of Risk
Resolution of
Risk

View of Justice
and Fairness

Holism
Ephemeral and Fragile
Imperfection

Grammatical Analysis
Pro-technology
Technical Fix

Anti-Technology

Rhetorical analysis
Controllability

Need to Minimise

Opportunity

Logological Analysis
Economic
Regulation
Growth
Grammatical Analysis
Government
Loss of Control
Intervention
Rhetorical analysis
Equality of
Equality before Law
Opportunity
Logological Analysis

Inequitable System
Equality of Condition
and Result

1990; Thompson, 1980; Thompson et al., 1990; Thompson & Rayner, 1998)

Summary

This chapter represented cultural risk theory in general and the application of the
Burkean framework of rhetorical criticism to cultural risk theory in particular with
the implications of critical themes for accounting and accountability research.
Cultural risk theory suggests that any individual risk position is influenced by
cultural beliefs and values (Douglas, 1970; Douglas, 1985; Douglas & Wildavsky,
1982). This thesis utilises Douglas and Wildavsky’s (1982) Risk and Cultural model
to analyse institutional-biased political debate of the GAB water governance and
allocation. According to Park (2010), this transdisciplinary theoretical model does
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Themes

Low Growth and
Invasiveness

Properties of
Free Market
Governance and
Social and
Desired System
Planning
Environmental equity
Adapted from: Schwarz and Thompson (1990, pp. 66-67, see also Ney & Thompson, 2011;

6.5

Critical

Economic Consequence

Cause of
Ecological Crisis

Grammatical Analysis
Science (Trial
Expertise
and Error)
Rhetorical analysis
Cornucopian and
Stable within
Abundant
Boundaries
Logological Analysis
Objectivity
Procedural Validity

Border
Institutions

Stewardship

Attitude towards
Technology

Hierarchy
Institutions

Concept of Control

Preferred
Learning Style

Market
Institutions

not only explicitly acknowledge diverse risk responses from different institutions but
also explains policy decision-making process with respect to contested perceptions
towards risk management.
This thesis investigates different positions taken by market institutions (represented
by BHP and BHP OD); hierarchy institutions (represented by Australian Federal and
South Australian government); and border institutions (represented by civil society),
regarding the GAB water related risks from BHP OD’s GAB water extraction and its
further proposal of ODEP.

Cultural risk theory informs an exploration of the

underlying assumptions of the contentious water related disclosure and
accountability discourses by three institutions and analyses their role in incorporating
economic, social and environmental accountability into a transdisciplinary dialogue.
Since cultural risk theory is concerned with how risk is mediated and “politicalized”
through cultural patterns and beliefs (Douglas, 1992, p. 29), it provides us with an
enabling and emancipatory conceptualisation to understand why different institutions
(BHP and BHP OD; Australian Federal and South Australian government; and civil
society) support different GAB water governance policies and why they focus on
different policy issues regarding risk-based GAB water sustainability. Specifically, it
facilitates an understanding of how risk discourses and strategies are operated within
centre institutions (e.g. BHP, BHP OD, Australian Federal and South Australian
governments), and how they are negotiated and resisted by the border institutions
(e.g. civil society).
In this chapter, the three-fold Burkean framework of rhetorical criticism is applied to
cultural risk theory to identify features, functions and implications of each
institutional group’s risk discourses. Major concepts of cultural risk theory are
thereby made explicit. They are preferred learning style (feature), view of nature
(function), property of knowledge ideal (implication), attitude towards technology
(feature), view of risk (function), risk resolution (implication), cause of ecological
crisis (feature), view of justice and fairness (function) and property of desired system
(implication).
These nine concepts are also linked to three accounting and accountability themes Preferred learning style, view of nature and property of knowledge ideals from three
148

institutions help to understand the contested nature of accounting concept of control
with associated accounting recognition and measurement rules. Institutional
assumptions about the attitude towards technology, and a view of risk and risk
resolution, facilitate the understanding of the stewardship debate from both
mainstream and critical accounting perspectives. Institutional perceptions of the
cause of the ecological crisis, view of justice and fairness and property of desired
system enable an analysis of the resource allocation issue and its associated
economic consequences arguments, to further understand accounting and
accountability. These theoretical concepts with accounting themes provide analytical
scaffolding which facilitates interpretation of the GAB water risk debate in Chapter 7,
8 and 9.
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CHAPTER 7 PREFERRED LEARNING STYLE, VIEW OF NATURE AND
PROPERTY OF KNOWLEDGE IDEAL
7.1

Introduction

The preceding chapter introduced cultural risk theory (Douglas & Wildavsky, 1982),
with the application of a Burkean framework of rhetorical criticism that supports the
analysis and interpretation of institutional disclosures in respect of the Great Artesian
Basin (GAB). This chapter applies three major concepts from cultural risk theorypreferred learning style, view of nature and properties of knowledge ideal to analyse:
market - BHP Billiton (BHP) and BHP Billiton Olympic Dam Corporation Pty Ltd
(BHP OD); hierarchy - Australian Federal and South Australian government; and,
border institutions’ - civil society viewpoints manifest in their disclosure documents
in the context of GAB water-related risks.
According to Burkean grammatical analysis, institutions display heterogeneous
learning styles to understand nature as they retain certain knowledge while omitting
other (Douglas & Wildavsky, 1982). According to Burkean rhetorical analysis, these
different learning styles subsequently establish “self-consistent version[s]” of nature
and inform a corresponding social order (Rayner, 2012, p. 107). In the logological
analysis, symbolic actions in the form of discourse from market and hierarchy
(centre) institutions give rise to hierarchising and separating effects with respect to
the property of their knowledge ideals, which “direct our attention toward certain
features of our environment and away from others” (Thompson et al., 1990, p. 28).
The purpose of the analysis is to identify different institutional perspectives with
regard to preferred learning style, view of the GAB groundwater system and
property of knowledge ideal. This analysis has implications for an understanding of
the accounting concept of control with respect to natural resources from both a
mainstream and critical perspective. This concept and the subsequent recognition
and measurement of relevant assets and liabilities in financial reports are contestable
when what is considered a public good becomes a resource for profit. The threelevelled analysis of different institutional perspectives and critical themes of
accounting and related accountability are displayed in Table 7.1.
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Table 7.1 Preferred Learning Style, View of Nature, Properties of Knowledge Ideal and Concept of Control

Accountability

Control

Properties of
Knowledge
Ideal

Control

View of Nature

Control

Preferred
Learning
Style

Market Institutions

Hierarchy Institutions

Grammatical Analysis (Discursive features)
Science (Trial and Error)
Expertise
Implement modelling studies subject to evolving
Trust expert knowledge and use scientific research to
learning process to control the potential decline of
understand rechargeability of the GAB and
spring flows for sustainable GAB water extraction
determine its water balance
BHP OD’s GAB water extraction does not entail a ‘liability’ as the potential water extraction related risk is
trivial and uncertain, sanctioned by South Australian government
Cornucopian and Abundant

GAB is rechargeable and BHP OD’s GAB water
extraction only makes up of a small part of total GAB
water storage. Humans are masters of nature

Rhetorical Analysis (Discursive functions)
Stable within boundaries
GAB is rechargeable with a slow recharge rate. The
current GAB water extraction from BHP OD is within
‘sustainable yield’. Significant cultural synthesis of the
GAB with the wellbeing of the inhabitant

GAB water intake for BHP OD’s mining operation not recognised as an asset because South Australian
government grants it the water licence without charge. Unmeasurable ‘asset’ is unidentifiable in monetary terms

Objectivity
Ostensible objectivity underlying scientific method is
achieved by ignoring moral and ethical dimensions of
the GAB water extraction

Logological Analysis (Discursive implications)
Procedural Validity
Procedural validity underlying scientific method is
achieved by silencing contradictory scientific studies
about the likelihood of non-rechargeability of the GAB

Mainstream accounting system serves as an ideological tool for a vested interest to overuse non-renewable
resources and downplay the ecological impacts
Managerial accountability
Social and environmental benefits and costs are
immaterial, unquantifiable and unmeasurable in the
free market

Administrative Accountability
Increasing concern with economic growth thus passing
more power to the market

Main focus on the scientific and technical dimensions of accountability, neglecting the full social and
environmental costs
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Border Institutions
Holism
Believe the assumption of rechargeability of the GAB is flawed and
BHP OD’s modelling studies are faulty due to simplistic models and
limited data. Holistic knowledge is desired
BHP OD has responsibility for environmental damage, such as
declining spring flow
Ephemeral and Fragile
GAB is a fragile and non-rechargeable water resource. It intricately
connects to the wellbeing of human and non-human inhabitants. BHP
OD’s water extraction negatively affects the GAB water system
Recognition and presentation of the obligation that BHP OD has
towards the GAB water extraction. Disclosure of the likelihood of a
non- rechargeable GAB
Imperfection
Scientific and expert knowledge as limited and incomplete because
of its evolving nature. BHP OD and governments’ wilful ignorance
of counter scientific inquiries in the pursuit of economic self-interest
is unethical
Critical accounting requires GAB water extraction related risks as a
(contingent) liability to be recognised in BHP OD’s financial reports,
stipulated by South Australian government
Moral Accountability
A more encompassing form of accountability to acknowledge a
relationship of obligation to or responsibility for the other which
cannot be discharged by mere reference to one’s economic interest. It
cultivates openness and dialogue for social and distributive justice
rather than scientific economic reasoning

The chapter begins with an analysis of the preferred learning style, view of nature
and property of knowledge ideal of the market and hierarchy (centre) institutions
(Section 7.2) before the explication of those of the border institutions (Section 7.3).
The concept of control and associated issues of accountability is then discussed with
insights for financial accounting-standard setting in the era of impending
environmental crisis (Section 7.4).
7.2

Preferred learning style, View of nature and Property of knowledge ideal
of the centre institutions

As documents issued by BHP OD and Australian Federal and South Australian
governments are cross cited and overlapping to a great extent, perspectives from
market and hierarchy institutions are combined to provide a consistent view from
centre institutions. As Douglas and Wildavsky (1982) argue, centre institutions
incorporate market and hierarchy cultures with only a few exceptions in this case. In
regards to preferred learning style, both market and hierarchy institutions believe in
expert knowledge to control risk, such as mainstream science, (Douglas &
Wildavsky, 1982; Ney & Thompson, 2011) which is subject to continuous trial and
error in an evolving process (Douglas & Wildavsky, 1982). In terms of the view of
nature, market institutions advocate an image of a robust natural world with
abundant resources which can be utilised by human ingenuity (Ney & Thompson,
2011; Ostrander, 1982), while hierarchy institutions stipulate a stable and resilient
nature when the natural resource is used sustainably within knowable limits (Ney &
Thompson, 2011; Schwarz & Thompson, 1990). In respect of property of knowledge
ideals, the market institutions’ faith in risk probability quantification excludes the
moral dimension of the risk (Douglas & Wildavsky, 1982), whereas hierarchy
institutions adopt a similar bias in determining what type of expert knowledge is
legitimate and what kind of scientific evidence counts as credible (Ney & Thompson,
2011).
7.2.1

Grammatical analysis - Preferred learning style of centre institutions

Contested learning styles in the broader context of sustainable development are
constructed by market, hierarchy and border institutions through discursive practices.
According to Douglas and Wildavsky (1982), the centre institutions have a preferred
learning style that is grounded in expert knowledge, such as mainstream science, to
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control risks. Hierarchy institutions construct themselves as agents whose role is to
identify the boundary between equilibrium and disequilibrium zones, since it
believes that the ecosystem is stable within certain limits through human interaction
(Thompson et al., 1990). In this case, the concept of rechargeable GAB water
aquifers is crucial for Australian Federal and South Australian governments to
reinforce the ideal of a manageable system for water extraction.
Governments trust experts to discover and determine natural limits and predict
certainty (Schwarz & Thompson, 1990), Therefore, their learning style tends to
collude with that of BHP OD since the market institutions support the development
of modern science as the agency to control GAB water extraction related water risks
(Douglas & Wildavsky, 1982).
Scientific studies have supported GAB’s rechargeability and demonstrated that it is
an open system with continuous flow that is evidenced by the progressive ageing of
water from the recharge to discharge area (South Australia, Legislative Council,
2005). For example, The Hon. T.G. Roberts (South Australia, Legislative Council,
2005, p. 3417) verifies that:
A considerable body of research has been conducted by the Bureau of Rural
Sciences in Canberra, on its [the GAB’s] recharge, flow and discharge processes
and hydrochemistry, which indicates that it is an open system and recharge is
occurring. Ongoing research and investigation into the recharge processes is
being conducted in Queensland and this study also shows modern recharge is still
occurring.
More specifically, the Queensland Government website presents a diagram (Figure
7.1) to demonstrate how the GAB aquifer is refilled by rainfall. Diagram or “visual
epigraph”, according to Davison (Davison, 2011, p. 129), has rhetorical effects. It is
used in this case for hierarchy institutions to promote the construction of a
‘rechargeable’ GAB.
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Figure 7.1 Why an Artesian Bore Flows
Source: Queensland Department of Natural Resource (DNR) ( in Endersbee, 2000b, n.p.)

Following this diagram, the explanation confirms that:
‘Artesian’ water is underground water confined and pressurised within a porous
and permeable unit, an aquifer. The aquifers of the Great Artesian Basin consist
of permeable sandstones. These aquifers are recharged by rainfall infiltrating into
the uplifted and exposed sandstones on the edge of the basin. Recharge waters
slowly move down through the sandstone, filling the aquifer to the level of the
intake area. As the aquifer is confined by an overlying impermeable unit, the
water becomes pressurised. When a bore is drilled into the aquifer, the water will
rise due to this pressure (Queensland Department of Natural Resource (DNR) in
Endersbee, 2000b, n.p.).
As such, Australian Federal and South Australian governments are ‘undaunted’ by
scientific research in an effort to understand GAB’s hydrogeochemistry and
rechargeability. This implies an unshakable faith in expert predictions for “a
comprehensive, objective and balanced view of the subjective matter” (Ney &
Thompson, 2011, p. 65). Such a learning style is based on the assumption that
certified experts can generate objective and ‘true’ knowledge on which they often
agree (Ney & Thompson, 2011) that is consistent with various scientific results that
support the rechargeability of the GAB.
154

For example, with regard to the GAB water balance, there was “a revised numerical
assessment of the groundwater flow characteristics of the GAB” published by the
Bureau of Rural Sciences in 2000 which showed that “the steady-state water balance
was calculated at 3.21 GL/d [Giga-litre/day]” (Welsh, 2000 in BHP Billiton Olympic
Dam Corporation Pty Ltd., 2012a, p. 2). This balance was “in close agreement with
the results of the previous major basin-wide groundwater flow model that indicated a
recharge rate of 3.02GL/d” (Habermehl, 1980 in BHP Billiton Olympic Dam
Corporation Pty Ltd., 2012a, p. 2). Based on these research results, the South
Australia groundwater budget is determined:
The Water Allocation Plan (WAP) describes the groundwater budget set for the
GAB resource in South Australia. The WAP estimates 471 ML/d as inflow into
South Australia with estimated outflows in 2003 of 66 ML/d from springs, 128
ML/d from wells, vertical leakage into overlying sedimentary formations of 274
ML/d per day and 3 ML/d from horizontal flow (South Australian Arid Lands
Natural Resources (SAALNRM) Board, 2009, in Torrisi & Trotta, 2009, p. 195).
It is important to note here that BHP OD also cites research from both Australian
Federal and South Australian governments, which indicates that centre institutions
process ‘valid information’ from the authority of science and expertise (Douglas &
Wildavsky, 1982; Ney & Thompson, 2011).
Consistent with the government’s learning style, BHP OD also relies on existing
expert/scientific knowledge (Douglas & Wildavsky, 1982) to privilege the
rechargeability

aspect

of

the

GAB.

Based

on

the

assumption

of

an

equilibrium/steady-state condition, BHP OD has developed modelling studies and
corresponding programs to control and manage the potential decline rate of the
spring flow to achieve sustainable GAB water extraction. These acts are
characteristic of the “bold experimentation in the face of uncertainty” seen in market
institutions (Thompson et al., 1990, p. 27). Quantification is constructed as “a
method of stating problems” (Douglas & Wildavsky, 1982, p. 101) that is manifest
in the construction of risk probability (Douglas & Wildavsky, 1982). This type of
learning style is subject to a continuously evolving and updated process (Douglas &
Wildavsky, 1982) that is sanctioned by the South Australian government as it also
relies on professional knowledge to determine the limits of water extraction within
which the GAB eco-system remains stable.
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Modelling studies commissioned by the government are relied on and used to further
the argument for BHP OD. For example, a Technical Works Program required by the
then SA Minister Weatherhill to enhance Olympic Dam’s “existing hydrogeological
understanding, monitoring and model by means of review and improvement” is cited
by BHP OD (2010a, p. 62). In response, BHP OD indicates that in order to
“stimulate groundwater flow in the south-west GAB and the influence of the
wellfields supplying water to Olympic Dam and Roxby Township”, it has created
“several groundwater models, from the initial GAB 95 model, through successive
improvements and more and better data to the ODEX model families” for more than
15 years (BHP Billiton Olympic Dam Corporation Pty Ltd., 2012f, p. 10).
Computer modelling combined with water monitoring and management data are
used to control the negative effects of GAB water extraction from wellfields A and B
on the GAB springs within hydrogeological zones (Torrisi & Trotta, 2009). BHP OD
in its Environmental Impact Statements of 1982 37 and 1997 made predictions of the
extent of spring flow reductions due to the wellfield operation (BHP Billiton
Olympic Dam Corporation Pty Ltd., 2012b). According to Douglas and Wildvasky
(1982), scientific development is subject to trial and error due to false assumptions,
defective measures, faulty data, and poorly conducted experiments. In this case, BHP
OD’s modelling is limited to a hydrogeological understanding at the time of the
estimation and is therefore prone to error in predictive models.
For example, in Kinhill Engineers Pty Ltd’s 38 (thereafter Kinhill) (1982) ODEP
Draft EIS, a computer-generated model was applied to predict the artesian flow
reductions in response to water abstraction from Olympic Dam wellfields. According
to the Draft EIS, 33 ML/day was expected to be extracted from wellfields A and B.
However, just one year later, Kinhill’s (1983, p. 60) ODEP Supplementary EIS
recognised the limitations of hydrogeological and ecological knowledge:

37

Kinhill (1982) Draft EIS, Kinhill (1983) Supplementary EIS and Kinhill (1984) are closely associated documents. The
computer model used for spring flow prediction in Kinhill (1982) therefore, is supposed to be the one used in Kinhill (1983)
and Kinhill (1984) without major revision. It is also evident in the predicted spring flow presented in Table 4 “Estimates of
Reduction in Bore Discharge, 1982” (Keane, 1997, p. 43), Table 5 “Estimates of Reduction in Spring Discharge, 1982”(Keane,
1997, p. 44) and Table 7 “Predicted and actual impacts on WMC monitored spring groups and observed impacts on endemic
mound spring fauna” (Keane, 1997, p. 46) and BHP OD is supposed to take actions if monitoring evidence show those
predictions are exceeded (BHP Billiton Olympic Dam Corporation Pty Ltd., 2010a).
38
Kinhill Engineers Pty Ltd, used to be under the name of Kinhill-Stearns Roger or Kinhill Stearns Pty Ltd is an American
company which prepared EIS and SEIS of ODEP 1982 and 1997 for the then western Mining Corporation (Olympic Dam
Corporation) Pty Ltd, now BHP Billiton Olympic Dam Corporation Pty Ltd.

156

Joint Venturers recognize that concern exists in respect of the effect of the water
supply borefields on the mound springs. They have therefore in consultation with
the relevant specialists prepared a programme that will enable a more detailed
assessment of these effects. It is recognized that the present level of knowledge
of both hydrogeological and ecological aspects of the springs and the southern
portion of the GAB is limited.
Despite this limited knowledge and insufficient data, wellfield A was developed and
operations were commenced in the vicinity of the mound springs (Keane, 1997).
More than a decade later, in Kinhill’s (1997, p. 18) ODEP EIS summary, it was
acknowledged that BHP OD’s water extraction had caused adverse impact on certain
groups of mound springs: “[r]ecently, water abstraction by WMC has been identified
as the probable cause of an adverse habitat change at the Bopeechee and Hermit
Springs spring groups.” This environmental harm is evident in Table 7.2 (sourced
from Keane (1997, p. 46), which shows the difference between the predicted flow
reduction in 1984 and the actual monitoring results in 1995.
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Table 7.2 Predicted and Actual Impacts on WMC Monitored Spring Groups and
Observed Impacts on Endemic Mound Spring Fauna

Source: ODO Expansion Project EIS (1997, in Keane, 1997, p. 46)

From the above table, the spring flow prediction in 1984 indicated that the discharge
rate of mound springs from the Bopeechee spring group would decline 20-30% over
the following decade. In the actual data reported in 1995, however, the discharge rate
for Bopeechee spring group had declined by 43%. Therefore, it is clear that BHP
OD’s knowledge and learning style is characterised by uncertainty, which is likely to
be improved only through continuous trial and error.
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Apart from the limitations in hydrogeological and ecological knowledge, Kinhill
(1997) reports that the initial modelling studies used for predicting spring flow
decline rate in the Draft EIS for ODEP 1982 (Kinhill, 1982) was based on an
extraction rate of 6 ML/d from Wellfield A. Yet in reality, the extraction rate was up
to 15 ML/d. To remedy this impact, “the reinjection of water adjacent to these spring
groups and a reduction since November 1996 in water abstraction in Borefield A
from 15 ML/d to 6 ML/d” has been implemented (Kinhill, (ODEP EIS Summary)
1997, p. 18). The hydrogeological relationship has been revised to cover “a planning
period of twenty years to the year 2016…using an updated hydrogeological model
and recently acquired data to assess compliance with requirements of the special
water licences” (Kinhill, (ODEP EIS Summary) 1997, p. 10; see also BHP Billiton
Olympic Dam Corporation Pty Ltd., 2012b).
Available disclosures suggest that the on-going monitoring program presents both
consistent and inconsistent results within the predicted trend against the benchmark
of predicted declines of spring flow made in Kinhill (1984) and Kinhill (1997).
Consistent results are documented by BHP OD, such as “[t]he GAB spring flow
rates in the area remained stable or rose slightly during the reporting period, and
remain consistent with historical averages” (BHP Billiton Olympic Dam Corporation
Pty Ltd., 2008a, p. 25; 2009a, p. 29; see also BHP Billiton Olympic Dam
Corporation Pty Ltd., 2010a; 2012a).
Uncertainties also arise from the enhanced, but still incomplete knowledge about
hydrogeology and ecology. For example, “[s]pring flow is naturally variable and
inherent conditions make accurate flow measurements difficult” (BHP Billiton
Olympic Dam Corporation Pty Ltd., 2012b, p. 9).
As a result, inconsistent monitoring data falling outside historical trends also exist.
For example, in respect of the Spring flow rate recorded by HBS004, a monitoring
bore to measure Beatrice spring flow, BHP OD (2008a, pp. 47-48) indicates that;
[d]ue at least in part to changes in the flow measurement method and the
morphology of the spring, the recorded flow rate at HBS004 since monitoring
resumed is significantly less than that previously recorded. The recorded flow
rate in April 2008 was again lower than the previous two measurements.
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According to BHP OD (2009a, p. 52), “[t]he recorded flow rate in April 2009 was
again lower than previous measurements by Land Use Consultants”. Therefore,
uncertainty regarding the potential impact on the spring flow from the Olympic Dam
wellfields is likely to occur due to the ever-evolving understanding of the
hydrogeological and ecological relationship.
To conclude the grammatical analysis, the hierarchy institutions - the Australian
Federal and South Australian governments trust expert knowledge and use scientific
research to understand the rechargeability of the GAB and to determine its water
balance. As a sound basis, the market institution (BHP OD) implements modelling
studies to control the potential decline of spring flows for its sustainable GAB water
extraction. While both governments and BHP OD support the development of
modern science to control and manage the GAB water related risks, both accept that
this is an evolving learning process and therefore subject to trial and error (Douglas
& Wildavsky, 1982).
7.2.2 Rhetorical analysis - View of nature of centre institutions
Based on the information from science and experts as the appropriate agency of
learning style, centre institutions - Australian Federal and South Australian
governments and BHP OD establish the view that the GAB is an open system that is
replenished through rainfall.
BHP OD, as the market institution, frames the public interest as consistent with “a
wonderfully robust and bountiful natural world” (Ney & Thompson, 2011, p. 48)
with abundant water resources from the GAB. Torrisi and Trotta (2009, p. 195) for
example, despite describing South Australia as “the driest state of the driest
inhabited continent in the world”, assert that GAB underground water storage is “a
completely unexpected feature for such an arid climate”. Accordingly, BHP OD
(2012a, p. 2 also 2008a, 2009a, 2010a, 2011a, 2013a) describes the GAB as “one of
the world’s largest groundwater reservoirs, covering a total area in excess of 1.7
million km², of which approximately 350,000 km² lies in South Australia”.
Hierarchy institutions - Australian Federal and South Australian governments, on the
other hand, construct the GAB as a scarce resource (Schwarz & Thompson, 1990) in
a broad arid environment with increased water demand and slow groundwater
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movement. For example, according to the SAALNRM Board (2009a, p. 1),
“Olympic Dam is located in the arid region of South Australia with low, erratic and
infrequent rainfall”. It is an area where “[l]ong dry periods occur. Evaporation is
extremely high, ranging from 2400 to over 3700 Millilitre/y…[which] significantly
exceeds rainfall”.
The South Australian government acknowledges that the GAB water resource has
become increasingly scarce due to increasing water demands for expanding mineral
exploration and development. For example, Natural Resources Committee member
Mr Van Holst Pelle-Kaan states that;
[d]evelopment projections indicate the GAB will account for 10 per cent of all
water use in South Australia by 2016 -— which, as we know, is not very far
away - Current board projects indicate the resource is in decline over the long
term; with recharge lower than discharge. (South Australia, House of Assembly
2011a, p. 3227)
This higher discharge rate compared to the recharge rate of the GAB is evidenced in
a more recent report issued by Bureau of Rural Sciences, claiming that “[the GAB’s]
recharge rates range from 0.5mm to 10mm per year, with a maximum of
approximately 40mm per year” (Habermehl et al., 2009, in Great Artesian Basin
Protection Group, 2009c, n.p.).
Regarding the South Australia proportion of the GAB, the SAALNRM Board (2009a,
p. 13) mentions that the water balance components are not actually ‘balanced’- as the
“basin-wide outflows still exceed the inflows”.
In addition, the SAALNRM Board (2009a, p. 28) emphasises that, since the impact
of increased GAB water discharge, the low-hydraulic conductivity of “the
‘sustainable yield’ should not strictly be equated to the basin recharge”.
By recognising the GAB water resource as scarce, Australian Federal and State
governments introduce the concept of controllability. In other words, hierarchy
institutions exploit the strategy of identification with the public interest by
constructing a view of responsible agents that protect nature within ecological
boundaries (Thompson et al., 1990). In this case, the GAB water system has the
potential for stability if it is managed within certain limits. This is congruent with
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the market institution (BHP OD’s) construction of a resilient and “[b]enign” (Ney &
Thompson, 2011, p. 48) GAB water system where water extraction generally does
not have an overall negative impact while under the management arrangement it has
with government.
According to The Hon. T.G. Roberts (South Australia, legislative Council, 2005, p.
3417), “hydrogeological understanding of the Basin is … accepted as a sound basis
for the setting of water use and management arrangements for the Basin.” The Hon.
G.E. Gago (South Australia, Legislative Council, 2011, p. 4) refers to the WAP
(Water Allocation Plan) for the Far North Prescribed Wells Area issued by the
SAALNRM Board (2009a), to illustrate that “at least 350 mega litres per day of
water can be sustainably extracted from the South Australia section of the GAB. The
BHP B[illiton] allocation is well within that range.”
Representing the voice of BHP OD, the Australian Uranium Association (2009)
suggests that BHP OD’s total water extraction only comprises a very small if not
negligible amount of total water stored within the GAB. For example;
[h]istorically, Olympic Dam has been a relatively large user of ground water
drawn from the GAB, but using small amounts in absolute terms when
considering the size of the reservoir… Olympic Dam’s daily extraction limit of
42ML/d represents a small percentage - less that 3% - of the natural daily outflow
from the Basin; and a tiny proportion of the overall volume of the GAB
(Australian Uranium Association, 2009, p. 5).
For hierarchy institutions, nature and human society are constructed as inseparable
with the synthesis of nature and culture in harmony and “necessary to everyone’s
wellbeing” (Ostrander, 1982, p. 26). The SAALNRM Board (2009a, p. 15), for
example, contends that the mound springs of the GAB “are of immense cultural
importance” and they “have been a focus for human activity throughout history.”
These mound springs play a very important role for Aboriginal people both
economically and culturally.
Traditionally, Aboriginal people have a strong connection with their land and the
resources found within it. Water is an important aspect of this connection,
providing food in the form of fish, mussels and plants, a source of drinking
water…Commonly associated with the mound spring are rich complexes of
archaeological sites and intricately woven webs of myth and song, which
demonstrate that these springs were, and are, a vital part of the cultural landscape
(SAALNRM Board, 2009a, p. 21).
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Additionally, mound springs have been “inextricably entwined with the livelihoods
and social structure of the inhabitants of the land” since early European settlement,
and they are “critical” to “the viability of the pastoral, mining and tourist industries
in the region” (SAALNRM Board, 2009a, p. 1).
According to Schwarz and Thompson (1990, p. 65) and Thompson et al. (1990, p.
28), hierarchy institutions establish a myth of nature as “perverse/tolerant”. Since the
South Australian government believes that the GAB water system is both delicate
and resilient, it acknowledges that irresponsible water extraction could affect GAB
water ecosystems negatively. However, this matter can still be remediated by using
the water resource more sustainably. For example, to ensure secure environmental
flows to GAB springs, the Roxby Downs (Indenture Ratification) Act 1982 was
issued by the South Australian government to regulate the Olympic Dam mine
(Torrisi & Trotta, 2009). This Act requires the implementation of a monitoring
program with respect to the GAB spring flow. The purpose of the program is to
“[d]etermine the extent of flow change at GAB springs within each hydrogeological
zone of impact that may be attributed to water abstraction from Wellfields A and B”
(BHP Billiton Olympic Dam Corporation Pty Ltd., 2010a, p. 55).
As a response, BHP OD agrees that water extraction from the GAB is likely to affect
the spring flow in local areas of wellfields through reduced artesian pressure if not
managed properly (BHP Billiton Olympic Dam Corporation Pty Ltd., 2008b, 2012b).
Therefore, the monitoring program implemented by BHP OD under legislative
requirements conveys the market institution’s image of an intelligent and informed
agent that conquers and improves natural resources based on ingenuity (Ostrander,
1982). For example, according to BHP OD (2013a, p. 46, see also BHP Billiton
Olympic Dam Corporation Pty Ltd., 2012a):
A core group of 41 GAB springs in the vicinity of the wellfields are monitored
every six months…[to] [d]etermine the extent of flow change at GAB springs
within each hydrogeological zone of impact that may be attributed to water
abstraction from Wellfields A and B.
This statement of ‘a core group’ implies that some springs are more significant than
others. This attitude is sanctioned by the South Australian government despite its
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acknowledgement of the cultural significance of the mound springs. For example, as
SAALNRM (2009a, p. 15) demonstrates:
A number of springs in South Australia are recognised for their ecological and
social value - namely the Dalhousie, Coward, Hermit Hill and Neales River
Spring Complexes, all of which have been listed on the register of the National
Estate, reflecting their national significance.
This indicates that humans are capable of privileging some elements of nature, and
that some elements can be separated from others. This instrumental view of nature
silences a more holistic spiritual and cultural value of the mound springs from
Aboriginal groups. While preserving some mound springs, they are, at the same time,
preparing the public/society for the loss of some ‘unimportant’ springs in exchange
for economic benefits that the mining industry brings (Keane, 1997).
This attitude is also evident with regard to those relatively ‘significant’ monitored
springs: “[Out of 41 monitored springs] 15% of the 41 springs contribute 77% of the
total flow. 60% of the monitored springs contribute less than 5% to the total flow”
(BHP Billiton Olympic Dam Corporation Pty Ltd., 2013a, p. 2). However, “overall
variation in reported spring flows appear to be large for small flows and decrease
with increasing reported flows” (BHP Billiton Olympic Dam Corporation Pty Ltd.,
2013a, p. 48). That is, “errors/uncertainties in small spring flows, relative to the
reported values, are considerably higher for small springs” (BHP Billiton Olympic
Dam Corporation Pty Ltd., 2013a, p. 2). Therefore, “there is…an opportunity to
analyse and report spring flow and bore data in a more integrated way, possibly
concentrating on the large spring flows initially” (BHP Billiton Olympic Dam
Corporation Pty Ltd., 2013a, p. 2).
To conclude the rhetorical analysis, the centre institutions - both BHP OD and
Australian Federal and South Australian governments - construct a rechargeable
GAB. The governments hold that the GAB water resource is controllable within
limits - and the current level of BHP OD’s water extraction is within a ‘sustainable
yield’ range. This supports BHP OD’s view that its water extraction only makes up
of a very small part of the total GAB water storage. Furthermore, the South
Australian government emphasises the significance of the cultural synthesis of the
GAB with the livelihood and wellbeing of inhabitants. In accordance with BHP
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OD’s perspective that humans are the masters of nature, this position allows the
centre institutions to decide which parts of the natural environmental are preserved
and also the best use of GAB water for economic benefits.
7.2.3 Logological analysis - Properties of knowledge ideal of centre institutions
While constructing science and expertise as agency and identifying nature as
resilient and knowable within boundaries, centre institutions establish ‘objectivity’
and ‘procedural validation’ as terminstic screens. With respect to the property of
their knowledge ideal, this perspective legitimates their preferred learning style and
view of nature.
While the hierarchy insists on gaining knowledge about the rechargeability of the
GAB that is consistent with mainstream science, it is difficult for it to widen its field
of knowledge (Douglas, 1986). As Douglas (1986) asserts, hierarchy institutions
prefer to silence those scientific studies that are in tension or contradictory. Mudd
(2000) for example, points out that the assumption of a ‘rechargeable GAB’ is based
on current hydrogeological understanding, where “the recharge areas are known to
be at full piezometric pressure, suggesting abundant and continuous recharge…[but]
no quantitative field studies of recharge are yet available”. Therefore, estimates of
total inflow are merely derived from “some analytical techniques, assumed
hydrogeological properties and observed artesian pressures” (Mudd, 2000, p. 465).
Since the inflow data obtained to date is inconclusive and can only be understood as
estimates, it may be subject to significant errors. For example, Mudd (2000, p. 466)
draws on Hillier (1996) and cautions that “the perceived steady-state condition may
be a balance between outflow and transmission of water through the GAB aquifers
rather than recharge.”
However, this assumption of a ‘non-rechargeable’ GAB is notably absent in
Australian Federal or South Australian governments’ documents (more details see
Section 7.3.1). According to Douglas (1986, p. 77), “[o]ften when a new scientific
discovery has been rejected and left to lie inert until later, it is precisely an idea
which lacked formulaic interlocking with normal procedures of validation.” As such,
hierarchy institutions construct and control “institutional memory” (Rayner, 2012, p.
108) by directing attention to a particular knowledge about the rechargeability of the
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GAB while ignoring others. Evidently, hierarchy institutions create hierarchising and
separating effects which (re)produce social divisions and inequities while
determining what type of expert knowledge constitutes a legitimate fact and what
kind of scientific evidence counts as credible (Ney & Thompson, 2011). According
to Rayner (2012, p. 110), the “institutionalised forgetfulness” is crucial to maintain
institutional arrangements and public memory as the storage system for establishing
the “social order” (Douglas, 1986, p. 70).
Likewise, what underpins the market institutions’ scientific methods is ostensible
objectivity (Douglas & Wildavsky, 1982). BHO OD’s modelling studies for
predictions of declined spring flow, for example, convey the image of an objective
and value-free practice for ‘proper management’ of GAB water extraction. A trust in
quantification is also manifested through the scientific process of monitoring,
measuring, organising and calculating. As Douglas and Wildvasky (1982, p. 71)
contend:
Objectivity means preventing subjective values from interfering with the
analysis. Put the figures in, work out the probabilities, crank the handle, and the
answers will come out. … Far from being objective, the figures about
probabilities that are put into the calculation reflect the assigner's confidence that
the events are likely to occur. Since the risk analyst who feeds the machine its
data is only human, he cannot focus on all prospects with an equally steady gaze.
As such, market institutions create hierarchising and separating effects producing
and reproducing social divisions and inequalities through the techniques of risk
analysis. According to Douglas and Wildavsky (1982), market institutions’ scientific
experimentations are inadequate for judging whether some risks are ‘properly
managed’ while others are worth taking due to the subjective value of the risk
analyst (Douglas & Wildavsky, 1982).
Furthermore, scientific risk analysis more often than not, “decontextualizes and
dissocialises” human problems through quantification (Douglas & Wildavsky, 1982,
p. 80). Throughout the process of measuring, organising (including discriminating)
and calculating; BHP OD creates areas with ordered and scrutinised details, while
discriminates “shadowed” spots with nothing to see and no questions to ask
(Douglas, 1986). Such shadowed spots include holistic views and moral concepts
such as whether the spiritual and cultural value of the mound springs should be
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sacrificed for the economic benefits that the mining industry brings. According to
Douglas and Wildvasky (1982, p. 81), “science and risk assessment… explicitly try
to exclude moral ideas about the good life. Where responsibility starts, they stop”.
To conclude the logological analysis, an ostensible objectivity and procedural
validation that underpins scientific methods is achieved by silencing contradictory
scientific studies about the likelihood of a state of non-rechargeability of the GAB by
hierarchy institutions (Douglas, 1986). In the process, moral and ethical dimensions
of GAB water extraction by the market institution is ignored (Douglas, 1986;
Douglas & Wildavsky, 1982).
7.3

Preferred learning style, View of nature and Property of knowledge ideal
of the border institutions

This section outlines the border institutions’ learning style, view of nature, and
property of knowledge ideal and demonstrates the difference from those of the centre
institutions - BHP OD and the Australian Federal and South Australian governments.
The evidence of these interests is drawn from public submissions to ODEP EIS
(BHP Billiton, 2009), media articles and academic references, as they represent the
border institutions’ holistic learning style (grammatical analysis) (Ney & Thompson,
2011), view of a fragile nature with depleting resources (rhetorical analysis)
(Schwarz & Thompson, 1990), and property of knowledge ideal characterised by
imperfection (logological analysis) (Douglas & Wildavsky, 1982). This documentary
evidence is often in the form of critical comments to: the assumed rechargeability of
the GAB; the evolving nature of scientific knowledge to understand the impact of
BHP OD’s existing GAB water extraction; and, the proposed increased extraction
amount for ODEP on this groundwater resource and related ecosystem (BHP Billiton,
2009, 2011a). This evidence often uses more subjective language. It is not
unexpected that some media articles (e.g. Great Artesian Basin Protection Group,
2009c; Serve the people, 2008) cite scientific inquiry that is contradictory to the
scientific results of those accepted by the centre institutions (e.g. Endersbee, 2000b),
as border institutions prefer to reveal the “polarized and politicized” scientific
community itself to make their frustrations over scientific disputes visible (Douglas
& Wildavsky, 1982, p. 65).
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7.3.1 Grammatical Analysis - Preferred learning style of border institutions
Border institutions construct themselves as agents whose acts are characterised by
“timorous forbearance” which necessitate an “effective sanction” for prevention of a
possible catastrophe (Thompson et al., 1990, p. 27).
With the belief that the GAB groundwater resource is depleting, it is difficult for the
border institutions to accept scientific experimentation and continuous trial and error
processes from centre institutions (Thompson et al., 1990) as the proper knowledge
type and learning style. From this perspective, any uncertainty or error is considered
likely, therefore, to cause irreversible damage (Thompson et al., 1990) and is
therefore unacceptable. Lad A (CL 233, n.p.) notes that evolving scientific
knowledge is subject to errors and believes that it is about “making a hypothesis and
then trying to prove it right or wrong.” As a result, “[h]istory is riddled with ‘experts’
presenting facts that are later proven to be wrong”.
Lad A (CL 233, n. p.) also emphasises that, although trial and error processes are
widely accepted by industry as “a recognised pathway to achieve a particular
outcome”, with respect to BHP OD’s impact on the GAB water system, “proceeding
with projects [e.g. ODEP] based on current understanding rather than fact” is more
likely to have “major, usually irreversible” consequences (Lad A, CL 233, n.p.).
Other documentary evidence from the border institutions directly questions the
assumption of rechargeability suggested by the hierarchy.
The border reveals flawed experiments and limited data (Douglas & Wildavsky,
1982) arising from BHP OD’s modelling studies for predicting declined spring rate
due to the operation of wellfields. For example, the Great Artesian Basin Protection
Group (2009b, 2009c) suggests that the Australian Federal and South Australian
governments are unable to comprehend the ‘real’ non-rechargeability situation of the
GAB. The reason lies in a flawed key assumption of a commonly applied
mathematical model of groundwater. Endersbee39 (2000b, n.p.) also points out that

39
Professor Endersbee’s research represents scientific inquiry that is contradictory to the scientific results of those accepted by
the centre institutions. Endersbee (e.g. 2000b) assert that the GAB is a closed system with finite plutonic water resources and
this finding is often cited in publicly-available documents from the border institutions (e.g. Great Artesian Basin Protection
Group, 2009c; Serve the people, 2008).
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the concept of rechargeability from rainfall is “wrong and encourages waste, thereby
seriously harming the long term yield of this resource of water”40.
According to Endersbee (2000), the GAB water is a plutonic resource.
The sediments [of the GAB] are normally consolidated. The water that was in
these sediments at the time of deposition has been slowly squeezed out over
geological time …Sediments derived from sands consolidate into sandstones.
Even though a bed of sand may originally have an open structure, the processes
of consolidation reduce the porosity. Waters derived from the consolidation of
other sediments may enter the free spaces and precipitate other minerals, and the
sand structure deforms under the increasing stresses (Endersbee, 2000b, n.p.).
Therefore, all computer programs or models derived from this flawed assumption of
a rechargeable GAB are “potential traps for the unwary” (Endersbee, 2000b, n.p.).
From the border institutions’ perspective, the models have “many unknown
components” (Taylor R, CL 337, n.p.). Keane (1997, p. 44) suggests that the
hydrogeological model used in the ODEP 1982’s EIS is “simplistic” and the
subsequent results represent “a very slim understanding and appraisal of the impact
on the mound springs (See Table 7.2).”41 The “significant deficiency in the amount
of knowledge” and limited availability of hydrogeological data have made the
models “at best very rough estimates” (Keane, 1997, p. 50).
Moreover, Mudd42 (2000) demonstrates numerous factors that are likely to influence
the observed rate of a spring flow. And he emphasises that “these factors are hard to
account for quantitatively and are typically ignored in compiling variations and longterm changes in spring flow rates” (Mudd, 2000, p. 468). As such, those “unresolved”
40

Endersbee (2000b, n.p.) further categorises and elaborates several aspects of the ‘false impression’ that the Queensland
government ‘rechargeable’ aquifer diagram (see Figure 7.1) conveys. First, he considers the vertical scale of intake beds in the
diagram that shows “intake beds as strata lying in an almost vertical direction with the beds exposed to the rainfall”. Endersbee
(2000b, n.p.) reveals the rhetorical effect of the image (Barthes, 1977; Davison, 2011) and contends that it is misleading as “the
beds are virtually horizontal” around these so-called “recharge” regions.
Second, Endersbee (2000b, n.p.) asserts that rocks in those regions are “sound and impervious” which makes it impossible for
the surface rainfall to enter and percolate underground for thousands of kilometres.
Third, Endersbee (2000b, n.p.) is concerned about the relative density of the rock (2.6) and the water (1.0). The Queensland
government diagram does not consider such differences, instead it implies an impossible physical phenomenon - “the pressure
head of the seepage water from the intake beds, less friction losses all the way, would be sufficient to overcome the stresses in
the rock at the base of the borehole” (Endersbee, 2000b, n.p.).
Fourth there is a concern about the claimed “water-bearing porous sandstones” at the bottom of sedimentary rocks. Such porous
sandstones could only exist under fairly high water pressure, which has to be “comparable to the stresses in the rock”. Such
water pressure shows “a plutonic source of water from the bedrock below the strata” (Endersbee, 2000b, n.p.).
41
For example, according to Keane (see also Great Artesian Basin Protection Group, 2009a; 1997, p.471)“By the early 1990s it
was apparent that impacts on the mound springs were underestimated in Kinhill (1982)… By 1990 the spring vents at Priscilla
and Venables had ceased flowing, and there were visible reductions in flows and wetland area at other spring complexes,
notably Hermit Hill, Beatrice and Bopeechee.”
42
Dr. Mudd is a scientist whose scientific views are contradictory to the scientific results of these accepted by the centre
institution (Mudd, 2000).
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aspects of the models “give rise to uncertainty in the predictions” (Mudd, 2000, p.
470).
From BHP OD’s perspective, the modelling studies are prone to errors and are
subject to an evolving process (Section 7.2.1). However, for the border institutions,
those assessment approaches and improved modelling studies adopted by ODEP
1997 EIS still contain “some gross inadequacies that need to be corrected by
collection of data and independent analysis” (Keane, 1997, p. 50). Keane (1997)
points out that problems remain in accurately measuring the flows from the springs
and the pressures in bores over several years period to determine if the GAB
underground water system is in equilibrium43.
Holistic knowledge characterises the ideal learning style for border institutions (Ney
& Thompson, 2011), and it is considered as the key to understanding and protecting
a fragile GAB underground water system with depleting water resources. This
degree of completeness does not only require the acknowledgment of scientific
debate, but also embraces Aboriginal knowledge beyond the field of formal scientific
inquiry (Ney & Thompson, 2011). For example, the Great Artesian Basin Protection
Group (2009d) contends that our current knowledge of the groundwater system is
still poor, especially when considering the “long-time scales associated with shifts in
the condition of many groundwater systems” (Great Artesian Basin Protection Group,
2009d, n.p.). Professor Endersbee (2000b, n.p.) points out that while scientific
research activities have become increasingly specialised in our society and has led to
“an increasing narrower concentration of effort”, what is really needed is “free and
open” scientific inquiry and more “learned debate”.
43
Keane (1997, p. 49) specifies some significant flaws embedded in the computer model used in ODEP 1997 EIS : “The recent
figures are derived from a computer model used by Berry and Armstrong. Several comments on this model will be made:”
(Keane, 1997, p. 49)
“The estimates are based on 50% of the South Australian portion of the GAB. The inflow into this reduced portion is
approximated at 76 ML/day. This is a very small estimate when compared to 425 ML/day for the water balance of South
Australia as a whole.” (Keane, 1997, p. 49)
“It underestimates vertical leakage, leading to higher groundwater flow through the aquifer units. This results in an overestimate of the potential bore flows that actually occur in the field.” (Keane, 1997, p. 49)
“The analysis of the Lake Eyre portion of the basin in South Australia puts the ODO water extraction into proper perspective. It
shows it as being 18% of the total water movement in the local region. If the ODO usage expands to 42 ML/day as planned,
this will represent 55% of the water movement through the region.” (Keane, 1997, p. 49)
“The model incorporates an assumption that GAB is in steady state, ie. there are no changes over time. This is based on the
classic Habermehl paper of 1980 (Habermehl, 1980), which claimed that the basin is in equilibrium - “provided no new major
developments occur which will affect this equilibrium situation, discharge and potentials will not change significantly”. In the
seventeen years since this statement was made many large scale developments have occurred in South Australia and the basin
as a whole. The assumption of equilibrium let alone steady state needs much scrutiny and critique. Equilibrium, unlike steady
state, is a balance between opposing processes where the dynamic position is able to change” (Keane, 1997, p. 49).
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Apart from scientific inquiry, serve the people (2008, n.p.) argues that Aboriginal
knowledge of the GAB water resource is rich because of “the accumulation of many
tens of thousands of years of practical experience in surviving and maintaining
communities on the driest continent in the world.” According to an Aboriginal miner,
for example, “water in the centre of Australia…is like a spider’s web of streams
under the ground, and [Aboriginal people] knew where to dig for it.” (Serve the
people, 2008, n.p. ) This is consistent with Ney and Thompson’s (2011, p. 41)
argument that Aboriginal knowledge has taught that life in all kinds and forms are
connected vitally- “everything is connected to everything else”. To conclude the
grammatical analysis, border institutions believe that the assumption of
rechargeability is flawed and BHP OD’s modelling studies are faulty due to
simplistic models and limited data. Holistic knowledge that acknowledges both
counter scientific inquiry and Aboriginal knowledge is desirable.
7.3.2 Rhetorical analysis - View of nature of border institutions
While constructing holistic knowledge as the appropriate agency of learning style,
border institutions promote identification with the public by framing themselves as
moral agents who seek to treat the ecosystem with great care (Schwarz & Thompson,
1990), permitting “life in its varied and beautiful forms to continue” (Douglas &
Wildavsky, 1982, p. 135). Border institutions therefore construct another hierarchy
and social order distinct from market and hierarchy institutions. The myth of an
‘Ephemeral’ nature is recommended (Thompson et al., 1990); where nature is
constructed as fragile with depleting resources (Schwarz & Thompson, 1990).
Contrary to the view from centre institutions, border institutions construct the GAB
water system as a scarce and vulnerable water resource in an arid environment. For
example, “South Australia is the driest state in the driest inhabited continent”
(Amery-Gale M, CL 99, n.p.) “with evapotranspiration generally exceeding rainfall
by an order of magnitude or more” (Mudd, 2000, p. 465). From the border
institutions’ perspective, the GAB groundwater system is an interconnected system
and part of an intricate ‘web of life’ (Douglas & Wildavsky, 1982; Ney & Thompson,
2011). According to Mudd (2000, p. 468), “the mound springs are the only
permanent source of water in the arid interior of South Australia and a delicate yet
intricate ecological balance has been established”. These unique mound springs
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“contain many endemic and rare species that have undergone genetic differentiation
and speciation.” As such, reduced flows from mound springs are very likely to have
detrimental effects on those rare species (Henderson K, CL 196; Great Artesian
Basin Protection Group, 2009d, n.p.). The border institutions perceive the natural
world as closely linked to the human world and they hold a utopian view that life of
all forms is in an equal position and exists in a balanced and harmonious ecosystem
(Douglas & Wildavsky, 1982). For example, the outflow of groundwater from the
GAB plays a “vital” (Mudd, 2000, p. 468) role for Aboriginal people who have
inhabited this “desert region” (Keane, 1997, p. 23) for “many thousands of years and
remain so to this day” (Mudd, 2000, p. 468). In addition, “it is impossible in modern
times to predict, with any confidence, that an individual mound spring does not have
any significance due to similarities with other springs in an area.” (Mudd, 2000, p.
468).
Springs from the Lake Eyre region “are recognised as being under the traditional
custodianship of the Arabanna people” (Mudd, 2000, p. 468). This is supported by
the evidence that “abundant stone chips, grinding stones, other traditional tools in the
vicinity of the springs, and … the rich mythological and oral history of the springs in
Aboriginal culture” (Mudd, 2000, p. 468). Keane (1997, p. 23) gives an example that
“the Bubbler [spring] is described by Aboriginal people as the convulsions of the
ganmari snake which was killed by a Guyani ancestor”. Therefore, all the mound
springs have a fundamental importance to traditional inhabitants, and the
deterioration of any group of springs could cause significant distress to some
Aboriginal people, regardless of their direct or indirect associations with the sites
(Hercus and Sutton, 1985, cited in Keane, 1997; Mudd, 2000). Border institutions
identify the acts from market and hierarchy (centre) institutions as “guilty” (Livesey,
2002b, p. 127), since they believe human activities have brought along disastrous
physical consequences on the natural world (Ney & Thompson, 2011). In this case,
human beings have exerted negative impacts on the GAB groundwater system for
centuries, which has led to depleting water resources. Mudd (2000) suggests that the
GAB spring flows and artesian pressures were relatively high before European
settlement. “[E]xcessive development” of the GAB by European activity over the
last century has led to “an overall decline” in the spring flows (Mudd, 2000, p. 463).
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The volume of BHP OD’s proposed increased water extraction from its expansion
project is also contested. For example, Keane (1997, p. 34) illustrates that the agreed
GAB water extraction limit of 42ml/d for Olympic Dam is a large amount which
“accounts for 9-25% of the total artificial extraction from the south western portion
of the GAB”. Public submissions to ODEP EIS (BHP Billiton, 2009) and media
articles also present the view that both existing and proposed GAB water extraction
is immense for South Australia as a “tragically dry state” (e.g. People for Nuclear
Disarmament (WA), CL 65, n. p.).
To conclude the rhetorical analysis, border institutions view the GAB as a fragile
water system with increasingly depleting water resources. Furthermore, it is very
likely to be a non-rechargeable, therefore, non-renewable resource. The border
institutions’ holistic view holds that nature is intricately connected and closely linked
to the wellbeing of human and non-human inhabitants (Ney & Thompson, 2011).
While maintaining a utopian view that all life forms are equal and exist in a
harmonious ecosystem (Douglas & Wildavsky, 1982), the border institutions argue
that human activities such as BHP OD’s water extraction have had negative impacts
on the GAB water system.
7.3.3 Logological analysis - Property of knowledge ideal of border institutions
The paradoxes and controversies inherent in the hierarchising and separating effects
derived from the properties of centre institutions’ knowledge ideal, provide
opportunities for border institutions to resist and transform. Through the construction
of holistic knowledge as agency and identification of nature as ephemeral and fragile,
border institutions establish ‘imperfection’ as the terministic screen. With respect to
the property of their knowledge ideal, this is in order to legitimate their preferred
social order and learning style.
Since border institutions’ knowledge ideal is morally explicit, they acknowledge a
“polarized and politicized” scientific community to make scientific disputes visible
(Douglas & Wildavsky, 1982, p. 65). From the border institutions’ perspective, the
centre institutions highlight scientific ‘facts’ while obscuring other information
(Douglas, 1986) with regard to the notion of a rechargeable GAB and manageable
water abstraction from BHP OD’s wellfields. It is suggested that “the firm belief in
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the rechargeability” of the GAB (Endersbee, 2000b, n.p.), along with the subsequent
“wilful ignorance” of the opposite position (Owen, 2009, p. 2), have contributed to
immense wastage of the GAB water resource (Endersbee, 2000b; Great Artesian
Basin Protection Group, 2009b).
For example, Endersbee (2000b, n.p.) admits that he feels alone as he “seem[s] to be
the only person in Australia who was saying that the Great Artesian Basin was
definitely not being recharged from surface rainfall”, while his colleagues and
friends are “apprehensive”. And, it is surprising to see “the intensity of the
opposition” which “attempt[ed] to persuade ATSE [Australian Academy of
Technological Sciences and Engineering] not to publish … [his] paper,” especially at
the level of State government. The State government 44 even told the Australian
Geological Survey Organisation to “keep out of groundwater studies, as that was a
state responsibility.” In its broader context, Endersbee (2000b, n.p.) argues that it
represents a “warning light” that demonstrates that scientific inquiry is not always
“free and open” in Australia; especially where “[t]he struggle for funds” gives rise to
“an increasingly narrower concentration of effort.” Apart from the wilful ignorance
of the debatable nature of the GAB at the State government level, the current water
extraction from BHP OD’s wellfields and the proposed continuous and even
increased GAB water extraction amount, according to Greens Parliamentary Leader
Mark Parnell, is “more culpable” (South Australia, Legislative Council 2011, p. 62)
for “the extinction of Mound Springs and the harm to a number of others.” (South
Australia, Legislative Council 2011, p. 6). It is evidenced by Keane (1997, p. 64) that
it appears that BHP OD has “ignor[ed] the expert advice” regarding the potential
environmental and ecological impact in the first place.
From the perspective of the border institutions, such wilful non-disclosure from
centre institutions can be attributed to “economic self-interest”; where research
funding and investment “serve to hide the truth” of potential environmental risks and
pollutions (Douglas & Wildavsky, 1982, p. 59). For example, the Great Artesian
Basin Protection Group (2009b, n.p.) suggests that this purposeful ignorance may
derive from “big money at stake”:
44
Endersbee (2000b) does not name the state government which prevented his paper from publication. Yet from the context of
the GAB water related debate for BHP OD’s mining operation, it can be inferred that such ‘wilful ignorance’ represents the
interest of the South Australian government in this case.
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[G]overnments receive a lot of revenue from mining, and mines are huge users of
GAB water. The GAB water entitlement for Olympic Dam mine alone is 42
million litres a day. It is likely that governments would be reluctant to admit they
were allowing a finite resource to be squandered in this way. Much better to
assure everyone that it is recharging (Great Artesian Basin Protection Group,
2009b, n.p.)
In addition, Keane (1997, p. 62) suggests that BHP OD made “a mockery” of the
process of the EIS “in the name of short term cost reduction”. Despite BHP OD’s
(2008a, 2009a, 2010a, 2011a, 2012a, 2013a) claim that its modelling studies and
field investigations have undergone peer-review process and assessment by both
Australian Federal and South Australian government experts. It is argued that such a
peer-review assessment is flawed as “the government is very reliant on data that
comes from the company” (Cleary, 2011, n.p.).
While centre institutions generate the basic scientific techniques of organisation,
calculation and discrimination; from the perspective of the border institutions this
social order inevitably gives rise to “myopia” (Douglas & Wildavsky, 1982, p. 75).
In this case, the border institutions’ opinion is that the government and BHP OD’s
reliance on certain scientific information and advice inevitably imposes ‘involuntary
risk’ on a society which is both ironic and unethical (Douglas, 1986; Douglas &
Wildavsky, 1982; Rayner, 2012). For example, Endersbee (2000b, n.p.) asserts that
the perpetration of the replenishable GAB myth from the government “promote[s] a
gross deception of the public”. Owen (2009, n.p.) argues that South Australia, “the
state at the end of the Great Artesian Basin … will bear the brunt of this apathy, this
neglect, this wilful ignorance by those who hold the policy levels.” (Owen, 2009,
n.p.).
To conclude this logological analysis, border institutions view scientific and expert
knowledge as limited and incomplete because of its evolving nature (Douglas &
Wildavsky, 1982). The terministic screen of imperfection is demonstrated in border
institutions’ holistic knowledge ideal. From this perspective, centre institutions Australian Federal and South Australian governments and BHP OD’s wilful
ignorance of counter scientific inquiries and expert advice in the pursuit of economic
self-interest is unethical (Douglas & Wildavsky, 1982), as it has caused immense
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GAB water wastage and endangered the GAB springs and imposed an involuntary
risk on a society that will bear the costs of the mistake.
7.4

Concept of control

Accounting recognition and measurement relies on the concept of control, not
necessarily ownership. This view is represented in accounting standards such as the
International Accounting Standard Board’s (IASB) (2001) Framework for the
Preparation and Presentation of Financial Statements (thereafter the Framework).
According to the IASB (2001, IASB Framework para.16), “[t]he financial position
of an entity is affected by the economic resources it controls45”, and the elements
such as assets and liabilities are “directly related to the measurement of financial
position” (IASB 2001, IASB Framework para.49). These elements should be
recognised46 if:
(a) it is probable that any future economic benefit associated with the item will
flow to or from the entity; and
(b) the item has a cost or value that can be measured47 with reliability” (IASB
2001, IASB Framework para.83)
However, this control concept and the subsequent recognition and measurement of
relevant assets and liabilities in financial reports is contestable when what is
traditionally considered a public good becomes a resource for profit. In this case, the
debate over the appropriate learning style to understand the nature of the GAB water
resource and the property of knowledge ideal based on cultural risk theory (Douglas
& Wildavsky, 1982) provides an opportunity to explore this theme.
As a public good, the GAB can be considered as communally owned. Although it is
non-exclusive in use, it can be rival in consumption. In rhetorical analysis, while
endorsing the centre institutions’ construction of a robust and resilient nature within
natural limits and boundaries (Ney & Thompson, 2011), the BHP OD and South
Australian government assert that the GAB water resource is rechargeable and BHP
45
According to the IASB (2001, IASB Framework para.57), “[m]any assets, for example, receivables and property, are
associated with legal rights, including the right of ownership. In determining the existence of an asset, the right of ownership is
not essential; thus, for example, property held on a lease is an asset if the entity controls the benefits which are expected to flow
from the property”.
46
According to the IASB (2001, IASB Framework para.82), “[r]ecognition is the process of incorporating in the balance sheet
or income statement an item that meets the definition of an element and satisfies the criteria for recognition”.
47
According to the IASB (2001, IASB Framework para.99), “[m]easurement is the process of determining the monetary
amounts at which the elements of the financial statements are to be recognised and carried in the balance sheet and income
statement”.
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OD only extracts a small amount to process minerals. These assumptions legitimate
BHP OD’s water extraction sanctioned by South Australian government. The
disclosure of GAB water in social and environmental reports from BHP and BHP
OD and GAB water regulatory statements and policies from the Australian Federal
and South Australian government can be considered as “ a means of bundling or
packaging uncertainty into an acceptable form” to facilitate the distribution of
market institution’s rights and obligations (Moerman & van der Laan, 2012, p. 107).
According to IASB (2001, IASB Framework para.49), “[a]n asset is a resource
controlled by the entity as a result of past events and from which future economic
benefits are expected to flow to the entity”. This past event includes the water
licence granted to BHP OD from South Australian government “as part of a program
to encourage economic growth in an area” (IASB 2001, IASB Framework para.58).
However, although the GAB water resource is controlled as an asset by BHP OD for
mining operations, this asset is not shown in the BHP OD’s balance sheet because
conventional accounting only “capture[s] and measure[s] business transactions”
(Jones, 2010, p. 130). In IASB’s (2001, IASB Framework para.89) words,
[a]n asset is recognised in the balance sheet when it is probable that the future
economic benefits will flow to the entity and the asset has a cost or value that can
be measured reliably48.
In this case, BHP OD does not recognise the GAB water intake for its mining
operation as an asset because South Australian government grants it the water
licence without charge. This ‘asset’ is unmeasurable therefore unidentifiable in
monetary terms. This controlled GAB water resource will only become an asset
when BHP OD is sold. By that time, it will be realised and recognised as purchased
‘goodwill’.
The BHP OD and the South Australian government also match the centre institutions’
worldview that expert knowledge such as modern science as agency makes it
possible for humans to control and manage natural resources (Douglas & Wildavsky,
1982; Schwarz & Thompson, 1990) through calculation, quantification and
48

According to the IASB (2001, IASB Framework para.34), “[m]ost financial information is subject to some risk of being less
than a faithful representation of that which it purports to portray. This is not due to bias, but rather to inherent difficulties either
in identifying the transactions and other events to be measured or in devising and applying measurement and presentation
techniques that can convey messages that correspond with those transactions and events. In certain cases, the measurement of
the financial effects of items could be so uncertain that entities generally would not recognise them in the financial statements”.
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prediction (Gray, 1992; Power, 2007). In the grammatical analysis, the discourses of
the centre demonstrate that BHP OD’s GAB water extraction does not have
excessive negative impacts that affect the stable and resilient GAB water system
because the wellfields operation is well controlled within the most updated scientific
knowledge and expertise. Following this assumption, BHP OD does not see that its
GAB water extraction entails a ‘liability’ as the potential water extraction related risk
is trivial, uncertain and sometimes non-severable from impacts due to other sources
other than BHP OD’s wellfields. This non-recognition of ‘liability’ is also consistent
with IASB’s Framework. According to IASB (2001, IASB Framework para.49):
A liability is a present obligation of the entity arising from past events, the
settlement of which is expected to result in an outflow from the entity of
resources embodying economic benefits.
And,
[a] liability is recognised in the balance sheet when it is probable that an outflow
of resources embodying economic benefits will result from the settlement of a
present obligation and the amount at which the settlement will take place can be
measured reliably (IASB 2001, IASB Framework para.91)
Such non-recognition of GAB water intake as an asset and the consequent water
extraction related risks as a liability in financial reports for BHP OD, is supported by
South Australian government. Risk, from both market and hierarchy institutions’
perspective, is properly managed and controlled within the centre (Douglas &
Wildavsky, 1982). Centre institutions’ perspectives reflect managerial and
administrative accountability. Managerial accountability is based on the dominant
neo-classical economic supposition that social and environmental benefits and costs
are immaterial, thought to be unquantifiable therefore unmeasurable in the domain of
free market (Freedman & Stagliano, 1990). Administrative accountability, on the
other hand, is increasingly concerned with economic growth, therefore “passing
more power to the market” (Spence et al., 2010, p. 78).
This non-recognition of both asset and liability disseminates and legitimates the
centre institutions’ construction of an abundant GAB water resource and scientific,
trial and error learning style as the most appropriate learning style to understand and
control this water resource. This inference seems to be contradictory to the concept
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of neutrality described in IASB’s Framework para 36, which requires the
information in financial statements to be neutral:
Financial statements are not neutral if, by the selection or presentation of
information, they influence the making of a decision or judgement in order to
achieve a predetermined result or outcome (IASB 2001, IASB Framework
para.36).
According to Maunders and Burritt (1991, p. 12), incomplete or absence of
“representation of uncertain positions may be particularly inappropriate where an
omitted outcome constitutes ecological ‘ruin’”. That is, the accounting system in its
current form, serves as an ideological tool for a vested interest to overuse nonrenewable resources and downplay ecological impacts (see also Hines, 1989; Jones,
2010). In the logological analysis of disclosures from the centre institutions,
‘objectivity’ and ‘procedural validation’ are the ‘terministic screens’ that underpin
scientific methods. This is achieved by silencing contradictory scientific studies
regarding the likelihood of non-rechargeability and ignoring the moral and ethical
dimensions of the GAB water extraction by the BHP OD (Douglas, 1986; Douglas &
Wildavsky, 1982).
According to Buhr (2001) and Lehman (1995), managerial accountability from
market institutions and administrative accountability from hierarchy institutions
constitute the most common forms of accountability in current western liberal
societies. They subscribe to ‘business-as-usual’ and ‘middle-of-the-road’ cases for
sustainable development. These approaches focus on the scientific and technical
dimensions of accountability and subsequently neglect the full social and
environmental cost of corporate activity (Andrew, 2007; Beder, 1997; Dumay et al.,
2010). This critical perspective is consistent with the border institutions’
construction of the GAB water system, their preferred learning style, and the
corresponding property of knowledge ideal.
Public submissions to the ODEP EIS (BHP Billiton, 2009), several media articles
and academic studies support the border institutions’ primary concern for a fragile
nature with depleting natural resources (Schwarz & Thompson, 1990) and the
incompleteness and limitedness of scientific knowledge and expertise as an authority
(Douglas & Wildavsky, 1982). From the rhetorical and grammatical analysis, the
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GAB water resource is constructed as non-rechargeable and the corresponding
scientific knowledge advocated the centre as contradictory and flawed. This
imperfect concept is due to incomplete and limited hydrogeological and
hydrochemical knowledge and the uncertainty arising from the use of evolving
modelling studies characterised by a trial and error learning process.
Therefore, managerial and administrative accountability from centre institutions
manifest an ostensible objectivity with both “positive and negative sanctions” that
make “the image of events that counts” (Roberts, 1991, p. 363). These forms of
accountability

entail

“unintended

and

unacknowledged…environmental

consequences that spill out from the pursuit of strategic objectives” (Roberts, 1991, p.
367). In this case, the South Australian government’s permission for BHP OD’s
GAB water intake has had detrimental impacts on this fragile GAB water system.
Following on from the border institutions’ argument, while controlling the GAB
water resource, BHP OD also has responsibility for environmental damage, such as
declining spring flow.
From an accounting perspective, these assumptions affect the relevance and
reliability ideal of disclosures related to GAB water as a ‘controlled’ economic
resource. According to the IASB (2001, IASB Framework para.29), the relevance of
information is closely related to its nature and materiality. In the context of the GAB,
the non-rechargeable nature and ecosystem damages exerted by BHP OD’s
wellfields supports the borders recognition of the obligation that BHP OD has
towards the risks associated with GAB water extraction. From the border institutions’
perspective, BHP OD should, sooner or later, disclose the likelihood of a nonrechargeable GAB in its notes, explanatory material or supplementary schedules49,
and account for its GAB water extraction related risks as a liability, or at least a
contingent liability or a provision 50 . This requirement to participate in a form of

49
According to IASB (2001, IASB Framework para.88), “[a]n item that possesses the essential characteristics of an element but
fails to meet the criteria for recognition may nonetheless warrant disclosure in the notes, explanatory material or in
supplementary schedules. This is appropriate when knowledge of the item is considered to be relevant to the evaluation of the
financial position, financial performance and cash flows of an entity by the users of financial statements.”
According to IASB (2001, IASB Framework para.21), “notes and supplementary schedules and other information…may
contain additional information that is relevant to the needs of users about the items in the balance sheet and income statement.
They may include disclosures about the risks and uncertainties affecting the entity and any resources and obligations not
recognised in the balance sheet (such as mineral reserves).”
50
According to IASB (2001, IASB Framework para.64), “[s]ome liabilities can be measured only by using a substantial degree
of estimation. Some entities describe these liabilities as provisions. In some countries, such provisions are not regarded as
liabilities because the concept of a liability is defined narrowly so as to include only amounts that can be established without
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moral accountability is more encompassing and acknowledges “a non-instrumental
relationship” to the other. In other words, a relationship of obligation to our
responsibility for the other that cannot be discharged by reference merely to one’s
economic interest (Shearer, 2002).
The stability of the centre is disrupted by the ‘noisy’ border institutions. In this case,
the market institution is requested to disclose more information to facilitate
information about the “socialization of risk” (Moerman & van der Laan, 2012, p. 107)
related to the GAB water. This suggested (extra) information increases “the public
awareness of risk” (Moerman & van der Laan, 2012, p. 115) and allows the
(re)definition and (re)location of risk management to (re)establish a stable centre
institution while fulfilling the interests of the border institutions to settle the “moral
problems about social inequality” (Douglas & Wildavsky, 1982, p. 177).
After all, if the current GAB water resource allocation is based on the limited
understanding of the renewability of the GAB water resource itself and trial and
error modelling studies from BHP OD, whose primary goal is profit-making without
independent confirmation from South Australian government, there is a danger for us
as a collective to face an [un]expected and unwanted economic, environmental and
cultural loss which may threaten our basic living standards. Border institutions
embrace an ethical concern regarding “the moral status of economic collectivities,
including the scope of the moral community and the good that this community seeks”
(Shearer, 2002, p. 541).
If GAB water extraction related risks were represented as a (contingent) liability in
BHP OD’s financial reports it would define and communicate a different
construction of the GAB water system as fragile and depleting (rhetorical analysis).
The prevailing mainstream scientific model would no longer be the taken-for-granted
method to understand and control the GAB water resource (grammatical analysis).
The form moral accountability required by the border institutions consequently
cultivates openness and dialogue for social and distributive justice rather than
scientific and economic reasoning (Messner, 2009). In Schweiker’s (1993, p. 224)

the need to make estimates. The definition of a liability in paragraph 49 follows a broader approach. Thus, when a provision
involves a present obligation and satisfies the rest of the definition, it is a liability even if the amount has to be estimated.”
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words, “[w]hat we account for and our substantive notions of what is good are bound
up with these relations to others and ourselves”. Moral accountability as such,
requires face-to-face communication and acknowledges mutual understanding in the
absence of power dynamics, especially seeks to make the voice of the vulnerable to
be heard (Messner, 2009; Roberts, 1991).
According to the logological analysis, the centre institutions - Australian Federal and
South Australian governments and BHP OD’s - wilful ignorance of counter scientific
inquiries and expert advice in the pursuit of economic self-interest is unethical
(Douglas & Wildavsky, 1982), as it has caused immense water wastage, endangered
GAB springs and imposed an involuntary risk on society.
According to Hines (1989, p. 62), accounting practice is a political activity “by
selecting and reflecting materialist aspects of society”. Cultural risk theory, by
suggesting that assumptions such as the preferred learning style, view of nature and
property of knowledge ideal are shaped by institutional beliefs and interests,
provides us with a critical lens to analyse the politicised nature of accounting
concept of control with subsequent accounting measurement and recognition rules.
In this theme, the centre institutions - South Australian government and BHP OD’s
assumptions of preferred learning style, view of nature and the property of their
knowledge ideal has conferred institutional legitimacy on the non-recognition and
non-presentation of the controlled natural resource as an asset and its consumption
related risks as a liability in BHP OD’s financial reports. The border institutions, by
challenging those taken-for-granted assumptions, provide us with the opportunity to
reconsider this accounting concept of control and its indirect consequences in
perpetuating environmental crises.
7.5

Summary

This chapter analysed the institutional debate of the GAB water risk through
contested disclosures among market institutions - BHP and BHP OD, hierarchy
institutions - Australian Federal and South Australian governments and border
institutions - civil society, using three major concepts from cultural risk theory, with
the application of Burkean rhetorical criticism. From this analysis, different
institutional perspectives with respect to the preferred learning style, view of the
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GAB groundwater system and property of knowledge ideal and their implications for
accounting concept of control and related accountability are elucidated. The
following chapter analyses different institutional position in the GAB water risk
debate using another three major concepts - attitude towards technology, view of risk
and resolution of risk from cultural risk theory, and discuss their implications for
accounting concept of stewardship and related accountability.
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CHAPTER 8 ATTITUDE TOWARDS TECHNOLOGY, VIEW OF RISK
AND RESOLUTION OF RISK
8.1

Introduction

The preceding chapter applied three major concepts of preferred learning style, view
of nature and property of knowledge ideal to analyse the institutional debate
regarding the Great Artesian Basin (GAB) water - related risks and discussed the
implications for the accounting concept of control and related accountability. This
chapter applies three major concepts from cultural risk theory: attitude towards
technology, view of risk and resolution of risk, to understand the concept of
stewardship.
According to Burkean grammatical analysis, intrinsic differences are embedded in
attitudes towards the technology of institutional life (Douglas & Wildavsky, 1982).
These different attitudes toward modern technology subsequently generate a
distinctive view of risk for Burkean rhetorical analysis. Finally in Burkean
logological analysis, different institutions select a particular set of risks and
foreground certain solutions instead of the others.
The purpose of this analysis is to identify different institutional perspectives with
regard to attitudes towards water efficiency related technology, a particular view of
the GAB water risks and finally the resolution of risk. This analysis has implications
for an understanding of the accounting concept of stewardship and provides insights
for social and environmental accounting and reporting practices. The three - level
analysis of institutional perspectives and critical themes of accounting and related
accountability are displayed in Table 8.1.
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Table 8.1 Attitude towards Technology, View of Risk, Resolution of Risk and Stewardship

Accountability

Steward- Resolution of Risk
ship

Stewardship View of Risk

Steward- Attitude towards
ship
Technology

Market Institutions
Pro-technology
Adopt BSC information technology for water management and
water efficiency technology to tackle risks

Hierarchy Institutions
Grammatical Analysis (Discursive features)
Technical Fix
Require water efficiency related technology as a
technical adjustment to the extant GAB water use

Constructed and objectified GAB water risks rendered by technology are to control the uncertainty of water sustainability.
Manifest through a standard measure in the form of a water efficiency indicators under the protection of legislation
Water efficiency related technologies are perceived as centre institutions’ stewardship mechanism to account for their
financial, social and environmental responsibility

Opportunity
Design monitoring programs and water efficiency programs to
challenge GAB water risks and turn them into opportunities

Rhetorical Analysis (Discursive functions)
Controllability
Establish the Indenture Act (1982) to govern BHP
OD’s mining project

Border Institutions
Anti-technology
Water efficiency related technology focuses on techno-economic facets
neglecting moral and environmental dimensions of the GAB water risks. These
are moral defects as environmental value of the GAB water resource is
incommensurable with a short-term economic value
Water efficiency related technologies do not satisfy the discharge of
environmental responsibility. Centre institutions’ consideration of financial
responsibility heavily outweigh that of environmental responsibility
Need to Minimise
Despite the implementation of monitoring programs and water efficiency
programs, BHP OD’s mining operation has irreversible risks. Radical change
like an outright ban on the BHP OD’s GAB water extraction is advocated

Dual objectives of centre institutions for economic growth and the GAB water protection
The general fulfilment of managerial stewardship is reflected in the South Australian government and BHP OD’s dual
objectives. Both financial, environmental and social responsibility has been charged through BHP OD’s monitoring and
water efficiency programs
Logological Analysis (Discursive implications)
Regulation
Protect standardised operating procedures or regulation
as the realistically feasible solution to manage potential
threat
Imperialist tendency - ODEP as the best operational solution to sustainable development in general, and water efficiency
related technologies in particular. Long-term GAB water value and risks are excluded from centre institutions’ risk
resolution
The continuous improvement of the water efficiency indicator legitimates the managerial stewardship of BHP OD for its
extant operation and the proposed ODEP, sanctioned by South Australian government. Social and environmental aspects
of the GAB water risks are shifted sideways
Economic Growth
Assume economic and market measures are the most
appropriate for valuing objects or concepts

BHP OD’s GAB water monitoring program and water efficiency program do not
fulfil its environmental responsibility. Radical change is needed to discharge
centre institutions’ managerial stewardship

Low Growth and Invasiveness
Economic expansion is not constructed as an environmental solution. The ODEP
is general and the water efficiency related technology in particular imply the
promise of the satisfaction of endless wants for capitalist interests without
satisfying the real human needs

Social and environmental responsibility covered by centre institutions’
managerial stewardship can only be discharged through requirements for
ceasing the GAB water intake from the BHP OD

Managerial Accountability

Administrative Accountability

Moral Accountability

Natural resources are treated as economic good and they are
objectified for efficiency and profit maximisation

Taking a social value base allegedly, the main concern
is with economic development, with the pluralist
political assumptions that the state pursues a neutral
mediating role in conflict resolution

Requires moral relations to others which necessitates mutual understanding
beyond the giving and receiving of accounts through formal categories provided
by managerial and administrative accountability. Political participation is
important

Focus on procedural and technical dimensions of accountability and perpetuate the status-quo without critically analysing
the social and environmental effects
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In this chapter the market and hierarchy (centre) institutions (Section 8.2) are
analysed before the explication of the border institutions (Section 8.3). The concept
of stewardship and associated issues of accountability is then discussed with insights
for social and environmental accounting and reporting practices (Section 8.4).
8.2

Attitude towards technology, View of risk and Resolution of risk of centre
institutions

As documents issued by BHP Billiton Olympic Dam Corporation Pty Ltd (BHP OD)
and the Federal and State government correspond to a great extent, both perspectives
from market and hierarchy institutions are combined to highlight a consistent view
from centre institutions. According to cultural risk theory (Douglas & Wildavsky,
1982), centre institutions encompass both market and hierarchy cultures. In terms of
attitude towards technology, both market and hierarchy institutions perceive
technological advancement as the solution for economic development without
unacceptable environmental risks (Ney & Thompson, 2011; Schwarz & Thompson,
1990; Thompson & Rayner, 1998). In regards to the view of risk, while hierarchy
institutions support carefully planned and designed policies to ensure sustainable
development for both economic growth and environmental management (Ney &
Thompson, 2011; Thompson & Rayner, 1998); market institutions advocate
economic development and believe that environmental risks can be transformed into
opportunities by challenging and tackling them boldly (Douglas & Wildavsky, 1982;
Ney & Thompson, 2011; Schwarz & Thompson, 1990; Thompson et al., 1990). In
respect of the resolution of risk, while market institutions’ technologies imply that
market and economic measures are the most appropriate for valuing objects
(Douglas & Wildavsky, 1982), hierarchy institutions sanction such technologies as
“realistically feasible” solutions to their needs for sustainable development (Douglas
& Wildavsky, 1982, p. 93). This constructed and objectified notion of risk facilitates
technological and operational expansion without consideration of the long-term
environmental risks (Douglas & Wildavsky, 1982).
8.2.1

Grammatical analysis - Attitude towards technology of centre institutions

At this level, contested attitudes towards technology in the broader context of
sustainable development are constructed by market, hierarchy and border institutions
through discursive practices. According to cultural risk theory (Douglas &
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Wildavsky, 1982; Ney & Thompson, 2011; Thompson & Rayner, 1998), centre
institutions favour technology, which is dependent on specialised knowledge and
expertise to establish and operate. Hierarchy institutions construct themselves as
agents whose acts are to protect both economic growth and the environment
(Douglas & Wildavsky, 1982). Technology, as agency, is favoured by hierarchy
institutions (Douglas & Wildavsky, 1982), because they believe that a successful
environmental policy can be executed through technical adjustments to extant
institutions (Thompson & Rayner, 1998)
In this case, water efficiency related technology is advocated by the South Australian
government to control GAB water risks. For example, according to the South
Australian Arid Lands Natural Resources Management (SAALNRM) Board (2009a,
p. 29), “one key” approach to management is using water judiciously, as it is the
government’s responsibility to “eliminate waste and to maximise social and
economic benefits in a manner that is environmentally sustainable.” Incorporation of
water efficiency techniques and technologies and utilisation of industry best
practices for all water users is an expectation from the hierarchy (SAALNRM Board,
2009a).
In response, BHP OD adopts ‘Best Practicable Technology’ (BPT) with assistance
from “scientists, ecologists, engineers, hydrogeologists, operators and maintainers”
to achieve sustainable management of water extraction from the GAB and “Zero
Harm to the environment” (Torrisi & Trotta, 2009, p. 204). BPT is defined as
“[t]echnology which minimises risks to people and the environment, now and in the
future, that can reasonably be implemented taking social and economic factors into
account” (BHP Billiton Olympic Dam Corporation Pty Ltd., 2012d, p. 14). This is
consistent with Douglas and Wildavsky’s (1982) assertion that market institutions
construct themselves as agents open to the view that technology is the symbol for
social distinction and wealth generation.
Market institutions tackle environmental risks by using technology to increase the
scale of economic production (Ney & Thompson, 2011; Schwarz & Thompson,
1990). In this case, for BHP OD, the GAB water risks are treated as “technical
challenges” in which the implementation of advanced technology improves GAB
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water use efficiency (Torrisi & Trotta, 2009, p. 200). One example is related to the
water flow in the hydromet.
The hydromet, according to Torrisi and Trotta (2009), is sensitive to change in liquor
chemistry and is closely linked to water quality. A principal variable which
influences the amount of uranium recovered is the concentrate of chloride. That is,
an elevated chloride concentration level reduces uranium recovery. Any recycled
tailings liquor or lower quality water added to the metallurgical plant to substitute
GAB water will increase the level of chloride concentration in the hydromet (BHP
Billiton Olympic Dam Corporation Pty Ltd., 2011b, 2012f; Torrisi & Trotta, 2009).
This procedure “places an upper constraint on water qualities” that can be fed into
the plant to substitute GAB water (Torrisi & Trotta, 2009, p. 200).
To overcome this technical barrier, BHP OD has developed a SYSCAD model for
the hydromet plant to improve an understanding of the impact of chloride on
uranium recovery. This model determines a maximum operating level of chloride
concentration that simultaneously optimises GAB water input (Torrisi & Trotta,
2009). According to Torrisi and Trotta (2009, p. 200), “[t]his project is a good
example of Olympic Dam using appropriate technology to improve GAB water use
efficiency.”
In addition to particular water efficiency technologies, Torrisi and Trotta (2009) also
describe the Balance Scorecard (BSC) approach as an information technology that
BHP OD has adopted for water management. This approach aims to reduce water
demand in each step throughout the (internal) ore production process and includes
the setting and achievement of water use targets. It emphasises the basic cycle of
continuous water efficiency improvement “where targets are set, plans put in place,
actions carried out and measurements taken to confirm any deviations from target
and opportunity to set improved targets” (more details of the BSC information
technology in BHP OD regarding sustainable water management in Appendix B)
(Torrisi & Trotta, 2009, p. 198).
From the perspective of cultural risk theory, BSC information technology adopted by
BHP OD is a managerial instrument of control in terms of turning the uncertain and
contingent nature of water sustainability into a manageable water risk (Catasús,
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Ersson, Gröjer & Yang Wallentin, 2007; Power, 2007). More specifically, this
information technology translates both the objectives of economic growth and
environmental protection into actions such as setting targets, identifying performance
drivers, measuring performance, analysing variance and rectifying variance to make
the risk object - water demand for ore production predictable, measurable and
therefore manageable (Hilgartner, 1992).
The implementation of a BSC approach to water management is consistent with
BHP OD’s expectation of “decidability” and “actionability” about the future (Power,
2007, p. 26). The unpredicted force of technological progress regarding water
efficiency will render the present “fuss” over GAB water risks irrelevant in the near
future (Thompson & Rayner, 1998, p. 48). This adoption of BSC information
technology is also consistent with the ideal governing form of hierarchy institutions,
in which standardised operating procedures help to “objectify, rank and manage”
(Ney & Thompson, 2011, p. 63) GAB water related risks.
BSC information technology is utilised by BHP OD to introduce “standard measures”
(Douglas & Wildavsky, 1982, p. 96) and facilitate the valuation of GAB water in a
“monetarized” economic system (Douglas & Wildavsky, 1982, p. 95). For example,
while water consumption data is presented using the Production Information
Management System (PIMS) to track actual water usage against targets (Torrisi &
Trotta, 2009); the water usage variance for the operation of individual units is
measured by volume and efficiency. This approach is similar to “that used in cost
management accounting which can separate cost variances due to volume, efficiency
and price” (Torrisi & Trotta, 2009, p. 199). Figure 8.1 provides the formula for
calculating the total variance of water usage from a target, where

Figure 8.1 Total Variance of Water Consumption
Source: Torrisi and Trotta (2009, p. 199)
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V is the volume of water expressed as kilolitres
e is water consumption efficiency expressed as kilo litres per unit of production
driver
T is the production driver, commonly throughput tonnes in a given period
(Torrisi & Trotta, 2009, p. 199).
As Torrisi and Trotta (2009) explain, the first term in Equation 3 illustrates the
volume of water consumption which varies according to efficiency changes in
underlying processes, while the second term demonstrates the volume of water
consumption variance related to throughput change in production.
It is important to note here that the BSC approach modifies various water
consumption measurements through variance analysis into a water use efficiency
indicator (Catasús et al., 2007). And this water efficiency indicator is introduced by
BHP OD as a combination of “standard measures” (Douglas & Wildavsky, 1982, p.
96) to legitimate existing ore production and the proposed Olympic Dam Expansion
Project (ODEP) with increased GAB water extraction. For example, according to
Torrisi and Trotta (2009), analysing the water consumption variance allows water
consumption drivers to be managed for setting targets, identifying possible further
improvement for water demand and efficiency, and at the same time, enable other
projects to deliver increasing production volume. Figure 8.2 is an example of
industrial water use efficiency at Olympic Dam from Financial Year 04-Financial
Year 09 with water consumption and water efficiency variances.
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Figure 8.2 Industrial Water Use Efficiency at Olympic Dam, FY04 to FY09
Source: Torrisi and Trotta (2009, p.200)

According to Figure 8.2, from 2000 to 2009, GAB water extraction from BHP OD’s
wellfields has remained relatively constant despite increased mine production. Since
June 2004 to June 2009, there has been an industrial water efficiency improvement
of 15 percent from 1.27 KL/ton to 1.07 KL/ton of ore milled (Torrisi & Trotta, 2009,
p. 201). It is notable that the diagram or “visual epigraph” has a rhetorical effect
(Davison, 2011, p. 129), and is used in BHP OD to promote the image/construction
of continuous improvement in water efficiency.
This process of modification of “measurements into indicators”, according to
Catasús et al (2007, p. 508), reflects an organisation’s aim to “distinguish a number
that is used as an input in the managerial process from a number that chiefly aims to
represent the organisation.” In this case, the water efficiency indicator represents the
economic achievement and environmental protection of BHP OD as a proxy for how
much water is used (and saved) in producing one ton of ore.
According to Torrisi and Trotta (2009), from 1991 to 2009, ore production increased
by 490% while the volume of abstracted GAB water increased by 215%. This
demonstrates “50% improvement in the GAB water efficiency per unit of milled ore”
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for BHP OD (Torrisi & Trotta, 2009, p. 203). By using this indicator, BHP OD
demonstrates that more ore could be produced. This is consistent with the market
institutions’ belief that technological advancement can mitigate environmental risks
while boosting production scale (Ney & Thompson, 2011; Schwarz & Thompson,
1990; Thompson & Rayner, 1998). As such, BHP Billiton claims that “[w]hile future
growth may result in an overall increase in water usage, GAB water will be used
efficiently so that growth is sustainable” (BHP Billiton, 2007b, p. 225; see also BHP
Billiton, 2010).
The advocacy and protection afforded by the standardised measures introduced by
BHP OD’s BSC information technology and water efficiency technology is explicit
in legislation from the hierarchy institution - the South Australian government (Ney
& Thompson, 2011). For example, according to the Roxby Downs (Indenture
Ratification) Act 1982 (the Indenture) (p. 31) and Roxby Downs (Indenture
Ratification) (Amendment of Indenture) Amendment Act 2011 (p. 49), BHP OD
shall, to the extent that it is reasonably practical and economic for …[it] to do so,
design, construct and operate or cause to be designed, constructed and operated
all plant so as to ensure the most efficiency use of all water sources.
To conclude the grammatical analysis, while the South Australian government
requires water efficiency related technology as a technical adjustment (Thompson &
Rayner, 1998) to extant GAB water use, BHP OD has also adopted BSC information
technology to tackle the GAB water risks with skill and confidence (Ney &
Thompson, 2011; Schwarz & Thompson, 1990). The objectified GAB water risks
rendered by technological advancement are used by centre institutions to control the
uncertain and contingent nature of water sustainability (Catasús et al., 2007; Douglas
& Wildavsky, 1982; Power, 2007). The technological achievement for both
productivity boost and reduced water risks (Ney & Thompson, 2011; Schwarz &
Thompson, 1990; Thompson & Rayner, 1998) is manifested through a standard
measure in the form of a water efficiency indicator mandated by the South
Australian government in legislation.
8.2.2 Rhetorical analysis - View of risk of centre institutions
Drawing upon their image of technology with respect to risk attitude, hierarchy
institutions exploit the public interest. By constructing themselves as agents with a
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moral imperative to satisfy human needs while protecting the environment with
carefully planned and designed policies (Ney & Thompson, 2011; Thompson &
Rayner, 1998), they identify as ensuring sustainable development.
In this case, the South Australian government has two main objectives for both
economic growth and protection of GAB water. First, hierarchy institutions construct
sustainable development as “meeting the needs of the present without compromising
the ability of future generations to meet their own needs” (Brundtland, 1987, p. 8).
Although the market individualists’ risk-taking behaviour might be rational to meet
human needs and wants, the overall outcome from economic growth is argued to be
environmentally detrimental (Ney & Thompson, 2011; Thompson & Rayner, 1998).
While this view coincides with the border institutions’ normative aspect, it differs in
terms of the solution that it promotes (Thompson & Rayner, 1998). Complete risk
aversion responses are impractical, and indeed, “social upheaval” would only make
things worse (Thompson & Rayner, 1998, p. 305).
For example, the South Australian government acknowledges explicitly that BHP
OD’s continued GAB water extraction for mining operation is likely to cause
declined potentiometric surface of the basin and negatively affect mound spring
flows and the associated eco-systems (Government of South Austrlia, 2011b;
SAALNRM Board, 2009a). However, the challenge for the government is to
preserve advantages of economic growth while leaving sufficient water for the
environment and community (Roxby Downs (Indenture Ratification) (Amendment
of Indenture) Amendment Act 2011; Roxby Downs (Indenture Ratification) Act
1982).
BHP OD expresses a similar position with regard to the relationship between
economic growth and environmental protection with the South Australian
government. Following the Brundtland (1987) definition of sustainability, BHP
OD’s engineers Torrisi and Trotta (2009, p. 195) define sustainable development in
the context of the GAB as;
[d]evelopment that meets the needs of GAB natural springs hosting flora and
fauna, pastoral, mining, petroleum, energy industries and cultural, community,
tourism and other users without compromising the ability of future generations
and environment to meet their needs.
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That is, the sustainability of BHP OD’s development relies on using GAB water
responsibly while ensuring the mining operation remains viable (BHP Billiton,
2011a, 2012). It is important to note that this is an example of intertextuality.
Intertextuality is defined by (de Beaugrande & Dressler, 1981, p. 10) as “the factors
which make the utilisation of one text dependent upon knowledge of one or more
previously encountered texts”. In this case, this definition is drawn on that of the
Brundtland report (1987), which seeks communicative and institutional legitimacy
(Slembrouck, 2011). This intertextuality is authoritatively informed and has
rhetorical effect (Young, 2003). It portrays BHP OD as a responsible corporate agent
under the governance of a hierarchy institution. The challenge of scarce natural
resources for hierarchy institutions is not to stop economic development with its
future expansion, but to find the appropriate rules for stronger governance (Ney &
Thompson, 2011).
In this case, the Indenture was established as a legal framework to govern BHP OD’s
extant and future/proposed mining project (Government of South Austrlia, 2011a).
From BHP Billiton’s (2009, p. 208) view, this contractual framework allows BHP
OD to make significant investment decisions with “confidence” while ensuring “the
continuation…of a safe and environmentally acceptable operation capable of
providing major economic benefits to South Australia and Australia.”
In terms of BHP OD’s GAB water intake in general, the Indenture provides a model
of management “based on acceptable or allowable impacts on the groundwater
resource and dependent ecosystems”. That is, it sets a 5 metre default value of
drawdown for existing designed areas around Wellfield A and B, which has been
adopted to date51 (Power, 2002). And a particular “lower value of 2.2 metres was set
for part of the boundary for Wellfield A in a more sensitive area near the Hermit Hill
spring complex” (Power, 2002, n. p.). Two special water licences are granted to BHP

51
“[T]he designated area shall be that area from which it is reasonably expected that the abstraction of water therefrom by the
relevant Joint Venturers or an associated company for the thirty year period next ensuing will not reduce the potentiometric
pressure by more than five metres (or such other pressure reduction as may be agreed between the relevant Joint Venturers or
an associated company and the Minister of Water Resources) at the boundary of the designated area” (Roxby Downs (Indenture
Ratification) Act 1982 p. 28).
“If the Minister of Water Resources has reason to believe that the continued abstraction of water by the Joint Venturers from
the designated area will be detrimental to the water resource or that there is a reasonable possibility of a complete or partial
failure of the water supply therefrom, he may issue to the relevant Joint Venturers a notice requiring them to restrict the
abstraction of water from the designated area to the limit set out in the notice, or, if appropriate, to establish another wellfield
and designated area” (Roxby Downs (Indenture Ratification) Act 1982 p. 29).
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OD for

GAB water extraction under the criteria of acceptable drawdown rate

(Roxby Downs (Indenture Ratification) (Amendment of Indenture) Amendment Act
2011; Roxby Downs (Indenture Ratification) Act 1982).
In particular, BHP OD is required to “design, install and maintain an appropriate
monitoring system” to manage GAB water resources, including total extraction
volume from production wells, water pressure of all wells and designated areas of
the wellfields and water qualities in each well (BHP Billiton Olympic Dam
Corporation Pty Ltd., 2012d, p. 8; see also: Power, 2002; Roxby Downs (Indenture
Ratification) Act 1982). The Indenture also focuses on a judicious use of water.
BHP OD is required to submit an annual report by a competent hydrogeologist, to
define the aquifers’ response to water extraction, resources ability to maintain the
water supply and strategies for future water exploration, production and management
(Roxby Downs (Indenture Ratification) Act 1982; BHP Billiton Olympic Dam
Corporation Pty Ltd., 2012b, 2012d; ). It is worth noting that this report is used as a
mechanism for BHP OD to discharge managerial accountability and facilitate
administrative accountability for the government (see Section 8.4). As such, the
Indenture manifests a desire for mining development and GAB water protection as
“incremental…remedial and serial” (Douglas & Wildavsky, 1982, p. 93).
A hierarchy or social order between nature and risk attitudes is subsequently
established by market institutions. The GAB water resource is constructed as
resilient and able to recover from fluctuations (Ney & Thompson, 2011) such as
extraction. A sustainable water management system is implemented to control GAB
water risks such as “scarcity… potential environmental impact, operating costs,
production constraints, and the influence of a social licence to operate” (Torrisi &
Trotta, 2009, p. 203).
According to Gray, Owen and Maunders (1988, p. 13), this ‘social licence’ is
considered “the rule of the game in which the organisation chooses to play”. In this
case, BHP OD’ managerial accountability is based on the requirements of
government legislation and therefore conveys corporate legitimacy (see Section 8.4).
It is assumed that corporate compliance with legislation is “wholly embedded in the
status quo and should, therefore, be acceptable to society-at-large” (Gray et al., 1988,
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p. 13). The ‘social licence’ is also an example of the rhetorical effect of
‘intertextuality’, as it draws on legislation as authority.
BHP OD submits an annual Environmental Management and Monitoring Report
(EMMR) and an annual GAB Wellfields Report to the South Australian Department
of Primary Industry and Resources (PIRSA) (BHP Billiton, 2009, 2011a). While
EMMR documents general annual environmental achievements and challenges the
Environmental Management Program (EMP), the Wellfields Report presents detailed
data regarding BHP OD’s GAB water supply to assess legal compliance. This
includes comparisons between actual impacts of the wellfields’ operation against
expectations and predictions made in the Environmental Impact Statement (EIS)
1997 (Kinhill, 1997). In addition, evaluation of the GAB aquifers’ drawdown
response, delineates drawdown effects on environmental flows and pastoral water
supplies. A contingency plan is maintained to address unexpected drawdown and
spring flow decline around Olympic Dam wellfields (BHP Billiton, 2009, 2011a). As
such, the market institution BHP OD constructs “the ingenious, inquiring and
experimenting” institution (Thompson et al., 1990, p. 62) or informed agents that
challenges and tackles environmental uncertainties “boldly” (Ney & Thompson,
2011, p. 47) through “exhaustive monitoring, analysis, modelling and reviews by [an]
independent expert” (Torrisi & Trotta, 2009, p. 203).
It is also worth noting that by adopting water efficiency technology for ODEP, BHP
OD constructs the GAB groundwater resource as “a raw material on which human
skill, knowledge and daring have been successfully focused” (Thompson et al., 1990,
p. 62). In other words, new combinations of expertise and technology are constructed
to mitigate the unforeseeable risks and to take care of the future (Thompson et al.,
1990).
Therefore, market institutions frame public interest in economic growth and suggest
that citizens do not have to “lower standards of living by very much in order to
reduce risk a little” (Douglas & Wildavsky, 1982, p. 67). Market institutions attempt
to convince the public by constructing risk aversion as the main source of danger,
where risk avoiders neglect “the danger averted by new technology, or in advance of
experience, the benefits or economic growth” (Douglas & Wildavsky, 1982, pp. 27196

28). In this case, BHP OD has implemented “continuous improvement initiatives”
(Torrisi & Trotta, 2009, p. 201), which are said to successfully turn risks into
opportunities (Douglas & Wildavsky, 1982; Ney & Thompson, 2011; Schwarz &
Thompson, 1990; Thompson et al., 1990).
To conclude the rhetorical analysis, both BHP OD and the South Australian
government have the dual objectives of economic growth and GAB water protection.
While the South Australian government established the Indenture Act (1982) as a
carefully planned legal framework (Ney & Thompson, 2011; Thompson & Rayner,
1998) to govern BHP OD’s extant and proposed/future mining project, BHP OD, in
response, has designed monitoring programs and water efficiency programs and has
implemented improvement initiatives to challenge the water-related risks of its
mining operations and turn these risks into opportunities (Douglas & Wildavsky,
1982; Ney & Thompson, 2011; Schwarz & Thompson, 1990; Thompson et al., 1990).
8.2.3 Logological analysis - Resolution of risk of centre institutions
While constructing technology as an agent and identifying risk as opportunities,
market institutions establish ‘economic growth’ as the terministic screen with respect
to their resolution of risk to legitimate their attitude towards technology and view of
risk. According to Douglas and Wildavsky (1982, p. 69), a market institution’s risk
assessment compares risks “by placing their costs and benefits on a common
economic plane”. In other words, it assumes economic or market measures are the
most appropriate for valuing objects regardless of their comparability (Douglas &
Wildavsky, 1982). The water efficiency indicator (see 8.2.1) represents an implied
risk assessment technique and it is a “technocratic” answer to how much water
resource should be sacrificed for how much wealth produced (Douglas & Wildavsky,
1982, p. 150).
However, according to Douglas and Wildavsky (1982), a technical solution preferred
by market institutions places too much emphasis on immediate returns or
profitability on investments activities. In this case, BHP OD seeks economic growth
by taking its GAB water extraction related risks intentionally through its monitoring
and water efficiency programme. According to Douglas and Wildavsky (1982, p. 86),
“[t]o maintain a rosy expectation of the long term…[market institutions - BHP OD]
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must exert continual vigilance in justifying the present system, with its delayed
satisfactions.”
As Douglas and Wildavsky (1982) further argue, market expectations are short-term
and at odds with environmental value which is usually long-term focused (Douglas
& Wildavsky, 1982). In this case, BSC information technology and water efficiency
technology mask the “moral ingredients” (Douglas & Wildavsky, 1982, p. 70) in
decision-making processes.
According to Douglas and Wildavsky (1982), the market institutions’ advocacy for
technology and absence of consideration for long-term environmental risks is
consistent with the preference of the hierarchy institutions. Hierarchy institutions
identify risks as something that needs to be controlled and use ‘regulation’ as the
terministic screen with regards to their resolution of risk and legitimation of their
risk attitude and preferred social order.
According to Douglas and Wildavsky (1982, p. 93), hierarchy decision-making
involves multiple goals which make it relatively easier to “retrospectively rationalize
whichever ones happen to be accomplished”. “[T]he need that seems most urgent in
these conditions is the one whose solution is realistically feasible” (Douglas &
Wildavsky, 1982, p. 93). Standardised operating procedures or regulations facilitate
this governing style and assist hierarchies to “objectify, rank and manage” a potential
threat (Ney & Thompson, 2011, p. 63). In this case, BSC information technology
and water efficiency technology are considered as “realistically feasible” solutions to
the South Australian governments’ “most urgent” need of economic growth without
‘unacceptable’ environmental effects (Douglas & Wildavsky, 1982, p. 93). They
assist

the

governments

in

avoiding

attempts

“to

know

too

much

about …[environmental] consequences” by limiting instead of expanding available
data (Douglas & Wildavsky, 1982, p. 93).
This point is evident from a Hansard extract of the confrontation between Australian
Greens Leader Hon. M. Parnell and Hon. G.E. Gago52 and his statement that the

52

The Hon. G.E. GAGO is the Minister for Agriculture, Food and Fisheries, Minister for Forests, Minister for Regional
Development, Minister for the Status of Women, Minister for State/Local Government Relations for the South Australian
government.
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BHP OD’s water extraction had “no adverse impact” on the GAB mound springs
(South Australia, Legislative Council 2011, p. 5):
The Hon. M. PARNELL: .... Can the minister first of all confirm that, over the
history of this mine, mound springs have been negatively impacted and continue
to be negatively impacted? In fact, my understanding is that at least one or two of
those mound springs are only maintained artificially by additional pumping of
water (South Australia, Legislative Council 2011, p. 6).
The Hon. G.E. GAGO: I think I have already put this on record, that after 25
years of operation there are no impacts on sensitive receptors in the environment
that are in excess of those considered and approved in the earlier state and federal
[ODEP] environmental impact statements of 1982 and 1987 (South Australia,
Legislative Council 2011, p. 6).
Furthermore, according to the Hon. P. Holloway (South Australia, Legislative
Council 2011, p. 3675):
[T]he South Australian government already ensures that [BHP OD’s] mining
operations conform to world's best practice principles, including…[water]
management practices. As such, the government is committed to ensuring that all
aspects of an expanded Olympic Dam also conform to these principles.
From the above Hansard extracts, the South Australian government implies that BHP
OD’s water management system including BSC information technology and water
efficiency technology is a satisfactory solution to meet the government’s
requirements of sustainable development. These overlapping views from BHP OD
and the South Australian government reflect the centre institutions’ view towards
risk resolution. According to Douglas and Wildavsky (1982), both hierarchy and
market institutions are fearful of those risks which threaten the system as a whole, as
well as public confidence. Both have tendencies towards imperialism, that is, both
see expansion of current operational area through technology as the best solution to
organisational and institutional problems.
According to Douglas and Wildavsky (1982), market institutions encourage the idea
that expansion solves problems such as limited economic growth. The “imperialist
tendencies” (Douglas & Wildavsky, 1982, p. 97) from both market and hierarchy
institutions mean that BHP OD and South Australian government collaborate (Elliott,
1983; Linsley & Shrives, 2009). According to Douglas (1990, p. 12), a “market
individual needs a political base to assure its basic security…[while] hierarchy
culture needs an economic base”. When interests of both institutions intersect, their
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power becomes formidable (Linsley & Shrives, 2009; Moerman & van der Laan,
2012), and risks are considered “properly managed” within the centre (Durkin, 1990,
p. 5).
Hierarchy institutions with market institutions consequently create hierarchising and
separating effects which (re)produce social divisions and inequities. In this case,
BSC information technology regarding water management and water efficiency
technology from BHP OD, required and sanctioned by the South Australian
government is an ideological tool used by the centre institutions to foresee
“disturbance and setbacks in normal course” and “weather” them (Douglas &
Wildavsky, 1982, p. 122). As a result, BHP OD and the South Australian
government do not embrace “the structure and goals of the environmental movement”
regarding GAB water risk (Douglas & Wildavsky, 1982, p. 188).
To conclude the logological analysis, while market institutions assume economic and
market measures are the most appropriate for valuing objects or concepts (Douglas
& Wildavsky, 1982), hierarchy institutions protect standardised operating procedures
or regulation as the “realistically feasible” solution to manage the potential threat
(Douglas & Wildavsky, 1982, p. 93). Centre institutions therefore have an
imperialist tendency that both BHP OD and the South Australian government
perceive ODEP (BHP Billiton, 2009) as the best operational solution to sustainable
development in general, and water efficiency related technologies to generate more
economic and environmental benefits in particular (Douglas & Wildavsky, 1982;
Thompson & Rayner, 1998). The long-term GAB water value and risks, on the other
hand, are not incorporated into the centre institutions’ risk resolution (Douglas &
Wildavsky, 1982).
8.3

Attitude towards technology, View of risk, and Risk resolution of border
institutions

This section outlines the border institutions’ attitudes towards technology, view of
risk and risk resolution and demonstrates the difference from those of the centre
institutions - BHP OD and the South Australian government. The evidence of border
institutions’ interests is drawn from public submissions to ODEP EIS (BHP Billiton,
2009), media articles and academic references. Border institutions construct modern
technology as “moral defects” (Douglas & Wildavsky, 1982, p. 7) “enter[ing] and
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spoil[ing]” the centre institutions (Douglas & Wildavsky, 1982, p. 124). The view of
risk is perceived as impending and irreversible and imposed by excessive economic
growth (Douglas & Wildavsky, 1982). Risk resolution is characterised by ‘low
growth’ (Schwarz & Thompson, 1990). This documentary evidence is often in the
form of comments critical of the sustainable mining development of BHP OD and its
water efficiency related technology and often uses subjective rather than scientific or
pseudo-scientific objective language.
8.3.1 Grammatical analysis - Attitudes towards technology of border institutions
Border institutions protest against the technology supported by market and hierarchy
institutions because they perceive it as the main source of risk from environmental
pollution (Douglas & Wildavsky, 1982). In this case, although BHP OD has applied
BSC information and water efficiency technology to GAB water management, from
the perspective of border institutions, they are to some degree “deceptive” (Save the
basin, 2011c). For example, according to Quilty R and Vervoort W (CL 297, p. 3),
there is a “double standard” regarding BHP OD’s environmental commitments. On
one hand, BHP OD intends to improve its water use efficiency to achieve a reduction
by 18% for the ODEP with respect to the amount of water consumption per tonne of
ore processed (BHP Billiton (Chapter 25), 2009). On the other hand, it plans to
increase GAB water extraction by approximately 9 ML/d, which is equal to 14% of
the maximal amount permitted under the current licence (BHP Billiton, 2009).
Additionally, BHP OD’s commitment to environmental principles is questionable
considering the proposal to build a desalination plant to replace the mine’s water
demand entirely. According to BHP Billiton (2009), the water demand for the
proposed ODEP will be 322 ML/d for the next 40 years plus. As Quilty R and
Vervoort W (CL 297) assert, since such an amount is more than 20% of the total
output for all water users in the GAB, it is not surprising that BHP Billiton (2009)
does not want BHP OD identified as the single largest water extractor from the GAB:
We are confident that the company would have made these kind of assessments
when choosing the political reality of a desalination plant over a much more
simple, but massive, expansion of its demand on the GAB limited resource and
the likelihood that an extended licence for such a level of GAB extraction would
not be granted (Quilty R & Vervoort W, CL 297, pp. 2-3).
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A desalination plant is proposed which is capable of producing 40% above the
required amount for ODEP. For border institutions, this plant with large excess
production capacity, “clearly establishes a belief in the company that the
environmental and financial costs of a very large plant are manageable” (Quilty R &
Vervoort W, CL 297, p. 3). From the perspective of Quilty R and Vervoort W (CL
297) and the Australian Conservation Foundation (CL 10), the replacement of GAB
water with desalination water will have substantial environmental, social and
national economic benefits, which is in accordance with the long run interests of
border institutions.
However, the ODEP EIS (BHP Billiton, 2009), indicates that not a “single drop”
from the proposed desalination plant will offset BHP OD’s GAB water demand
(Save the basin, 2011c, n.p.). The failure of the EIS to address any potential
conservation opportunity of the GAB challenges BHP OD’s environmental
commitment and its ‘high standard’ environmental policies and practices (Quilty R
& Vervoort W, CL 297).
From the border institutions’ perspective, both water efficiency related technology
and the desalination related technology emphasises a techno-economic solution to
sustainable development. This solution will confront difficulties when faced with the
“social judgement” (Douglas & Wildavsky, 1982, p. 70) arising from the GAB water
risks.
Indeed, border institutions believe that ‘appropriate technology’ is the motto of
market institutions that “are happy to operate at any size, to any technical
specification, within their capacities, providing it is cheap enough to make them a
profit” (Schwarz & Thompson, 1990, p. 11). BHP OD’s reliance on BSC
information technology and water efficiency technology is consistent with this
border institutions’ perspective of the cheapest alternative. For example, Quilty R
and Vervoort W (CL 297) assert that one of the most apparent rationales for the
implementation of water saving (technologies) rather than a desalination plant is
because the GAB is considered a cheaper water source. This commercial
consideration obviously outweighs the environment (Quilty R & Vervoort W, CL
297).
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The direct ignorance of biological and cultural value of the GAB mound springs
together with the environmental health of the GAB for economic gain in the short
term, is “irresponsible” (Henderson K, CL 196, n.p.), especially since long-term
environmental

value

and

short-term

economic

value

are

fundamentally

incommensurable.
In all of the environmental changes through which Australia will pass during the
long life of this proposed mine, conservation of the GAB national resource
requires considerably more than today's measure of the value of the processed
resources against the cost of GAB water used for that processing. Putting a dollar
value on the end product of any process which makes demand on the GAB
demeans the word 'conservation'; such a raw economic yardstick is most certainly
not the measure by which to ensure that the GAB will meet the challenges of the
future (Quilty R & Vervoort W, CL 297, p. 5).
Thus, BHP OD’s BSC information technology and water efficiency technology has
no place in the border institutions’ argument. Border institutions object to
‘commensurability’ and the “immoral” exercise of the market institution’s belief that
resources can be “bought and sold” (Douglas & Wildavsky, 1982, p. 67). According
to Mackenzie (2009, p. 451), border institutions hold “a bleak, essentialised view of
capitalism, as inherently irresponsible and environmentally damaging”. Border
institutions reinforce that the value of the GAB water resource cannot be measured
merely by the eco-efficiency indicator for ore production (profit), as “narrowly
conceived” by economics (MacKenzie, 2009, p. 453) (see Section 8.2.1).
According to cultural risk theory, while hierarchy institutions’ support a “technical
fix” it adopts the market institutions’ advocacy for technological advancement
(Schwarz & Thompson, 1990, p. 93). Border institutions construct hidden dangers
emanating from technology as an evil which will “enter[s] and spoil[s]” the centre
institutions (Douglas & Wildavsky, 1982, p. 124). Technological pollution is
representative of “moral defects” (Douglas & Wildavsky, 1982, p. 7). For example,
in the words of Parnell (Australian Greens, 2007, n.p.) and Takver (2011, n.p.), BHP
OD has promised “weak commitments” that have been sanctioned by the South
Australian government for years. These commitments, manifested through
technology, “seem to be business as usual and are expanded to up to the maximum
that BHP can get away with” (Australian Science Media Centre, 2011, n.p. see also
Johnson H, CL 217). It is important to note here that border institutions’ perceive the
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‘social licence’ (see Section 8.2.2) as a normative model with an explicit value
system. It is “clearly at variance with the terms of what is normally accepted to be
the status quo” (Gray et al., 1988, p. 12) by the centre institutions. Consistent with
Gray et al.’s (1988, p. 13) argument, the ‘social licence’ from the centre institution
accepts legislation as “a full specification of the rules of the game” without
acknowledgment of “the role played by the State and/or the current and historical
distribution of power in the society”. Therefore, border institutions are against “big
technology” (Douglas & Wildavsky, 1982, p. 49). In this case, the majority of
submissions suggest that the GAB water should not be wasted on unnecessary
mining projects such as ODEP (e.g. Anti-Nuclear Alliance of W.A. (ANAWA), CL
7; Derrick A, CL 147; Henderson K, CL 196). And BHP OD should be required to
cease its extraction from the GAB as soon as the desalination plant is established (e.g.
Australian Greens, CL 13; Conservation Council of South Australia, CL 24;
Environment Tasmania Inc., CL 37; Friends of the Earth, CL 42).
To conclude the grammatical analysis, border institutions perceive centre institutions’
water efficiency related technology as focusing only on the techno-economic facets
of sustainable mining development, while neglecting moral and environmental
dimensions of GAB water risks. The failure of BHP OD to address any potential
water saving opportunity of the GAB water resource, from its proposed desalination
plant (BHP Billiton, 2009), reflects the centre institutions’ focus on commercial
considerations. From the border institutions’ perspective, water efficiency related
technologies are “immoral” exercises (Douglas & Wildavsky, 1982, p. 67) that
represent the “moral defects” (Douglas & Wildavsky, 1982, p. 7) of the centre
institutions.

The

environmental

value

of

the

GAB

is

fundamentally

incommensurable with the short-term economic value manifested through BHP
OD’s water-efficiency technology for its ore production and ODEP.
8.3.2 Rhetorical analysis - View of risk of border institutions
Border institutions construct a hierarchy or social order different from those from the
centre institutions. Nature is constructed as dreadfully unforgiving (Schwarz &
Thompson, 1990). According to Douglas and Wildavsky (1982, p. 67), “unbridled
economic growth” has exerted harm on the natural environment and humankind.
From the border institutions’ perspective, although BHP OD’s has implemented
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monitoring programs and a water efficiency program, the mining operation has had
adverse impacts on the long-term sustainability of the GAB water resource as the
company incrementally expands its operations (Keane, 1997). Border institutions,
unlike the market institutions, do not perceive risk as an opportunity (Schwarz &
Thompson, 1990). In particular, BHP OD’s mining operations have risked “precious”
mound springs (Environment Tasmania Inc., CL 37, n.p.). Anecdotal evidence has
been obtained by Keane (1997, p. 21) from interviews with local residents which
shows that “the drilling of wells has definitely reduced the spring discharges in the
South Australia portion of the GAB.” And a few of those springs are “only
maintained artificially by additional pumping of water” (South Australia, Legislative
Council 2011a, p. 6).
For border institutions, these impending dangers are irreversible. Irreversible risks
are “explosive and unstable [with] each deviation growing larger until the
environment is so altered it can never return to its original state” (Douglas &
Wildavsky, 1982, p. 21). In this case, public submissions contend that the quantities
of water extracted by BHP OD for mining operations is “far too large” in this driest
continent, especially taking into consideration climate change (Luesby Al, Luesby J,
Luesby An, Luesby, CL 244, n.p.; see also Roberts Georgia, CL 304, n.p).
Madigan M (CL 247, n.p.) uses the example of water restrictions in some Australian
states to highlight the excessive water intake currently proposed by BHP OD:
No matter how much domestic households at the Government's request and
legislation, attempt to cut back on water use there is nothing that can save the
scarce water resources of the state while an incredible 100,000 litres of water
every minute is being used by BHP Billiton.
Border institutions therefore align with the public by establishing themselves as
moral agents who are unwilling to face irreversible catastrophic degradation with no
chance of turning back (Douglas & Wildavsky, 1982). As Douglas and Wildavsky
(1982, p. 23) assert, there will be no future if economic development “permits any
fool or rogue to inflict irreversible damage”.
Border institutions are concerned with all possible damage and assess the long-run as
fairly close. Consequently, the future will be different as the continuity of the status
quo forebodes an “imminent disaster” (Douglas & Wildavsky, 1982, p. 122). For
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example, centre institutions acknowledge the need for stringent licensing and strict
monitoring and reporting because of the potential risks associated with GAB water
extraction (Save the basin, 2011b, 2011c). However, public submissions in respect of
the proposed ODEP, urge the Federal and State government to look back at the “past
disastrous government policies concerning the inland river systems, lakes and
wetlands” (Great Artesian Basin Protection Group, 2009c, n.p.), and to give serious
consideration to the ODEP, as the environmental damages will extend beyond the
life of the mine (Bentley A , CL 114).
From the border institutions’ perspective, there needs to be a radical change to a
‘business-as-usual’ (Douglas & Wildavsky, 1982; Schwarz & Thompson, 1990)
approach through an immediate adoption of the precautionary principle, in its strict
version, for the management of the GAB. The precautionary principle states that
“unless policy actors can prove that a particular activity is innocuous to the
environment, they should refrain from it” (Ney & Thompson, 2011, p. 42). In the
GAB, it is expressed as “where we see a serious threat to the environment, a lack of
scientific certainty shouldn't prevent us taking precautions” (Penfold L, CL 288, n.p.).
Regarding mining operations in general, this principle promotes the “transitioning to
green industry and jobs” (Georgia R, CL 304, n.p.). For BHP OD in particular, this
principle implies that the Federal and State governments should acknowledge that it
is very likely that the GAB is a plutonic and non-rechargeable resource 53 (see
Chapter 7, Section 7.3.2), and alter their water management policies accordingly so
as to “conserve and utilise the remaining water in the Basin” (Great Artesian Basin
Protection Group, 2009c, n.p.).
Therefore, border institutions urge policy makers “not to delay action until further
scientific evidence is available” (Thompson & Rayner, 1998, p. 294), because trial
can only be tolerated when there is the certainty of no error (Schwarz & Thompson,
1990). According to the border institutions, asking BHP OD and the South
Australian government to extract less GAB water for current mining operations and
the ODEP is not enough. What is needed is to preserve GAB springs as well as this
groundwater resource itself. For example, it is suggested that BHP OD should
53

Even it is really replenishable from rainfall, the recharging rate is so slow which is almost negligible comparing with the rate
of outflow.
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undertake “[a]n environmentally conscientious operation” (Conservation Council of
South Australia, CL 24, p. 15). That might include an independent and thorough
assessment of the GAB groundwater resource sustainability with a special focus on
an extensive historical review of BHP OD’s wellfields’ impacts on mound springs
and investigations to address remedial options for affected springs (Keane, 1997, see
also Walsh T, CL 353; Mudd, 2000).
According to cultural risk theory, border institutions aim to “bring man back into
balance with the environment” (Douglas & Wildavsky, 1982, p. 137) without
“exploitative values, destructive technologies, and de-humanised relationships”
(Douglas & Wildavsky, 1982, p. 135). For example, according to Johnson H (CL
217), “[a] genuinely viable economy is based on ecological integrity, not the other
way around”.
Therefore, restoring the GAB ecosystem and freeing this groundwater resource, “has
the added advantage of bringing us much nearer to the desired future-harmony with
nature” (Schwarz & Thompson, 1990, p. 10). Border institutions call for an outright
ban on BHP OD’s GAB water extraction. It is recommended that “[e]very effort
must be undertaken to minimise potential and real losses of water” from the BHP
OD site (National Farmers’ Federation, CL 55). It could be investigations for an
alternative source of water supply, eradication of the waste and eventually
decommission of the use of the GAB water (National Farmers’ Federation, CL 55;
Conservation Council of South Australia, CL 24; Environment Tasmania Inc., CL
37). This conservation ideal of the border institutions needs to “become part of a
process of ‘social learning’…in which institutions to mitigate…[GAB water risks]
are created, evaluated and reshaped” (MacKenzie, 2009, pp. 453-454).
To conclude the rhetorical analysis, border institutions perceive that BHP OD’s
mining operation has created an irreversible risk to the long-term sustainability of the
GAB water resource and related ecosystem, despite the implementation of
monitoring programs and water efficiency programs. Although it is undeniable that
mining development has brought economic benefits, these benefits need to be
considered against environmental risks. Border institutions therefore call for a
radical change through the adoption of the precautionary principle regarding the
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centre institutions’ GAB water management policy. An outright ban on the BHP
OD’s GAB water extraction by the South Australian government is advocated by
border institutions as the only solution for risk mitigation.
8.3.3 Logological analysis - Resolution of risk of border institutions
The paradoxes and controversies inherent in the hierarchising and separating effects
derived from market and hierarchy (centre) institutions’ risk resolutions provide
opportunities for border institutions to resist and transform. Through a construction
of anti-technology as an act and identification of risk minimisation, border
institutions establish ‘low growth’ as the terministic screen to legitimate their
preferred social order and risk attitude.
When border institutions assess risk, they reveal their moral commitments “explicitly
and prominently” (Douglas & Wildavsky, 1982, p. 73) and attempt to bring these
risks to public attention forcibly (Thompson et al., 1990). For example, Quilty R and
Vervoort W (CL 297) analyse BHP OD’s intention for continuous GAB water
extraction alongside the implementation of the proposed desalination plant. They
infer that the 18% water saving proposed in the EIS will reduce BHP’s operating
costs rather than saving the limited GAB water resource. This is not only an
environmental issue, it is also an ethical issue (Save the basin, 2011a, Quilty R &
Vervoort W, CL 297):
If a mining company has a commercially viable alternate source of water
available to meet the needs of its operations then should it be allowed to access
GAB water for those operations [?] (Quilty R & Vervoort W, CL 297, p. 5)
Underlying this perspective is the assumption of a zero-sum game. This outlook
assumes one cannot benefit except at the expense of another. Following the
reasoning of trade-off, the border does not tend to take the economic measures from
the market (and hierarchy) institutions seriously. Therefore, border institutions do
not believe in economic expansion as an environmental solution (Douglas &
Wildavsky, 1982).
In this case, several public submissions suggest that although it is undeniable that the
BHP OD has brought economic benefits, such benefits need to be considered against
environmental risks. As Lad A (CL 233, p.1) contends, for example, while jobs and
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economic stimulus arising from the mining industry “aids the state coffers”, the
question needs to be asked is “should this take precedence over ecological integrity”?
As such, any further GAB water extraction for proposed expansion is “unsustainable
and indefensible” (Wells J, CL 363, n.p.).
This argument from border institutions shifts the attention to human needs and wants.
For border institutions, real human needs are closely bound with the cycle of the ecosystem, and are defined in both material and spiritual terms. While material needs
cover food, shelter and clothing, the spiritual aspects embrace personal development,
self-realisation and harmony with nature (Thompson & Rayner, 1998). In this case,
water efficiency technology for ore production implies the promise of satisfaction of
endless wants in an age of consumerism which fails to satisfy human needs
(Thompson & Rayner, 1998). For example, according to Johnson H (CL 217) and
Madigan M (CL 247), our fundamental needs for health, wellbeing and democratic
rights are based on pure water, clean air, uncontaminated soil and diversity of
species, which should not be “compromised for the monetary gain of big business”
(Higginbottom K, CL 199, n.p.).
According to Thompson and Rayner (1998, p. 296),
Wants…are mere chimeras shaped by commercial interests and packaged by
advertising agencies. These chimerical wants then function to ensure continued
economic growth by creating demand for unnecessary and wasteful products.
In this case, border institutions identify BHP OD and South Australian governments’
capitalist imperative for endless ore production as a major reason for the over
extraction of GAB water. To maintain the desired profit margin, vested interests
pursue unsound environmental practices with no regard to the cost on the natural
world (Thompson & Rayner, 1998). For example, Mudd (2000, p. 473) asserts that it
seems that BHP OD and South Australian State government have outlined the most
fundamental principles for GAB groundwater management with “very little”
emphasis on the GAB resource management to “sustain minimum environmental
flows” of the GAB springs.
For border institutions, excessive development of mineral resources in general and
water efficiency related technologies in particular, count as unnecessary and wasteful
operations. A subsequent rise in profit and income from increased ore production
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does not signify an improved quality of life. Instead, BHP OD’s entitlement to the
immense extraction of GAB water represents an unfulfilled human need. The living
environment has been damaged by those environmentally irresponsible and
unsustainable activities (Ney & Thompson, 2011; Thompson & Rayner, 1998). For
example, as Derrick A (CL 147, n. p.) asserts, “we do not need mining and
development at any cost”. According to Luesby AL, Luesby J, Luesby An, Luesby N
(CL 244, n.p.), “water is more precious to us than uranium income or jobs.” If the
BHP OD’s mining water usage from the GAB exceeds the renewal rates (if there is
any), “we are literally robbing from our children their right to access …water” (Ella,
CL 258, n.p.). As such, BHP OD’s BSC information technology for water
management and specific water efficiency technology from the border institutions’
perspective manifests an “undemocratic unresponsiveness to individual needs”
(Douglas & Wildavsky, 1982, p. 149), and demonstrates an “unfeelingness for
individual suffering” within society (Douglas & Wildavsky, 1982, p. 127).
To conclude the logological analysis, border institutions do not construct economic
expansion as an environmental solution (Douglas & Wildavsky, 1982). The ODEP in
general and the water efficiency related technology in particular implies the promise
to satisfy endless wants for the capitalist interests of centre institutions without
satisfying real human needs (Thompson & Rayner, 1998). Border institutions
therefore are against GAB water extraction for “unnecessary” mining projects like
ODEP even with water efficiency related technology (Schwarz & Thompson, 1990,
p. 9) .
8.4

Stewardship

There are two basic views of the objectives of financial reporting adopted by
accounting standard setters. One is decision-usefulness and the other is stewardship
(International Accounting Standard Broad (IASB) 2001, IASB Framework para. 12;
13; 14). Stewardship is derived from property rights and is based on the idea that
managers as agents look after the assets or resources which are entrusted to them by
the owners (IASB 2001, IASB Framework para.14). The concept of stewardship has
evolved through historical development from traditional custodial relationship to the
modern concept of managerial performance (O'Connell, 2007; Pannell, 1979).
According to Chen (1975), the managerial stewardship concept covers not only the
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responsibility to immediate owners-shareholders’ interest, but also social
responsibility. In other words, it requires managerial accountability to not only
embrace the “resolution of agency problems between management and owners”
(Shearer, 2002, p. 562), but also extend to the stewardship of environmental assets.
The competing views of stewardship hinges on an understanding or disclosure of
that which a company is said to control. Companies should become accountable for
the natural resources which they control and their business activities’ environmental
impacts (Jones, 2010). As such, the needs for social and environmental reporting can
be considered as originating from the broader notion of managerial stewardship
(O'Connell, 2007).
However, as some critical accounting researchers (e.g. Adams et al., 1998;
Broadbent, 1998; Gray, 2006; Roberts & Scapens, 1985) contend, the current social
and environmental reporting practices reinforce ‘business-as-usual’ and ‘middle of
the road’ approaches, and do not provide sufficient and comprehensive information
to meet the needs for achieving environmental and social sustainability. This
argument is evident when managerial stewardship of a natural resource or public
good, e.g. the GAB, is contested. Cultural risk theory, by contrasting the distinctive
assumptions of attitude towards technology, view of risk and risk resolution from
market, hierarchy and border institutions, provide us with the rationale to understand
this debate from both mainstream and critical accounting perspectives.
In rhetorical analysis, according to Ney and Thompson (2011) and Thompson and
Rayners (1998), centre institutions support a well-planned and designed policy to
integrate economic growth with environmental management, and they assert that
environmental risks can be reduced and mitigated through the transformation of risks
into opportunities in the advancement of economic development (Ney & Thompson,
2011; Schwarz & Thompson, 1990; Thompson et al., 1990). In this case, the general
fulfilment of managerial stewardship from the perspective of centre institutions is
reflected in the South Australian government and BHP OD’s dual objectives for both
mining development and the GAB water conservation.
While the South Australian government represents societies’ interests to grant BHP
OD the GAB water licence for its mining operation, it has established the Indenture
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Act (1982) as a carefully planned legal framework (Ney & Thompson, 2011;
Thompson & Rayner, 1998) to govern mining development. BHP OD management
has become, not only a steward for tis shareholders, but also the steward of the GAB
water system for civil society as a whole. From the perspective of centre institutions,
both financial, environmental and social responsibility has been discharged through
BHP OD’s monitoring and water efficiency programs since these programs control
the GAB water extraction related risks to an acceptable level according to legislation.
This perspective reinforces the managerial accountability of market institutions and
administrative

accountability

of

hierarchy

institutions.

Under

managerial

accountability, natural resources are treated as an economic good and they are
objectified for efficiency and profit maximisation (Shearer, 2002). Administrative
accountability, albeit taking a social value base, has been mainly concerned with
economic development (Spence et al., 2010). It is also founded on the pluralist
political assumptions that there is no profound social conflict and “the state pursues a
neutral mediating role in conflict resolution” through regulation (Tinker et al., 1991,
p. 29).
It is important to note that in the grammatical analysis, sustainable development
from centre institutions is constructed as a technical issue which can be solved by the
power of modern technology (Ney & Thompson, 2011; Schwarz & Thompson, 1990;
Thompson & Rayner, 1998). In this case, while the South Australian government
believes that a successful environmental policy can be carried out through technical
adjustments manifested through water efficiency technology; BHP OD considers
water efficiency technologies as able to tackle the GAB water risks with skill and
confidence while increasing the scale of ore production. Therefore, BHP OD has
adopted BSC information technology and the specific water efficiency technology to
construct and objectify GAB water risks to facilitate management in accordance with
the legislation. These water efficiency related technologies are used by the centre
institutions’ as a stewardship discharging mechanism to account for their financial,
social and environmental responsibility. In particular, BHP OD has introduced
various water demand and consumption measures and modified them into a water
efficiency indicator.
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In the logological analysis, continuous improvement of the water efficiency indicator
legitimates managerial stewardship of BHP OD for its extant mining operation and
the proposed ODEP. It constitutes a “realistically feasible” solution to sustainable
mining development from the South Australian government’s perspective (Douglas
& Wildavsky, 1982, p. 93).
However, according to Douglas and Wildavsky (1982), the centre institutions tend to
ignore long-term environmental risks. While market institutions assume economic
and market measures are the most appropriate for valuing objects or concepts
(Douglas & Wildavsky, 1982), the hierarchy institutions prefer to segregate and
define ‘sustainable development’ by upgrading certain dimensions of risks while
downgrading others (Ney & Thompson, 2011). In this case, BHP OD’s water
efficiency related technology and the water efficiency indicator advocated and
supported by the South Australian government reflect the market institution’s belief
in economic measures as appropriate for GAB water and the hierarchy institutions’
preference of highlighting economic and technical aspects of the GAB water risks
while shifting social and environmental aspects sideways.
As Andrew (2007) asserts, managerial and administrative approaches to
accountability largely focus on procedural and technical dimensions of
accountability. They form a “strict liberal accountability” framework perpetuating
the status-quo by simply providing information to allow efficient utilisation of scarce
resources without critically analysing what the market institutions are doing to the
environment and society (Lehman, 1999, p. 518). The ignorance of long-term GAB
water risks from centre institutions has triggered a contest over BHP OD’s
managerial stewardship from the border institutions’ perspective.
According to the rhetorical analysis of cultural risk (Douglas & Wildavsky, 1982;
Schwarz & Thompson, 1990), border institutions do not see risks as opportunities.
On the contrary, they hold that unbridled economic growth has exerted irreversible
risks on the environment. In this case, border institutions believe that BHP OD’s
mining operation has had significant adverse impacts on the long-term sustainability
of the GAB water resource as the company continuously expands its operation. Such
impacts have outweighed the economic benefits brought by the mining operation. As
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such, BHP OD’s GAB water monitoring program and water efficiency program
which seem to objectively control GAB water risks to an ‘acceptable’ level does not
fulfil its managerial stewardship regarding environmental responsibility from the
border institutions’ perspective.
This is consistent with Christie, Dyck, Morrill & Stewart’s (2013, p. 389) argument
of accounting as a “part of the rationalizing form of [measurement and] calculation
necessary to organise and give meaning to economic action”. In Adam’s (2004, p.
732) words, the alignment of managerial accountability and administrative
accountability brings into focus “sustainability of the business [and government]
rather than [social and] environmental sustainability.” For that reason, border
institutions advocate a radical change to ‘business as usual’ and ‘middle of the road’
approaches through an immediate adoption of the precautionary principle regarding
the GAB water management policy to discharge centre institutions’ managerial
stewardship towards the GAB groundwater resource and its related ecosystem.
In the grammatical analysis, border institutions construct modern technologies as the
main source of environmental risks (Douglas & Wildavsky, 1982). In this case,
border institutions perceive BHP OD’s BSC information technology and water
efficiency technologies, encouraged and sanctioned by the South Australian
government, as focusing merely on techno-economic facets of sustainable mining
development. This is consistent with Gray’s (1992) assertion that managerial and
administrative

accountability

internalises

through

numerical

quantification,

environmental management and reinforces an analytical, scientific and technical
solution (see also Beder, 1997; Dumay et al., 2010). In particular, the failure of BHP
OD to address any potential water saving opportunity of the GAB water resource
associated with its proposed desalination plant and its plan for further increased
GAB waster extraction for the ODEP, reflects the underestimation of full social and
environmental costs (Beder, 1997).
Water efficiency related technologies from the border institutions’ perspective
therefore cannot be considered as a managerial stewardship discharging mechanism,
but rather “immoral” exercises (Douglas & Wildavsky, 1982, p. 67) with “moral
defects” (Douglas & Wildavsky, 1982, p. 7). Furthermore, BHP OD’s water
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efficiency indicator, supported by the South Australian government represents shortterm

economic

value

for

mining

production,

which

is

fundamentally

incommensurable with the long-term environmental value of the GAB groundwater
resource. This “monetarized” GAB water value (Douglas & Wildavsky, 1982, p. 95),
according to Jones and Solomon (2013, p. 677), does not “capture the environmental
consequences of an organisation’s activity”, therefore does discharge environmental
responsibility (Christie et al., 2013; Jones, 2010).
In the logological analysis, as Thompson and Rayner (1998) assert, current economic
development with the assistance of advanced technologies, implies the promise of
the satisfaction of endless consumerist wants but fails to meet real human needs. In
this case, border institutions consider excessive development of mineral resources
with water efficiency related technologies as unnecessary and wasteful. This
argument reflects border institutions’ moral accountability as it is concerned with the
community within which private entities and governments are situated. A
community that defines “whose needs count and whose goods are sought” (Shearer,
2002, p. 546). Moral accountability requires relations to others and necessitates
mutual understanding beyond the giving and receiving of accounts through the
formal categories provided by managerial and administrative accountability
(Messner, 2009). In this case, moral accountability calls for negotiation, explanation
and articulation through processes of political participation in regards to mining
development (Lehman, 1999)
Criticisms from border institutions reflect a common viewpoint of critical accounting
researchers. That is, the social and environmental reporting practices in the form of
‘business-as-usual’ and ‘middle of the road’ approaches, instead of rendering
organisational transparency and social and environmental sustainability, manifest as
an obstacle to obfuscate antagonism and conflicts among different social segments
(e.g. Spence, 2007).
According to Cooper and Sherer (1984) and Roberts (1991), accounting and
reporting practices are neither neutral nor objective but rather serve an ideological
function to legitimate particular interests and behaviours. Cultural risk theory, by
suggesting assumptions such as attitude towards technology, view of risk and risk
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resolution are shaped by institutional beliefs and interests, provide us with a critical
lens to analyse the contested nature of the managerial stewardship concept with its
related financial, social and environmental responsibility. In this theme, the centre
institutions-the South Australian government and BHP OD’s assumptions of risk
attitude and the preferred technology has conferred institutional legitimacy on the
fulfilment of managerial stewardship of the GAB water resource in terms of financial,
social and environmental responsibility. The border institutions, by challenging those
taken-for-granted assumptions, provide us with the opportunity to reconsider the
mainstream managerial stewardship concept and its compliant role in attributing to
the ecological degradation.
8.5

Summary

This chapter analysed the institutional debate of the GAB water risk through
contested disclosures among Market (BHP, BHP OD), Hierarchy (Australian Federal
and South Australian governments), and border institutions (civil society), using
three major concepts from cultural risk theory with the application of Burkean
rhetorical criticism. From this analysis, different institutional perspectives with
respect to the attitude towards water efficiency related technology, view of the GAB
water risks and resolution of risk, and their implications for accounting concept of
control and related accountability are elucidated. The following chapters analyse
different institutional positions in the GAB water risk debate using another three
major concepts - cause of ecological crisis, view of justice and fairness and
properties of desired system from cultural risk theory, and discuss their implications
for accounting concept of economic consequences and related accountability.
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CHAPTER 9 CAUSE OF ECOLOGICAL CRISIS, VIEW OF JUSTICE AND
FAIRNESS AND PROPERTY OF DESIRED SYSTEM
9.1

Introduction

The preceding chapter applied three major concepts - attitude towards technology,
view of risk and resolution of risk to analyse the institutional debate with regard to
the Great Artesian Basin (GAB) water related risks and discussed these implications
in terms of the accounting concept of stewardship and related accountabilities.
Stewardship is a function of the concept of control as discussed in Chapter 7. This
chapter applies the three major concepts from cultural risk theory- the cause of
ecological crisis, view of justice and fairness and property of desired system to
understand the concept of economic consequences from an institutional perspective.
As suggested by Douglas (1985, p. 92), different institutional structures identify
some risks while obscuring others. In a Burkean grammatical analysis, institutions
tend to clarify certain sets of problem, such as the cause of ecological crisis. These
different perspectives toward the causes subsequently generate distinctive views of
justice and fairness. These two concepts form various properties of a desired system
that is explored in the Burkean logological analysis. This analysis provides insights
to facilitate and justify government intervention in financial accounting and reporting
practices in an era of looming environmental crisis. The three-level analysis of
institutional perspectives and the critical theme of accounting and related
accountabilities are displayed in Table 9.1.
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Table 9.1 Cause of Ecological Crisis, View of Justice and Fairness, Properties of Desired System and Economic Consequence
Market Institutions

Hierarchy Institutions

Government Intervention
The proposed water levy as an inaccurate and
misguided economic policy serving as a major
obstacle to sustainable development.

Grammatical Analysis (Discursive features)
Loss of Control
Plan and organise water planning and management activities to
control market forces, and collect NRM water levy to fund these
activities to prevent water resource degradation

The government’s proposed water levy is ‘unequal’
and brings disastrous economic and social
consequences, since it is a ‘disincentive’ to efficient
water use
Equality of Opportunity
Believe fair-play in an unfettered market. Mining
industry should not be required to pay the proposed
water levy due to its investment in water planning and
management services through regulatory and voluntary
initiatives
Take positive assumptions into consideration for an
equal water levy proposal and assume common/public
good as the outcome of the free exchange that can be
achieved by pursuit of private interests
Free Market
A firm faith in a competitive free market and the
survival of the fittest principle. It does not want to take
responsibility for cost recovery failure from those less
productive water using sectors

The water levy proposed restricts mining activities by realigning
the private, social and environmental cost to remedy the problem
of externalities
Rhetorical Analysis (Discursive functions)
Equality before Law
Believe a fair distribution ranked by a need for solidarity and
maintenance of the system. Propose to increase the water levy on
industrial users because of ‘the capacity to pay’ principle
Take normative values such as humanity and ethics into
consideration of their proposal of an ‘unequal’ water levy for the
common/public good
Logological Analysis (Discursive implications)
Governance and Planning
Although hierarchical rules facilitate top-down (cost) reallocation,
it attempts to punish sectors responsible for economic value
creation and reward sectors with less economic success. Social
equity is neither possible nor necessary

Advocate an equal water levy to support the objectives
of a competitive and economically efficient market.
Not recognise nor realise GAB water conservation, the
equal right to access of water and a strong bonded
democratic society

Propose an ‘unequal’ water levy to redistribute or reallocate a part
of the wealth from mining industry to assist the vulnerable stock
and domestic sectors for the management of GAB, in order to
satisfy social needs and perception of doing the right thing

Managerial Accountability
Restrict social relations to economic terms portray
human identity as purely economic subjects pursuing
self-interests. It serves to negate the very obligation to
broader social and environmental distributive justice as
it does not account for costs beyond the monetary
value

Administrative Accountability
Preservation of the GAB water resource in good condition so as to
provide social and environmental benefits to the public in
perpetuity. However it is vested in agreed procedures and rules
supported by regulatory coercion, more concerning with political
pragmatism and acceptance than social and environmental equity
and justice
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Border Institutions
Inequitable System
The free and over-extraction of the GAB water resource for
mining operation is a symptom of a wider social imbalance.
The allocation of the GAB water resource in favour of
market and government short-term economic interests
reflect wider social issues in terms of humanity and equality
The wider social ill and imbalance manifested through legal
exemptions granted to BHP OD brings detrimental social
and environmental consequences

Equality of Condition and Result
Favour a voluntaristic and egalitarian life-style. The current
inegalitarian social system is manifest through unjust and
unequal legal privilege that BHP OD is entitled. This
‘dehumanised’ relationship needs to be stopped to protect
the GAB water resource and related communities
Incorporate (more radical) ethical dimensions into account.
Both water levy proposals from centre institutions exclude
social and environmental costs, such as those of social
solidarity and equity
Social and Environmental Equity
The legal framework for operation and development of
Olympic Dam points to the ‘moral defect’ of the socioeconomic system of the centre institutions. A belief in
human goodness requires individuals begin as equal and end
up as equal
Urge the charge and eventual phase out of BHP OD’s GAB
water extraction for resource reallocation and wealth
redistribution for restoration of a democratic society

Moral Accountability
A fundamental and more encompassing form of
accountability to cover the ethical requirement of
accountability to the other. It requires an identity answerable
to wider social interest and it encompasses wider scope of
common/public good apart from the private good

This chapter begins with an analysis of the cause of the ecological crisis, view of
justice and fairness and properties of desired system from the market and hierarchy
(centre) institution (Section 9.2) before the explication of the border institutions
(Section 9.3). The concept of economic consequences and associated issues of
accountability are then discussed with insights for financial accounting and reporting
practices.
9.2

Cause of ecological crisis, View of justice and fairness and Properties of
desired system of centre institutions

In this chapter, BHP Billiton Olympic Dam Corporation Pty Ltd (BHP OD) and the
Australian Federal and South Australian government’s risk perspectives are mainly
represented through the Minerals Council of Australia (MCA) and government
agencies including Australian Competition and Consumer Commission (ACCC) and
the South Australian Arid Lands Natural Resources Management (SAALNRM)
Board. In the previous chapter, the risk perspectives of the market and hierarchy
were combined as centre cultures (Douglas & Wildavsky, 1982). However, as the
evidence issued by market and hierarchy institutions are in opposition in this case,
the risk perspectives from the centre institutions are analysed separately.
With regard to the cause of the ecological crisis, hierarchy institutions perceive it
that a lack of governance and planning has led to an inability to control unbridled
economic growth (Ney & Thompson, 2011; Thompson & Rayner, 1998). In contrast,
market institutions understand the ecological crisis as deriving from misguided
government economic policy (Thompson & Rayner, 1998). With respect to the view
of justice and fairness, hierarchy institutions seek to coordinate social groups
“without violating status differentials” (Schwarz & Thompson, 1990, p. 6), since fair
distribution is ranked by needs (Ney & Thompson, 2011). Hierarchy institutions
have confidence in “sacrificing few for the good of the whole” (Douglas &
Wildavsky, 1982, p. 101). On the contrary, market institutions emphasise individual
autonomy and prefer the rules of fair-play (Douglas & Wildavsky, 1982; Ney &
Thompson, 2011; Schwarz & Thompson, 1990). In respect of properties of a desired
system, while hierarchy institutions “adopt a limited redistributive ethic…limiting
exchange so as to limit losers” (Thompson et al., 1990, p. 61); market institutions
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accept social inequities among social groups as long as fair competition and free
exchange systems are not hampered (Douglas & Wildavsky, 1982).
9.2.1

Grammatical analysis - Cause of ecological crisis of hierarchy institutions

As Thompson and Rayner (1998) suggest, the importance and purpose of governance
with regard to economic life and environmental crisis can be traced back to the
hierarchy institutions’ view of nature. Despite the view that nature serves to meet
human needs and wants, hierarchy institutions do not see nature as infinitely resilient
(Thompson & Rayner, 1998).
Hierarchy institutions are agents who construct the cause of ecological crisis as a
lack of governance and planning (Ney & Thompson, 2011). From this perspective,
economic life in terms of resource allocation, production and consumption of goods
and services “should not be left to the free interplay of market force” but rather
subject to central planning (Ney & Thompson, 2011, p. 611). To facilitate the
implementation of the National Water Initiative (NWI) (see Chapter 2, Section 2.3.4),
the Federal government established a NWI steering group which includes
“representatives from federal, state and territory governments and some of their
water pricing regulators” to plan and organise a wide range of water planning and
management activities, aiming to support water use while maintain the health of the
ecosystem (Australian Competition and Consumer Commission (ACCC) 2009, p. 5).
Broadly speaking, water planning and management activities include “the
administration of water entitlements, developing plans and frameworks to allocate
the resource, activities to address the impact of water use” (ACCC, 2009, p. ix).
More specifically, they cover “implementing these plans/strategies frameworks and
monitoring compliance against the plans”; “collecting and analysing data to gain a
better understanding of the levels of extractions as well as the potential implications
of extraction for the water system, and managing this data”; and “undertaking capital
works, such as the modification of weirs to achieve environmental outcomes”
(ACCC, 2009, p. 6).
For example, the NWI steering group, as a hierarchy institution, undertakes water
planning and management activities (ACCC, 2009). Some water planning and
management activities “predominately focus on generating economic benefits for a
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particular water user or group of water users”, for example, “a program to increase
water use efficiency” (ACCC, 2009, p. 6); others are “undertaken mainly to benefit
the environment”, for example, “setting a limit on water extraction for consumptive
and [industry] use” (ACCC, 2009, p. 6). At times, “one activity may be undertaken
to address a number of different needs” (ACCC, 2009, p. 6). Therefore, the hierarchy
does not see utility-maximisation as the primary rational because unbridled
economic growth can be harmful to the environment (Thompson & Rayner, 1998).
In addition to national level policies, the SAALNRM Board, as the South Australian
government agency, takes responsibility for implementing water planning and
management activities. As a hierarchy institution, it is “afraid of upheavals which
escape from a rational order and they fear for the life in the organisation” (Douglas
& Wildavsky, 1982, p. 91). For example, the SAALNRM Board (2009b, p. 7)
proposes a vision for the South Australian Arid Lands Region as “a healthy
functioning ecosystem with sustainable industry and vibrant communities”, and it
emphasises
the need to monitor and evaluate [water] resource change over the short, medium
and long term, at regional and local scales and to evaluate and adopt [water
planning and management activities] accordingly (SAALNRM Board, 2009b, p.
17).
Similar to the NWI steering group, the SAALNRM Board, as a hierarchy institution,
supports rational management of both the economy and the environment to prevent
the detrimental effects of excessive economic activity (Thompson & Rayner, 1998).
More specifically, it collects a Natural Resource Management (NRM) water levy
based on the rationale that “the licence holder has an entitlement right to access the
resource and should contribute to the cost of its management based on the size of
their entitlement” (SAALNRM Board, 2009b, p. 13). Without this “ongoing [water]
planning and management [activities], the water resource will deteriorate in both
quantity and quality with ramifications to ecosystems and water users” (SAALNRM
Board, 2009b, p. 14).
According to cultural risk theory, this water pricing scheme/water levy charge can be
seen as a mechanism to expand government control through its interference with
market institutions, such as corporations (Ney & Thompson, 2011). It represents a
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“explicit control” upon which hierarchy institutions rely (Douglas & Wildavsky,
1982, p. 180). By forming a “bureaucratic structure”, this water pricing mechanism
will “rectify the short-termism and greed” of the market, and lead to sustainable
water resource management (Ney & Thompson, 2011, p. 45).
To conclude the grammatical analysis, while the NWI steering group centrally plans
and organises a wide range of water planning and management activities to control
“the free interplay of market force[s]” (Ney & Thompson, 2011, p. 611), the
SAALNRM Board collects the NRM water levy to fund these water planning and
management activities to prevent water resource degradation. This water levy charge,
as a water pricing scheme, is considered as an instrument which forms a
“bureaucratic structure” for governments to: expand their control through
interference with corporations (Ney & Thompson, 2011, p. 45); to manage both the
economy and the environment; and, to prevent the detrimental effects of excessive
economic activity (Thompson & Rayner, 1998).
9.2.2 Grammatical analysis - Cause of ecological crisis of market institutions
Market institutions are agents that do not take environmental problems seriously
(Ney & Thompson, 2011). For them, the present “ballyhoo” over environmental
issues is considered “much ado about nothing” (Ney & Thompson, 2011, p. 47). In
this case, from market institutions (BHP OD and the MCA) 54 perspective; the
hierarchy institutions, the ACCC and the SAALNRM Board’s plans to raise funds
for water planning and management are unnecessary and simply misrepresent the
impact of the mining industry’s water usage.
For example, while the MCA (2009a, n.p.) acknowledges that water is “a critical
business input for all operations” in the mining industry, it describes itself and its
members as “having a long-standing commitment to sustainable development and
the effective management of Australia’s water resource”. From the MCA’s (2009a, n.
p.) perspective, the mining industry is “a very small [water] consumer” which was
“responsible for 2.4% of Australia’s net water consumption” during 2004-05, and is
also “a temporary user of water, often in areas where there are no competing
industrial uses” (Australian Bureau of Statistics, 2012). Notwithstanding, “one of the
54
It is important to note that in Sections 7.2.3 and 7.2.4, BHP OD’s perspective partly represented through the voice of MCA,
as the MCA “represents over 85% of minerals production in Australia” including BHP (Minerals Council of Australia, 2009a).
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highest value users of that water” (Minerals Council of Australia, 2009a, n. p.).
Table 9.2 below shows water consumption and industry gross value added by
various industry for 2004-2005.
Table 9.2 Water consumption and Industry Gross Value Added by Industry
IGVA ($m)

Water

IGVA

Water

IGVA/Vol

[Industry

Cons. (GL)

(%)

Use

Cons.

(%)

($m/GL)

Gross Value
Added]
Agriculture

$24,344

12,191

3

73

$2.00

Forestry and

$2,347

51

0

0

$46.02

Mining

$64,223

413

8

2

$155.50

Manufacturing

$99,688

589

13

4

$169.25

Water supply

$7,407

2,083

1

13

$3.56

Electricity and

$14,444

271

2

2

$53.30

Other industries

$577,333

1,059

73

6

$545.17

Total

$789,786

16,657

fishing

gas

Source: ABS Data for 2004-2005 in MCA (2009a, n. p.)55

Regarding GAB water consumption related productivity, Torrisi and Trotta (2009)
draw on the National Water Commission (2009) and note that the total value of
production from the GAB in 2009 was approximately AUD$4 billion with AUD$1
billion from agriculture, AUD$1 billion from petroleum, and AUD$1 billion from
mining and a small but increasing value from tourism. (Market institution - BHP OD
as a small GAB water consumer is discussed in Chapter 5, Section 5.2.1).
Furthermore, Torrisi and Trotta (2009, p. 196) point out that the GAB water
55

This data is consistent with the National Water Account (Australian Bureau of Statistics, 2012). During 2010-11, the
Australian economy has extracted 71.796 GL of water from the environment. Agriculture industry accounted for 54% of
Australia’s total water consumption as the largest water users. The mining industry consumed 4% (540GL) of the total water
volume, which is similar to 5% (651GL) of the total water consumption from the manufacturing industry. More specifically,
Australian Bureau of Statistics (2012, n. p.) documents that:
“[T]he mining industry consumed 10% more water in 2010-11 than it did in 2009-10. However the industry also recorded a
total of [AUD] $243 million of gross value added per GL of water consumed, a 25% increase from 2009-10. Gross value added
far outweighed the increase in consumption, demonstrating the efficient, high value-add proposition of the minerals sector’s use
of water nationally…Compare this to the agriculture industry, which generated a total of [AUD] $4 million of gross value
added (on average) for every GL of water consumed in 2010-11 and the manufacturing industry, which generated a total of
[AUD] $166 million of gross value added for every GL of water consumed, a 1% increase from 2009-10.”
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demanded by BHP OD’s Olympic Dam Expansion Project (ODEP) would decrease
in the long run:
With coastal desalination the preferred option for water supply to the proposed
expansion of Olympic Dam to open pit mining, the relative proportion of water
demanded by Olympic Dam … is expected to decrease over time as other uses
grow in demand particularly from other possible mining and geothermal
operation.
BHP OD has also described itself as a responsible and productive water user. For
example, while being “acutely aware” that the GAB is “a scarce resource”, BHP OD
has “a group of engineers dedicated to identifying and implementing initiatives that
reduce water consumption” (Dornin, 2007, n.p.), so as to “progress… development
in a sustainable way” (BHP Billiton, 2007a, p. 175).
According to Thompson and Rayner (1998), the market institution perceives
distorted prices for resources, as a result of misguided government economic policies,
as the cause of the ecological crisis. In this case, the proposed unequal water levy by
the SAALNRM Board is constructed by the MCA as government interference which
serves as a major “obstacle” (Thompson & Rayner, 1998, p. 299) to achieving
sustainable development.
For example, MCA (2009a, n. p.), the capacity-to-pay principle outlined by the
SAALNRM Board (2009b) has “contributed equally to the externalities being
addressed” and “failed to recognise [that] the externalities for which the levies are
proposed are already internalised for the minerals industry through other regulatory
instruments”. This internalisation includes the costs for water planning and
management activities borne by water users through the states’ regulatory
instruments; and, business voluntary initiatives that “demonstrate leadership by
internalising costs of environmental externalities” (Minerals Council of Australia,
2009a, n. p.). For example, BHP OD is required to submit an annual Environmental
Management and Monitoring Report (EMMR) and an annual GAB Wellfields
Report to the South Australian Department of Primary Industry and Resources
(PIRSA) for BHP OD’s operation (BHP Billiton, 2009, 2011a) (see Chapter 6,
Section 6.2.1). BHP OD has also participated in the GAB Sustainability Initiative
Program initiated by the Federal government and the South Australian government
between 1998 and 2004 (Torrisi & Trotta, 2009) (see Section 9.2.4).
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According to the MCA (2009a, n. p.), business investments generate products which
are “provided directly to governments, to support their responsibilities for the
sustainable management of water resources including planning activities” (Minerals
Council of Australia, 2009a, n. p.). For example, BHP OD conducts groundwater
monitoring quarterly and collects data about the hydrogeology of the GAB around
the region of wellfields. This data set is shared with government authorities and
researchers for reporting and study purposes (Torrisi & Trotta, 2009) (see Chapter 8,
Section 8.2.2). Since these industry investments represent “a substantial contribution”
to water planning and water management activities, “the pricing for access to water
should appropriately reflect the investments made by industry” as long as these
investments continue (Minerals Council of Australia, 2009a, n. p.).
Therefore, from the MCA’s perspective, the cause of the ecological crisis emanates
from an inaccurate water pricing mechanism. As Thompson and Rayner (1998)
argue, this is an explicitly technical argument for environmental issues which
focuses on a natural resource price mechanism. In other words, market institutions
assume that markets occur naturally and the demand-supply-price mechanism is
objective and value free (Hines, 1989). Market institutions, therefore, construct
resource management as a debate of “scarcity and cost” (Thompson & Rayner, 1998,
p. 298).
In the case of water scarcity, the GAB groundwater resource should be valued highly
to cover the increasing cost of water planning and management activities. If reflected
accurately in the water levy, it should influence the decision making of water users
because of the effect of market forces such as “substitution, technical innovation, and
structural change” (Thompson & Rayner, 1998, p. 296). In order to compete in the
market, strategies need to be adopted and behaviours have to be changed by water
users to minimise costs. Conversely, if a resource is undervalued, that is, its scarcity
is not reflected through the resource pricing scheme, this resource will tend to be
over utilised (Thompson & Rayner, 1998).
For the MCA, the unequal water levy represents a “disincentive” (Thompson &
Rayner, 1998, p. 299) to efficient water use by providing free water access to stock
and domestic users. Because it encourages overuse and results in water resource
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degradation, the MCA raises “significant concerns that should water charging rules
be applied in the same manner to all industries and users” (Minerals Council of
Australia, 2009a, n. p.). Water levies,
if enacted, would promote barriers to establishing efficient markets, and at worst,
potentially provide windfall gains to stock and domestic users when a water
market is established (Minerals Council of Australia, 2009a, n. p.).
The failure to internalise environmental costs from the market institution’s
perspective, contributes to environmental degradation, because the environment is
only protected when the true (economic) value is achieved (Thompson & Rayner,
1998).
According to Ney and Thompson (2011), institutional regulations or hierarchical
interventions that align with the objectives of an unfettered market are advocated by
market institutions (Ney & Thompson, 2011). Such regulations support competition,
prevent resource loss (Douglas & Wildavsky, 1982) and therefore bring overall
social benefits such as technological innovation which, in turn, enlarges production
scale (Thompson & Rayner, 1998). In this case, the MCA (2009a) emphasises the
importance of an equitable and economically efficient market, and its focus is to
“support the removal of barriers to trade, [and] promote sustainable development
within the Basin” (Minerals Council of Australia, 2009a, n. p.).
To conclude the grammatical analysis, the MCA and the BHP OD, as market
institutions, perceive the ACCC and the SAALNRM Board’s plan to raise more
funds for the water planning and management activities for the GAB water
protection as “much ado about nothing” (Ney & Thompson, 2011, p. 47). The
mining industry in general and BHP OD in particular, consider themselves as small,
productive and responsible water users. With respect to the cause of the ecological
crisis, the MCA views the proposed water levy by the SAALNRM Board as an
inaccurate and misguided economic policy which serves as a major “obstacle”
(Thompson & Rayner, 1998, p. 299) to sustainable development. It argues that the
minerals industry has already borne the costs for water planning and management
activities through the States’ regulatory instruments and business’ voluntary
initiative. The unequal water levy is viewed as a “disincentive” (Thompson &
Rayner, 1998, p. 299) to efficient water using behaviour by providing free water
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access to stock and domestic users, and therefore encouraging overuse and water
resource degradation. For that reason, the MCA advocates an equal water levy for all
water users to support competition and prevent resource loss in accordance with
objectives of an economically efficient market (Ney & Thompson, 2011).
9.2.3 Rhetorical analysis - View of justice and fairness of hierarchy institutions
Drawing upon their construction of a lack of central planning and control as the
cause of the ecological crisis, hierarchy institutions exploit the strategy of
identification with the public interest by promoting planning to limit present
consumption and accumulate capital for benefits of social and environmental justice
in the long-run (Thompson et al., 1990). The SAALNRM Board plans to collect
funds from the current water levy to cover ongoing water planning and management
activities to prevent water resource degradation. For example, according to the
ACCC (2009), the SAALNRM Board has the power to charge a NRM water levy to
water access entitlement holders through water licensing systems.
Hierarchy institutions consequently discursively establish a hierarchy or social order
with respect to a particular view of justice and fairness based on fair distribution
ranked by needs (Ney & Thompson, 2011) funded in the confidence in “sacrificing
few for the good of the whole” (Douglas & Wildavsky, 1982, p. 101). The
SAALNRM Board proposes an ‘unequal’ pricing mechanism to cover the cost of
ongoing water planning and water management activities. Industrial users are
required to pay a higher water levy due to their higher economic value creation
(increased profit) while stock and domestic users are exempt. The reason for
proposing a higher water levy on industrial users is the ‘capacity to pay’ principle.
As the SAALNRM Board (2009b, p. 14) explains,
the largest levy payer will be OZ Minerals with about [AUD] $291,000 per year.
This company has started mining and processing gold and copper at Prominent
Hill. It has spent around [AUD] $30m in providing suitable aquifer water to the
site. The company expects to mine and process each year 104,000 tonnes of
copper and 115,000 ounces of gold. At today’s prices this is a gross income of
nearly [AUD] $660 million. Thus their levy is 0.05% of gross income. Another
levy payer is expected to be Heathgate Resources - Beverley at an estimate
[AUD] $11,000. Based upon present production levels this levy will be around
0.12% of gross income.
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As such, priority is given to the solidarity and maintenance of the system as a whole
(Ney & Thompson, 2011).
In the hierarchical worldview, nobility obliges. That is to say, differences of rank,
status, influence, and wealth exist and are quite acceptable, as long as those at the
top make a concerted, genuine effort to shelter those at the bottom from the
vagaries of life (Ney & Thompson, 2011, p. 66).
To conclude the rhetorical analysis, the SAALNRM Board as a hierarchy institution
maintains a belief that a current sacrifice will lead to the future gain (Thompson et al.,
1990). They propose to increase the water levy on industrial users because of ‘the
capacity to pay’ principle, to present fair distribution in society ranked on a need for
solidarity and maintenance of the system (Ney & Thompson, 2011).
9.2.4 Rhetorical analysis - View of justice and fairness of market institutions
Since the pricing regulation is the cause of ecological crisis, market institutions are
competitive actors that create extra wealth to benefit themselves and others
(Thompson et al., 1990). This assumption is characterised by a laissez-faire attitude
that emphasises individual autonomy and the resultant freedom with respect to needs
and wants (Ney & Thompson, 2011; Schwarz & Thompson, 1990).
Unlike hierarchy institutions, which are in favour of institutional rules, market
institutions prefer rules for fair-play (Douglas & Wildavsky, 1982). In this case,
responding to the water planning and management activities and the proposed water
levy from the SAALNRM Board, the MCA (2009a, n. p.) highlights “a critically
important point of difference” between the mining industry and other water users.
Unlike other users of water, the industry is heavily regulated in all aspects of
water access, storage, use, reuse and disposal, and the intersection of the existing
regulatory frameworks and the water reform process is yet to be understood and
reconciled by governments (Minerals Council of Australia, 2009a, n. p.).
Indeed, as the MCA (2009a, n. p.) demonstrates, the mining industry “invest[s]
significantly” in water planning and water management services through “a variety
of regulatory, co-regulatory and voluntary initiatives”. Many of these investments
“are provided to governments to support their broader water management mandate”.
According to the MCA (2009a, n. p.), while the mining industry “supports the userpays principles” (see Section 9.2.5) proposed by the government agency such as the
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ACCC, it is “already paying through investments” in water planning and
management activities such as: modelling, impact assessment and stakeholder
engagement; metering and monitoring including volume, quality and community
expectations; reporting, including data and records in the form of reports provided to
all jurisdictions; and adaptive management including the intellectual capacity to
improve water use efficiency and reduce or remediate negative environmental
impacts arising from water use and ongoing research initiatives (Minerals Council of
Australia, 2009a, n. p.).
The MCA (2009a, n. p.) notes that there are also “capital and corporate service costs
associated with” the above-mentioned activities. Capital costs include the provision
of infrastructure and systems such as stream flow gauging stations, control weirs,
monitoring bores, and water registers. Corporate services include corporate services
delivery and corporate planning functions such as communication, human resources,
legal, IT, financial management and records management, business and strategic
planning and performance review against these plans (Minerals Council of Australia,
2009a, n. p.) Referring to the user-pays principle as advocated by the ACCC (see
Section 9.2.5), the MCA (2009a, n. p.) maintains that “these cost should be aligned
with the activities to which they relate, rather than appearing as separate activities”.
Such investments from the mining industry in water planning and management
activities are evident in the BHP OD’s case. For example, Torrisi and Trotta (2009, p.
204) indicate that “the supply of water to the mine and the continuous improvement
in industrial water efficiency of demand incur a significant financial cost to the
business”, and this “financial commitment” of the company is “a reflection of the
accountability to deliver the sustainability of water use”. More specifically,
according to BHP Billiton (2011a, p. 115), BHP OD has “invested significant capital
development of the GAB wellfields and associated pumping stations and pipelines”.
BHP OD also “committed significant quantities of operating and capital expenditure
to engineering contractors to identify and implement water saving projects” (Torrisi
& Trotta, 2009, p. 202).
Apart from the mining operation itself, BHP has participated in the GAB
Sustainability Initiative Program initiated by the Federal government and South
229

Australian government between 1998 and 2004 (more detail see Chapter 2, Section
2.4.1) (Torrisi & Trotta, 2009). It has “directly funded, project-managed or
contributed to” the capping free-flowing bores, the installation of close-pipe
reticulation systems, and bore remediation programs within the GAB (BHP Billiton,
2011a, p. 114). A total fund of AUD$2.2 million was spent on these projects which
has “resulted in savings of around 37 megalitres per day [ML/d] since 2004 in the
vicinity of the Olympic Dam wellfields” (International Council on Mining and
Metals (ICMM) 2012, p. 19). Again in 2009, BHP Billiton “purchased two pastoral
properties in the north of the wellfield area and shut down several free-flowing bores”
which has given rise to the “further savings of 5ML/d” (ICMM, 2012, p. 19).
According to BHP Billiton, this overall amount of water saving
is greater than the annual average GAB usage over the same period, and is also
more than the amount of water currently extracted from the GAB for use at
Olympic Dam and Roxby Down (currently 33 ML/d).
Therefore, BHP Billiton (2011a, p. 114) perceives the water levy imposed on the
mining industry, is unfair and unjust. As Ney and Thompson (2011, p. 37) contend,
fairness for market institutions mean that “those who put the most in get the most
out”. The role of market agents is consequently enacted through framing public
interest in competitive free markets which is constructed to “select the best and reject
the worst” (Douglas & Wildavsky, 1982, p. 99). Thompson and Rayner (1998, p.
300) assert that, for market institutions, “what is good for market efficiency is good
for the environment, increased efficiency means less waste and a more careful use of
resources”.
To conclude the rhetorical analysis, the market institution, the MCA believes that
fair-play resides in an unfettered market (Douglas & Wildavsky, 1982). Therefore,
justice in the mining industry is achieved when they are not requested to pay the
proposed water levy because of their substantial commitment to investment in water
planning and water management services through a wide range of regulatory and
voluntary initiatives.
9.2.5 Logological analysis - Properties of desired system of hierarchy institutions
Hierarchy institutions construct the loss of government control as the cause of
ecological crisis and identify their concept of justice and fairness as equality before
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law. Therefore they use ‘governance and planning’ as the terministic screen with
regards to the properties of their desired system and to legitimate their preferred
social order.
According to Thompson, et al. (1990) and Douglas and Wildavsky (1982), hierarchy
institutions prefer to use direct instrumental rules/bureaucratic means to allocate
resources by physical quantities. In this case, the ACCC (2009) prefers to allocate
NRM water levy charges according to an individual’s or groups’ water use. For
example, the water levy charging principle, ACCC (2009, p. 21) indicates that “all
costs associated with water planning and management must be identified” and
“water planning and management charges are to be linked as closely as possible to
the costs of activities or products”.
For the ACCC, this user-pays principle enforces the importance of improved
transparency for the cost and charges of water planning and water management
activities. This user-pay approach could:
advance the water charging objective of achieving pricing transparency in respect
of cost recovery for water planning and management through the publication of
increased and consistent information about water charges and the reporting and
improved information about water planning and water management costs and
cost recovery arrangements (ACCC, 2009, p. ix).
Following the user-pay approach, the SAALNRM Board (2009b) proposed to
increase the NRM water levy from 1c/kl in 2006/2007 to 6.5c/kl for industrial users
(including the mining sector) issued with water licences. This increased water levy
imposed on the mining industry is consistent with the speculation that “the need for
water for mining is expected to increase significantly over the next 5-10 years”
(SAALNRM Board, 2009a, p. 38).
It is important to note that this increased water charge will have direct
impacts/economic consequences for the ODEP. Although BHP OD has not been
charged any GAB water cost due to the privileges under the Roxby Downs
(Indenture Ratification) Act (1982) 56 , this proposed amendment to the water levy
would come into effect as one part in the Roxby Downs (Indenture Ratification)
56
South Australian government has issued two water licences (Roxby Downs (Indenture Ratification) Act 1982) (see Chapter 6,
Section 6.2.1) to BHP OD’s predecessor WMC to “provide certainty of water supply for the [mining] development”
(SAALNRM Board, 2009b, p.13).
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(Amendment of Indenture) Amendment Act (2011) for ODEP. In other words, it will
increase

BHP

OD’s

liability/expense

and

therefore

negatively

affect

equity/capital/profitability when the ODEP takes place.
According to Douglas and Wildavsky (1982, p. 180), notwithstanding that
hierarchical rule facilitates top-down (cost) reallocation, it is not concerned about the
“contradiction among the founding principles or incompatibility between them and
the way of life they justify”. This is because hierarchical rules attempt to punish
sectors responsible for economic value creation and reward sectors with less
economic success (Ney & Thompson, 2011). In this case, despite the ACCC’s userpays principle and the proposed increased water levy on industrial users, the
SAALNRM Board provides an “exemption from the levy for any water allocated for
stock and domestic purposes”, as stock and domestic users have not been issued
water licences 57 (SAALNRM Board, 2009b, p. 12).
Hierarchy institutions therefore create and maintain hierarchising and separating
effects which (re)produce social division. The various social groups, such as
industrial, stock and domestic users are considered to be bound “in an orderly and
ranked relationship”. The role of the hierarchy institution is to merely to coordinate
these groups “without violating status differentials” (Schwarz & Thompson, 1990, p.
6) through the water levy system. What the hierarchy institution attempts to create,
therefore, is “a procedural rationality that is more concerned with the properties of
who does what than with trying to evaluate the outcome” (Schwarz & Thompson,
1990, p. 67).
As can be seen from this case, the SAALNRM Board aims to “behoove” (Ney &
Thompson, 2011, p. 67) the affluent industrial sectors to assist vulnerable stock and
domestic sectors. This is done in an effort to improve adoptive water planning and
water management regarding monitoring, evaluating and reporting capacities to
ensure that the deterioration of water resources with its ramifications to ecosystems
and water users can be overcome. As such, as a hierarchy institution, the SAALNRM
57

According to SA Murray-Darling Basin Natural Resources (2013a, p. 3) , “[w]ater used for stock and domestic purposes does
not require a water licence. Stock use means watering stock, other than stock subject to intensive farming. Domestic purposes
include water used for non commercial domestic purposes and irrigating up to 0.4 hectare of land used solely in connection
with a dwelling, e.g. garden area.” “Water used for stock and/or domestic purposes… does not need to be metered. This
includes water from any source, including a well, dam, watercourse or rainwater tank” (SA Murray-Darling Basin Natural
Resources, 2013b, p. 4).
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Board “adopt[s] a limited redistributive ethic… limiting exchange so as to limit
losers” (Thompson et al., 1990, p. 61).
To conclude the logological analysis, the ACCC prefers to use hierarchical rule
(Douglas & Wildavsky, 1982) to allocate a NRM water levy charge according to the
amount of water used in accordance with the ‘user-pays-principle’. The SAALNRM
Board implements these rules without regard to social equity (Schwarz & Thompson,
1990) by proposing to increase the water levy on industrial users to assist the
vulnerable stock and domestic sectors.
9.2.6 Logological analysis - Properties of desired system of market institutions
While constructing government intervention as the cause of ecological crisis and
identifying the concept of justice and fairness as the equality of opportunity, market
institutions establish ‘free market’ as the terministic screen with respect to the
properties of their desired system and to legitimate their preferred style of justice and
fairness.
According to Thompson and Rayner (1998), the underlying market institutions’
diagnosis of an environmental crisis is linked to a capitalist system that goes hand in
hand with environmental protection and necessary growth for attaining sustainable
development. It is consistent with the assertion of Ney and Thompson (2011, p. 37):
“Adam Smith’s invisible hand ensur[es] that people only do well when others also
benefit”.
Since market institutions have a firm faith that a competitive free market “select[s]
the best and reject[s] the worst” (Douglas & Wildavsky, 1982, p. 99), they do not
take responsibility for individual failures (Douglas & Wildavsky, 1982). In this case,
the MCA (2009a, n. p.) maintains that the link between the user-pays principle and
the investment made in water planning and management activities (either through
water levies or planning and management services) is presently “not equal across all
water users” and the user-pays principle is “twisted completely”. According to the
MCA (2009a, n. p.), the ACCC and SAALNRM Board expect the mining industry to
“pay twice” for water planning and water management functions. In other words, a
discrepancy exists between the mining industry and other water users regarding
water metering, monitoring and reporting standards. Albeit “accounting for circa 80%
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of water consumption in the Great Artesian Basin”, domestic and stock users are
“not required to monitor or report water use” while the mineral industry water users
are under the concerns of policy makers to raise funds to cover the cost for water
planning and management activities (Minerals Council of Australia, 2009b, p. 29).
As a result, the MCA (2009a, n. p.) suggests “the relative contributions of users to
the water planning process, investments in infrastructure, and water volume and
quality…to be factored into pricing arrangements”. According to the MCA (2009b, p.
29), “with greater consistency across water users regarding metering and use, better
strategic water resource planning can be implemented”.
The MCA, as a market institution, does not want to “carry heavy fixed liabilities”
(Douglas & Wildavsky, 1982, p. 101) for a less productive water using sector. As
Douglas and Wildavsky (1982, p. 101) assert, “it holds that people responsible for
their own misfortunes, stupidity and neglect explain their losses”. As explained by
Williams (1992), the existence and acceptance of a market system as the mainstream
social economy is rooted in a fundamental assumption of human nature. That is,
human beings are “self-seeking wealth maximisers” (Williams, 1992, p. 104).
Another taken-for-granted assumption is that the industrial capitalist society is
predicated on the fittest will survive principle (Hines, 1989). It is assumed that
markets are arbitrated by an “invisible hand” of market forces in terms of free
competition (Hines, 1989, p. 64). For market institutions, failures are attributed to
individual incompetence and/or bad luck, while the competitive market remains
smart and guiltless (Douglas & Wildavsky, 1982).
Market institutions therefore create hierarchising and separating effects producing
and reproducing social divisions and inequities. Since market institutions espouse
individual success and focus on the ‘bottom line’ only, temporary inequalities within
social groups are accepted as long as fair competitions and free exchange systems
are not hampered (means-end rationality). According to Douglas and Wildavsky
(1982, p. 179):
[Market institutions’] fundamental justification is not faith in the value of the
individual but faith in the freedom to exchange… [l]ong term concentrations of
wealth make it impossible to give honest answers to the challenge of envy: with
wealth stabilised, the premise of equality is flouted.
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In other words, market institutions value free competition, not the “relational niceties”
of members within society (Schwarz & Thompson, 1990, p. 6).
To conclude the logological analysis, as the MCA has a firm faith in a competitive
free market and the survival of the fittest principle, it does not want to take
responsibility for other cost recovery failure (Douglas & Wildavsky, 1982) from
those less productive water using sectors such as the stock and domestic users.
As a result of the MCA’s (2009a, 2009b) comments on increased industrial water
levy and water charge rules for water planning and water management activities in
particular, and the border institutions comment through public submissions on BHP
OD’s legal privileges under the Indenture Act (1982) (Section 9.3), an industrial
water levy of 3c/KL58 has been approved by the SAALNRM Board (2009b). The
stipulation of this water levy has come into effect as section 13(12) in the Roxby
Downs (Indenture Ratification) (Amendment of Indenture) Amendment Act (2011)
for ODEP. The GAB water charge will be based on this approved levy rate “capped
at $0.101KL… for 30 years from the commencement of the project. The charge will
then revert to the current NRM levy rate” (Government of South Austrlia, 2011a,
n.p.; see also Roxby Downs (Indenture Ratification) (Amendment of Indenture)
Amendment Act 2011 ).
9.3

Cause of ecological crisis, View of justice and fairness and Properties of
desired system of border institutions

This section considers the border institutions’ perspective of the cause of the
ecological crisis, view of justice and fairness and properties of a desired system and
the differences from both market institutions - the MCA and the BHP OD and
hierarchy institutions - the ACCC and the SAALNRM Board. Evidence of the
interests of the border institutions’ is drawn from public submissions to ODEP EIS
(BHP Billiton, 2009), media articles and academic references. These sources
represent the view that: the cause of the ecological crisis is rooted in the socioeconomic system as a wider social ill (Ney & Thompson, 2011; Thompson &
Rayner, 1998); justice and fairness as “voluntaristic and egalitarian” and dependent
upon “fraternal and sororal cooperation” (Schwarz & Thompson, 1990, p. 7); and, a
58

The water levy is AUD$0.0318/KL (Roxby Downs (Indenture Ratification) (Amendment of Indenture) Amendment Act
2011 ).
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desired system is characterised by ‘social and environmental equity’ (Schwarz &
Thompson, 1990). This documentary evidence is often in the form of criticisms of
the Indenture Ratification Act (1982) established between BHP and the South
Australian government as a legal framework for the operation and development of
Olympic Dam in general and BHP OD’s legal privileges granted by the Indenture
Ratification Act (1982) in particular.
9.3.1

Grammatical analysis - Cause of ecological crisis of border institutions

Border institutions are agents who consider the environmental crisis as a symptom of
a wider social ill. From the border institutions’ perspective, the abuse of nature is
fundamentally related to social structures and values (Thompson & Rayner, 1998).
This is consistent with Hines’ (1989) argument that markets, demands, supply, price
and cost are socially constructed. By making markets appear to be natural and
therefore inevitable and neutral, they can be viewed as “part of an ideology which
perpetuate and legitimate a world capitalist and industrialist order” (Hines, 1989, p.
64). It is this capitalist social order, from the border institutions’ perspective, where
the imbalance emerges (Ney & Thompson, 2011; Thompson & Rayner, 1998).
Therefore, environmental degradation can only be properly understood if it is seen as
a symptom of a wider social ill. The way humans pillage natural resources recklessly
is a significant indicator for other social malaise such as racism, gender
discrimination, social alienation and so on (Ney & Thompson, 2011; Thompson &
Rayner, 1998). In this case, an example of this social ill is evident in the way market
(and hierarchy) institutions treat Aboriginal groups with regard to mining operations,
as the Indenture Ratification Act (1982) is not restricted by the Aboriginal Heritage
Act (1988) which is “designed to protect the health and wellbeing of the peoples”
(Madigan M, CL 247, n.p.).
As emphasised by Hon. M. Parnell (Australian Greens, 2007, n.p.), the Aboriginal
Heritage Act (1988) is “one piece of legislation which does not apply to Roxby but
which would apply to any other miner in South Australia”. It is also “the key
legislative enactment aimed at protecting indigenous heritage in South Australia”
(Friends of the Earth Adelaide, CL 44, p. 7). However, under the Indenture
Ratification Act (1982), BHP Billiton [and its predecessor WMC] has been placed in
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“a legal position to undertake any consultation that occurs, decide which Aboriginal
groups they consult and the manner of that consultation” (Friends of the Earth
Adelaide, CL 44, p. 8). As such, from the perspective of the border institutions,
individualists and hierarchists in centre institutions are “the ideological standard
bearers” of a devastating socio-economic system (Thompson & Rayner, 1998, p.
304). Lack of proper governance is also the root of the environmental crisis from the
hierarchy institution (see Section 9.2.1) and is a symptom of underlying imbalances
within the social world. In this case, border institutions view the allocation of the
GAB water resource in favour of market and government interests as the cause of the
GAB risk of crisis. According to Douglas and Wildavsky’s (1982, p. 150), issues are
“a confrontation between corporate [and governmental] technocratic domination and
decentralized community independence.” This view is closely associated with a
broad range of issues from: the endangered mound springs to the cultural and
spiritual damage to Aboriginal groups; the unfair water distribution to the likely
draining of the GAB; and, the consequent catastrophic future of water shortage.
Border institutions construct social equity as the agent to address social imbalance in
favour of justice, humanity and freedom from repression (Douglas & Wildavsky,
1982; Thompson & Rayner, 1998). This is “a holistic view” of the “whole spectrum
of social and cultural activity” when it comes to diagnosing environmental problems
(Thompson & Rayner, 1998, p. 295). In this case, border institutions urge the South
Australian government to relinquish the “outdated” (Environment Centre NT, CL 35,
n.p.) or “anarchistic” (Friends of the Earth Australia, 2011, n.p.) legal exemptions for
BHP OD under the Indenture Ratification Act (1982) for ODEP.
Although the final decision of ODEP made by the Federal government and South
Australian government requires BHP to “be levied for water extracted from the
Basin, providing revenue that will enable the Government to better manage this
precious natural resource” (News Release, 2011, n.p.), the Hon. M. Parnell is not
completely satisfied with the hierarchy’s requirement to cap charges for 30 years,
because it “really just shows how unique and favourable this arrangement is. No one
else - no other user of water, no irrigators, no other mining companies gets this
concession” (South Australia, Legislative Council, 2011, p. 5). Therefore, the border
institutions’ objective of blocking this unjust allocation of water is not merely to
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safeguard itself from any potential environmental crisis, but also to “break the
stranglehold which they consider such interests have on society” (Douglas &
Wildavsky, 1982, p. 150).
To conclude the grammatical analysis, border institutions consider the ecological
crisis- the free and over-extraction of the GAB water resource for BHP OD’s mining
operation- is manifested through the legal exemptions that are granted to BHP OD
under the Indenture Ratification Act (1982). From this perspective, the allocation of
the GAB water resource in favour of market and government short-term economic
interests which has been arranged under the Indenture Ratification Act (1982) will
never resolve or relieve the GAB water-related environmental problem unless wider
social issues in terms of humanity and equality are addressed. Border institutions
therefore call for the relinquishment of the legal exemptions for BHP OD under the
Indenture Act for ODEP. From this perspective, it is only through “a levelling of the
fundamental inequity” (Ney & Thompson, 2011, p. 37) that is characteristics of the
Indenture Ratification Act (1982) that the GAB water resource can be preserved.
9.3.2

Rhetorical analysis - View of justice and fairness of border institutions

While constructing an inequitable social system as the cause of the ecological crisis,
border institutions promote identification with the public by framing themselves as
moral agents who support policies to protect the environment without “exploitative
values…and dehumanised relationships” (Douglas & Wildavsky, 1982, p. 135). For
them, social relationships are said to be fundamentally dependent upon “fraternal and
sororal cooperation” and therefore should be “voluntaristic and egalitarian”
(Schwarz & Thompson, 1990, p. 7). Encroachment of a differential social status
from a hierarchical lifestyle and unequal distribution of wealth and power from
market institutions threatens this ideal state of justice (Thompson et al., 1990).
To highlight the border view of fairness and justice, the current and historic
treatment of Aboriginal groups is used as a salient example. The Indenture
Ratification Act (1982) constructs a “structural dependency” (Thompson & Rayner,
1998, p. 296) for Aboriginal groups on BHP OD’s and its predecessor WMC’s
mining operation and it is a serious impediment to sustainable GAB water
management. For example, according to Environment Tasmania Inc. (CL 37, p. 1),
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WMC used “divide-and-rule tactics and exerted persistent, unwanted pressure until
the mining company got what it wanted”.
As Lad A (CL 233, p. 4) argues, Roxby Downs “began with the manhandling and
forcible eviction of the Traditional indigenous elders [and this] speaks
volumes…[about] this industry’s scant regard for what is right and respectful”. For
example, in 1983, Kokatha men “had to defend a sacred site at Canegrass Swamp
with guns from bigoted Roxby workers with a bulldozer building the Borefield Road”
(Lad A, CL 233, p. 4)59.
Friends of the Earth (CL 42, n.p.) describes another “particularly notorious incident
in the history of the Olympic Dam mine” of laying a water pipe by WMC in the mid1990s on the land of Arabunna Traditional Owners. “The dispute over this pipeline
led to violence, terrorism, imprisonment, and the death of one person” (Friends of
the Earth, CL 42, n.p.). While BHP cannot be held responsible for WMC actions, “it
seems little has changed, including BHP B[illiton]’s refusal to relinquish the
overrides and exemptions it enjoys from the Aboriginal Heritage Act” (Friends of the
Earth, CL 42, n.p.). As Friends of the Earth Adelaide (CL 44, p. 8) states, “BHP
Billiton clearly cannot participate in decisions concerning the recognition and
protection of Aboriginal sites without a gross conflict of interest.”
Indeed, according to Henderson K (CL 196, n.p.), “BHP continues to consult with
the Arabunna in a selective manner embodying the racism inherent in Indenture Act”.
This “divide and conquer’ technique”, described by Henderson K (CL 196, n.p.) is
“typical of corporate engagement strategies, which try to convince a usually
unsatisfied and educated public that they have regard for environmental and social
justice”:
According the Aboriginal Community Centre in Marree, ran by the Arabunna,
splinter pro mining groups of Aboriginal people have been handpicked for
consultation, whilst the rest of the community is ignored and shafted. …For the
Arabunna who have strong ties to the Mound Springs … this is greatly
distressing, as it is also for those of the general public who work to achieve trust
59
According to Cooper (2010, p. 189), “[a]boriginal and environmental concerns about mining at Olympic Dam were first
raised in 1979. In June 1980, it was alleged that clay pans adjacent to a proposed shaft site were of mythological significance.
Such matters led Premier David Tonkin to note in November 1981 that only as a consequence of the Olympic Dam discovery
was aboriginal interest attracted to the remote area. However, it was the construction of the bore field road across Canegrass
Swamp, 50km north of Olympic Dam, in July 1982 that provoked the largest indigenous protest. It was only resolved in
December after it was suggested that WMC might invoke the force majeure provision of their indenture and the Government
approved $450,000 expenditure to reroute the road.”
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between Aboriginal and white communities in order to foster a socially just
future. (Henderson K, CL 196, n.p.)
In Arabunna Elder Kevin Buzzacotts’ own words (ABC Premium News, 2011b, n.
p.): “We don’t want that big great gaping hole in the desert… because it is a sacred
site and we’re trying to protect our areas”.
Like the Arabunna community, the Kokatha People’s Committee “has not had the
opportunity to be involved in the investigation or to provide further information”
(Lad A, CL 233, p. 4).
Servethepeople (2008, n.p.) gives another example of the consultation process of
BHP with the Kokatha people regarding the ODEP:
At the moment, BHP is in a hurry to get signatures of approval for the expansion
of the mine from a group of Kokatha elders who are being dragged into a meeting
on December 14, 2008. However, there is some resistance from within this
group. One source reports that some of the elders are not only reluctant to sign,
but want to withdraw signatures already obtained from now deceased elders.
BHP is confident that even one signature will suffice to provide evidence of
consultation and consent.
As a result, from border institutions’ perspective, the Indenture Ratification Act
(1982) allowing BHP OD and its predecessor WMC to consult with whichever
Aboriginal group in whatever way it prefers, is seen as fundamentally unjust.
Border institutions consequently establish another hierarchy and social order
differing from those from market and hierarchy institutions. Border institutions
construct the issue of justice and fairness with regard to the interaction between
humans and nature and social relations. They contend that human fate is inextricably
connected to that of Planet Earth (Ney & Thompson, 2011).
To conclude the rhetorical analysis, border institutions favour voluntaristic and
egalitarian life-styles (Thompson et al., 1990, p. 62). They believe that the depletion
of the GAB water resource is a result of an inegalitarian social system (Thompson et
al., 1990), an example of which is manifested through BHP OD’s unfair and
undemocratic consultation with Aboriginal community, permitted under the
Indenture Ratification Act (1982). Such unjust and unequal legal privileges have also
allowed BHP OD a potential commercial gain over other miners and developers.
Border institutions urge the South Australian government to adopt policies to prevent
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“exploitative value” and “dehumanised relationships” (Douglas & Wildavsky, 1982,
p. 135) such as charging and eventually phasing out BHP OD’s GAB water
extraction to protect the GAB water resource and related communities.
9.3.3

Logological analysis - Properties of desired systems of border institutions

The paradoxes and controversies inherent in the hierarchising and separating effects
derived from properties of market and hierarchy (centre) institutions’ desired system
provide opportunities for border institutions to resist and transform. Through the
construction of an inequitable system as the cause of ecological crisis and
identification of justice and fairness as equality of conditions, border institutions
establish ‘social and environmental equity’ as the terministic screen with respect to
properties of their desired system to legitimate their preferred social order.
Border institutions believe that environmental pollution does not only occur in a
physical and technical sense (Douglas & Wildavsky, 1982). According to Douglas
and Wildavsky (1982, p. 37), there are conceptual dualisms upheld by the pollution
ideal such as moral and immoral, purity and impurity, innocent and guilty as a means
to “sustain the vision of good society”. In this case, border institutions hold that the
current and proposed intake of GAB water by BHP OD “may preclude other users by
[sic] humans and the rest of the fragile ecosystems in those area for thousands and
thousands of years” (Walsh T, CL 353, n. p.) (more details see Chapter 7, 8). They
identify institutional mistrust and label GAB water degradation as a sign of the
“moral defect” of the centre institutions (Douglas & Wildavsky, 1982, p. 36).
This moral defect is manifest in the form of the Indenture Act (1982) between BHP
(and its predecessor WMC) and the South Australian government as a legal
framework for operation and development of Olympic Dam (see Chapter 8, Section
8.2.2). According to the Environment Centre NT (CL 35, n.p. see also Walker N, CL
352), this Indenture Ratification Act (1982) “allows wide-ranging and totally
indefensible exemptions from key laws” including the Environmental Protection Act
(1993), the Natural Resources Management Act (2004) and Aboriginal Heritage Act
(1988). As Hon. M. Parnell (Australian Greens, 2007, n. p.) indicates, the Indenture
Act “was created to fast-track and protect the establishment and operation of the
Olympic Dam copper and uranium mine.”
241

From the border institutions’ perspective, these “legal privileges” (Australian
Conservation Foundation, CL 10, p. 3) are of a “sweeping nature” (Poppins, 2008,
n.p.). For example, BHP OD’s GAB water intake is exempt from the regulations of
either the Environmental Protection Act or the Natural Resources Management Act.
Two special water licences (Roxby Downs (Indenture Ratification) Act 1982 ) are
“issued under this indenture allowing WMC [and its successor BHP OD] to extract
groundwater from the borefields up to agreed maximum drawdown levels” (Keane,
1997, p. 42) (more details see Chapter 8, Section 8.2.2).
For border institutions, the first unfair legal privilege is BHP OP’s “free
consumption of water” (Rozali A, CL 309, n.p.). As Arid Lands Environment Centre
(CL 8, n.p. ; see also Environment Centre NT, CL 35; Friends of the Earth, CL 42;
People for Nuclear Disarmament (WA), CL 65; Roxstop Action, CL 77; Women’s
International League for Peace & Freedom (Australian Section), CL 92) contends:
The Roxby Downs Indenture Act allows BHP Billiton to extract massive
unsustainable amount of water for free, despite the company posting profits of
[USD] $ 17.7 billion dollars in 2007-08 [USD $ 13.01 billion in 2010 and USD
$23.951 billion in 2011 (Friends of the Earth, 2011)].
In Rozali A’s (CL 309, n.p.) words, “[t]his is not fair dinkum”. Although BHP
claims that its bore-capping program has saved more water than the volume currently
consumed by the mine (see Section 9.2.4), Friends of the Earth Australia (2011, p. 7;
see also Friends of the Earth, CL 42) argue that:
[w]ater extraction for the mine is localised and the adverse impacts are all too
apparent to people who have monitored the Mound Springs over the past 20
years. Likewise, the company’s bore capping program is small comfort to
pastoralists who suffer reduced water flow from the localised effects of water
extraction for the mine.
The second unfair legal privilege is BHP OD’s exemption to any water restriction.
According to Hon. M. Parnell (Australian Greens, 2007, n. p.);
[w]hilst irrigators and householders are suffering water restrictions, BHP
Billiton’s arrangements provide that … there is no risk to the quantities it can
take. This is directly against the National Water Initiative [NWI] which says that,
when we need to reduce allocations, we need to share the pain of those cuts
around. This particular corporate operation does not need to share any of the pain
of water cuts to which irrigators and householders are subject.
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As such, the Indenture Act is considered as “unfair and undemocratic”
(Henderson K, CL 196, n.p.).
For border institutions, ‘worldliness’ and

‘conspiracy’ have caused the

environmental crisis that endangers humankind (Douglas & Wildavsky, 1982, p. 10).
Put into secular terms, worldliness appears in big organization, big money, and
market values - all deny equality and attack goodness and purity; conspiracy
includes factions plotting secret attack, transporting evil into an essentially good
world.
In this case, BHP OD’s decision to undertake ODEP from the border institutions’
perspective “has been justified on the basis of [economic] cost” regardless of the
environmental cost (AAP General News Wire, 2011, n.p.; see also Friends of the
Earth Australia, 2011; Whyalla News, 2011a). According to Organ K (CL 277, n.p.),
for instance, the need for increased GAB water extraction for ODEP is:
questionable and appears to be driven by extreme greed on the part of BHP
B[illiton]. Should they continues to mine at Olympic Dam at their current
volumes they will no doubt still make billions of dollars over a longer and more
controlled period with no need to unnecessarily upgrade their water usage. It
would seem to us that the unseemly haste with which BHP B[illiton] wishes to
garner the riches of Olympic Dam verges on the obscene.
For border institutions, the Indenture Ratification Act (1982) is “the subject of secret
negotiations between the South Australian government and BHP B[illiton]”
(Environment Tasmania Inc., CL 37, p. 4). The South Australian government’s
stipulation and sanction of these legal privileges (see ection 6 and section 9 of the
Indenture Ratification Act (1982) and Indenture Amendment (2012)) “makes a
ludicrous farce of any governments claim to be taking…conservation issues
seriously” (Maizey P, CL 248, n.p.). As speculated by Lad A (CL 233, p. 3), the
South Australian government may think “it is more important to have a bullish
economy rather than a healthy environment. That a rapacious BHP Billiton…is
better value than ecological sustainability”.
This attitude towards environmental problems is also closely related to how the
South Australian government treat Aboriginal groups in the society. According to
Burdon (2006, n.p.), for example;
[t]he inclusion of the Aboriginal Heritage Act 1988 (AHA) in the Indenture Act
has significant consequences for issues of equality and questions how seriously
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our State Government treats indigenous rights and interests…Our Government is
playing a dangerous balancing game with promises on one hand and contrary
legislative action on the other.
As such, “[South Australian] parliament has exposed the yawning gap between the
government’s hyperbolic spin over the Roxby riches and the dark reality of this
terrible deal” (Friends of the Earth Australia, 2011, n.p.). Border institutions
therefore commit to bring equality to all humankind, and they have a particular
philosophical underpinning to justify their idea. Such a guiding principle is a belief
in “human goodness and the supreme value of the individual” (Douglas &
Wildavsky, 1982, p. 177). Hence, border institutions’ desired system demands that
individuals begin as equal and finish as equal (Ney & Thompson, 2011).
In this case study, border institutions support charging for water use and the eventual
phasing out of BHP OD’s rights to extract water to protect the GAB and related
communities. For example, border institutions suggest that the GAB groundwater
resource is “a resource owned by the whole of Australia and its people” (Crowford H,
CL 138, n.p.). BHP OD “should be made to pay for its extraction of water and be
working towards phasing out its use of this precious and finite resource” (Arid Lands
Environment Centre, CL 8, n.p.; see also Women’s International League for Peace &
Freedom (Australian Section), CL 92; Henderson K, CL 196; Blakey C, CL 116;
Keyes S, CL 224).
To conclude the logological analysis, border institutions believe that the Indenture
Ratification Act (1982) between BHP and the South Australian government as a
legal framework for operation and development of Olympic Dam points to the
“moral defect” of the socio-economic system of the centre institutions (Douglas &
Wildavsky, 1982, p.36; Thompson & Rayner, 1998). Since border institutions
believe in “human goodness and supreme value of the individuals” (Douglas &
Wildavsky, 1982, p. 177), their desired system requires their individuals begin as
equal and finish as equal (Ney & Thompson, 2011).
9.4

Economic consequences

Accounting and reporting practice and disclosure is said to provide information for
decision-making to correct market asymmetries. However, due to an increasing
awareness of accounting in its social and political context, such a practice is neither
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recognised as objective, neutral nor a fair representation (Cortese et al., 2009;
Fogarty et al., 1994; Zeff, 1978). In fact, it is influenced by “outside forces” (Zeff,
1978, p. 56) that “have sought to impose their definition of reality, and the
consequences of it, upon society” (Hines, 1988, p. 260). Such consequences are
termed “economic (and/or social) consequences” (Fogarty et al., 1994, p. 25; Zeff,
1978, p. 56). Economic consequences 60 can be understood as “the results of the
reallocative outcomes” of a policy standard, and “form the central political outcome”
(Fogarty et al., 1994, p. 25).
Government policies, in terms of calculative standards, normally have an income
redistribution or/and resource allocation function therefore entail economic (or/and
social) consequences. Unsurprisingly, it is the economic (or/and social)
consequences arguments that are used by various constituents to push through their
interests and values to influence income redistribution or/and resource allocation
(Zeff, 1978). It is normally argued that a certain outcome of redistributed wealth or
resources is that it could “impose restrictions or costs on some while conferring
benefits to others” (Solomons, 1978, p. 89). As such, policy-makers are advised to
take these “allegedly detrimental consequences” into consideration when deciding on
policy rules or standards (Zeff, 1978, p. 56).
In this case, the debate over the NRM water levy is analysed by drawing on different
institutional assumptions regarding the cause for the depletion of the GAB water
resource, the pertinent issue of justice and fairness and the properties of a desired
system. Cultural risk theory, by contrasting these distinctive assumptions from
market, hierarchy and border institutions, provides a rationale to understand an
economic

consequences

argument

from

the

perspectives

of

managerial,

administrative and moral accountability.
In the grammatical analysis, the SAALNRM Board, as the South Australian
government agency, proposed to collect funds from the NRM water levy to cover
water planning and management activities of the Federal government agency through
the NWI. The GAB water resource, from the perspective of the hierarchy institutions,

60
Economic consequences in accounting studies is defined as “impact of accounting reports on the decision-making behaviors
of business, government, union, investors and creditors” (Zeff, 1978, p. 56).
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is a common/public good which is perceived as necessary for the enhancement of
both economic and social well-being of the nation (Barton, 2006; Pallot, 1992).
Hierarchy institutions’ objective is to preserve public goods so as to provide social
and environmental benefits to the public in perpetuity (Barton, 1999). The water levy
is used to restrict mining activities by realigning the private, social and
environmental cost to remedy the problem of externalities (Barton, 1999), and
prevent the detrimental effects of excessive economic activity (Thompson & Rayner,
1998).
According to rhetorical analysis, the SAALNRM Board proposes to increase the
water levy on industrial users because of ‘the capacity to pay’ principle while
exempting stock and domestic users. The rationale for such preferred resource
allocation and wealth distribution is from the hierarchical belief that fair distribution
in society is ranked by a need for solidarity and maintenance of the system (Ney &
Thompson, 2011) by “sacrificing a few for the good of the whole” (Douglas &
Wildavsky, 1982, p. 101).
It is important to note that hierarchy institutions take normative values such as
humanity and ethics into consideration with their water levy proposal for the
common/public good (Williams, 1992). According to Funnell (2003, p. 107),
governments of Westminster traditions are said to be accountable to parliament and
the people for “governing in the best interests of all citizens according to accepted
conventions or legally prescribed processes”. The hierarchy institutions’ water levy
proposal, therefore, incorporates a social value base influenced by social needs and
perception of doing the right thing (Ball & Grubnic, 2007). From the logological
analysis, since it is the “nobility”’s obligation to “make a conceited genuine effort to
shelter those at the bottom from the vagaries of life” (Ney & Thompson, 2011, p. 66),
the SAALNRM Board proposes to increase the water levy on industrial users to
assist the vulnerable stock and domestic sectors. This proposed water levy policy
will redistribute or reallocate a part of the wealth from mining industry for the
management of GAB. Hierarchical risk assumptions of the cause of ecological crisis,
view of justice and fairness and properties of desired system therefore legitimate the
SAALNRM Board’s water levy charging rules/policy.
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In grammatical analysis, to respond to the ACCC and the SAALNRM Board’s plan
to raise more funds for water planning and management activities, the MCA and the
BHP OD as market institutions perceive this proposed government policy as “much
ado about nothing” (Ney & Thompson, 2011, p. 47). It is because market institutions
do not take into account the existence of social and environmental costs (Freedman
& Stagliano, 1990; Lehman, 1996), and restrict social relations to economic terms
(Messner, 2009; Roberts, 1991). In this case, the MCA views the increased water
levy proposal on industrial users as inaccurate and a misguided economic policy
which serves as a major “obstacle” to sustainable development (Thompson & Rayner,
1998, p. 299). It argues that the minerals industry is a small and responsible water
user who has already borne the costs of water planning and management activities
through the States’ regulatory instruments and voluntary initiatives. From a market
institution perspective, this ‘unequal’ water levy would bring disastrous economic
and social consequences, as it is considered as a “disincentive” (Thompson &
Rayner, 1998, p. 299) to efficient water-using behaviour. Evidently, market
institutions portray humans as economic subjects pursuing self-interests through
motivations and rationales such as individualism, utilitarianism and instrumental
value of good (Arrington & Francis, 1993; Messner, 2009; Roberts, 1991; Shearer,
2002). This identity is characterised by a laissez-faire attitude that emphasises
individual autonomy and the resultant freedom with respect to their needs and wants
(Ney & Thompson, 2011; Schwarz & Thompson, 1990).
As such, the MCA advocates an equal water levy for all water users to support the
objectives of a competitive and economically efficient market (Ney & Thompson,
2011). The intended economic consequence, arising from such an equal water levy,
is that the mining industry is not requested to cover the cost of water planning and
management activities for those from less productive water using sectors such as
stock and domestic users. According to the logological analysis, the underlying
rationale for this market institutions’ preferred wealth distribution, or resource
allocation, arises from the market institutions’ faith in a ‘free market’ and the fittest
survive principle (Douglas & Wildavsky, 1982; Hines, 1989).
As explained by Hines (1989), when markets are implicitly assumed to be occurring
naturally, the demand-supply-price mechanism is considered as objective and value
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free. Financial accounting and reporting practices, from this perspective,
communicate the cost and price as emerging from this “impersonal” mechanism
(Hines, 1989, p. 62). Following this argument, any government intervention in the
free market play is considered as “unwarranted” unless such an intervention is
consistent with the principle of an efficient market (Hines, 1989, p. 62). Moreover, it
is assumed the most ‘efficient’ or ‘fittest’ firms are the “most profitable in financial
accounting terms” since markets are arbitrated by an ‘invisible hand’ of market
forces in terms of free competition (Hines, 1989, p. 64).
It is important to note that these are positive assumptions that market institutions
take into consideration in their equal water levy proposal. The hierarchical
suggestion of “nobility”’s obligation (Ney & Thompson, 2011, p. 66) and the need
for free market control (Ney & Thompson, 2011), from market institutions’
perspective, if incorporated, could hinder the development of a competitive and free
market, and therefore should be excluded. It is notable here that market institutions
assume common/public goods as the outcome of the free exchange that can be
achieved by the pursuit of private interests (Benston, 1982). The issue that the
interest of shareholders does not necessarily serve the collective or common good of
the wider community is not visible (Shearer, 2002).
Therefore, these ‘positivist’ assumptions affect mainstream accounting’s “ability to
ask ethical questions about itself…by depriving its language of ethical meaning”
(Williams, 1992, p. 104). Mainstream accounting practices, when considered as
neutral and value-free, measure “efficiency”, “productivity” and “profitability” and
only these properties are considered as “real” (Hines, 1989, p. 65). Others, such as
GAB water conservation, the equal right to access of water, and a strongly bonded
democratic society, are given little or no recognition and therefore are not realised.
According to Schweiker (1993) and Shearer (2002), this managerial accountability
serves to negate the very obligation to broader social and environmental distributive
justice, as it does not account for costs beyond a monetary value. Market institutions
are loathe to accommodate the proposed water levy from hierarchy institutions and
take responsibility for other individual failures (Douglas & Wildavsky, 1982) such
as covering the cost of water planning and management activities for those from less
productive water using sectors.
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It is notable that in this case, the market and hierarchy institutions are divided on this
issue, which provides an opportunity for the border to gain traction for influencing
the decision-making of the centre. Border institutions, according to the grammatical
analysis, believe that BHP OD’s current free GAB water intake for its mining
operation is a symptom of a wider social ill and imbalance (Ney & Thompson, 2011).
This social imbalance is manifested through legal exemptions that are granted to
BHP OD under the Indenture Act (1982). This moral defect arises from the
alignment of managerial accountability and administrative accountability. From a
border institutions’ perspective, while managerial accountability has an overriding
focus on the individual and profitability (Schweiker, 1993; Shearer, 2002),
administrative accountability is vested in agreed procedures and rules supported by
regulatory coercion (Puxty et al., 1987) which is concerned with political
pragmatism and acceptance more than social and environmental equity and justice
(Tinker et al., 1991).
Such a moral defect has brought: detrimental social and environmental consequences
in terms of BHP OD’s unfair and undemocratic consultation with Aboriginal groups;
BHP OD’s unjust and unequal legal privileges over other miners and developers; and,
the depletion of the GAB water resource. From the border institutions’ perspective,
managerial accountability at large, and administrative accountability to some extent,
reflect “a sense of self as solidary and singular with no necessary connection to
others” (Roberts, 1991, p. 358). They are unlikely to rectify social ills fundamentally
caused by “waste, exploitation, extravagance, disadvantage or coercion” (Tinker et
al., 1991, p. 29). In the rhetorical analysis, it was shown that the allocation of the
GAB water resource in favour of market and government short-term economic
interests which has been arranged under the Indenture Act (1982) will never resolve
the GAB water-related environmental problems unless the social ill in terms of
humanity and equality are addressed (Ney & Thompson, 2011; Thompson et al.,
1990).
Border institutions therefore call for the relinquishment of the legal exemptions for
BHP OD under the Indenture Act (1982) for ODEP. More specifically, border
institutions urge the South Australian government to charge and eventually phase out
BHP OD’s GAB water extraction. Resource allocation and wealth distribution,
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preferred by border institutions, are to relieve and eventually resolve the GAB water
crisis through “a levelling of the fundamental inequity” (Ney & Thompson, 2011, p.
37) between BHP OD and the Aboriginal community and between BHP OD and
other miners and developers. The rationale underpinning such intended economic
(social and environmental) consequences is from the sectarian bias towards a
voluntaristic and egalitarian life-style (Thompson et al., 1990, p. 62) without
“exploitative value” and “dehumanised relationships” (Douglas & Wildavsky, 1982,
p. 135).
Border institutions as such hold a wider concept of accountability. This form of
accountability can be termed ‘moral accountability’ which is a fundamental and
more encompassing form of accountability to cover the ethical requirement of
accountability to the other (Messner, 2009; Shearer, 2002). As Robert’s (1991, p.
358) asserts, moral accountability can enact “a sense of self which whilst
individually

confirming

simultaneously

acknowledges

and

expresses

the

interdependence of self and others”.
According to the logological analysis, it is this “moral defect” (Douglas &
Wildavsky, 1982, p. 36) of the capitalist social order within which mainstream
accounting practices are embedded that fails to challenge the root cause of
environmental problems (Beder, 1997; Gray, 1992; Jones, 2010). From the border
institutions’ perspective, managerial and administrative accountability from centre
institution is “a self-referential exercise” (Shearer, 2002, p. 559) which justify one’s
actions for one’s own sake (Messner, 2009) and constructs social relations in a way
that the moral obligation to others tend to be diminished if not silenced (Shearer,
2002).
Border institutions’ proposed water charge and eventual aim of phasing out BHP
OD’s GAB water extraction, will first redistribute or reallocate part of the wealth
from the mining industry for GAB water management, then relocate the GAB water
resource to Aboriginal people, other miners and developers. As such, border
institutions’ risk assumptions of the cause of ecological crisis and justice and
fairness legitimate their preferred water levy charging policy and eventual aim of
phasing out BHP OD’s GAB water use.
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This proposed policy incorporates a (more radical) ethical dimension, as it is the
“human goodness and the supreme value of the individual” that border institutions
advocate (Douglas & Wildavsky, 1982, p. 177), in their attempt to “avert disaster to
humanity” for restoration of a democratic society (Hines, 1989, p. 65). Moral
accountability therefore, requires an identity answerable to wider social interests and
it encompasses wider scope of common/public good, apart from the private good
(Schweiker, 1993).
According to Solomons (1983, p. 108), the desirability of public policy “can only be
evaluated in a normative model with a full set of assumptions”. More specifically,
economic consequences arguments arising from the proposed policy or standard are
often based on certain assumptions including a posited criteria of what counts as
goodness (Solomons, 1983). Cultural risk theory, by suggesting assumptions such as
the cause of ecological crisis, view of justice and fairness and properties of desired
system are shaped by institutional beliefs and interests, provides us with a critical
lens to analyse the water levy debate with its related economic (and social)
consequences arguments, and the further implications for accounting practices. In
this theme, the market institution - the MCA and BHP OD’s assumptions of the
cause of ecological crisis, view of justice and fairness and properties of desired
system have conferred institutional legitimacy on the positive economic
consequences arguments for an equal water levy. Hierarchy institutions - the ACCC
and the SAALNRM Board and sectarians from border institutions, by challenging
those taken-for granted assumptions, albeit to a different extent, provide us with the
opportunity to reconsider the ‘positive’ economic (and social) consequences and its
implication for mainstream accounting to perpetuate ecological degradation and
social inequity.
9.5

Summary

This chapter analysed the institutional debate of the GAB water risk through
contested disclosures among market institutions - BHP and BHP OD, hierarchy
institutions - Australian Federal and South Australian governments and border
institutions - civil society, using three major concepts from cultural risk theory, with
the application of Burkean rhetorical criticism. From this analysis, different
institutional perspectives with respect to the cause of the GAB water sustainability
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related risk, view of justice and fairness, and property of desired system and their
implications for accounting concept of economic consequences and related
accountability were described and discussed. This chapter also provided insights to
facilitate and justify government intervention in financial accounting and reporting
practices in the era of looming environmental crisis. These different institutional
positions in the GAB water risk debate drives different concepts of value presented
in the concluding chapter.

252

CHAPTER 10 CONCLUSION
This thesis investigates the contested domains concerning Great Artesian Basin
(GAB) water governance and GAB water risks from BHP Billiton Olympic Dam
Corporation Pty Ltd (BHP OD)’s mining operation. It examines the culturally
constructed meanings of GAB risk by collating and analysing accounts and
juxtaposing three sets of risk perspectives from industry, government and civil
society. These different perspectives are manifested through mandatory and
voluntary water accounting disclosures and policy debates from BHP, BHP OD, and
its representative Minerals Council of Australia (MCA); the GAB water regulatory
policy and proposals from the Australian Federal government and South Australian
government; and alternative disclosures from civil society including NonGovernment Organisations (NGOs) (radical), environmentalists and Aboriginal
groups.
The context of this study is salient as it is concerned with the politicised control of
the Australia’s largest groundwater resource-the GAB against the backdrop of water
scarcity and the complex nature of the water governance issue. Such complexity,
according to James et al. (2012) is a result of how water is perceived and valued by
different socio-cultural institutions. This thesis explored the procedural, technoscientific and economic rationality of the industry and government and contrasted
this with the social and environmental concerns from civil society to address the
following question:
How do disclosures of perceived risk impact on assumptions of accounting and
accountability provided by industry, government and civil society in the case of
contested water sustainability of the GAB?
This thesis delved into the fraught terrain of accounting and associated issues of
accountability. It conceives mainstream accounting as an authoritative and
monologic discourse through which power is exercised and capitalist assumptions
are imposed (Brown, 2009). Giving voice to alternative views and interests from
socio-political constituencies other than those from industry and sometimes the
government, this thesis aligns with a stream of ‘counter-accounting’ studies (Archel
et al., 2009; Boyce, 2000; Gallhofer et al., 2006; O'Sullivan & O'Dwyer, 2009) to
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highlight the political struggles and social conflicts inscribed within the fundamental
contradiction and exploitative dimensions of capitalist system.
This thesis adopted a cultural risk perspective as a methodology which emphasises
risk discourse from a social constructivist aspect and perceives the recognition and
assessment of risk as an inherent socio-political activity infused with the
(re)production of shared meaning and understanding of reality (Horlick-Jones &
Sime, 2004). According to Head (2010, p. 10), contemporary water governance
policies tend to be dominated by managerial efficiency and bureaucratic and
authoritative procedures. These decontextualised and reductionist approaches in
discipline-based risk research are found to be insufficient to understand the entire
risk profile related to water resource issues (Baleta, 2012; Horlick-Jones & Sime,
2004). A cultural risk perspective perceives risk as transdisciplinary, culturally
nuanced, and focuses on the institutionally constructed nature of the conceptual
debate on risk and sustainability issues (Lupton, 1999). It facilitates a dialogic and
participatory approach to the GAB water governance to promote transparency and
democracy.
Consistent with a social constructivist methodology, the analysis used an approach
that uncovered contradictions and gaps between corporate perspectives and
stakeholders’ perspectives. Burkean rhetorical criticism was adopted as a mode of
inquiry. Consisting of a three levelled approach - the grammar, rhetoric and logology
analysis - Burkean rhetorical criticism (Stillar, 1998) identifies and interprets
features, functions and implications of discursive practices or discourses. It is based
on the underlying assumption that rhetoric is one of the symbols to constitute the
world to influence others to achieve social unity (Burke, 1950, 1966, 1969). This
thesis examined how rhetoric is used by BHP, BHP OD, the Australian Federal and
South Australian government and civil society through contested accountability
disclosures.
To advance social and environmental approaches to accounting, this thesis was
informed by a cultural risk theory (Douglas, 1970; Douglas & Wildavsky, 1982)
that defines problems from three heterogeneous institutions - market, hierarchy and
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border institutions. Applying Burkean rhetoric criticism with cultural risk theory
informed the major sustainability related assumptions of the three institutions.
In Chapter 7, the three major concepts from cultural risk theory-preferred learning
style (grammatical analysis for discursive features), view of nature (rhetorical
analysis for discursive functions) and property of knowledge ideal (logological
analysis for discursive implications) were used to analyse market - BHP and BHP
OD, hierarchy - Australian Federal and South Australian governments and border
institutions’ - civil societies’ perspectives manifest in their discourse in the context
of GAB water-related risks. This three-level analysis had implications for an
understanding of the accounting concept of control regarding natural resources from
both mainstream and critical perspectives. In the grammatical analysis, centre
(market and hierarchy) institutions trust expert knowledge and use scientific research
to understand the rechargeability of the GAB, determine its water balance and
implement modelling studies subject to evolving learning process. On the other hand,
border institutions believe that the centre institutions’ assumption of rechargeability
is flawed and BHP OD’s modelling studies are faulty due to simplistic models and
limited data. These different assumptions about a preferred learning style underpin
mainstream and critical perspectives of the accounting concept of control of water
resources. In this case, market institutions believe that GAB water extraction does
not entail a ‘liability’ as the potential risk for water extraction is uncertain. This
perspective is sanctioned by hierarchy institutions - the South Australian government.
Border institutions - civil society, on the other hand, contend that BHP OD has
responsibility for environmental damage, such as declined spring flow.
In the rhetorical analysis, centre institutions believe that the current GAB water
extraction from BHP OD is within ‘sustainable yield’. Border institutions believe
that GAB is a fragile and non-rechargeable water resource. These different
assumptions, regarding the view of nature, give rise to an understanding of the
accounting concept of control. In this case, the market institutions - BHP and BHP
OD do not recognise the GAB water intake for BHP OD’s mining operation as an
asset in the financial report because a hierarchy institution - South Australian
government grants it the water licence without charge. This ‘asset’ is unmeasurable
therefore unidentifiable in monetary terms. Border institutions, on the other hand,
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insist on the recognition and presentation of the obligation that BHP OD has towards
the GAB water extraction related risk.
In the logological analysis, centre institutions silence contradictory scientific studies
about the likelihood of the non-rechargeability of the GAB and ignore the moral and
ethical dimensions to achieve procedural validity and the objectivity underlying a
scientific method. Border institutions assert that the centre institutions’ knowledge
ideal is limited and incomplete and unethical due to the wilful ignorance of counter
scientific inquiries in the pursuit of economic self-interest. In this case, the centre
supports an accounting system which serves to overuse non-renewable resources by
downplaying ecological impacts. Border institutions, on the other hand, support
recognition of GAB water extraction related risks as a (contingent) liability to be
recognised in BHP OD’s financial reports and mandated by South Australian
government.
This analysis revealed different styles of accountability perceived by three
institutions. Market and hierarchy institutions use managerial and administrative
accountability that focuses on the techno-scientific dimensions of accountability that
neglects the full social and environmental cost of water use. Border institutions, in
contrast, adopt moral accountability and acknowledge a relationship of obligation to
the other which cannot be discharged by mere reference to scientific reasoning and
economic interest.
In Chapter 8 the three major concepts from cultural risk theory-attitude towards
technology (grammatical analysis for discursive features), view of risk (rhetorical
analysis for discursive functions) and resolution of risk (logological analysis for
discursive implications) were used to understand the accounting concept of
stewardship.
In the grammatical analysis, while centre institutions construct and objectify GAB
water risks through water-efficiency technology to control the uncertainty of water
sustainability, border institutions believe that water efficiency related technology
focuses on techno-economic facets, neglecting the moral and environmental
dimensions of the GAB water risks. In this case, water efficiency related
technologies are perceived by centre institutions as those having responsibility or
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stewardship discharging function in respect of their financial, social and
environmental responsibility. Border institutions, on the other hand, believe that a
technological solution does not satisfy the discharge of environmental responsibility.
In the rhetorical analysis, centre institutions possess dual objectives of economic
growth and water protection with the intention of turning risks into opportunities.
Border institutions believe that the risk to the ecosystem from BHP OD’s mining
operation is irreversible. In this case, centre institutions believe that the general
fulfilment of managerial stewardship is reflected in the South Australian government
and BHP OD’s objectives for both mining development and GAB water
conservation. Border institutions, on the other hand, assert that the South Australian
government’s water governance regime and BHP OD’s water efficiency program
will not fulfil managerial stewardship regarding environmental responsibility unless
radical change occurs.
In the logological analysis, centre institutions have imperialist tendencies and see the
Olympic Dam Expansion Project (ODEP) as the best operational solution to
sustainable development in general by excluding the long-term value and risks from
their risk resolution. Border institutions, in contrast, do not construct economic
expansion as an environmental solution. From their perspective, the ODEP in
general and the water efficiency related technology in particular imply the promise
of the satisfaction of endless wants for capitalist interests without satisfying real
human needs. In this case, the continuous improvement of the water efficiency
indicator legitimates managerial stewardship of BHP OD for its extant mining
operation and the proposed ODEP. Centre institutions treat the social and
environmental aspects as less important. Border institutions, on the other hand,
believe that social and environmental responsibility can only be discharged by
ceasing GAB water intake to recover earlier damage and depletion..
This three level analysis revealed different styles of accountability assumed by the
three institutions. Market and hierarchy institutions assume managerial and
administrative accountability that focuses on procedural and technical dimensions of
accountability by treating GAB water reserves as an economic good and objectifying
it for efficiency and profit maximisation. Border institutions, on the contrary, adopt
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moral accountability that requires acknowledgement of relations to others which
necessitates mutual understanding and political participation.
In Chapter 9, the three major concepts from cultural risk theory - the cause of
ecological crisis (grammatical analysis for discursive features), view of justice and
fairness (rhetorical analysis for discursive functions), and properties of desired
system (logological analysis for discursive implications) was used to understand the
accounting concept of ‘economic consequences’.
In the grammatical analysis, hierarchy institutions plan and organise water planning
and management activities to control market forces and prevent water resource
degradation, such as the NRM water levy to fund activities. Market institutions
perceive this proposed water levy as an inaccurate and misguided economic policy
serving as a major obstacle to ongoing sustainable development. Border institutions,
on the other hand, believe that the free and over extraction of the GAB for mining
operations is a symptom of a wider social imbalance. The allocation of the GAB
water resource in favour of market and government short-term economic interests
reflects wider social issues in terms of humanity and equality. The water levy
proposed by hierarchy institutions to restrict mining activities by realigning private,
social and environmental costs to remedy the problem of externalities, is perceived
by the market as ‘unequal’ and will bring disastrous economic and social
consequences, since it is a ‘disincentive’ to efficient water use. Border institutions,
on the other hand, assert that the wider social ills and imbalance manifested through
legal exemptions granted to BHP OD brings detrimental social and environmental
consequences.
In the rhetorical analysis, hierarchy institutions believe a fair distribution is
reinforced by the need for solidarity and maintenance of the system. A water levy is
proposed on industrial users because of ‘the capacity to pay’ principle. Market
institutions believe that fair play resides in an unfettered market. Subsequently, the
mining industry should not be required to pay the proposed water levy due to its
investment in water planning and management services through regulatory and
voluntary initiatives. Border institutions, on the other hand, favour a voluntaristic
and egalitarian approach. They believe that the current inegalitarian social system is
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manifest in the unjust and unequal legal privilege that BHP OD is entitled. Further,
this ‘dehumanised’ relationship needs to be phased out to protect the GAB water
resource and related communities. These different assumptions of justice and
fairness give rise to the accounting concept of economic consequences. In this case,
while hierarchy institutions take normative values such as humanity and ethics into
consideration in its proposal of an unequal water levy for the common/public good,
market institutions take positive assumptions into account for an equal water levy
proposal and assume the common/public good as the outcome of the free exchange
that can be achieved by the pursuit of private interests. Border institutions, on the
other hand, incorporate (more radical) ethical dimensions into account.
In the logological analysis, hierarchy institutions believe in the impossibility and
unnecessity of social equity and attempt to collect more water levy on sectors
responsible for economic value creation and reward sectors with less economic
success. Market institutions have a firm faith in a competitive free market and the
survival of the fittest principle. Therefore, they do not want to take responsibility for
cost recovery failure from those less productive water using sectors.

Border

institutions, on the other hand, contend that the legal framework for the operation
and development of ODEP points to a ‘moral defect’ of the socio-economic system.
In terms of economic consequences, hierarchy institutions propose an ‘unequal’
water levy to redistribute or reallocate a part of the wealth from the mining industry
to assist the vulnerable stock and domestic sectors in order to satisfy social needs and
a perception of doing the right thing. Market institutions advocate an equal water
levy to support the objectives of a competitive and economically efficient market.
Border institutions, on the other hand, urge charging a levy and eventual phase out of
BHP OD’s GAB water extraction for resource reallocation and wealth redistribution
for restoration of a democratic society.
This three level analysis revealed different styles of accountability. Hierarchy
institutions assume administrative accountability, which is vested in agreed
procedures and rules supported by regulatory coercion. Market institutions assume
managerial accountability which restricts social relations to economic terms and
portrays human identify as purely economic subjects pursuing self-interests. Border
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institutions, in contrast, assume a moral accountability which is a fundamental and
more encompassing form of accountability requiring an identification of the social
interest and a wider definition of common/public good.
10.1 Contribution to the accounting literature
This thesis addresses GAB water governance from different socio-cultural
institutions and the discursive significance of contested accounting and alternative
(counter-accounting) disclosures involved in the GAB water debate arising from the
BHP OD’s mining operation and the proposed expansion.
Ideological splits in respect of risk-based sustainability issues between divergent
interest groups has been keenly acknowledged by critical accounting researchers (e.g.
Brown & Dillard, 2013; Dey et al., 2011; Dillard & Brown, 2012; Spence et al.,
2010). Although the current critical SEAR studies have identified that the modern
corporate water accounting and reporting practices represent capitalist interest
perpetuating the status-quo, there is a lack of water accounting studies that explicitly
highlight the political struggles and social conflicts by including socio-political
constituencies, other than those from the industry. In other words, the current
literature on water related SEAR -practices tends to be organisational or industryfocused without engaging with the construction of social and environmental values
and positions from other perspectives, such as those from NGOs, environmental
activists and Aboriginal groups. As Spence et al., (2010) contend, this apolitical
problem of SEAR research undermines both its theoretical and practical agenda for
social change.
This thesis echoes this call and examines how BHP, BHP OD, Australian Federal
and South Australian governments and civil society perceive ‘sustainable’ water
governance in general and BHP OD’s entitlement to and management of the GAB
water in particular. It compares water accounting disclosures in the form of
mandatory and voluntary social and environmental reporting and policy debates from
industry, water regulation related disclosures from governments and juxtaposing
them with external alternative accounting disclosure from civil society. It is therefore
aligned with counter-accounting studies which give voice to alternative views and
interests and expose the fundamental contradictions and exploitative dimensions of a
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capitalist system (e.g. Archel et al., 2009; Gallhofer et al., 2006).This thesis further
interrogates three different styles of accountability (stewardship) and their
corresponding underlying value schemes through the lens of water related
accounting and alternative (counter-accounting) disclosures. Its makes a unique
contribution to the extant literature by adopting a discursive and dialogical approach
to accounting to create social and environmental visibilities, promote democratic
participation, enhance transparency in decision-making and improve accountability
(Bebbington et al., 2007; Brown, 2009; Brown & Fraser, 2006; Dillard & Brown,
2012; Gray, 1992).
10.2 Contribution to methodology and method
As Brown and Dillard (2013) propose, there is a need for a more inclusive
consideration of and approach to accounting to confront the prevalent power
asymmetries to surface and support heterodox view, voices, visions and values from
various interest groups. The methodology of a cultural risk perspective is a
transdisciplinary approach encompassing multiple worldviews to constructing
knowledge (Brown et al., 2010).
Extant water accounting studies anchor managerial and economic accountability
discourses through corporate disclosure mechanisms including mandatory and
voluntary sustainability type reports. These approaches tend to be organisationcentred rather than issue-centred, disciplinary rather than transdisciplinary,
ontological homogenous rather than diverse. They downplay institutional and social
dissents and conflicts (Brown & Dillard, 2013). By combining elements of various
methodologies from both positive and normative risk disciplines in a single approach,
a cultural risk perspective is used in this thesis to investigate ecological issues to
“develop and implement pluralistic democratic processes that can help articulate and
operationalize a progressive social and environmental agenda” (Brown & Dillard,
2013, p. 9). This evolved transdisciplinary methodology therefore brings ‘hard’
(positive and objective) and ‘soft’ (normative and judgemental) knowledge together
which “transcends ‘pure’ discipline” (Horlick-Jones & Sime, 2004, p. 444), and
seeks to deliver and enhance public participation and engagement in water resource
policy decision-making against the backdrop of water scarcity and complex water
governance in a democratic pluralist society.
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Accounting information in this thesis is conceived as discursive and rhetorical
components of a dialogue (Frame & Brown, 2008). As Fairclough (2003, p. 3)
contends, discourse is referred to as “different ways of structuring areas of
knowledge and social practice”. In this thesis, discourse is considered as a mode of
institutional and political practice. Consistent with a cultural risk perspective as
methodology, both complementary and competing discourses emanate out of
interactions between BHP OD, governments and civil society around the water
intake of BHP OD for ODEP. These different sets of discourses are linked to
different cultural and institutional risk perspectives in respect to the relationship
individuals have to nature and their social relations.
Rhetoric is the strategic technique of using discourse for persuasive effects. This
thesis examines the culturally and institutionally constructed nature of the GAB
water related risks and how it is conducted through discourse in accounting and
accountability related documents by adopting a Burkean rhetorical criticism as a
method (Stillar, 1998). With a Burkean assumption that rhetoric is one symbol to
constitute the world, gives it meaning and expresses common interests to achieve
societal unity (Burke, 1950, 1966, 1969), this method incorporates three levels of
analysis - grammar, rhetoric and logology (Stillar, 1998) to identify features,
functions and implications of discourses. By apply this Burkean rhetorical criticism
to cultural risk theory allowed the researcher to establish theoretical concepts
(Chapter 6) and provide analytical scaffolding to facilitate interpretation of the GAB
water risk debate by drawing on three institutional discursive risk practices.
10.3 Contribution to theory
This thesis adopts cultural risk theory as a transdisciplinary approach to theorise
social conflicts and dissentions and their implications for wider social engagement
and dialogue (Brown & Dillard, 2013; Spence et al., 2010; Tinker et al., 1991). By
defining problems from heterogeneous domains (Lawrence, 2010), cultural risk
theory explores the underlying assumptions of the contentious water related
disclosure and accountability discourses which manifest as the GAB water debate.
Cultural risk theory (Douglas, 1970; Douglas & Wildavsky, 1982) perceives risk as
social constructs determined by cultural rationalities and beliefs of various
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institutions within society. Risk-based sustainability policies, from this perspective,
result from a constant struggle among these participants to position their risk
perspectives on the public agenda and impose it on others (Baleta, 2012). Cultural
risk theory enables divergent interest groups, creates and enlarges institutional
spaces of potentiality through which alternatives are facilitated to emerge/surface
(Brown & Dillard, 2013). Accordingly, cultural risk theory is employed as a
‘polylogic’ theory to democratic engagement and participation with an emphasis on
socio-cultural expectations and value debates (Brown & Dillard, 2013; Horlick-Jones
& Sime, 2004; Sampford, 2009).This thesis contributes to cultural risk theory by
applying a Burkean rhetorical criticism framework to tease out major risk-based
sustainability assumptions of three (active) institutions - industry, government and
civil society, associated with features, functions and implications of each
institutional group’s risk discourse. These assumptions to demonstrate the
explanatory power of this theory for analysing contested discourses of the GAB
water related disclosure from BHP OD, governments and civil society. These
concepts which are made explicit in this thesis are preferred learning style (feature),
view of nature (function), property of knowledge ideal (implication), attitude
towards technology (feature), view of risk (function), resolution of risk (implication),
cause of ecological crisis (feature), view of justice and fairness (function), and
property of desired system (implication).
These nine concepts in turn have implications to three accounting and accountability
related themes. Preferred learning style, view of nature and property of knowledge
ideals from three institutions facilitate the understanding of the contested nature of
accounting concept of control with associated accounting recognition and
measurement rules. Institutional perceptions of attitude towards technology, view of
risk and risk resolution assist an understanding of the stewardship debate from both
mainstream and critical accounting perspectives. Institutional assumptions of the
cause of ecological crisis, view of justice and fairness and property of desired system
enable the analysis of the natured resource allocation debate with its related
economic consequences arguments, and further implication for accounting practices.
This thesis also contributes to cultural risk theory by matching three different styles
of accountability and their corresponding underlying concepts of value to market,
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hierarchy and border institutions’ risk-based sustainability assumptions. It explicates
managerial, administrative and moral accountability to enable a further
understanding of why certain risk discourse and rhetorical strategies are operated
within centre - market and hierarchy institutions and why they are resisted and
negotiated by those from border institutions with alternative accounting disclosures.
Cultural risk theory (Douglas & Wildavsky, 1982), through the recognition of the
existence of three (active) institutional solidarities, and the resultant cultural
dialogues manifest in accounting and accountability discourse, is crucial for its
significance in respect of the resolution of risk-based sustainability problems. This
thesis underlines and fosters conflictual and oppositional social groups (Brown &
Dillard, 2013). It seeks to engage heterodox socio-cultural perspectives, surface the
inevitably dissenting assumptions and values associated with accounts, and highlight
the power relations which structure dialogical opportunities. As such, understanding
of accounting is broadened from the formal organisational or institutional-centred
perspectives, to acknowledge the demand for democratic engagement between
diverse actors across various political arenas (Brown & Dillard, 2013). Cultural risk
theory therefore, helps ‘resensitise’ accounting to “its critical and pluralistic roots by
advocating a version of pluralism that is less ‘politically quiet’” (Brown & Dillard,
2013, p. 9).
10.4 Thesis limitations
The limitation of the thesis can be categorised into both scope and methodology. The
discursive practices or discourses are analysed only through public available
documents from three institutions - market (BHP, BHP OD, MCA); hierarchy (the
Australian Federal Government and South Australian government); and border
institutions (civil society). In this case, the analysis of stakeholders’ interaction
dynamics are confined to the nature of the documents collected and investigated for
each institutional perspective; and, some stakeholder group perspectives (e.g. Fatalist
solidarity) were excluded from the disclosure dynamics as a result of unavailability
of data (Rodrigue, 2014). In addition, emphasising the disclosure production
(account) and communication (rhetoric) has meant that the reception of the
disclosure was beyond the scope of the thesis and research question.
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While this study offers an in-depth understanding of micro-level information
dynamics in the accounts, it restrains the generalisability of findings and conclusions
(Rodrigue, 2014) from a broader context. This meso-level of analysis, is also
incapable of addressing all the complexity and anomalies of pluralist and competing
interests involved in the GAB water governance regarding BHP OD’s water intake
for its mining operation or the macro-level context such as global capital.
10.5 Future research
There are some potentially fruitful areas for future research arising from this thesis.
The case of the GAB water debate arising from BHP OD’s mining operation plays a
pivotal role for understanding the water problems with contested water governance
paradigms. To address the thesis limitation, other forms of discourse such as
interviews could be conducted by the researcher with representatives from BHP,
BHP OD, the Federal Australian government and South Australian government, the
NGOs, radical environmentalists and Aboriginal groups.
Additionally, on a macro level, this approach together with cultural risk theory as a
‘polylogic’ framework can be applied to other political debates of water such as
those from Great Artesian Basin Strategic Management Plan and the National Water
Initiative (NWI) more broadly. On a meso or micro-level, it can be duplicated to
other specific water dialogue or discussions for example coal seam gas mining in the
Murray-Darling Basin.
Apart from the water context, there are also opportunities to research other types of
environmental issues including air and soil pollution and how these issues are
politicalised and negotiated by different socio-cultural institutions within society.
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APPENDIX A An Example of differences between grammatical and rhetorical
analysis
Stillar (1998) exemplifies differences between grammar and rhetoric through an
illustration of texts on a ‘Ancient Grains’ cereal box.

Source: Stillar (1998, p.71)
‘Too Good to be True” is the name for a series of low-calorie breakfast cereal
manufactured by the President’s Choice product line (Stillar, 1998).
There are two sections of text for the side panel. The first consists of a sentence
stressing the importance of these grains, while the second makes a list of four types
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of grains with a precise description with respect to their history. The first section
(cereal manufacturer as agent) advocates the consumption of the cereal (the act) to
preserve on-going cultivation (the purpose) (Stillar, 1998).
The second section characterises grains as agents that possess noteworthy attributes
that derive from their ancient geographical origins. This scene constructs the grains
as mysterious and powerful as a result of their origin and characteristics (Stillar,
1998).
These grammatical resources (act, purpose, agents, agency and scene) provide
structures and features of symbolic action. The grammatical analysis is concerned
with making replicable and explicit statements with regards to the use of combined
language units and operates with a consistent and coherent set of terms to derive a
descriptive analysis.
The grammar resources form a basis for a rhetorical act. Rhetorical analysis focuses
on an overriding function of language as symbolic action. Identification here is
dependent on consubstantiality - sharing substance, in literal and symbolic terms.
This rhetorical act aims to persuade, invite and unite the reader to consume the cereal
to become a part of Ancient Grains consumer congregation literally and a part of
‘ancient’ grains preserving congregation symbolically (Stillar, 1998).
The rhetorical act embedded in the text therefore seeks to build a unity of addressees
sharing interest and having a stake in conservational-characterised hierarchical social
order (those who consume ‘ancient’ grains and those who do not; those who are
insiders and those who are outsiders; those who are up compared to those down).
What is constituted as ‘ancient’ and ‘exotic’ in terms of history and culture is
presumed to be superior to those contemporary and commonplace grains; and
addressees those who ‘connect’ themselves with ‘ancient’ grains as presupposed to
be more environmentally, culturally conscientious and health conscious than those
who do not (Stillar, 1998).
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Appendix B Balance Scorecard (BSC) Information Technology in BHP OD’s
Sustainable Water Management
BSC (target setting and development of performance drivers) is an information
technique used in the GAB water management. In order to control any of the water
variables, a “meaningful target” needs to be set. However, because of the complex
nature of the interlinked unit operations and the special water quality needs for each
unit, determining a meaningful target is not straightforward. Apart from that, there
are also other difficulties of setting the target. For example, traditional metrics such
as water consumption per day might be appropriate for a long-term planning, but it is
not appropriate for shorter frame such as daily and weekly which is necessary for
feedback regarding operation. In addition, the target setting can be complex for water
use as relation between water usage and mineral production is not linear due to, for
example, seasonal or emergency reasons (Torrisi & Trotta, 2009).
For such meaningful targets to be set, activities such as consulting with operational
personnel, reviewing the instrumentation and process diagram, inspecting plant,
measuring water flows manually and statistically analysing historical measured
flows were conducted to understand water consumption drivers at Olympic Dam.
The climate and production drivers are obtained for some 91 water consumption
points across the operation and a model to predict the water consumption of each
point was developed. Key water consumption drivers on a daily basis were found.
They are flotation tailings thickener underflow density, mill throughput, copper
concentrate produced from rotation, Smelter anode production, smelter feed rate,
acid production, relative humidity and ambient temperature (Torrisi & Trotta, 2009).
The approach for setting targets is practical and time efficient. Instead of using
theoretical principle for water consumption and identifying the basic demand for
water by each operational unit, majority of targets were simply set on the basis of
historical use excluding those from random events. It is believed that targets on
historical data provide more realistic predictions. The application of various water
consumption models to planned production on daily basis helps to calculate daily
water targets for consumption in terms of individual streams. This allows collective
targets for unit operations to be made. It also helps to forecast future water demand
from “a strategic and budgeting perspective” (Torrisi & Trotta, 2009, p.198).
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BSC (performance measures)
The GAB water use is metered at various locations to obtain the balance between
overall extraction and operational and domestic (Roxby Down) usage. The volume
of extracted water from all production bores at the wellfields and the volume
delivered to BHP OD site were recorded by flow meters. The majority of them are
magnetic tube meters and approximately 90 percent of GAB use is explainable using
those meters (Torrisi & Trotta, 2009).
There is a daily water supply balance through which the daily water demand can be
determined. Volume balancing for water supplied, water demanded and net storage
changes is achieved using ‘Production Balance by Honeywell’ - a “specially
designed and configured software”(Torrisi & Trotta, 2009, p.198). Data collection is
almost automated and daily data are automatically retrieved through flow meters
connected to “the Ethernet PLC process control system and attached data acquisition
system”. They are then totalised and fed into the Production Balance of the software.
According to Torrisi and Trotta (2009, p.198), such information is “invaluable to the
operations and management teams by allowing real time decision making to reduce
operating costs by minimising the water demand by the unit operations.”
BSC (water consumption and variance analysis)
According to Torrisi and Trotta (2009, p.199), data of water consumption are
presented on BHP OD’s intranet using database of Production Information
Management System (PIMS) to track actual water usage against the target. Data are
available for various time frames ranging from individual streams and site totals and
expressed in both efficiency and volumetric basis. Traffic lights are used in the
report to indicate whether the actual water consumption is above, below or close to
the target. Such a report is discussed at integrated management meetings daily,
weekly and monthly. Regarding analysing the variance, the water usage variance for
operation of individual unit is analysed in integrated management reporting by
volume variances and efficiency variances (more details see section 6.2.2) (Torrisi &
Trotta, 2009).
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BSC (rectification of variance)
According to Torrisi and Trotta (2009), improved operating discipline leads to the
achievement in water use efficiency. Operating discipline is defined by Olympic
Dam as “the adherence to operating procedures for the prevention and timely
rectification of safety, environmental and production variance.” Within Olympic
Dam, many of unit operations are “ISO 9001 and ISO 14001 Quality systems
certified with extensive controls in place to ensure compliance” (Torrisi & Trotta,
2009, p.202).
Torrisi and Trotta (2009) give an example of recycling water recovered from Smelter
Concentrate Filtration to Grinding. There are occasions such as during a shutdown,
the water cannot be accepted at Grinding and therefore must be disposed in the
tailings storage facility. In this situation, water losses approximately equals to 2
ML/d. Such loss was quite frequent and often unnecessarily occurs because of poor
planning, little operational discipline and a lack of communication between
departments of production. Changes have been made to a situation where production
departments work closely to ensure water is recycled and a plan for shutdowns.
Moreover, some manual valves to divert the water to disposals are “locked closed to
allow control over their operation” by the coordinator of the concentrator production.
The disposal water is now “limited to an absolute last resort” (Torrisi & Trotta, 2009,
p.203).
BSC (Learning + Development)
The BSC approach also incorporates an aspect of learning and development to
facilitate improved water consumption efficiency. According to Torrisi and Trotta
(2009, p.202), the accountability for sustainable GAB water management is
maintained “throughout the organisation from the President Uranium through to
Technicians who have hour to hour control of the water demanded by the operation”.
The position description of every employee demonstrates “responsibilities for
achieving Zero Harm to the environment through the sustainable use of water in
recognition of the supply from the GAB” (Torrisi & Trotta, 2009, p.202).
Water budgets are set for major operational sections (BHP Billiton Olympic Dam
Corporation Pty Ltd., 2008b, p.7), and water issues including water demand are
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discussed at production meetings on a daily and weekly basis. Key water
consumption drivers are represented graphically for awareness and education
purposes (Torrisi & Trotta, 2009). In order to align organisation behaviour to
sustainable GAB water extraction and usage, water key performance indicators are
included in BHP OD’s Reward and Recognition Scheme. It includes a proportion of
the reward for employees for achieving water efficiency targets quarterly and
annually. To further reinforce appropriate water use behaviour by management and
supervisory teams, water consumed by each production department is “internally
priced and charged to the end user by the infrastructure Department”. Such priced
water encourages managers to “drive water efficiencies and hence lower reportable
operating expenditure for their area” (Torrisi & Trotta, 2009, p.202). In addition,
BHP OD also establishes a water steering committee “with representatives from all
departments, to ensure a coordinated approach to…water management across site”
(BHP Billiton Olympic Dam Corporation Pty Ltd., 2011b, p.2).
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